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Abstract
In the late 1990s, the internet was heralded as a global opportunity for new 
ventures. One aspect of this opportunity was the innovation of including small 
firms and consumers in seamless ‘business webs.’ The second aspect was the 
distance insensitivity and intemationality of the internet.
New ventures appeared in different countries responding to this seemingly 
global opportunity. In Germany, this response appeared especially strong 
against the background of years of slow development of the domestic 
information technology (IT) sector.
This thesis examines the role of national government policy in a world being 
transformed by technology. ‘Network thinkers,’ following Schumpeter’s 
concept of ‘creative destruction,’ believed the internet represented a global 
innovation opportunity. They emphasised the independence and self-governance 
of globally networked market players, arguing that the territorial basis of 
national government policy has eroded. The problematique guiding this research 
effort has emerged from this thinking. Can the concepts associated with network 
thinking account for the apparently strong entrepreneurial response to the 
internet in Germany?
A detailed study of the development of internet ventures in Germany was 
carried out to examine this guiding question. The study was supported by 
quantitative data supplied through a 123-firm survey conducted in the Spring of 
1998. This research revealed that the entrepreneurial response in Germany was 
much weaker than it appeared to contemporary observers. New ventures had to 
adopt a ‘mixed-play’ approach which placed them on a less innovative and less 
international, slower growth trajectory.
Two key policy arenas were identified which constrained the development of 
German internet ventures: (1) The course of telecommunications liberalisation 
and (2) the initial lack of venture capital. Practitioners have long been aware of 
the importance of these two determinants for internet development. The main 
contribution of this thesis has been to add to the understanding of how these two 
factors have operated in a national environment conditioned by distinctive 
institutions.
2
Table of Contents
Abstract............................................................................................. 2
Table of Contents............................................................................. 3
Figures.............................................................................................. 6
Acknowledgements..........................................................................8
1. Continuity or Rupture -  Interpreting the German 
Internet “Wunder” ............................................................. 9
Global opportunity...........................................................................................14
Structures and agents: Institutionalist theory..............................................19
Institutionalism versus network thinking....................................................23
Refraction..........................................................................................................26
Three domestic agents and two policy arenas............................................29
The case for Germany.................................................................................... 33
Company focus and empirical research...................................................... 35
Chapter breakdown.........................................................................................37
Was it merely ‘irrational exuberance?’ ....................................................... 39
Part I -  Global Opportunity
2. Explaining the Global Growth of the Internet...............42
An overview o f internet "take-off'..............................................................44
Rise in transnational demand for internet services.................................... 54
Entrepreneurial activity and supply boom ..................................................65
The role o f the USA: Multilateral or bilateral flows?.............................. 73
3. Regulation and the Death of Distance.......................... 76
Differences in the regulation o f international data and
telecommunications networks.......................................................................79
The subsidised U.S. internet acts as a global hub..................................... 83
Intentional lack o f regulation in other areas............................................... 86
The issue o f technological standards............................................................94
The debate on small firm innovation and regulation.................................98
International policy convergence: The lesson from financial
services............................................................................................................102
Conclusion......................................................................................................106
Part II -  National Political Economy
4. Policy Shifts and Political Compromise in the
Kohl Era..........................................................................110
The German economy: Impact o f unification and social programs.... 114
Policy-making in Germany..........................................................................119
Preamble one: The national videotex debacle.......................................... 124
Preamble two: The research network debacle.......................................... 126
Taking the long road to telecommunications liberalisation.................. 128
Multimedia legislation: The "Rechtsstaat" offers its services............... 139
Promoting the "garage entrepreneur".........................................................146
Conclusion: The access sacrifice................................................................152
5. Deutsche Telekom and Internet Access in
Germany........................................................................ 156
The global cost challenge and the telecommunications industry 159
Deutsche Telekom in the cost trap............................................................. 164
Infrastructure challenges faced by Deutsche Telekom........................... 173
German cable TV: Left to stagnate?..........................................................177
The renaissance o f T-Online....................................................................... 180
Deutsche Telekom: "A bad loser?” ............................................................ 187
Telecommunications infrastructure investment and capital
markets............................................................................................................ 189
Conclusion......................................................................................................196
6. Survey of Internet Entrepreneurship in Germany 200
Introducing the typical German internet start-up....................................202
Start-up funding and the "balancing act"................................................. 204
Slow internationalisation............................................................................ 208
Unbalanced demand for internet services................................................ 210
Technology enthusiasts and management know-how............................ 212
Wrong country, wrong tim e........................................................................216
7. Internationalisation of Internet Start-ups from
Four European Countries.............................................219
Europe in trouble...........................................................................................223
Domestic internet demand structures in Europe.....................................228
Telecommunications liberalisation across Europe and internet
access prices..................................................................................................231
The European venture capital bottleneck................................................. 239
Further relevant policy areas.......................................................................248
The internet start-up experience in four European countries............... 250
Why Sweden?............................................................................................... 259
4
Conclusion: The Power of National Governments 264
Refraction revisited...................................................................................... 265
Summary o f Part I- Global Opportunity.................................................. 270
Summary o f Part II- National Political Economy...................................272
Comparing innovative activity................................................................... 276
Future directions o f research.......................................................................280
The power o f national governments.......................................................... 282
Appendix A: Procedure and Results of the 
Globalstartup Survey....................................................288
Procedure....................................................................................................... 288
Firm taxonomy details.................................................................................290
Main survey results...................................................................................... 293
30 selected German internet start-ups.......................................................308
Selected images from the globalstartup survey....................................... 314
Appendix B: Interviews.................................................319
Interviews with representatives o f private enterprises...........................319
Interviews with parliamentarians, their staff, government officials
and representatives o f private/ public institutions...................................323
International interview partners................................................................. 325
Appendix C: Selected financial figures for 
International telecommunications operators.............327
Appendix D: Internet advertising expenditures
and the number of internet users by country.............331
Bibliography 332
Figures
One Differences in network thinking and
institutionalist views....................................................... 25
Two Revenue growth of SAP A G ...........................................47
Growth of internet host computers............................... 52
Commercial versus educational host
computer growth............................................................. 54
International presence of the three most important 
internet search services.................................................. 68
Growth in venture capital investments USA................72
Four Investments by the tbg compared to total venture
capital investments in technology in Germany 149
Five Comparison of selected internet access costs
USA/ Germany in 1998................................................168
Debt of Deutsche Telekom.......................................... 170
Net Cash Flow of Deutsche Telekom 1990 to 1998.. 171
Basic earnings per share (EPS) of selected 
telecommunications operators..................................... 172
Top Six Internet Providers in 1997 and 1998.............174
Percentage ISDN lines to main lines.......................... 175
Number of T-Online subscribers compared to
total number of internet users...................................... 183
Six The typical German internet start-up in
Spring 1998 ...................................................................204
Forms of financing.......................................................206
Proportion of start-ups generating most of their sales 
from project work or product sales............................. 208
Number of firms with given percentage of
foreign sales.................................................................. 210
Seven Macroeconomic indicators, End 1997........................224
Internet penetration in 1998.........................................229
Estimated absolute number of secure web servers ....230
Estimated internet advertising spending per 
internet user..................................................................230
The most and least expensive countries for 
consumer internet access............................................. 232
Internet cost and host density......................................234
Hours spent online per month in 1999.......................236
Key dates of telecommunications privatisation
and fixed-line competition...........................................238
Number of new listings on Europe's growth 
exchanges..................................................................... 242
Early stage venture capital investments by amount 
of investment compared to total venture capital 
investments................................................................... 244
Venture capital investments in technology................ 245
The largest independent web development 
companies..................................................................... 251
Internationalisation of Swedish ecommerce 
start-ups........................................................................ 254
Most popular 15 local web properties in
August/ September 1999.............................................256
Company headquarter locations in Bathwick Group
e-League of “Top 100” European internet
start-ups........................................................................ 262
Acknowledgements
Many, many people have helped me in this effort, some were perhaps not even 
aware of this fact. I am indebted to them all. Here, I can only mention those who 
were involved to a great degree, even here, I probably have forgotten some.
My supervisor, Dr. Razeen Sally, has, of course, put his mark on this effort and 
has always been very encouraging. Personally, his work has influenced me 
because it always returns to the fundamentals, whether it is in International 
Political Economy research or the history of political thought. Professor Mike 
Hodges, who sadly passed away while I was at the London School of 
Economics, also made very valuable suggestions. I also want to thank past 
teachers who have trained me in business history and economic history, 
Professor Dr. Toni Pierenkemper and Dr. Ralf Banken, both now at Universitat 
zu Koln, as well as Professor Volker Berghahn, now at Columbia University.
I would be very selfish indeed if I would forget to mention those employers who 
by extending me part-time or project-based work helped me finance this effort 
from 1996 to 1999. They include Matthias Graf von Krockow, Wulf Matthias, 
Jorg Birkelbach, Jerome H. Mol, Ives Brant, Mirko Lorenz, Eamonn Wilmott, 
Michael Mathews, Oliver Samwer and the rest of the Alando.de family, Pierre 
Morin and Yves Sisteron.
Without Jochen Rieker at Manager Magazin there would not have been any 
quantitative survey. He was of invaluable help just by believing in this project. 
All of the entrepreneurs and policy-makers who granted me interviews are also 
thanked here for their time, their valuable insight and their trust.
Finally, I will not forget that my family, Josefina, Julinka and Noah, put up with 
my grumpy moods and continual absence. Julinka and Noah were actually bom 
into this effort! My parents, Gisela and Horst, were extremely supportive as 
well. For example, they often reminded me of the total time I had already spent 
working on the thesis and that it really would be appropriate to complete it fast.
Of course, none of these people bear any responsibility for the flaws in this 
dissertation.
8
Chapter One 
Continuity or Rupture -  Interpreting the German Internet “Wunder”
“Germany excels at, and is stuck in, mid-level technologies -  great cars. But 
it has little of the upper-level technologies that matter today to be a 
frontrunner, nor the mindset or the structures to quickly become a player” 
(Dombusch, 2000, 74).
From the 1970s onwards, German government and private sector initiatives tried to 
boost their country’s innovation capacity in information technology (IT). Germany’s 
position in this key sector was behind that of the United States and some Asian 
countries. Initially, under Social Democrat leadership, government tried to support 
German efforts in IT by financing co-operative, large-scale research programs involving 
multinational European corporations.1 They were programs co-ordinated at a European 
policy level, and indeed, the problem was perceived as a European challenge. But these 
initiatives did not meet their ambitious goals. One target of these efforts, Siemens, did 
not manage to achieve global leadership in basic information technologies such as data 
networking equipment or personal computing. In 1998, Siemens outsourced its Nixdorf 
computer production arm to Acer of Taiwan and indigenous computer manufacture
•y
ceased in Germany.
In the 1990s, the Christian Democrat-led coalition revised these sectoral initiatives in 
accordance with perceived lessons from the United States. The first of these lessons was 
technological, the second organisational. First, the technologies driving IT, media and 
telecommunications were becoming strongly interdependent. Innovative efforts were 
focused on the convergence of these previously technologically distinct sectors. Second, 
innovations in converging technologies seemed to emerge not out of large, established 
companies, but, instead, from new ventures. Observing these developments, members of 
the Christian Democrat government tried to accelerate telecommunications liberalisation 
in Germany with the objective of stimulating competition as well as entrepreneurship 
and innovation. Furthermore, government experimented with alternative research policy 
involving innovative small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The emphasis shifted
1 For a brief account how intervention was justified in Germany as supporting the free market economy 
see Starbatty (1999, 175-177).
2 Many interpreted this as the final surrender of Germany and, in fact, Europe, from the contest for IT 
leadership (see, for example, Thurow, 2000, 85).
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from promoting upstream innovation to downstream support in bringing the innovation 
to the market. In parallel, powerful actors in the financial sector promoted the 
establishment of an alternative technology stock exchange, the Neuer Markt, as part of 
their efforts to modernise German capital markets along Anglo-Saxon lines.
However, the results of these initiatives were not immediately apparent. While IT 
growth rates in Germany rose significantly in the mid-1990s, they were until 1998 still 
lagging the rates of market growth in the United States and also those of some European 
countries such as France and the UK (EITO, 1999, 344, 350). Overall economic growth 
rates did not compare well to other countries and unemployment was a problem.3 A lack 
of entrepreneurship was cited by many commentators and policy makers as an important 
aspect of the malaise.4 In 1999, the economist Paul Krugman wrote a short practitioner 
piece called “Why Germany Kant Kompete,” citing rigid regulation and lack of 
dynamism.5 The introductory quote from fellow economist Rudi Dombusch illustrates 
this mood as well.
Parallel to domestic efforts in Germany to rekindle innovation, the dual developments of 
convergence and entrepreneurship achieved greater momentum in the United States. 
From the mid 1990s onwards, technological convergence between IT, media and 
telecommunications began to be focused on a single data networking platform, the 
internet, which had already been long in existence but was registering very strong 
adoption rates among consumers and business users. The importance of the internet was 
not at first recognised by established players in IT, media and telecommunications, 
which were working on convergence projects with their own proprietary technologies. 
The internet was a classic case of a disruptive technology (Christensen, 1997), where 
innovation was driven by entrepreneurial initiatives. The commercialisation of internet 
technologies occurred during a five-year period beginning with the initial public 
offering (IPO) on NASDAQ of the first significant internet start-up, Netscape 
Communications, in August 1995 and ended in a stock market bubble which peaked 
from late 1999 to Spring of the year 2000. Within this five-year commercialisation 
phase, hundreds of new ventures in the United States pioneering internet technologies
3 Discussed in Chapters Four and Seven.
4 This belief was shared by policy makers regardless o f party orientation (compare Kleinert and Mosdorf, 
1998, 214; Henzler and Spath, 1997, 153-156).
5 In his monthly column “No Free Lunch,” Fortune, July 1999.
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were financed by a continuously growing inflow of venture capital amounting to over 
100 billion USD.6
After this growth, boom and bust period, only a small handful of significant internet 
ventures survived, yet these had in a relatively short period of time managed to build 
sustainable, international operations in the USA, Europe and Asia. More importantly, 
and this is subject of intense, ongoing debate, established US companies in IT, media 
and telecommunications as well as firms in other industries may have increased their 
productivity, either by acquiring internet ventures or by generating internal technology 
know-how in adopting internet innovations.7 In some industries, internet adoption 
evoked a shock effect by increasing price competition and lowering profit levels (Porter, 
2001). In this case, productivity gains will only appear when these industries restructure. 
Other diverse economic effects may also set in such as a lower level of inventory in the 
economy (DeLong, 2001).
While the longer-term economic impact of the internet is still difficult to ascertain, it is 
clear that this impact will not only manifest itself in the United States alone. In fact, at 
the turn of the century, something happened in Germany which was quite unexpected.
IT growth picked up in Europe, including significant two-digit growth in Germany.
o
These rates began to match those of the United States. Established companies in 
Germany intensified their efforts in telecommunications, media and IT. Siemens, for 
example, successfully entered computer chip design and manufacture and successfully 
spun off this unit, called Infineon. The engineering conglomerate Mannesmann launched 
a successful mobile telecommunications division which developed into the strongest 
competitor of the Deutsche Telekom. Most surprising, however, was that German 
private and public capital markets were registering similar enthusiasm for young
6 Statistics from the “PricewaterhouseCoopers MoneyTree Survey in partnership with VentureOne” (“Q4 
2000”) including restated historical data from 1995 to 2000. Also see the article in the 
PricewaterhouseCoopers MoneyTree newsletter, “Venture Capital Investing Survey: Quantifying What A 
Long, Strange Trip It’s Been,” “Nextwave Q4 2000” as well as further PricewaterhouseCoopers 
MoneyTree Surveys cited in Chapters Two and Seven o f this thesis.
7 Any definite conclusions about the level o f productivity gains brought about by internet innovation are 
premature. Economists are still discussing if conventional means used to measure industrial productivity 
need to be revised with a rising proportion o f information goods in an economy. For one view, see the 
summary by J. Bradford DeLong (2000).
8 Press release by European Information Technology Observatory (EITO), “EITO 2001: Strong 
accelaration in Net Economy development expected to continue in Europe, despite present storms in 
capital markets. ICT market in Europe grows by 13% in 2000, outdistancing US growth rate (8.2%),” 
Brussels, 28.02.01.
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technology companies as the US capital markets; only, funding was pouring into 
indigenous new IT, media and telecommunications ventures. From the end of 1999 to 
the turn of the century, growth rates on the Neuer Markt were identical to those on 
NASDAQ. In the two months prior to consolidation from March 2000, the Neuer Markt 
actually had grown twice as fast as the booming NASDAQ.9 By the end of 2000, 344 
IT, media and telecommunications companies, including 67 internet ventures, had listed 
on the new German technology exchange.10 While it was surprising that 
entrepreneurship had apparently re-awakened in Germany, it was noteworthy that this 
re-awakening had occurred in telecommunications, media and IT and not in traditional 
German areas of leadership such as the engineering-based industries. The question 
which stands at the beginning of this thesis is: “What happened here?” So far, the 
available answers do not seem satisfactory.
One could argue that the transformation in dynamism was the result of public and 
private sector initiatives in Germany to foster telecommunications competition and 
entrepreneurship. One could discuss in detail the initiatives of Christian Democrat 
government and the financial sector. While this argument needs to be duly examined, it 
would not be correct to view this transformation as a purely domestic phenomenon. 
Stock market investors in Germany were trying to emulate gains observable in the 
United States. Many of the German internet ventures had business models which were 
identical to those adopted by start-ups in other countries. One needs to also examine to 
what extent there was more to this development than merely ‘blind’ copying among 
investors and entrepreneurs. One argument is that actual structural shifts were occurring 
in the global economy. These were driven by disruptive technological developments on 
an international scale affecting a wide variety of economic sectors (see Cohen et al, 
2000). German entrepreneurs were responding to these fundamental global changes.
One important aspect of these changes was the spread of international data networks, 
which began in the financial services sector, moved to multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
and, with the commercialisation of the internet, reached small enterprises and 
consumers.11 Other European countries were apparently undergoing a similar
9 Over the year 2000, NASDAQ had lost 56% o f its value, while the Neuer Markt index, NEMAX, lost 
about 80%. „Falscher Glaube an eine neue Ara. Aufstieg und Fall des Neuen Marktes: Wie die Euphorie 
entstand und wer sie antrieb,“ Financial Times Deutschland, 15.03.01, page 21.
10 DG Bank Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank AG Research, “Neuer Markt,” Februar 2001.
11 For the spread o f international data networks before the commercialisation o f the internet, refer to 
Dicken (1992) and Cash, McFarlan, McKenney (1992).
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transformation to Germany. World-wide networks, especially the internet, may have led 
to unprecedented, world-wide ‘leapfrogging’ opportunities.
One of the objectives of this research is to explore the hypothesis of a global opportunity 
for technology innovation delivered via world-wide data networks.12 During the 1990s, 
this promise was contained in a popular vision of a so-called ‘Digital Revolution,’ 
promoted with missionary fervour by technologists and writers close to technological 
developments. It was adopted by entrepreneurs and investors. Aspects of this vision 
were further developed by critical scholarship, especially by sociologists who studied 
technological change as part of a ‘globalisation’ research agenda. The vision of a Digital 
Revolution, however, conflicted with current research on innovation and technological 
development in economics and the political sciences. This existing research adopts an 
institutionalist approach and emphasises the existence of distinct local structures 
determining innovation capacity. Yet, for this very reason, institutionalist scholarship 
has difficulties explaining global innovation opportunities which seem to rapidly travel 
across borders and across distinct institutional landscapes. The approach taken with this 
thesis was to select a large national economy and to understand the validity of these 
conflicting visions of technological change by studying actual development in a specific 
setting. An economy was chosen in which a strong entrepreneurial turn-around in 
response to global technological opportunity had apparently occurred: Germany. The 
apparent entrepreneurial turn-around refers to the number of new ventures appearing in 
Germany targeting the global internet opportunity. Their appearance in a country 
marked in previous years characterised by a lack of entrepreneurial dynamism seemed to 
validate the popular vision of the Digital Revolution.
In this introductory chapter, the most important themes which will be part of this thesis 
will be presented and placed in a theoretical framework. Firstly, the theme of a global 
innovation opportunity associated with the spread of international data networks will be 
explored. Practitioners closely involved with IT developments as well as scholars, 
mostly with a sociology background, have extensively described the nature of this 
innovation opportunity. The second theme to be discussed in detail in the Introduction is 
the role of national institutions in promoting or constraining innovation. After a 
discussion of these two themes, the central research framework will be described; based
12 For a critical examination o f leapfrogging opportunities provided by innovation in the 
telecommunications industry in developing countries see Singh (1999).
on a novel concept called refraction. Refraction is the distorting effect national 
institutions have on a global innovation opportunity. The refraction framework is used 
here as an analytical tool to study the role of national institutions vis a vis global shift in 
the setting of a particular domestic economy, in this case, Germany. The main domestic 
agents and policy arenas in Germany influencing internet development as well as the 
empirical basis of the study will then be presented. Before moving to the closing 
comments of the Introduction, the reasons for selecting Germany as the main focus for 
the study are reviewed.
Global opportunity
A body of work has appeared since the early 1990s which seeks to explain a 
contemporary and universal shift in the international economy related to innovation in 
information technology (IT), media and telecommunications. In some of the literature 
the internet manifests this structural shift. While some authors emphasise that the 
internet merely accelerated existing changes, other commentators suggest that the 
internet represents rupture. It is important to emphasise, however, that most of the work 
drawn upon here pre-dates the time when it became fully apparent that internet 
technologies would be adopted by established industries. While financial services firms 
and industrial MNEs were using proprietary networks, it was mostly researchers who 
were communicating over the internet platform. This body of work, therefore, also 
appeared long before the most extreme manifestation of the stock market bubble. This 
writing is different from money-making guides for internet business or airport 
bestsellers containing internet investment advice- although it probably inadvertently 
helped contribute to the ideas contained in these texts.
Instead of using the emotionally charged term Digital Revolution, the body of work 
under examination here is referred to here as network thinking. Network thinkers are 
contemporary observers who have privileged access to new developments in IT. 
Examples of these vocal observers are the futurist George Gilder (1989; 2000), the 
technology analyst Esther Dyson (1998), the business strategists Michael Cusumano and 
David Yoffie (1998) or the writer and Wired magazine editor Kevin Kelly (1994; 1998). 
Their thinking diverges on a number of issues, but, beginning from a premise of
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technological innovation, all discuss global shift wrought by technological innovation, 
and all heralded the arrival of new types of players in the economy as well as new rules 
for competition. In addition, a wide array of issues such as the role of policy or social 
effects are discussed. For them, convergence between IT, media and 
telecommunications results in the birth of a so-called new economy, eventually 
encompassing all industries.
At the same time that practitioners were promoting network thinking, academics began 
to concern themselves with similar themes. This body of literature did not emerge from 
within those areas of scholarship which have traditionally analysed innovation capacity, 
such as economic history or management studies. Much of this literature is associated 
with new directions in sociology, such as urban sociology (Sassen, 1996; Castells and 
Hall, 1994), post-structural economics (Lash and Urry, 1994; Harvey, 1990) or the 
analysis of the information age (Castells, 1996). As part of a detailed exploration of 
globalisation as a contemporary social shift, sociologists early on addressed the 
significance of the spread of global data networks in financial services and among 
industrial MNEs. Here, the discussion of social effects in this body of work will remain 
in the background while emphasis is placed on technology and the economy. 
Nevertheless, the theme of globalisation is such a crucial element to understanding 
current sociological research that it has to be addressed in the thesis.
But not only sociologists, also researchers in business strategy and economics concerned 
themselves with the so-called new economy. This work starts with the premise that 
anyone who offers information goods or services over the internet potentially has global 
reach at no additional cost. Barriers to entry and also to innovation are lowered. In the 
words of Cusumano and Yoffie:
“For companies competing in the new information economy, the internet is 
forcing managers and employees to experiment, invest, plan and change 
their ideas constantly while [italics in source] they are trying to build 
complex new products and technologies. The internet also requires 
companies to face the reality that competitive advantage can appear and 
disappear overnight... It was the electronic distribution capability of the 
internet that allowed Netscape to burst onto the scene in 1994 and, in only a 
few months, emerge as one of the most serious threats Microsoft had ever 
faced. This sudden rise to prominence of new companies can and will 
happen again.” (1998, 5).
15
Cusumano and Yoffie emphasise that it took Netscape only three years to reach annual 
sales of more than half a billion USD, whereas the software giant Microsoft; reached 
comparable revenues in fourteen years (1998,10). The basis of this rapid growth was 
what economists have labelled network effects. Network effects appear when the value 
of a good increases with the number of users. In this environment, users themselves 
recommend their good to others, leading to rapid distribution. But advantages of 
network externalities benefiting a single company need not be sustainable; competing 
companies can also benefit from these effects. The economist Danny Tyson Quah states 
this in the following way: “Superstar successes are in turn replaced, and easily” (1998). 
And in attempting to benefit from network effects, companies sometimes begin to 
compete in ways that erode their own established competitive advantages and can lower 
their profitability (Porter, 2001).
Beginning from a similar premise as business strategists and economists, network 
thinkers such as Esther Dyson go a step further in describing the consequences of a 
networked international economy: “Analysts and investors wonder who will replace 
Microsoft the way Microsoft replaced IBM as the information industry’s standard. The 
answer is that no one will: The model of an industry revolving around a central leader 
will give way to a new decentralised market” (1998, 20). Kevin Kelly states similar 
thoughts differently: “The world of the made will soon be like to world of the bom: 
Autonomous, adaptable and creative, but consequently, out of control” (1994,4). The 
sociologist Manuel Castells writes: “The information technology paradigm does not 
evolve towards its closure as a system, but towards its openness as a multi-edged 
network” (1996, 65). The vision is one of a fluid world marked by constant change 
which is hazardous to those established players who cannot adjust.
This volatile environment is deemed to lead to two possible structural consequences. 
First, the literature seems to suggest that a shift away from established innovation 
clusters such as Silicon Valley is in progress. Stated differently, a “Silicon 
Valleyisation” of the world is occurring. “[The internet is] a powerful tool for 
integrating local economies into the global economy and for establishing their presence 
in the world,” writes Dyson (1998, 17). Yet, the new centres of innovation need not be 
greenfield projects, they can also be old cities which assume new roles in the world 
economy. Castells contends that, “ .. .the largest, old metropolitan areas of the
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industrialised world are the main centres of innovation and production in innovation 
technology outside the United States ” (1996, 57). Regarding the new role of global 
cities, disagreement exists weather they represent forces of decentralisation or 
centralisation. A further influential urban sociologist, Saskia Sassen, for example, shows 
that the global digital era has brought with it concentration in power (2000, 104-112). 
One key theme of most of this work, however, is that the new regions or cities are 
perceived as having their own dynamics independent of the specific country they happen 
to be in. Sassen speaks of “a partial denationalising of national territory” (Sassen, 1996, 
xii). She emphasises the partial nature of this process because: “The state itself has been 
a key agent in the implementation of global processes, and it has emerged quite altered 
by this participation” (1996, 29).
A second possible consequence of technological change is the transfer of innovation 
capacity away from the industrial laboratories of large enterprises and research 
universities to new entities. These are new ventures but could also be enterprising 
individuals or newly organised, decentralised large corporations (Castells, 1996, 156). 
New ventures also do not need to stay small, they can leverage the network to become 
large very fast.13 International data networks are purported to enable new global 
business processes involving new types of specialised business entities. Related to this 
are trends towards outsourcing in industry, the increasing value of services as well as an 
emphasis on cultural production, these will be discussed in Chapter Two. Castells 
believes that the economic operating unit in the new global environment is the network 
itself and has ceased to be the firm. The name he assigns to the new organisational form 
is the network enterprise (1996, 171).
Thus, while some work focuses on new geographies, such as the appearance of new 
regions and cities, other work highlights the emergence of new organisational units such 
as start-up companies. In some of the writings discussed here, these two possible 
consequences are described as part of a general trend. New geographic regions appear 
outside of the established clusters, and they are populated by new ventures. What is 
more interesting, however, are differences implied by these two perspectives. While it is 
still very much possible to speak about the importance of unique local determinants 
specific to the new regions, work that focuses on new organisational units can almost
13 See, for example, George Gilder’s discussion o f the fibre-optics venture Global Crossing (2000, 183- 
192) as well as his critique o f U.S. anti-trust policy (2000, 165-180).
completely ignore specific local factors. Kelly states: “People will inhabit places, but 
increasingly the economy inhabits a space” (1998, 95). Castells, citing a fellow 
sociologist, David Harvey, refers instead to a process of time-space compression 
(Castells, 1996, 434-437; Harvey, 1990). The second organisational perspective thus 
represents a radicalisation of thinking. It will be argued here that, while this perspective 
is- especially with hindsight- easily susceptible to refutation due to its naive simplicity, 
it is also the most consequent description of contemporary technological shift available. 
It provides one explanation how technological opportunity can rapidly move across 
borders by allowing enterpises to integrate themselves in and contribute to new types of 
networked business processes.
On the whole, research within sociology is more critical of technological development 
and emphasises that while specific regions or new types of enterprises can have 
immense success, others are marginalized further (Sassen, 2000, 33-57). In contrast, 
network thinkers are optimistic, believing that technology can reduce global inequality 
on the whole and provide leapfrogging opportunities. To understand this stance better, it 
is important to emphasise that what is called network thinking here contains elements of 
both equality-oriented social democratic thinking as well as elitist, libertarian economic 
ideas. The Digital Revolution is an American invention, with strong influences from the 
1960s and not without jingoistic elements as evident in George Gilder’s book 
Microcosm (1989, 344, 346). This set of ideas has early on been masterfully analysed 
and critiqued in terms of a ’Californian Ideology’ (Barbrook and Cameron, 1995).14 The 
Digital Revolution was spread over the internet, through bestsellers and periodicals such 
as Wired magazine and prepared the ground for the ‘investment stories’ of internet 
entrepreneurs. Yet network thinking also is a set of ideas bom directly out of the 
technological experience of the past decades. The next section will discuss why unique 
aspects pertaining to new technologies have to be taken seriously by scholarship.
14 See also the instructive German-language article on the demise o f the so-called New Economy by Peter 
Glotz, “Aus der Traum,” Die Woche, 23.03.01, page 14. Also: Nicholas Gamham (2000, 63-81) and 
Brian Winston (1998).
Structures and agents: Institutionalist theory
In the previous section, recently occurring technological changes were presented as part 
of a global structural shift, the so-called Digital Revolution. In the very beginning of the 
chapter, a contrasting, ‘heroic’ explanation was considered. Using the case of Germany, 
policy makers and the financial sector were considered agents of change. These two 
explanations cannot be reconciled. The structural view of the Digital Revolution 
suggests that global shift provides new opportunities for a diverse group of new entities 
such as regional clusters and enterprises. The role of national governments in being able 
to implement change is seen as severely compromised. Even the new entities favoured 
by global shift are merely participants; they are not agents driving the change process. 
Technological change is seen as a powerful, exogenous force.
In this sense, network thinking shares similarities with Neo-Marxist theory, which views 
structural change as a constant, driven by very generalized forces such as the 
accumulation of capital (Wallerstein, 1979, 272; Cox, 1987). Underlying these 
approaches is an implicit belief in linear progress. A diversity of outcomes caused by the 
existence of individual agent choice was purposely excluded from the model. As 
Geoffrey Hodgson points out, however, the Neo-Marxist approach can account for 
structural change but not for the simultaneous existence of different types of capitalism, 
in Hodgson's words, impurities within capitalism (1996, 416-419).
This leads to a third explanation which can be entertained to account for recent events, 
which meshes agent-induced, ‘heroic’ change with a structural framework. Here, actors 
are both contributors to structural shifts as well as captured within structures. Outcomes 
are not fixed. Therefore, change opportunities exist, but they are scattered and refracted. 
The exploration of local differences within political-economic structures is possible. To 
emphasise the less deterministic and less universal use of the structure concept 
(compared to Marxist work), the term institution is used. The term has been defined as: 
"The rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction" (North, 1990, 3).
As is evident from this definition, the distinction in institutionalist research between the 
realm of politics and economics begins to fade. In fact, it is this blurring of distinctions 
which characterises ‘new’ political economy (Gamble, 1995) as well as ‘new’ economic
history (Wischermann, 1993). Economics itself has become ‘broader1 and has, in the 
words of Mancur Olson, “expand[ed] into the suburbs ” (Olson and Kahkonen, 2000, 1). 
According to Peter Hall, a political economist, institutions play a role in: “the definition 
and articulation of interests, the dissemination of ideas, the construction of the market 
behaviour and the determination of policy” (1986, 5). In this view, the market is itself an 
institution, as not only Hall but also the economist Geoffrey Hodgson and the economic 
historian Douglass C. North would point out (Hall, 1986, 12; Ash et al, 1994, 9; 
Wischermann, 1993, 250). Especially financial markets seem to, as institutions, play a 
critical role in fusing the political and the economic (Zysman, 1983, 7, 8). This approach 
to the role of institutions can be summarised with the phrase “institutions do matter” and 
can be found in the disciplines economics, economic history and political economy.
Broadly, two approaches of institutionalism can be differentiated. Historical 
institutionalism explains differences in structures through historic development (North, 
1990). The key concept here is that present structures were influenced by historic 
development. Institutions thus follow certain trajectories, this concept is called path 
dependence (Hill and Deeds, 1996, 435- 437). Related to this, institutions tend to be 
sticky; they define actor relationships most of the time and can preserve these over 
longer terms. This flavour of institutionalist scholarship is popular with scholars 
describing technological change because it allows insight into the origins of sustainable 
innovative capacity. The second approach, rational choice institutionalism, focuses on 
structures and information asymmetries at a specific period in time (Milner, 1997; see 
also Garrett and Lange, 1996, 49). Game theory is used as an analytical device to 
discuss rational choices among different policy options. This is only a rough 
categorisation; institutionalist theory has been applied to a wide variety of research 
agendas. The similarities of the institutionalist approaches found in these disciplines, in 
emphasising the role of agents and their relationship to institutional structures, are more 
important for this study than their differences (discussed in Steinmo, Thelen and 
Longstreth, 1992, 8).
In discussing actual cases, however, the reconciliation between agent choice and 
institutional structure is not straightforward in instituionalist scholarship. As Helen 
Milner has pointed out, ‘new institutionalism1 has often tended to emphasise 
institutional constraints over actor-induced innovation of institutional structures (1997,
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14-17). Yet, the theory allows for the possibility of significant agent-induced structural 
change. In the classic object of study for technological innovation, the Industrial 
Revolution, a radical sea-change occurred resulting in institutional changes brought 
about by specific actors. Yet, even during and after the Industrial Revolution, older 
institutional structures continued to exist and exert influence (Landes, 1969). Thus, the 
tension between actor-centric and structure-centric explanations exists also within 
institutionalist thought itself.
Major contributions to institutionalist theory originally emerged out of the detailed study 
of technological change by economic historians such as Douglass North. Economic 
historians examining the history of innovation have found technological explanations 
alone insufficient as an explanatory framework and have extended the discussion to a 
wide variety of political and cultural factors. Economic history therefore frequently 
approaches technological change by identifying groups resisting innovation and those 
promoting it. But interaction always occurs within a given historical institutional 
environment market by path dependence (Olson and Kahkonen, 2000, 13). Therefore, 
the inventive achievements of the entrepreneur are not sufficient alone to bring about 
change, despite popular prevalence of what Mancur Olson calls the “parable of the self- 
made entrepreneur” (Olson, 2000, 183).15
The guiding premise of new institutional economic history regarding technological 
innovation can be summarised in the following way:
“But the market is by no means the only way of aggregating the gains and 
losses from adopting an innovation: A variety of regulatory or political 
processes can be used to determine whether an innovation is to be adopted, 
and each will in general aggregate the gains and losses differently and thus 
will often come up with different answers about whether an innovation 
should be adopted.”16
A further body of work studying innovative capacity which is closely related to 
economic history in its approach is national innovation systems (Nelson, Ed., 1993) and 
sectoral innovation systems research (Mowery and Nelson, Eds., 1999). This research 
approach focuses on the impact of institutional factors on the innovation capacity of
15 Douglass North also “downgraded” the significance o f the entrepreneur and innovator (1966, 8).
16 Excerpt from an editorial introduction to an essay on resistance to technological innovation by Joel 
Mokyr (Olson and Kahkonen, 2000, 12).
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contemporary economies and emphasises, for example, differences in national 
educational systems. This work also highlights differences among distinct types of 
technologies and industrial sectors, as does economic history. Systems technologies 
such as electrical systems or aeronautics, for example, require a complex combination of 
improvements while other technologies do not (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993, 13-15).
A related direction of innovation research can be labelled the resource-based view 
found in management studies and within a research agenda called evolutionary 
economics. Here, attempts are made to describe the origins of innovation within the firm 
and pry open the “black box.” Firms are seen as independent agents capable of change. 
Their potential for innovation is limited by their internal resources, their management 
capabilities, for instance. These resources are mostly intangible; Nelson and Winter 
therefore call them routines (1982). In this view, firm strategy should focus not on 
pursuits such as erecting entry-barriers but on nurturing, accumulating and deploying 
resources (Penrose, 1966; Foss, 1996, 1). Thus, routines can be compared directly to 
institutional linkages, the habits found in institutionalist scholarship. They exhibit path 
dependency but can, at times, be changed accidentally {mutations) or purposefully 
through individual agency.
A final, influential body of work discussing innovative capacity is not directly related to 
institutional scholarship. Industry organisation research and the industrial cluster-based 
theory is closely associated with Michael E. Porter (1990).17 While the cluster-based 
theory of national industrial competitive advantage does not explain the rise of a new 
industry or a new technology, it is an extremely instructive research tool for comparative 
work in innovative capacity. The objective of this research is to identify country- or 
region-specific factors that lead to international competitive success. Porter focuses on 
microeconomic factors such as local demand conditions, regional industry structure and 
the intensity of local competition. Advanced local demand structures, for example, allow 
enterprises to develop products and services which excel in international competition. 
However, the industry cluster is a mostly static framework. Porter’s recent work shows 
how change occurs within these clusters, yet he still relates it to largely exogenous 
factors such as technological change, changes in demand structures and an ebbing of 
domestic rivalry (Foss, 1996, 4, 9- 12; Porter, 1990, 166-173).
17 For a discussion, see Hill and Deeds (1996, 429- 431).
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Institutionalist research has come a long way towards understanding the forces driving 
innovation. It is viewed not as an exogenous force, but as a capability which can be 
nurtured by policy-makers, entrepreneurs and managers. Yet, in different historic 
periods, innovation capability itself differs and industry structure evolves (Mowery and 
Nelson, 1999, 370-375). Because of the possibility of significant change, the danger 
implicit to active, sectoral technology policy is that policy may very well be promoting 
the ‘wrong’ players. Whereas chemical-pharmaceutical and electrical innovations at the 
turn of the 20th century emerged to an extent out of the industrial research laboratories 
of large concerns and the research university, IT innovations at the turn of the 21st 
century may instead favour different organisational entities.18 Innovation opportunities 
need to be understood not in general, but in specific terms related to the sector and the 
time period, and this has deep implications for domestic policy intending to promote 
national innovative capacity.19
Change in innovation patterns seems to be currently occurring even in the ‘old’ 
industries due to developments in global communications. Engineers and applied 
scientists seem to be increasingly forming a “transnational technological community.”20 
This interesting development, however, may be even more significant in the converging 
sectors of IT, media and telecommunications. To arrive at a better understanding of the 
specific nature of an innovation opportunity, voices close to that technology need to be 
heard and their views considered.
Institutionalism versus network thinking
The previous section explained the view that "institutions do matter." The institutionalist 
approach was developed within political economy and economic history as an analytical 
tool to account for subtle differences in diverging paths of developments during the 
Industrial Revolution and the 20th century. Network thinking emerged out of the
18 See the section “The Best o f Times” in Thurow (2000, 16-22). For a short discussion about industrial 
research laboratories: Nelson and Rosenberg (1993, 10-11).
19 Mowery and Nelson developed the term sectoral innovation system to reflect this insight (1999, 369, 
370).
20 The increasing transnationality of the industrial research community is briefly discussed by Nelson and 
Rosenberg (1993, 17-18).
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experience with information technologies in the past three decades. Yet, there are 
similarities between institutionalist scholarship and the vision of the so-called Digital 
Revolution. Both emphasise interconnections, one in institutional arrangements, the 
other in networks. For this reason, both see little chances for attempts of imposing 
complete control from a single point. No one actor can alone drive all the multiple layers 
of interconnectivity.
However, independent agent-influenced change is possible in institutionalist analysis, 
although continuity is more usual (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992, 15). 
Government bodies involved in a catching-up process of national competitiveness can 
purposefully strive to make improvements in their institutional structure; their success 
usually depends, however, on whether they can ‘get it right’ and among other things 
such as the participation of other agents in the financial establishment.21 Technological 
change is endogenous and can be explained through the interplay between agents and 
structures. All this stands in strong contrast to network thinking, under which 
technological change is exogenous. Change is not independent actor induced, but 
deterministic, thus bearing ironic similarities to Neo-Marxist views of structural change.
Both views have incorporated evolutionary models. Institutionalists such as Hodgson 
have pointed out that evolutionary change is driven by the necessary existence of 
diversity among institutional arrangements (Hodgson, 1996, 417). The impurities of 
capitalism trigger change. In the network thinking of Kelly, evolution and diversity are 
also stressed. They are based, however, on what Hodgson would call a populist, 
Darwinian interpretation of evolution. In contrast, recent biological studies emphasise 
the fact that evolution does not always guarantee the ‘survival of the fittest.’ In fact, the 
criteria offitness very much depends on the current evolutionary landscape and is 
continually subject to change (Hodgson, 1994, 209, 210). A domestic institutional 
environment which has been successful as an export-based industrial economy does not 
have to be suited to perform successfully in a post-industrial world. ‘Populist’ 
interpretations of evolution, therefore, assume the world is static and a certain winner 
type remains a winner for all time. The approaches utilised in this study, institutionalist 
political economy and economics, evolutionary economics and the resource- based view 
in management studies emphasise the necessity to examine not only corporate successes,
21 See the classic comparison between Russia and Germany during the Industrial Revolution by 
Alexander Gerschenkron (1962).
but also failures (see Schendel, 1996a, 1). Firms or even whole nation states surviving 
for many years on the brink of bankruptcy may contain resources that lead to success in 
another environment.
The main concepts of network thinking are summarised in the table below and 
compared to institutionalist scholarship.
Table 1. Differences in network thinking and institutionalist views.
“Networks matter.” “Institutions matter.”
PROCESS OF CHANGE Deterministic global 
structural change. 
Schumpeterian creative 
destruction.
Refracted and scattered 
change taking place within 
institutional constraints. 
Path-dependence. 
Stickiness.
ACTORS N ew  actors and regions 
are favoured by change, 
but they are not driving it.
Firms, national 
governments, lobbying 
groups, regions, 
institutions o f  all types.
RESULT OF CHANGE More chaos. Less political 
and economic hierarchy. 
‘Dinosaurs’ left behind. 
N ew  actors emerge as 
winners. ‘Leapfrogging’ 
by new regions or cities.
All institutions involved in 
incremental change. N ew  
roles for ‘old’ actors.
POSSIBILITY OF 
INDIVIDUAL AGENCY
None. Difficult but possible 
within institutional 
constraints. Most probable 
through influence over 
powerful central 
institutions, especially 
financial institutions. 
Contest between groups 
resisting and groups 
promoting innovation.
TYPE OF
INTERCONNECTIONS
Open computer networks. 
Low barriers to entry.
Historically formed 
institutional relationships.
TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION
Exogenous. Incremental. Path- 
dependent. Endogenous.
The two opposing lines of network and institutionalist thinking presented here echo to a 
certain extent contrasting views on technological change found within the work of Max 
Weber and the early work of Joseph Schumpeter. In fact, juxtaposing the two scholars 
has been a popular academic activity recently (Hamilton, 1996; Galambos, 1996). 
Interestingly, the work of the German sociologist resurfaces in the technology
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perspective of economists, management theorists and economic historians, whereas 
sociologists and popular network thinkers are referring to the Austrian economist. At the 
end of this thesis, these two great thinkers will be returned to.
Refraction
The thesis explores to what extent world-wide developments in information technology 
lead to new, unprecedented global innovation opportunities, enabling groups of ventures
regardless of location to participate in new global business processes. This interpretation
\
has been borrowed from network thinkers and research in sociology. In contrast, 
institutionalist scholarship itself does not supply us with a ready interpretation of 
technological opportunity created ‘externally’ by global data networks and convergence. 
This is, in part, because it cannot: Technology is viewed as an endogenous factor. It is 
difficult to describe universal, global structural change through the theoretical 
framework of new institutionalism alone. However, what institutionalist thought can do 
is provide us with an understanding of the activities of new ventures within their 
domestic environment. It furthermore helps illustrate why national government acts in a 
certain way to promote start-up activity or to liberalise telecommunications.
The approach taken here is to focus on a specific, large national economy where 
institutional factors influencing information technology innovation initially seemed 
especially constraining but where, nevertheless, a significant entrepreneurial wave did 
seem to materialise, apparently in response to ‘outside’ global developments. This 
economy could not be the United States, since as the originator of the internet wave, it 
does not contain the potential conflict between domestic institutions and a global 
technology opportunity arriving from the ‘outside.’ And it is exactly this conflict 
between ‘inside,’ domestic agents acting within the constraints of domestic structures, 
and ‘outside,’ global structural change, which is the focus of the thesis. In Germany, this 
conflict seemed especially severe. Many Germans and observers in other countries had 
almost completely forsaken the thought that Germany could achieve prominence in IT 
and participate in global IT innovation when, apparently, a significant wave of 
entrepreneurship in IT suddenly did materialise in Germany.
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This thesis evaluates in what specific ways global technology interacts with national 
institutions. To do so, a novel framework for the study of cross-border innovation is 
introduced, based on the concept of refraction. Refraction is the distorting effect 
national institutions have on a global innovation opportunity. Change agents, for 
example new ventures, respond not directly to global shifts but to their refracted state. 
The refraction effect can either magnify or reduce opportunity for new international 
ventures and therefore directs the path of development of new ventures in a specific 
country. Other actors, for example, government bodies or established enterprises, also 
act within this framework. Refraction is a hypothetical framework, the assumption made 
is that both global structural change as well as domestic institutional constraints can co­
exist. In fact, the concept inversely measures the strength of global technological 
change. The stronger the refraction effect is, the weaker is global shift.
The refraction framework is closely indebted to work in international political economy 
(IPE). IPE began as a field of international relations (IR) which can be defined through 
its object of research, the world economy and the role of international and domestic 
institutions in the world economy. IPE from the early 1970s onwards wrestled with the 
concept of systemic changes in the world economy (see Katzenstein, Keohane,
Kransner, 1999, 15-17). Much of the debate was focused on the role of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). A debate emerged between scholars emphasising global change and 
the retreat of the state (Stopford and Strange, 1991) and those pointing to the continuing 
role of the nation state (Waltz, 1979; Krasner, 1994, 15; see also Inayatullah, 1997). In 
the United States, this debate has been seen as a contest between so-called liberal and 
realist camps. In Europe, the discussion was much less focused on the liberal/realist 
contest and led to original research approaches. Sally, for example, began with an IPE 
inquiry to carry out what he called a micro-political examination of embeddedness 
(Sally, 1994; Sally, 1995). Embeddedness describes the extent to which multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) are rooted in their home countries. The concept is similar to 
refraction, however, the analytical emphasis is different. The objective when measuring 
embeddedness is understanding home country linkages of global enterprises abroad. The 
focus when measuring refraction is the distorting effect of national institutions on 
globally oriented enterprises at home. Most importantly, the refraction concept attempts 
to build a makeshift bridge between network thinking and institutional scholarship for 
analytical purposes.
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Within IPE, the refraction framework reflects a current debate surrounding the resilience 
of national institutions vis a vis internationalisation. Increases in international economic 
interaction in recent years have been linked to domestic political instability, “political 
entrepreneurship” and domestic institutional reforms (Milner and Keohane, 1996, 16- 
20). However, while technology is seen as a key influence in globalisation, IPE research 
has not explicitly explored the relationship of power and technological innovation. This 
is why the refraction framework has borrowed from different sources: Sociological 
studies of globalisation, and what is called here network thinking- contemporary popular 
accounts of technological opportunities wrought by global networks- as well as 
institutionalist scholarship on the history of technology and innovation.22
The concept of refraction is put to active use to study the case of Germany. The 
interplay of global technology and specific domestic agents in specific domestic policy 
arenas is analysed through a close qualitative and quantitative examination of the 
development of new internet ventures in Germany. The resource-based view on 
enterprise development is drawn upon to gain a better understanding how different types 
of external factors influence the development of company resources at an early stage of 
formation. Two specific factors examined here are local demand structures and the 
availability of risk capital. Economic history and research in national industrial 
competitive advantage, especially the cluster-based theory, are consulted as well, and 
the determinants are linked to two policy arenas, telecommunications liberalisation and 
research policy.
The apparent blurring here of national determinants ‘external’ to the firm and resources 
‘internal’ to the firm is purposeful and reflects the contention that they are different 
perspectives of the same phenomena. The new ventures themselves are, 
metaphorically, the “vessel” in which different influences make themselves felt. The 
measure of success is industrial leadership of the start-ups as a group and not solely of 
one exceptional venture. Mowery and Nelson define the term as “being ahead of one’s
22 Interestingly, this echoes yet another, theoretical debate within IPE scholarship in the United States 
between sociological and institutionalist accounts o f change in the international economy. However, this 
debate is broad and has not explicitly focused on technology either. Refer to Katzenstein, Keohane, 
Krasner (1999, 3 0 -4 2 ) .
23 The economists David Mowery and Richard Nelson have dedicated a section in their recent book to the 
difficulties o f distinguishing between resource availabilities, institutions and domestic market conditions 
(1999, 5-7).
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competitors in production or process technology, or in production and marketing, 
[giving] firms an advantage in world markets” (1999, 2). Mowery and Nelson 
differentiate the term industrial leadership from the term competitive advantage, which 
may confuse because it is often used to refer to the success of specific firms. It is 
important to reiterate that some network thinkers have explicitly stated that leadership in 
a network economy is not sustainable and this view contradicts, to a certain extent, the 
concept of industrial leadership which is used here as a yardstick. However, what is 
attempted here with the refraction framework is to find common ground in comparing 
two very different sets of ideas; establishing this common ground may at times be 
problematic.
The author is aware that the task taken on here is complex. What is attempted in the 
thesis appears here to be very abstract. This is not the case. The focus on quantitative 
and qualitative data on new ventures in Germany serves as a backbone of this effort, 
allowing research from different sources as well as insight from different theories to be 
incorporated in a structured way. In addition, the study is organised around a limited 
number of specific domestic agents and specific policy arenas.
Three domestic agents and two policy arenas
To understand how domestic institutional structures operate, it is necessary to adopt a 
micro-political, detailed perspective on individual agents and policy arenas (see, for 
example, Sally, 1995, 206, 207). Different types of agents, not simply government 
bodies, contribute to policy decisions. To describe the complex structure policy 
decisions are typically made in, Helen Milner uses the term polyarchy. Polyarchy refers 
to power sharing arrangements among domestic groups. The distribution of power in 
given historic situations is always more complex than in a simplistic hierarchy- even in 
what appears on the surface to be extremely hierarchical, totalitarian regimes (Milner, 
1997, 11-14).
Three types of domestic agents and two policy arenas are regarded as being especially 
relevant for this study of Germany. The three domestic agents in the polyarchy are 
national government bodies, the former monopolist telecommunications operator and
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young, innovative internet ventures. The policy arenas are telecommunications policy, 
which influences internet access and demand, and national research policy, especially 
the promotion of venture capital.
What were the reasons for selecting these agents and policy arenas? National 
government, for example, needs to be differentiated from other state actors such as 
regions and supranational policy bodies, both of which are playing an increasingly 
strong role in Europe. At least three German regions, Baden-Wurtemberg, the city-state 
of Hamburg as well as Bavaria, were very active in subsidising small firms in IT and 
telecommunications. The European Commission was also engaged in different 
initiatives to support small firms in this area, some programmes were being carried out 
with other G7/ G8 members. National government, was, therefore, not the only actor 
involved in competitiveness policy directed at internet start-ups. National policy makers 
were not even necessarily the most active; regional and supranational incentives both 
tended to specifically target individual firms or groups of firms with support packages 
including network access subsidies or free consulting services. One of the reasons why 
national government is central to this study, however, is because of its role in 
telecommunications liberalisation and national research policy. The contention made 
here is that these two policy areas, by influencing demand structures and the supply of 
capital, are crucial determinants for start-ups success; they are, thus, strong contributors 
to refraction. Within other industries or other historic periods, however, the national 
perspective may be misleading (Mowery and Nelson, 1999, 366-370; Nelson and 
Rosenberg, 1993, 15-18).
When speaking of national government, this study is referring to different policy bodies 
which do not always have compatible interests. National government policy almost 
always is the result of intense internal negotiation, causing policy inconsistencies and 
contradictions. In this case, three specific ministries are of greatest interest. These three 
are the Ministries of Finance, of Economics, and of Science and Education. The 
democratic representative bodies also play a role, as well as intermediary organisations 
placed in between the private and public sector. One such intermediary, parapublic 
organisation is a very important public/ private SME financing institution, the Deutsche 
Ausgleichsbank}4 These different bodies were central in framing both
24 For a discussion o f parapublic institutions see Webber (1994, 156).
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telecommunications policy, as well as research policy- which included a program to 
promote venture capital. Scholars analysing the German policy-making process in 
comparative studies have classified German politics as corporatist. In Chapter Four, this 
term will be examined for its usefulness in understanding the decision-making process 
among different national policy groups.
The second agent to be introduced here is closely linked to German national 
government. However, the Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG) needs to be understood as an 
independent economic and political agent. Its interests have been shaped by a unique 
historical trajectory, which cannot simply be equated to a purported unified government 
interest. Six historical themes stand out; they have shaped today’s DTAG. They are the 
universal telephone system, the technological capabilities of DTAG, the former 
monopolist’s involvement in the roll-out of a modem telecommunications infrastructure 
in the so-called “New German States,” the privatisation and stock market listing of the 
company, its desired transformation from a domestic to a global player as well as its 
response to the decisive action of the regulatory authority after liberalisation in 1998.25 
Through its near-universal ownership of all means of consumer internet access before 
liberalisation, it is not possible to understand the development of internet services in 
Germany without analysing the role of the Deutsche Telekom and its historically 
determined interests.
The final type of agent to be introduced here is the new internet venture. While only a 
limited amount of research has been carried out on internet start-ups in particular, 
scholarly attention began in the 1980s to be focused in general on the innovative 
capacity of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1982; 
Curran, Stanworth and Watkins, 1986; Haskins, 1986; Klandt, 1987; Bannock and 
Albach, 1991; Mullineux, 1994; Baker, 1996). The innovation capacity of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises has been discussed with German cases as well (Koschatzky, 
1997; Harhoff, Ed., 1997). Scholarly efforts initially were directed at showing that small 
firms can indeed be innovators. Traditionally, dominant views, also in political 
economy, emphasised the power of large firms in terms of market domination and
25 For excellent research on the origins o f the universal telephone system in Germany and the unique path 
o f development o f this system, refer to the work o f Frank Thomas (1995).
• , 96innovative potential. Work on SMEs has often been accompanied by research 
exploring the role of regional networks for SME development. One of the best-known of 
these efforts is AnnaLee Saxenian’s work which explores the advantages of Silicon 
Valley over Route 128 in Massachusetts (1996). In Europe, it was hoped that SME 
growth would be a solution to unemployment problems. This work has been 
accompanied by parallel developments in government programs targeted at the needs of 
SMEs. Aspects of this body of scholarship are very helpful here, especially analysis of 
the symbiotic relationships between large and small firms (Rothwell, 1986) and the 
significance of regional networks of large and small firms. German research specifically 
was invaluable to provide insight into the effects of research policy targeting SMEs in 
Germany. However, the usefulness of SME research for this study is restricted due to 
the focus of much of this work on older industries, not the role of new types of ventures 
in areas undergoing rapid technological change and supported by venture capital, such 
as software development or internet services. Perhaps this is the reason why a few of the 
SME studies cited above come to the conclusion that SMEs are better suited at primary 
inventions but do not have the financial resources to bring these to the market (Camoy 
et al, 1993, 8; Rothwell, 1986, 134, 135).
The reason research on SMEs has not delved into the role of new ventures in IT, media 
and telecommunications innovation is obvious; much of SME research predates these 
development. For this study, recent work examining the role of small firms in Silicon 
Valley is important to gain comparative insight. Serious work in business strategy on 
Silicon Valley firms has emphasised both the equally innovative role of specialised 
“pure play” small network players and the support given to them by experienced venture 
capitalists and private investors (for example, Cusumano and Yoffie, 1998). Steven S.
26 It was small firms which were seen as anachronistic elements obstructive to progress which cannot 
afford extensive research programs. Business historians such as Chandler showed how large firms 
developed powerful efficiencies o f scale and scope. The political economist J. K. Galbraith in 1957 
emphasised the importance o f large firms in technological innovation, made possible through the 
deployment o f additional resources for R&D within the firm. The later Schumpeter tended to agree with 
this view when discussing the 20th century (1975). Williamson used the concept o f transaction costs to 
explain the efficiencies of large firms (see, for example, Williamson and Winter, 1992). In the global 
economy, the advantages of large firms were compounded. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) were linked 
in works in International Political Economy (IPE) to national governments in terms o f their power and 
wealth. IPE has, to a great extent, been preoccupied with MNEs (Camoy et al, 1993, 8). MNEs used their 
transnational structures in order to allocate their resources more effectively and cut their costs. They 
negotiated with governments, using their global mobility as a powerful bargaining chip. Susan Strange 
and John M. Stopford called this “new diplomacy” (1991). In a similar way, John H. Dunning, who has 
extensively studied international business and multinational firms, recognised the contributions o f small 
firms in the global economy, but saw their activities very much as “orchestrated” by MNEs (1993b).
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Cohen and Gary Fields have recently re-emphasised the regional advantages of the 
success-driven, networked and highly diverse environment of Silicon Valley (1999). But 
regional differentiating factors associated with Silicon Valley are not the only reasons 
why a small number of US internet ventures managed to achieve a sustainable global
27presence. As Germany, two national policy arenas were especially important for the 
development of the internet in the United States, namely, telecommunications policy 
influencing local demand structures for internet services as well as policy influencing 
venture capital financing.
Business press articles discussing the contemporary development of the internet have 
repeatedly pointed out the importance of internet access and the availability of venture 
capital as crucial country-level institutional factors. As such, the identification of these 
factors is not unique to this thesis. These popular accounts, however, fail to examine 
how these institutional factors influence internet entrepreneurship. In addition, they 
often discuss either internet access or venture capital, not the combined impact of two 
factors. This applies also to academic research, which tends in the German case to either 
discuss internet access and local call fees while analysing telecommunications 
liberalisation (Gerpott, 1998) or the availability of venture capital (Leopold and 
Frommann, 1998; Kulicke, 1993; Lessat et al, 1999).
The Case for Germany
German history is a popular subject of study for “economic backwardness.” Germany 
“caught up” during the Industrial Revolution and, after the destruction due to the Second 
World War, again regained economic strength. Although this is a subject of particularly 
fervent debate, part of the success of the Federal Republic after the Second World War
9 ftwas due to financial initiatives targeting SMEs, the so-called ‘Mittelstand.’ In
27 Mowery and Nelson have argued recently that a narrow focus on industrial districts does not do justice 
to the variety of networks firms are linked to at different geographic levels: Regional, national and global. 
They prefer the term sectoral innovation systems (1999, 9-10); previously, the emphasis was on national 
innovation systems (Nelson, Ed. 1993).
28 Werner Abelshauser disagrees that the economic foundation o f Germany in terms o f  capital equipment 
and know-how was destroyed during the Second World War and therefore downplays the impact o f the 
Marshall Plan (1983). Alan S. Milward emphasises the importance o f the Marshall Plan and widens the 
debate to its role in having promoted European economic co-operation (1984). Christoph Buchheim 
discusses the role o f the Marshall Plan in the development o f a post-war multilateral free trade system 
involving Germany (1990, 99-107).
accordance with the Marshall Plan, so-called parapublic institutions extended credit for 
rebuilding businesses. Germany historically has a very strong small- and medium-sized
9Qenterprise (SME) base. Ergas described German technology policy as diffusion 
oriented meaning that it is primarily concerned with encouraging the spread of 
technology throughout the economy and especially to the smaller, export-oriented firms 
(1987).
Yet, by the 1980s, entrepreneurial dynamism in Germany seemed to have all but
disappeared, including in the key sector of information technology. For this reason, the
seeming resurrection of the Wirtschaftswunder in the late 1990s came as a surprise and
was featured in the media, for example, in two memorable cover stories in the 
* mnewsmagazine Der Spiegel. In no other country in Europe, including the United 
Kingdom, was the entrepreneurial boom surrounding the converging technologies and 
the internet so apparent as in Germany- in fact, it could be directly compared to what 
was occurring at the same time in the United States, albeit on a much smaller scale. In 
the year 1999 alone, German venture capital funds invested in 510 IT and 
communication technology companies, including 117 internet start-ups.31 By the year 
2000, dozens of internet start-ups had been listed on the Neuer Markt. The seemingly 
strong reappearance of entrepreneurial activity makes Germany an especially rewarding 
subject of inquiry.
Yet, while Germany was exceptional in the number of listed internet companies and the 
apparent suddenness of this entrepreneurial activity, it was not the only country where 
the boom was felt. The internet was generally perceived as a cross-border phenomenon, 
a technology which did not only enable the world-wide exchange of goods and services, 
but which could serve as a global entrepreneurial platform. Should the entrepreneurial 
turn-around in Germany be understood as a development with mostly domestic or 
mostly global origins? The objective of this thesis is to explore this question using 
evidence gathered directly from the new ventures themselves.
29 In 1986, SMEs, defined in Germany to be firms with under 500 employees, accounted for 46% or 
private sector GDP- compared to 32% in Britain (Bannock and Albach, 1991, 56).
30 “Hilfe gegen Arbeitslosigkeit? Ehrhards Enkel. Grundungs-Boom durch junge Untemehmer,” Der 
Spiegel, Nr. 3, 13.01.1997; “Die 68er regieren -  und ihre Kinder griinden Untemehmen. Generation Ich. 
Von der Revolte zur Rendite,” Der Spiegel, Nr. 21, 22.05.2000.
31 Statistics from the Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften e.V. for 1999 (dated 
31.12.99, accessible on the web site http://www.bvk-ev.de/).
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Company focus and empirical research
A close look at the firm level is necessary to fully understand the origins of apparent 
entrepreneurial revival in Germany. The delicate linkages between firms and policy­
making on a micro political economy level (Sally, 1995, 206, 207), should help expose 
the importance of specific global or domestic determinants. Without detailed analysis, 
US, German and other experiences can easily be conflated into one universal, world­
wide structural phenomenon or, alternatively, domestic developments can be cited as 
sole determinants.
An awareness of timing is crucial for this thesis. It is important not to equate the stock 
market bubble with the entrepreneurial wave surrounding the internet, at least not off­
hand without detailed analysis. Initial entrepreneurial activity in Germany in response to 
converging technologies, online services and data networks clearly began before 1995 
(Waesche, 1999a). Furthermore, even the first generation of German internet 
entrepreneurs who founded their companies around 1995 and 1996 could not have 
predicted the future course of the stock markets, especially the development of the 
alternative stock market Neuer Markt. The Neuer Markt started only in 1997 and its first 
year of activity was relatively slow. The same applies to the first generation of internet 
start-ups in the United States, although here stock market growth was evident much 
earlier. ‘Irrational exuberance’ on the stock markets was identified in a frequently cited 
speech by Alan Greenspan in 1996. First generation internet start-ups in the United 
States were founded in 1994 and 1995. It cannot be denied, however, that strong stock 
market growth until consolidation in the year 2000 greatly benefited the first generation 
of US internet entrepreneurs. Stock market growth provided these companies with a 
considerable flow of funding through secondary stock offerings as well as acquisition 
opportunities based on high valuations. With this advantage bestowed by the capital 
markets, a limited number of first generation US internet companies could pioneer new, 
networked business models, achieve sustainability and seriously establish their presence 
in international markets in Europe and Asia.
In order to compare first generation internet venture activity in Germany to that of the 
United States and other countries, the intentional choice was made to collect empirical
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data early, in this case, in the Spring of 1998. If indeed a seemingly instantaneous global 
shift had arisen which provided unprecedented technological opportunity, the effect of 
the shift should be observable in the development of the first generation of internet 
ventures. The fact that the early date of data collection is close to the founding of the 
first generation internet start-ups in Germany also bestows an additional benefit. 
Resource-based management studies emphasises the crucial first stages of enterprise 
development as a time when important future competitive capabilities are defined. At 
the same time, it is clear that the conclusions drawn here apply to the first generation of 
internet ventures and not necessarily to future entrepreneurial activity in Germany.
But the year 1998 was important also for another reason. It was the year in which basic 
telecommunications services were liberalised in many European countries including 
Germany. The demand structure for internet services would be considerably influenced 
by the actions of the new regulatory agency for telecommunications in Germany 
operating from 1998. By analysing the innovative capabilities of internet ventures in 
Germany at the beginning of this crucial year, the perspective gained is that of internet 
entrepreneurship before the demand effects of liberalisation could unfold. Demand 
structures changed significantly after 1998, but by that time the competitive capabilities 
of the first generation of German internet start-ups had already been defined. 
Liberalisation in Germany simply happened too late to be of benefit to these companies 
in their early stages of formation.
The challenge to this research approach was that, in 1998, there was a lack of quality 
information about internet ventures in Europe. At the time of research, Europe was still 
populated mostly by privately-held internet start-ups. For this reason, the country case 
study of German internet ventures is supported by empirical research carried out by the 
author in early 1998. Together with a major German business publication, data from 
over 120 German internet start-ups was collected. The empirical data and the qualitative 
information supplied by the entrepreneurs of these firms allowed a detailed analysis of 
how the two key domestic determinants under examination impacted on the path of 
development of the ventures. Again, the intention is to understand the actual means by 
which demand structures and financing influenced entrepreneurship in Germany.
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Despite the insight provided by this data, the conclusions that can be drawn from a 
single-country empirical study are to a certain extent limited, if they are not put into the 
perspective of the experience in other countries. The trade-off between the level of detail 
provided by a single country empirical study and the comparative insight of a multi­
country study is apparent. To overcome the limitations of this trade-off, a brief survey of 
three further European countries is included in this thesis in the final chapter before the 
Conclusion. In this European survey, the time period under examination is extended to 
early 2001, when this study was completed.
While a key year for this study was 1998, the full time period surveyed in this thesis 
extends from the 1970s, when the first corporate data networks were implemented and 
the internet was developed as a research network, to the end of 2000. At the end of the 
year 2000, the downturn of the stock markets had already begun to make itself felt, 
ending a period of innovation and entrepreneurial activity surrounding the internet. 
Despite this long time period under consideration and the detailed case study of actors 
and actions in the year 1998, it is crucial to add a note of caution. The history of internet 
entrepreneurship is a very recent development and many of the conclusions will need to 
be regarded as tentative.
Chapter breakdown
The chapters of this thesis are arranged in the following way. The thesis begins with an 
analysis of global structural shift and the spread of international data networks, moves to 
the domestic level with a detailed examination of Germany and ends in a four-country 
comparative overview. Thus, initially, the thesis is concerned with insight emerging 
from sociology and network thinking. The focus is not broadly on technological 
convergence or the commercialisation of the internet. While these themes have to be 
addressed to provide a basis for further discussion, Chapters Two and Three are 
explicitly dedicated to the global nature of the internet opportunity. How did it arise- 
what were the economic and political prerequisites for the internationalisation of the 
internet? The theme of globalisation will also be explored. Globalisation is a strong 
social shift some researchers believe is occurring; it could also have played a crucial role 
in the spread of international data networks.
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The first, global section serves as an entry point to a detailed single country study, 
which stands at the centre of this effort. While the global internet infrastructure is being 
built and extended, policy-makers are at home pondering national competitiveness in a 
networked world. But to what extent is internet entrepreneurship driven by global or 
domestic developments? To answer the main research question, one domestic economy 
was selected and analysed on micro-political and enterprise level. The following three 
chapters on Germany successively discuss the three main agent types in relation to the 
development of the German internet: The role of national government bodies, the 
Deutsche Telekom and the internet ventures themselves.
Chapter Four has a dual function. It broadly describes the policy-making process in 
Germany. It also discusses decisions made in the policy arena of research policy, 
including venture capital support programs and the promotion of the national online 
service BTX. It focuses on the research policy shift under Christian Democrat- 
govemment from a digigiste program to an initiative emphasising public/ private 
partnerships and indirect financial support. Chapter Four also has an important 
introductory role. It is difficult to understand the strategy of the Deutsche Telekom as an 
independent agent without discussing German government policy first.
In the fifth chapter, telecommunications liberalisation is analysed, especially how it 
impacted on the demand for internet services in Germany. The chapter concentrates on 
the role of the Deutsche Telekom and why it was unable to act as a catalyst for the 
uptake of internet services in Germany. To do so, it traces the historic transformation of 
former postal and telecommunications ministry to the Deutsche Telekom. When DTAG 
was partially privatised and listed as a public company in 1996, it needed to modernise 
its technological base, reduce its debt burden and internationalise. The result was a large 
cash requirement which was generated by comparatively high basic telephony tariffs as 
long as possible until and immediately after liberalisation in 1998. High prices restricted 
demand for internet access until 1998. From that year onwards, however, prices fell in 
Germany due to controversial but determined action by the regulatory authority, 
especially the innovative introduction of far-reaching unbundling measures. For the
32 Some commentators have argued that decisive, far-reaching unbundling has not only weakened the 
Deutsche Telekom but has lowered incentives to build competing networks (Engel, 2001,37). Others have
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purposes of thus study, the period from privatisation in 1996 to liberalisation 1998 is 
critical. During this time period, Deutsche Telekom (DTAG) has to be understood as an 
independent agent, despite its links to German government, especially in the the Finance 
Ministry. The objectives of DTAG were very different from those of other policy 
bodies, although these differences were perhaps not even understood by the policy­
makers themselves.
Chapter Six builds upon empirical research- a survey of over 120 internet start-ups in 
Germany- to gain a detailed look at the enterprise level. The intention was to expose 
linkages with domestic research policy and telecommunications liberalisation and 
discuss the overall impact of different policies of competitiveness. In this chapter, the 
refraction framework, presented in the theoretical part of this introductory chapter, is put 
to use. A detailed analysis of the trajectory of German internet start-ups allows us to 
understand the strength of the refraction effect and, also, how it operates. We can 
attempt to answer the main research question framed here about the interaction of the 
global technological shift and domestic institutions using the specific case of Germany.
The last chapter before the Conclusion again revisits the international level, here the 
development of internet start-up firms and policy conditions is compared with that of 
three other European countries. The purpose of this section is to understand better what 
was learned in the one-country study of Germany and to place these learnings in an 
international context. The international focus at the end of the thesis essentially returns 
to the theme of the first two chapters, however, under consideration of possibly unique 
national characteristics. The exploration of global technological shift and a specific, 
institutionally conditioned domestic environment can then be concluded.
Was it merely ‘irrational exuberance?’
Before beginning with this study of internet entrepreneurship, it is important to recall 
that the period under examination here coincided with a massive bubble on the 
international stock markets and with unprecedented investor interest in internet 
companies. From the 1995 listing of the first public internet company, Netscape, to the
lauded the regulatory authority’s action and the continual fall in telecommunications prices, including 
internet access prices.
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downturn from the year 2000 onwards, the stock markets seemed to temporarily have 
believed that the world was, indeed, undergoing an ‘Internet Revolution’ of sorts. Public 
preoccupation with the stock market bubble and the subsequent loss of considerable 
sums of money by small investors tended to overshadow some of the underlying 
currents of internet development. An important example of such an underlying current 
was the relationship of internet entrepreneurship to telecommunications liberalisation.
One of the intentions here is to expose some of these underlying currents, an activity 
which seems to the author to share similarities with an archaeologist scraping at a slab 
of ancient material to isolate some fossilised bones. At times, an archaeologist may find 
that the fossil he worked so hard to uncover was an insignificant, common find, not 
particularly beautiful and not adding to his knowledge of the era. Considering the 
amount of work involved, this is, indeed, a frightening thought. This thought continually 
accompanied this research task. It is crucial to consider the hypothesis that internet 
entrepreneurship may actually not have been an overly significant aspect when viewed 
against decades of telecommunications and information technology (IT) development. 
An accurate portrayal of internet entrepreneurship and innovation should, perhaps, 
emphasise a longer-term, continuous development of telecommunications and IT 
technologies with a definite leading role occupied by the United States. It seems 
possible that the global Internet Revolution, a glorious neo-Schumpeterian vision of 
discontinuity and punctuated equilibria, was exaggerated.33 The internet was perhaps 
inflated out of proportion by stock market interest in a number of new ventures which 
disappeared soon after the market downturn.
These ruminations strike the core of the central research question: What explains the 
apparent surge in IT and internet entrepreneurship in Germany in the final years of the 
1990s? Was it a global, discontinuous wave, representing an unique innovation 
opportunity? Or was the surge in entrepreneurship the result of carefully orchestrated 
national policy in Germany? Alternatively, perhaps there was no substantial
33 Within economic history, the theme o f continuity versus disruption is a familiar one. Economic 
historians such as Joel Mokyr have examined occasional, disruptive periods o f intensive innovation 
activity which may be accompanied by significant economic and political changes. These periods are 
called punctuated equilibria, leaning on lessons from modem evolutionary biology (2000, 69-72). These 
periods can be triggered by events not directly related to technology, such as changes in the social 
environment. An example was the Glorious Revolution o f 1688 in Britain which was an important 
precursor to the technological breakthroughs o f the eighteenth century (Mokyr, 1990, 298, 299). It is, 
therefore, legitimate to ask if the commercialisation o f the internet represented such a disruptive period 
and was accompanied by social changes.
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entrepreneurial surge at all, the phenomenon was merely the result o f ‘irrational 
exuberance’ on the stock markets which inflated some insignificant venturing activity.34
34 As early as 1996, Alan Greenspan used the term ‘irrational exuberance’ to refer to the situation on the 
capital markets (see Schiller, 2000).
Part I -  Global Opportunity 
Chapter Two
Explaining the Global Growth of the Internet
This thesis seeks to understand how a global innovation opportunity impacts on a 
national political economy. Specifically, the international diffusion of the internet in 
the late 1990s is examined on a global scale as well as its reception in one particular 
country, Germany. This first part of the thesis, comprised of Chapters One and 
Two, is dedicated to understanding the world-wide diffusion of the internet. Only 
then will the German example be addressed. Three aspects need to be reviewed 
when seeking to explain the internationalisation of the internet. The primary aspect 
was economic and social. The cross-border success of the internet can be viewed as 
the result of a demand- and supply-driven development. The second crucial aspect 
was technological. The internet was technologically very different from other types 
of networks, such as the digital telecommunications systems of the 1980s and 
1990s. The unique technological basis of the internet had a profound influence on 
both demand and supply. The third aspect was political. As in the case of the 
technological underpinnings of the internet, the international demand and supply of 
internet services cannot be explained without examining the role of public policy. 
These three aspects were deeply intertwined; yet, a segregation into three aspects is 
helpful as an explanatory tool. The first two aspects are addressed in this chapter. 
The role of policy is the subject of Chapter Three.
Before addressing cross-border demand for the internet, it is useful to review the 
history of international data networks within the corporation. This is because the 
demand for the internet as a cross-border network was linked to the demand for the 
internet as a cross-corporation, ubiquitous solution. Effectively, the internet 
supplanted previous company-only as well as country-only networks. The question 
asked is why company- and country-only networks did not survive and how the
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internet became the dominant world network platform. The chapter starts with 
companies and then moves to countries. It maps the early use of electronic networks 
in the financial services industry and multinational industrial concerns from the 
1960s and 1970s onwards. Global corporations used network-based services to co­
ordinate their world-wide activities. Within these businesses, the use of electronic 
networks was steadily expanded from “controlling” functions, within 
manufacturing processes and accounting, to “communication” and “collaboration” 
functions- still using proprietary solutions. In the second half of the 1990s, internet 
standards were steadily introduced into multinational concerns as a means to solve 
the problems that were associated with trying to forge a multifunctional, 
multinational corporate network composed of different proprietary systems. In a 
period with frequent mergers, acquisitions and increased outsourcing activity, the 
internet was attractive because it was a flexible and open system.
The chapter then discusses consumer use and the rapid spread of the internet itself 
across borders, to become competition for country-only systems. But the sequence 
here is distracting: The internet came to replace company-only systems at about he 
same time it moved with strength into the consumer sphere. The premise to be 
explored here is that the two are deeply dependent upon each other. International 
pioneer users, the “early adopters” of the internet, belonged to an elite group of 
mobile knowledge workers and students, whose work was affected by the 
interlocking of world-wide business processes. Because they were working within 
an environment which was increasingly globally integrated, they demanded a 
correspondingly international network standard which their peers abroad could also 
use. They had little use for consumer online networks which were exclusively 
domestic. Thus, the rising integration of global business processes is an important 
force explaining early adoption of the internet internationally both among firms as 
well as consumers. Without this development, company-wide and country-wide 
solutions would have gone a longer way in satisfying compatibility demands.
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It is crucial to note, however, that the internet was particularly well suited for its 
role as a cross-border, cross-corporation ubiquitous system. The technological 
underpinnings of the internet made it adaptable to a wide variety of different 
services. In fact, internet technology encouraged innovation. This is because 
internet technologies allowed innovation to occur on the periphery of the network. 
Small, new ventures could invent and provide new services on a global scale as 
easily as large network providers such as telecommunications operators could. 
Thus, the late 1990s was a time of experimentation with a rapidly growing supply 
of new internet services.
An overview of internet "take-off'
None of the basic technologies involved in offering network-based services were 
entirely new in the 1990s. Neither were the majority of network-based service types 
offered unknown before the 1990s. To understand why the period of the 1990s was 
unique and could be characterised as a period of "take-off," for a single network 
standard, the internet, it is important to look at the history of network-based 
services and their uses within business and consumer spheres.
In the 1970s, the first network-based services were bom out of necessity due to the 
high cost of computing. Time-sharing systems allowed several users to share 
computing resources. With the rapid fall of computing costs, however, computer 
network technologies were put to new uses because they allowed exchange of data 
among remote locations, including international locations. Here, three different 
areas within which new services appeared internationally will be described briefly, 
within the financial industry, multinational industrial enterprises and for consumer 
use. The financial industry had a pioneering role in the transnational, corporate use 
of network-based services. This role has been described numerous times in political 
economy literature; therefore, it is not necessary to dwell upon details here. Largely
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as a result of financial deregulation starting with the Eurodollar market in the 
1960s, the volume of transnational currency market transactions grew in the 1970s 
and 1980s, reaching a much-quoted figure of US$1.2 trillion daily (Dicken, 1992, 
365-367; Castells, 1996,434-437).
The role of networks within the global financial industry had two main 
characteristics which could be attributed to the use of transnational network-based 
services generally. The first was that network-based services allowed what Dicken 
called a "new global division of labour" to come into existence. In the instances 
where this occured, the result was increasing interdependence. The second was the 
arrival of a new temporal division of labour, the "new time regime" of Castells 
(Castells, 1996,429). It was the possibility for 24-hour trading which Susan Strange 
referred to in the title of her book "Casino Capitalism."
If financial services, especially currency markets, were a case where network-based 
services were put to truly transnational use, it was also a very limited example. 
Although the negative impact on world-wide political and economic stability was 
emphasised by contemporary observers, this was due mostly to the deregulated 
environment in which international currency trades took place and not to the 
transformational character of network-based services. Although modem financial 
services involved highly sophisticated uses of computer and network technology,1 
the basic transmission of price information itself did not require more than a 
telegraph. In fact, the financial system can be described as being global already in 
the late 19th century. Although global financial markets were an especially 
spectacular example of how network-based services could be put to transnational 
use, the limited number of players and the long communications technology 
tradition made it less interesting as an example of the transformation brought about 
by the combination of low-cost computing and data networks. Much more
1 See the survey "The frontiers o f finance" (The Economist Newspaper Ltd., 1996, 265-297).
2 Castells quotes Francois Chesnais with an estimate o f 50 major players in world financial markets 
(Castells, 1996, 435).
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instructive was the use of network-based services within multinational industrial 
corporations and the evolution of network services for consumers (including, 
incidentally, significant changes in business models for consumer financial 
services).
From the 1950s, industrial enterprises had mainframe computer systems installed 
primarily as a means to make the organisation of structured data more efficient. 
Payroll, accounting, production scheduling and order entry were some of the first 
tasks these systems were put to use for. Some of these systems were networked and 
could already be transnational in scope; writing a paper for the Columbia Journal o f 
World Business, Nanus coined the term ‘multinational computer’ in 1969, reflecting 
this development (vol. iv, No. 6; cited in Hagstrom, 1991, 19). The first network- 
based services within industrial enterprises moved beyond the experimental stage 
only in the second half of the 1970s, however. At that time, SKF, the Swedish ball­
bearings manufacturer, for example, integrated its production in Europe with the 
help of computer networks. By 1979, five computing centres in five countries, 
Sweden, West Germany, Italy, France and the UK had been linked through the 
corporate "Global Forecasting and Supply System." The internal efforts by SKF 
were supported by a third party, General Electric Information Services (Hagstrom, 
1991,221-223).
One way to map the spread of network-based controlling and production systems 
within international corporations is through the growth of the enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) applications market. The birth of the ERP market dates to the late 
1970s and early 1980s, when the first standardised software replaced custom 
controlling or production systems in large companies. Standardised software could 
be applied throughout the corporation and later allowed separate systems to be 
linked via corporate networks. One ERP market leader, SAP, was founded in 1972 
in Mannheim, Germany, and launched its mainframe ERP system in 1979. Two 
international clients, US based firm John Deere and UK-based Imperial Chemical
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Industries, persuaded SAP to develop English and French versions of its software in 
the early 1980s. Growth really took off, however, when a client/ server-based 
version of the SAP software was introduced in 1992, allowing individual units 
within companies with world-wide operations to be linked more effectively. A large 
number of Fortune 500 companies use SAP applications, including Coca-Cola, 
Chevron and General Motors. The growth of SAP derives from the success o f its 
software in implementing the network-based services necessary to support 
globalisation of large companies. Chart 1 shows the "take-off o f SAP in the 1990s; 
it had a 30% share of an estimated US$7.2 billion market.3
Chart 1. Revenue growth of SAP AG, a major vendor o f enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) applications (in DM million)4
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ERP systems had one thing in common with their in-house predecessors. They were 
company-only systems, which until the late 1990s communicated only in rare 
instances with the outside world. These drawbacks led to the rapid adoption of
3 SAP is present in 40 countries, the software is avaliable in 24 standard language versions and first- 
level system support can be called upon 24 hours via four centers in Germany, USA, Singapore and 
Japan. Information was obtained from the 1996 annual report of SAP AG as well as "SAP's 
Worldview," Red Herring, November 1988, p. GG6-GG10 and "Baan's Voyage," Red Herring, 
August 1998, p. 66-68.
4 From annual reports 1996 and 1997, SAP Aktiengesellschaft, Walldorf/ Baden.
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internet-based standards businesses which could be used across company borders. 
Internet systems, which were open and flexible, furthermore represented a means by 
which corporate Information Technology (IT) departments could regain cost control 
over their systems; they had become aware of strong dependence on vendors of 
proprietary software.5 The shift towards internet standards within the corporation 
was so strong that proprietary SAP systems were made internet-compatible.
Whereas some corporate networks in the 1980s and early 1990s already carried 
international traffic, consumer use of network-based services was for the most part 
domestic. This was due to the fact that the greatest number of consumers subscribed 
to on-line services which were initially national in focus.6 In the US, it was mostly 
new entrants that began to offer on-line services to consumers. Examples were 
CompuServe, America Online (AOL), Prodigy or Delphi.7 In Europe, consumer use 
was initiated in the late seventies by national telephony operators, BTX in 
Germany, Prestel in the UK and Minitel in France. Yet, the growth of country-only 
networks was comparatively slow. In Germany, the service developed by the 
Deutsche Bundespost languished throughout the 1980s and early 1990s; it reached 
its target user base of one million only at year's end 1995, after it had opened itself 
to the internet. Only Minitel in France was a real initial success; by the mid-1990s,
5 The advantages o f the deployment o f internet technologies within corporations can be illustrated 
with the case of Reuters. In the late 1990s, Reuters expanded its supply o f industry information to 
global industrial enterprises. This new, lucrative client base had been made possible through the 
proliferation of internet standards. For the first time, Reuters did not have to worry about the 
underlying network infrastructure because it simply provided its information on top o f internet 
standards. In the 1980s, when Reuters intended to provide the financial services industry with a 
similar network-based service, it had to finance the network infrastructure itself. Reuters, then the 
largest international news agency with an annual income in 1984 o f UK £313 million and a profit o f  
£74 million had to undergo public flotation in order to finance its proprietary news network for the 
financial industry (Boyd-Barrett, 1989, 108, 125).
6 With the exception of CompuServe. CompuServe was the first on-line service to venture abroad, 
and therefore to offer a transnational service; the first countries it expanded into included the UK and 
Germany in 1991. By Fall 1995, CompuServe provided access to users in more than 140 countries.
7 Among established players, the telephone operator AT&T planned a service called Interchange, 
Microsoft launched Microsoft Network and Apple started eWorld, but these services did not meet 
expectations as on-line services. At the high point for on-line services with their proprietary business 
model, Fall 1995, the following subscriber numbers were avaliable (in millions): AOL 3.8, 
CompuServe 3.5, Prodigy 1.7, Microsoft Network 0.2, Delphi 0.1, eWorld 0.1 (listed in OECD,
1996).
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it was offering 23,000 services and 6.5 million terminals were in use. Next to the 
free distribution of terminals, one of the main reasons for its success was that 
France Telecom opened the system to private providers of services, foreshadowing 
the success of the internet in this regard (Castells, 1996, 343-345).8
Many of these country-only subscriber on-line services included basic services such 
as communications, information and some instances of transactions already in the 
1980s. On-line banking was popular in Germany, for example, Americans 
developed on-line discussion forums into "communities" and the French used a 
telephone directory database.
In contrast to on-line services, the internet was internationalised quite early in its 
existence. But its use was initially limited to the research community. The military 
and research precursor network to the internet, ARPANET, was extended outside of 
the United States in 1973, when University College in London and the Royal Radar 
Establishment, Norway, were connected. It was in the late 1980s- when it was still 
used almost exclusively by research institutions- when the internet began to develop 
into the global network it is today. In 1988, all Scandinavian countries as well as 
Canada and France were connected to the internet via the US National Science 
Foundation Network (NSFNET). A year later, Reseaux IP Europeens (RIPE) was 
started to co-ordinate collaboration on extending the internet into a Pan-European 
network. It was in 1989 as well that further countries joined NSFNET, including 
UK, Germany, Japan and Australia.
Although the internet was a computer network standard comparable to its company- 
only and country-only peers, it had two distinguishing characteristics: It was “open” 
and “stupid.” Both of these technological characteristics encouraged adoption as
8 Sex services accounted for more than half of Mintel use in 1990, this dwindled later with the 
commercialization o f the internet. Up to 60 to 70% of internet traffic may be sex-related. Sex 
services seem to be a major force driving the use o f commercial network-based services. See 
Susanna Glaser, "Sex Drive. Pornography is pushing the pace o f technology," i-D Magazine, 
December 1998, 62.
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well as innovation. In addition to these, internet uptake and innovation can be 
explained by two further supportive factors, which can be labelled a “business” and 
an “economic” explanation.
The designers of the internet had intentionally created a technology which was 
“open.”9 This meant the internet could be used by anyone without paying licence 
fees. More importantly, the designers created institutions which insured that the 
system remained open in the future, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF). “Open” also meant that changes and improvements to the internet could be 
made in a peer selection process based on the principle of merit. Just as 
importantly, the internet encouraged innovation due to its architecture. Isenberg 
labelled the internet a “stupid network” to contrast it to the “intelligent networks” 
which were engineered by telecommunications firms. “Intelligent networks” require 
central control, “stupid networks” only function as pipes, with networking 
instructions coming from participating computers all along the network. It is 
impossible to take central control, and this also means that it is easy for an 
entrepreneur to offer new services at the periphery of the network.10
9 The technological basis for the internet actually consisted in combining two "open" technologies: 
the networking computing platform UNIX (developed by Bell Laboratories in 1969, but widely used 
only from the 1980s) and the communication protocol TCP/IP used on the ARPANET from 1983 
(after more than ten years o f development) which allowed computers to exchange data over a 
decentralised network. These technologies were made publicly available, improvements were the 
result o f an open exchange between developers that were also openly accessible, the so-called 
"Request for comments" (RFC). The RFC series was introduced in 1969. In addition, an array of 
different boards and task forces were formed by the publicly and privately funded research 
community to co-ordinate the various development activities surrounding the internet. From 1989 to 
1994, a third open technological concept was introduced to the internet community: The World 
Wide Web, a decentralised means of sharing information. See the section "Formation o f the broad 
community," in: Leiner et al, 1998.
10 In an article, David Isenberg summarises how the "Stupid Network" encourages innovation: 
"Stupid Networks make no assumptions about voice or other content. Users can put bits in one end, 
and the same bits come out in the other. Unlike the Intelligent Network model, the Stupid Network 
features abundant infrastructure, not carefully engineered scarcity. Addressing, features and class of  
service are specified in the user's terminal, at the edge o f the network. Furthermore, the Stupid 
Network's simple interface makes underlying network complexities irrelevant to the user. This 
creates an environment that fosters wild-eyed innovation, in which users can try out harebrained 
ideas without asking permission of a big bureaucracy. This unimpeded ability to innovate is most 
crucial. Think of the cost to humanity had Mosaic, the first internet browser, not been invented. The 
‘Next Big Thing’ is likely to come from a hacker's terminal than from an engineer at a central 
switching office, or a telephone company marketing department” (1997). Further information is
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In addition to these two technological factors, the internet was a classic example of 
a “disruptive technology,” to refer to Clayton Christensen’s useful concept (1997). 
This business factor encouraged innovation as well. Although large corporations 
were already using computer networks for several decades, entrepreneurs could act 
upon the window of opportunity associated with potential ubiquity, especially the 
possible mass use of the internet by consumers. The promise of a seamless 
computer network linking consumers and businesses was a powerful proposition 
enabling wholly new ways of conducting business. Entrepreneurs recognised this 
opportunity of potential ubiquity early, during a phase when internet use was still 
limited to pioneer adopters. They realised also that it would take time before 
established players would fully understand the potential of the internet. Indeed, 
established players at first underestimated and therefore bypassed the internet 
allowing newcomers to step in and innovate.
Lastly, the rapid uptake of internet standards among both businesses and consumers 
calls also for an economic explanation: “Network externalities.” When network 
externalities operate, each additional user of a given technology in a network causes 
the value of that piece of technology as a whole to grow. A fax machine is the 
classic example of network externalities. A single fax in the world linked up to the 
telephone system is not worth anything. But the value of that one fax machine is 
increased with each additional facsimile hooked up to a telephone line. Because of 
the linkage between value and user numbers, a technology that has become adopted 
by a certain critical mass of users can, at times, capture the whole market almost 
exclusively, leading to the exponential growth mapped in Chart 2 below. It is here 
that an effect called ‘lock-in’ sets in. It does not have to be the superior technology 
that succeeds; in fact, historical chance events can lead to the adoption of inferior
contained in a series of three articles, in which Isenberg debates with an Ericsson executive:
Isenberg, 1998a and 1998b as well as Jomer, 1998. See also Niko Waesche, “Clever servers hold the 
key to dumb networks,” CommunicationsWeek International, 18.01.99, page 9. Thanks go to 
Kenneth Niel Cukier of CommunicationsWeek International for pointing me towards this debate and 
allowing me to join the discussion.
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technologies.11 Network externalities can occur without an overt network being 
involved, too. It works with computer operating systems or software when 
compatibility issues raise the value of a program. It is for this reason that the debate 
surrounding network externalities was introduced in the US government case 
against Microsoft.
Chart 2. Growth of internet host computers (thousands).12
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The economist Danny Quah disagrees with some of the conclusions o f network 
externality research, however. He does not believe that products or services that 
have won the game of network externalities have captured the market indefinitely. 
They can be toppled by a new standard just as rapidly as it took them to lock in. 
Because of this, he re-introduces the term "superstar economics" as a substitute for
11 Realising how network externalities operate, users, when given a choice between incompatible 
standards, try to use the information they have to select the technology that will be successful in the 
future- meaning the technology does not have to be superior today. Michael L. Katz and Carl 
Shapiro have studied the formation of standards and cases under which inferior technologies capture 
markets (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). See also Arthur, 1989.
12 An internet host is a computer connected to the internet with a unique address (Internet Protocol 
IP address). The number o f hosts is the most accurate indication of internet growth available. 
Usually, several users connect through a single host. The source for these figures is Network 
Wizards (http://Avww.nw.com/). Because some organizations restrict access to their network data, a 
new survey method was used from July 1998. The host data from the years 1997 and 1996 may 
therefore need to be corrected upwards. All host figures are from the months of July except for 1990,
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network externalities. The basis of superstar economics is the infinite expansibility 
of a commodity which can be secured by reproducing digital content, for example. 
In fact, Quah believes that trade will increasingly involve reproduction and not 
exchange.13 Quah describes the consequences of superstar economics in this quote:
"A weightless-economy industry cannot erect entry barriers in the form 
of set-up costs to protect its established successes. Rather, ongoing 
success has to come from continual innovation and perpetual paranoia...
The upshot is the economics of superstars, where the top few supply the 
entire market, and are rewarded far beyond what would have been 
initially expected of them. But the picture is dynamic. Superstar 
successes are in turn replaced, and easily" (Quah, 1998).14
World demand by consumers for the internet took off in the second half of the 
1990s. This is when network externalities set in. Chart 2 shows the growth of 
internet host computers- these are the main access points to the internet (located at 
internet service providers (ISPs) and which are usually shared by several users). 
UUNET, one of the largest internet backbone providers, estimated that internet 
traffic doubled every 100 days in the 1990s. Country-wide network efforts as well 
as commercial on-line services eventually adopted the internet model and became 
part of the "network of networks." The internet was simply “backpacked” on their 
existing infrastructure. The applications run on the old networks were supplanted by 
“superstar” internet applications; only the network infrastructure remained.
The "take-off1 of the internet coincided with the commercialisation of the research 
network. In 1988, the privatisation of the internet began and was a carefully 
government-orchestrated process that ended with the defunding of the NSFNET
where an estimate was conducted in October. The data: 1998 36,739; 1997 19,540; 1996 12,881; 
1995 6,642; 1994 3,212; 1993 1,776; 1992 992; 1991 535; 1990 313; 1989 130.
13 The concept o f superstar economics was introduced in 1981 by Sherwin Rosen. Superstar 
economics and weightless economics has been popularized by Danny Quah and also by Diane Coyle 
with her book "The Weightless World."
14 For the concept of infinite extensibility see also Quah, 1997.
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backbone in April 1995.13 Whereas educational traffic expanded steadily, 
commercial services boomed in the months following after 1995 (See Chart 3). This 
short history o f the rise of the internet, however, does not reveal much about the 
drivers behind growth. Here, demand-side drivers will be discussed first, then 
supply-side factors.
Chart 3. Commercial versus educational host computer growth (thousands).16*
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* The "dip" in 1997 is due to a change in measurement methods only.
Rise in transnational demand for internet services
The purpose of this section is to discuss the demand-side factors driving the 
adoption o f the internet among different countries and companies world-wide.
15 Initially, NSFNET encouraged the use o f  its networks by commercial organisations on a local and 
regional level, while prohibiting commercial usage o f  the backbone. The idea was to stimulate the 
emergence o f  commercial backbone services such as PSI and UUNET (Leiner et al, 1998).
16 This data refers to the number o f  hosts with the top level domains .com (commercial) and .edu 
(educational) only. There are numerous other domains which are owned by commercial as well as 
educational organisations. One example are the country domains, for example .de for Germany or .jp 
for Japan, which include both types. A comparison between .com and .edu indicates the rapid growth 
o f  commercial hosts in contrast to the stable growth o f  educational hosts, however. The source is 
Network Wizards. The same cautionary note applies as in footnote 12.
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Multinational enterprises used the internet to restructure their world-wide 
businesses, using it to replace different proprietary systems existing in different 
countries. They also used internet standards to integrate smaller firms, usually 
suppliers, and thereby extended the reach of their cross-border network-based 
services. New internet-based linkages among firms allowed tightly integrated 
world-wide processes to an extent that older, proprietary networks could not. 
Effectively, qualitative changes in global business processes were evoked through 
the use of internet technologies at the same time as consumers began to reject 
country-only networks.
Before the rise of the internet, demand for transnational network-based services 
within industrial enterprises was linked to the increase in globally co-ordinated 
production efforts. A short excursion in history sets the stage for this discussion. 
From the Second World War until the 1970s, multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
enjoyed average profit margins above 20%. Corporate profits dropped precariously 
in the 1970s to levels between 10 and 20%. The G7 average rate of return in the 
manufacturing sector fell from 25% in 1965 to 12% in 1980. This resulted in what 
was labelled by some as the "Crisis of the Large Corporation" and by others as "The 
Great Profits Squeeze" (Castells, 1996, 152-168; Harrison, 1994, 125-127). Falling 
profits were due to rising overhead costs and rising volatility in the international 
economy. Two events can serve as markers, one was the so-called oil shock, the 
other the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the ensuing uncertainty in the 
foreign exchange system.
Rising costs and increasing volatility were responded to with a drive towards 
increased flexibility within MNEs as well as an increased appetite for 
experimentation. In fact, researchers from different disciplines state that the 1980s 
and 1990s were a phase of unprecedented organisational experimentation within 
corporations. The demand for increased foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as 
transnational computer networks within firms can both be attributed to this need for
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experimentation (see Castells, 1996, 81-86).17 Little choice existed but to do so: 
either one withdrew from a global presence and its attached "immense fixed costs" 
(Ohmae) or one sought to make the most of it. This resulted, among other things, in 
a wave of massive FDI increases: "This new logic forces managers to amortise their 
fixed costs over a much larger market base and this drives them towards 
globalisation" (Ohmae, 1994, 6, 7). The average annual growth in FDI from 1983 to 
1990 was 34% compared to growth in global merchandise trade of 9% (Hirst and 
Thompson citing UNCTAD and other sources, 1996, 54, 55).18
In fact, the massive growth in FDI was the most noticeable change in the world 
economy from the 1980s onwards. It is also the main quantitative change in the 
world economy which can clearly be associated with the controversial term 
"globalisation."
"In the period 1945-73 the dominant factor driving the world economy 
was growth in international trade; from the early 1980s onwards, we 
argue, it has been growth in FDI" (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, 51).
Management studies literature shows how increased FDI efforts were accompanied 
by organisational changes within enterprises. These have been described as the shift
17 For an investigative and critical account of MNE experimentation see Harrison, 1994. Explicit 
references to experimentation and management information systems can be found on pages 9, 10.
See also Beck, 1986, 345-357. On p. 345, Beck writes (in the 1980s): "Wir befinden uns am Beginn 
einer organisationskonzeptuellen Experimentierphase, die dem Zwang der Privatsphare, neue 
Lebensformen zu erproben, keineswegs nachsteht" (italics removed) (“We are at the beginning o f an 
experimental phase focusing on organisational concepts, which is in no way less profound than the 
experiments occurring in the private sphere.” My translation). The management theorists Bartlett and 
Ghoshal cite "traditional" and "emerging" motivations for globalising tendencies in MNEs. The first 
group includes: secure key supplies, market seeking and access to low-cost factors o f production.
The second group includes: increasing scale economies, ballooning R&D investment costs, 
shortening o f product life cycles, global scanning and learning capability (Bartlett and Ghoshal,
1995, 5-9; Hirst and Thompson, 1996, 62).
18 Measured in relation to domestic investment world-wide, FDI in the 1980s eclipsed the previous 
period o f FDI growth in the 1960s by a factor of two (Julius cited in Dicken, 1992, 51). Of global 
merchandise trade, approximately 1/3 is conduced within MNEs on an intra-firm basis. Outward FDI 
stock stood in 1992 at $2.6 trillion. Global sales by foreign affiliates stood in 1992 at $5.2 trillion, 
compared to the world-wide export of goods and (non-factor) services o f $4.9 trillion- again, 
including intra-firm trade (UNCTAD, 1995, xx, xxi, 3, 4; the approximation o f inta-firm trade levels 
was derived by US data; Intra-firm trade is also mentioned by Hirst and Thompson, 1996, 53).
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from the multinational to the global enterprise. Whereas the multinational 
enterprise replicated its functions to serve local markets, the global enterprise goes 
one step further. It tries to decrease redundancy by concentrating different parts of 
the business process in the region where this part is best carried out. Production 
centres can be distributed world-wide. Service activities within industrial 
enterprises, such as R&D and design, were distributed globally, taking advantage of 
the uneven global distribution of labour and know-how. The globalisation of 
production processes has been described and discussed frequently, for example 
within 'global commodity chain' (GCC) research (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994).
Transnational computer networks have been installed within firms in all of the 
cases just described in order to co-ordinate and control the global division of 
labour. They have also been instrumental in speeding up global activities in those 
instances when time-based competition is critical and 24-hour processes are 
necessary (Cash, McFarlan, McKenney, 1992, 226). Interestingly, organisational 
change and organisational experimentation have to a degree been implemented by 
management via the introduction of new computer-network-based services. 
Technology has purposely been used as a catalyst for change. The "Transformation 
of the IT function at British Petroleum" is just one example. Here, "The drive for a 
new, global [IT] architecture confronted local and cherished technical beliefs head- 
on" (Cross et al, 1998, 34).
Computer networks carrying corporate services do not always have to be installed 
"from above" within the firm. Even before the rise of internet technology, research 
into the global networks of the Swedish multinational ball-bearings producer SKF 
revealed that the world-wide corporate network was being used by employees to 
form their own "rebellious" ad hoc network-based services. These led to examples 
of "spontaneous co-ordination" among organisational units which were 
hierarchically not directly linked (Hagstrom, 1991, 107, 108, 123, 124). Hagstrom 
calls this "revealed demand" (Hagstrom, 1991, 110). Noticing this, the management
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of MNEs has in some instances introduced network systems explicitly to break up 
traditional hierarchies within firms.19 This tendency increased when cheap software 
for information-sharing with open standards proliferated due to the rise of the 
internet.20 By 1997, most of the largest MNEs had so-called “intranet islands” that 
had been initiated "parasitical ly" on top of corporate networks through ad hoc 
initiatives without central control.
It is a controversial question how many multinational enterprises have thus far 
transformed themselves from above or below into global firms by means of a 
computer network. Hirst and Thompson refute the existence of many more than a 
handful of such globally networked, globally oriented companies (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1996, 11, 76-98).21 FDI itself is strongly concentrated and the 100 
largest MNEs account for a third of total FDI stock (Hirst and Thompson citing 
UNCTAD, 53). Even the usually enthusiastic Dicken states that:
19 Although the rationale for introducing network systems has shifted with time, and the emphasis on 
control has declined, it has to be stated that even decentralised intranet-type approaches can be used 
for the purposes o f control as well as for "empowering" non-hierarchical project groups. Hagstrom 
elegantly views control as just one among a diverse set o f types of services that can be carried by 
corporate networks (Hagstrom, 1991, 58, 98, 106). It has been emphasised that networked IT 
systems are being viewed in corporations both as a means to achieve more central control as well as 
a means to limit the control o f the centre (Cash, McFarlan, McKenney, 1992, 82). (For the 
classification into three eras o f corporate computing see Cash, McFarlan, McKenney, 1992, 10).
Both strategies o f control and decentralisation were empirically found to exist side by side within 
one MNE, the Swedish roller-bearing producer SKF (Hagstrom, 1991, 100).
20 The following articles refer to the adoption of internet standards within German multinational 
corporations. Claudia E. Petrik, “Intranet krempelt hierarchische Strukturen um. AuBer Kontrolle,” 
Gateway Magazin fur Daten- und Telekommunikation, Heise Verlag, September 1996, p. 44 — 46; 
„Chemie- und Pharmakonzern experimentiert mit intemem Web. Hoechst: Intranet-Guerillas 
unterwandem Infokultur,“ Computerwoche, Nr. 27, 05.07.96, p. 69, 70; Niko Waesche und L. 
Nikolaus Guntrum, Hoechst AG Frankfurt am Main, Realisation einer Intranet Kultur -  Am 
Beispiel des Hoechst Wide Web,“ Industrie Management, Nr. 6, Dezember 1996, p. 3 9 -4 2 ;  
„Intranet/ Die elektronischen Medien befinden sich auf dem Vormarsch, Der PC dient als 
Informationsmittel und Arbeitsinstrument,“ Handelsblatt, 25.11.96, p. 28.
21 The World Investment Report cites a total o f 40.000 parent MNEs with 250.000 foreign affiliates 
for 1992 (UNCTAD, 1995, xx, xxi); it is obvious that the great majority o f these corporations are not 
installing computer networks to conduct global business strategies. In fact, the same report labels 40 
MNEs as being very transnational, measuring over 50% on the UNCTAD's composite index of  
transnationality (UNCTAD, 1995, xxvi, xxvii). UNCTAD has published an index of global 
corporations by using estimates o f the proportion of foreign employees and foreign turnover. Only 
the largest companies are included in the list. Through these statistics, it is evident that only a small 
proportion o f today’s large multinational firms are becoming truly global. It has been pointed out
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"In fact, only 4 or 5 per cent of the total population of TNCs 
[transnational corporations] in the world can be regarded as truly global 
corporations" (1992, 49).
It is, however, not necessary for a multinational firm to be global in order to take 
advantage of transnational computer networks, although the intensity of use and the 
dependence upon these services probably increase as the firm starts integrating its 
world-wide activities to a greater extent. In fact, it does not even have to be the case 
that the firm is located in more than one country. Companies in just one location 
can be integrated into transnational computer networks. An interesting case are 
smaller firms, usually suppliers for industrial enterprises that are integrated into the 
international networks of their clients. In the 1990s, it became evident that, 
although FDI boomed, ownership was not necessarily the only means the 
experimentally inclined MNE globalised its business processes; this is, in the words 
of Dicken, "an unsatisfactory narrow view of its geographical scope and influence " 
(Dicken, 1992, 48).
The trend in linking large corporations to smaller firms through computer networks 
originated in what was called electronic data interchange (EDI). EDI services 
allowed flexible manufacturing techniques to be implemented and shift holding 
costs and business risk from the manufacturer to the participating supplier (Cash, 
McFarlan, McKenney, 1992, 71, 72). In the USA, more than 60% of all firms 
apparently utilised some form of EDI in the mid-1990s (Wigand et al, 1997, 260).22 
Yet, EDI was no more than a set of standards to facilitate data interchange among 
different company networks. EDI standards have been eclipsed by internet 
standards for data transfer, which serve as a common standard. Internet standards
that although foreign direct investment is growing rapidly, much of this is generated by firms with a 
single location abroad.
22 An externalisation o f risks and costs can take place in subcontracting relationships between large 
and small firms also without EDI services, o f course. Although subcontracting has existed since the 
beginnings o f industrialisation ("putting-out"), network technologies have allowed the development
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meet an acute demand. Data interchange among firms has grown tremendously, 
accelerated through outsourcing.23 By building shared network structures it is 
conceivable that new enterprise structures appear that function as a whole, yet are 
separate entities.24 Management literature has referred to this as the "boundaryless 
corporation."23 This trend climaxes in the widely publicised corporate models 
Toyota, Nike and Benetton, all so-called "hollow firms" because they largely 
consist of subcontracting networks of hundreds or thousands of suppliers.26
But network enthusiasts have not stopped here. The last bastion of the spread of 
corporate networks has been the consumer 27 If consumers can be integrated into 
the network, not only as a receiver but also as a sender of information, business 
processes can be further optimised. Thus, when the individual becomes part of the 
network, it is possible to create a complete "network economy"28 in which, for 
example, a computer order placed by an internet user results in an immediate signal 
being sent to the assembly plant which automatically manufactures the product
of'just-in-time' systems which intensity the externalisation o f risks and costs. (Dicken, 1992, 216- 
220; Rabach and Kim, 1994, 128; Cash, McFarlan, McKenney, 1992, 71, 72).
23 For an in-depth overview of outsourcing, see "Outsourcing: The new IT strategy," the 6th chapter 
o f Currie, 1995, 130-153.
24 Given this background of EDI and internet-based data exchange, demand for network-based 
services can be divided into "purposive" and "passive" adopters. The first group are early adopters, 
users who want to be on the forefront o f technology or firms seeking competitive advantage. The 
second group are users who adopt a technology only when has become widespread or who are asked 
to adopt network-based services by their industry, by either dominant customers or suppliers. Firms 
leading in the adoption o f inter-organisational computer networks can also be labelled "facilitator" or 
"electronic market maker" in contrast to the "participant." For a concise discussion o f reasons for 
adoption and a classification of adopters into 'purposive' and 'passive' see DTI, 1987, "Executive 
Summary" and 49, 50; for inter-organisational systems initiatives see Cash, McFarlan, McKenney 
(1992, p. 74); for the term "electronic market maker" see Wigand et al (1997, 275, 276).
25 Seen another way, computer networks make transaction costs affordable for certain less 
hierarchically organised tasks even in inter-organisational exchanges (for a discussion o f transaction 
costs in the light o f IT systems, see Wigand et al, 1997, 37-42).
26 The Toyota, Nike and Benetton examples can be found in Dicken (1992, 221, diagram 222, 251, 
281). These subcontracting networks were primarily organisational and not necessarily supported by 
IT networks.
27 Consider the quote from the back cover of an American bestseller: "The individual will become 
more o f an entrepreneur, a private contractor, in complete control of his or her finances, with easy 
access to enormous computing power- in fact the sovereign individual" (Davidson and Rees-Mogg,
1997).
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according to customer specifications. Many of these transactional services are of the 
"self-service" type.29
Thus far, these schemes have been realised only in a few instances such as 
computers as well as in the travel and financial industries. Customised 
manufacturing processes such as the so-called “Dell system,” named after a 
computer manufacturer, are thus far only feasible in highly modular segments. It is 
important to note here, that, on the internet, there is no distinction in network costs 
whether the networked individual is abroad, thus sparking a transnational 
transaction, or within the same country as the company offering the service. Some 
cases are known in which internet firms have provided services which have 
involved significant cross-border transactions. One example is Tiss, a two-person 
German internet start-up in Heilbronn selling flight tickets mostly to consumers in 
the USA and generating substantial, nine digit DM revenues already in 1997 and 
1998.
Recent work in sociology has researched the use of the internet by individuals. 
Sociology has also been an avid contributor to literature about "globalisation." 
Although the amount of people actually working outside their home country is very 
limited and the percentage of these that are globally mobile workers is even 
smaller,30 sociologists have attempted to show why even those living in their 
country of origin are feeling more aware of global interdependence. The work 
ranges from examining how the identity of individuals may be affected in a global
28 For an ode to demand power updated to the age of the internet see McKenna, 1997. Like so many 
other books in the popular management literature segment, it is based almost entirely on anecdotal 
evidence.
29 From the view o f the economy as a whole, the proliferation o f these services partially results in a 
transfer of labour from paid, employee jobs to unpaid labour carried out by the client herself. This 
has been pointed out by Beck (1986, 352), who, however, does not consider new jobs created by 
computer network maintenance.
30 The group o f truly globally mobile can be reduced to a small group of highly skilled, highly paid 
professionals, the so-called "club class" (Hirst and Thompson, 22-31) or "transnational kernel" 
(Sunkel quoted in Stopford and Strange, 1991, 21). Only 1.5% of the global labour force worked 
outside their country in 1993. In the EU, despite the existence o f only a few restrictions o f labour 
mobility, this figure was only 2% (Castells, 1996 I, 232, 234).
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environment to discussing the risks or fears people may feel.31 The possible effects 
of a parallel increase of self-employment and independent contractorship as well as 
increasing uncertainties regarding retirement have been debated (Coyle, 1997, xiv, 
xv, 216).32 Another strand of work has culminated in the concept of the "knowledge 
worker," or, what Robert Reich called the "symbolic analysts" (Reich, 1991).33 A 
growth in cultural production has been noted in industrialised countries.34 In the 
United States, the number of "teleworkers" working from home via a network 
connection has been estimated to be as high as seven million by the Department of 
Transportation (US Department of Commerce, 1998, 48, 61). Castells generalises
31 Regarding the question o f identity in a global age, it was Akio Morita o f Sony who coined the 
phrase "global localisation" (See Ohmae, 1994, 8, 9). Globalisation is viewed by sociologists as a 
force that redefines what is meant by the "local." Globalisation and "deglobalization" thus go hand in 
hand (Robertson, 1992, 8, 10). Whereas in "traditional" societies the "local" was simply what was 
commonplace and usual, the "local" now is something that constantly interacts with the "global." The 
"local" thus is not what it used to be, but instead is a "tricky version o f the local which operates 
within, and has been thoroughly reshaped by the global and operates largely within its logic" (Wilson 
and Dissanayake, 1996, 5). The "local" covers a diverse range o f phenomena from from food to 
forms of "communal resistance" such as religious fundamentalism (Castells, 1997, 11,12). Global 
risks and uncertainty play a role in the global/local nexus as well. In the case o f Ulrick Beck, this is 
fueled by fear, in the case o f Giddens, by an increasing need to understand identity in a global 
context. (Beck, 1986). Within international relations writing, James Rosenau has called this the 
"emergence o f global issues" citing AIDS and atmospheric pollution (Rosenau, 1990, 12, 13). World 
society thus becomes a "community o f danger" (Waters, 1995, 62). Others argue that there is a trend 
for more people to be involved in cultural production itself and that this type o f production is 
inherently globally oriented. With the real or perceived changes o f the 'Information Society1 came 
new insecurities and the need for experimentation, felt by businesses as well as individuals. Kenichi 
Ohmae points out that "Nothing is 'overseas' any longer" (Ohmae, 1994, viii).
32 Part-time and temporary work has increased by about 30% in industrialised countries to about 50 
million workers (Castells, 1996, 266).
33 Michael S. Scott Morton defines the 'knowledge worker' as a fraction o f the work force working 
with information and adding value to it. Morton believes that in the manufacturing industries 40% o f  
employees and the service industry 80% of employees are 'knowledge workers' or 'information 
workers' (who process information without significant modification) (1991, p. 10).
34 Harvey discusses the growth of cultural production citing the rising numbers of artists as an 
example, "and this is only the tip o f an iceberg o f cultural production." Harvey then names local 
entertainers and graphic designers, "as well as those who are the 'culture transmitters'," in publishing, 
magazines, broadcast media. Paris apparently boasted only 2.000 artists in the last century, whereas 
New York City in the 1980s was the home for 150.00 artists exhibiting in 680 galleries (Harvey,
1990, 290). The cultural or design services are, furthermore, becoming increasingly international in 
scope. King cites the importance of international contracts for US architectural firms as an example 
of this trend (King, 1990, 398-400). It could be added that, due among other things to changes 
caused by the internationalisation o f media, firms are aware of the need to communicate on a 
political and moral level; one o f the contentions of some sociologists is, therefore, that corporations 
are becoming more like cultural institutions and are in increasing need o f cultural-type services.
Beck describes how business is acquiring a new moral and political dimension (Beck, 1986, 304,
305, 356).
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these trends into a development he calls the "individualisation of work" (Castells, 
1996, 201-326).
This thinking has also begun to inspire writers within the field of political economy 
leading to alarmist as well as enthusiastic ruminations. Rosenau stresses the 
reflexive self-consciousness of individuals exposed to globalisation (Castells, 1996, 
229, 230; Rosenau, 1990, 13, 15). Stopford and Strange contend how the 
transnational flow of ideas and beliefs, reflected also in consumer expectations and 
demand, can result in pressure on governments (Stopford and Strange, 1991, 20). 
Ohmae has stated the same even more idealistically:
"Governments can still arbitrage information or otherwise protect their 
markets by forcing citizens to buy high-priced beef (as is the case in 
Japan) or poor-quality automobiles (the case in India and Brazil), but 
product labels are spreading all over the world and news of product 
performance is harder to suppress. Information has empowered 
consumers" (1994, 4).
Discussing the effects of globalisation on the individual was, as this brief excursion 
into sociology shows, very much en vogue in the late 1990s. It is indeed quite 
possible that early consumer demand for internet services in the late 1990s was, in 
part, related to the global reach of the network, in contrast to older, country-only 
on-line services. It is also true, however, that most internet services are devised for 
a local audience, despite the possibilities of global reach. A study of the European 
Commission showed that 42% of all European internet services are offered only in 
the local language, not in English (European Commission, 1997, 29). The key to 
understand more about internet uptake among consumers would be to segment 
users into early adopters and mass users. This is not the place to follow this lead, 
but the contention made here is that internet demand was pioneered by early 
pioneers who explicitly searched for international services. These early adopters 
also were witnessing increased “globalisation” in their careers and private lives.
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It can, however, be safely said that the demand for internet services and other 
network-based services at home is highly dependent on cost. Cost has thus far 
prevented video-on-demand or interactive television from being realised on a broad 
scale (Wigand et al, 1997, 277). For private consumers, the cost of internet access 
depends largely on the cost of telephony services, because usually they "dial into" 
their internet service provider over a local phone line. Regulation is an important 
issue affecting the cost of telephony services as well as influencing the growth of 
internet infrastructure directly, as we will see in the next chapter.35
Given cost sensitivity, it is important to bear in mind, however, that internet use 
may be growing, but that it is far from being ubiquitous, even in the Triad countries. 
In this thesis, therefore, the author refers to the potential for ubiquity which acted as 
an important incentive for entrepreneurship. The use of global computer services, 
among consumers as well as among firms, was largely an experiment which 
considerably slowed its pace after market downturn from the year 2000. Similarly, 
the transition to the ‘global’ corporation (as opposed to the ‘multinational’ 
enterprise) itself is on precarious grounds; the period of transition coincided with a 
period of strong economic growth in the USA. Some sociologists and management 
theorists, even political economists, can be criticised for forgetting this when 
extrapolating trends from the late 1990s into the future. This speculative section on 
the origins of demand will be concluded with a reminder that similar issues to those 
discussed here already at an earlier point in time were popular in international 
relations and political economy. The 1970s heralded the rise of the "international 
society" and an increasingly interdependent world.
35 In some countries, internet access is restricted, for example in Vietnam, where an internet user 
requires a police permit. In India, a monopoly for internet service existed until Fall 1998.
36 There were important differences, however. Whereas the growing interdependency o f the world 
was in the 1970s seen as strengthening international organisations such as the UN, it is today viewed 
more ambivalently. Interdependency means new opportunities as well as new risks. Computer 
networks allow "minority" forms o f personal and collective identification- some sociologists refer to 
a rise o f "sub politics" (for example, Beck, 1986, 304, 238, 329)- to be established world-wide. 
Globalisation thus involves complexity and density, not homogeneity. In fact, heterogeneity is a 
response to globalisation (Robertson, 1992, 98-105, 188; Featherstone, 1990, 1, 2, 10). Despite the 
apparent proliferation o f American television programmes and other aspects o f US culture, an
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Entrepreneurial activity and supply boom
The founder of Amazon.com, an internet service company with one of the highest 
profiles in the late 1990s, described how he had originally perceived his chances of 
success in an FT interview:
"Yes. I find [the growth of Amazon.com] surprising. Anyone who had 
predicted what has actually happened would have had to be 
institutionalised."37
Growth in the demand for internet services was accompanied from the mid-1990s 
to the end of the decade by a period of massive investment and company foundation 
in the United States. The years after 1995 saw a rise in venture capital investment in 
internet-related companies from US$ 134 million to almost two billion dollars in 
1997. This figure rose to almost 20 billion US dollars in 1999 (refer to Table 2). 
This private investment activity was accompanied by dozens of stock market 
listings of internet service and software companies, a small number of which were 
spectacular, fuelling the imagination of the financial industry and further inciting 
investment. Already at the end of 1996, there were more than twenty internet 
companies listed on NASDAQ (Reid, 1997, xvi). This section will examine the key 
drivers fuelling this boom, especially venture capital investments in the United 
States, as well as explore the internationalisation of US internet start-ups.
Three main types of internet start-ups will be examined here: Web development 
agencies, portal and community sites as well as electronic commerce companies.
All three types of firms have contributed to the commercialisation and international 
success of the internet, yet they have distinct revenue models. Indeed, one could
"Americanisation," or "Coca-Colonization" as a form o f homogenisation is not taking place; the 
response to global/American culture is varied (Featherstone, 1990, 10).
37 "Billionaire nerd on his own bandwidth," Financial Times, 13.11.98, 13.
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extend this list much further. The internet has created a great variety of companies 
with different business models many of which will disappear, be adapted or 
consolidated. Missing from the list of types of firms to be examined here are 
internet service providers (ISPs), internet software companies and so-called 
business-to-business (B2B) start-ups. All of these firms which dominated the initial 
stages of internet development also underwent rapid change of their business 
models. All three company types, furthermore, had their greatest window of 
opportunity where the “disruptive” potential of the internet was the largest: In 
linking consumers to businesses and enabling seamless network transactions.
Of the three internet businesses discussed here, web development companies 
employ the most traditional revenue model: Professional services. In the mid-1990s, 
web development companies appeared in large numbers all over the United States 
and the rest of the world. They helped other companies establish a presence on the 
internet; especially lucrative opportunities were those in which client systems were 
extended to consumers and new interfaces were formed between businesses and 
consumers. Here, the web developers had clear advantages over the traditional 
consultants working with established companies, the IT consultants and systems 
integrators. The top web developers, firms such as USWeb, iXL and Agency.com, 
grew rapidly in the USA and abroad, mos.tly by acquiring smaller firms in their 
field. In Europe, all three were active in several countries, giving them pan- 
European scope. Internationalisation was a key growth strategy, because the most 
lucrative clients are multinational companies, which demand that global accounts 
be executed by several world-wide offices in concert. The three players mentioned 
here were well financed, either through venture capital-groups or, in the case of 
Agency.com, through a global advertising holding company. All were listed on 
NASDAQ. The acquired firms often are smaller companies, which are under­
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capitalised and focused on a local market- this is true for in Europe as well as the 
USA.38
The second basic type of internet start-up to be discussed here is the portal and 
community site. It obtained its revenues mainly through advertising targeting 
consumers. The most successful portal players from the USA, Yahoo!, Excite and 
Lycos, all internationalised quickly in an effort to extend their "mindshare" and 
"brand equity" (see Table 1, below). In its internationalisation strategy, Yahoo! was 
an innovator by first realising it needed to enter each foreign market separately with 
its own presence instead of trying to use the global reach of the internet to host an 
internet service for several countries from a single location.39 Organic growth was 
the main internationalising strategy of this type of player since the number of 
employees required to run an international office is small. A local presence was 
important, however, not only to intensify the advertising sales effort in each 
country, but also to adapt content to local language and culture. Despite organic 
growth strategies, establishing a significant international brand was costly, due to 
marketing measures, and the majority of European start-up portals were not able to 
extend their reach beyond at most a few direct neighbours. As a consequence, in 
Europe, internet brand building was dominated by established media and 
telecommunications companies, or US start-ups.
38 They mostly financed their growth through earnings. Web development firms are the easiest type 
of internet company to launch, with minimal capital requirements, making it also the most popular 
type o f internet player in all countries.
39 This was the initial European strategy for France and Germany followed by Excite from its 
London office. See Niko Waesche, "Building a Global Brand Name that the Locals Can't Spell, 
Excite Takes on American and Indigenous Portals in Europe," Tornado-Insider.com Magazine, 
April 1999, Number 1, pages 67-70, 103.
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Table 1. International presence of the three most important internet search services 
("Portals"), Fall 1988.40
Yahoo Excite Lycos
UK • • •
Germany • • •
France • • •
Italy • • •
Spain • •
Austria •
Switzerland •
Luxembourg •
Netherlands • •
Belgium •
Sweden • • •
Norway •
Denmark •
Japan • • •
China • •
Korea •
Singapore •
Australia • •
The last type of internet start-up to be discussed here are the so-called "electronic 
commerce" firms. They generated revenue by selling products or services to 
consumers through the internet. Some of the highest profile US start-ups here were 
Amazon.com (books) or E*TRADE (internet broker). In the beginning, these firms 
did not internationalise through offices abroad. From a single location, 
Amazon.com sold books in 160 countries; E*TRADE carried out transactions for
40 Data obtained from company information on the internet (http://www.yahoo.com/, 
http://www.excite.com/, http://www.lycos.com/). Only in a few cases is a national presence actually 
provided for out of that country. Mostly, a targeted service in the country's language is created in a 
centralised regional office. The European activities of Lycos Inc. are carried out in a joint venture 
with Bertelsmann AG.
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investors in 119 countries.41 The possibility of "exporting" goods and services via 
the internet to consumers is why these firms were slower to internationalise than the 
first two types of internet companies described here, which were dependent on 
catering to local businesses as clients. Nevertheless, the global electronic commerce 
model reached a certain natural limit. By early 1998, Amazon.com expanded 
internationally through acquisition of existing foreign players in Germany and the 
UK.42 E*TRADE launched its third international web site in France in March 1999 
together with a local investment bank, CPR.43 US electronic commerce players 
found that the foreign companies they bought and partnered with were well- 
established in their local market- similar to the web development companies. But, 
most had not built an extensive international presence themselves; they were 
domestic players.
To a great extent, the new US ventures mentioned here can be credited for 
inventing new revenue models or adapting existing ones to new circumstances. 
These innovators, however, also benefited from the unique opportunities available 
in the US through sophisticated internet demand structure and aggressive private 
and public capital markets. Their internationalisation was carried by the strength of 
their home base. US internet demand was early on marked by both high absolute 
user numbers, with the number of internet users in 1998 estimated at 79 million, as 
well as high penetration in the population, 29%.
Whereas high absolute user numbers represent large potential market size, high 
penetration rates and time spent online are indicators of sophistication of demand. 
Unlike most other markets, US internet demand already in the 1990s moved from 
early adoption to mainstream use. All three types of revenue models described here 
rely, directly or indirectly, on sophisticated internet demand structures. High
41 According to company web sites accessed on 28.11.99.
42 In Germany, Amazon acquired Telebuch ABC Biicherdienst and in the UK, Bookpages. 
Amazon.com press release, "Amazon.com Acquires Three Leading Internet Companies,
Acquisitions Extend Company's Ability to Serve International Customers," Seattle, 27.04.98.
43 Previous international launches were in Canada and Australia.
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penetration rates, for example, are crucial for web development companies. Their 
clients, such as banks or airlines, only considered an extensive internet presence and 
advanced internet service offerings if they could be sure that these new services 
would be able to reach a significant proportion of their customers. This was echoed 
in a Financial Times article on Sweden: "Once Internet penetration reaches a certain 
point, the development of services such as internet banking can take off."44 
Established firms such as the aforementioned banks and airlines also invested in 
internet advertising only if their advertising demonstrated adequate reach; thus, 
advertising expenditures were also dependent upon penetration. Portals, in turn, 
relied on advertising revenues. Lastly, penetration also was important for electronic 
commerce companies- if internet penetration had not increased in the US and 
spread the internet more broadly in the population, Amazon.com would not have 
sold more than computer books. Time spent online also was crucial for some of the 
same reasons. For users to become acquainted with new service offerings over the 
internet, it was important that time spent online was not discouraged by metered 
pricing in the USA. In all of Europe, metered pricing discouraged internet use in the 
late 1990s, slowing down the development from early adoption to mass use 45
Michael Porter, who has helped popularise the concept of home demand conditions 
in the analysis of internationalisation, argues that advanced domestic demand is 
crucial for the long-term competitiveness of internationally oriented companies 
(Porter, 1990, 86-100). US internet start-ups certainly took advantage of the 
sophistication of their home market, i.e. strong consumer penetration, to develop 
innovative business models which could be "exported" abroad. Start-ups also 
benefited considerably from aggressive and buoyant capital markets- both venture
44 Nicholas George, "Chilly Regions o f North Warm to the Net," Financial Times, 13.10.99, page 
16.
45 In Germany, NetCologne was unique in offering capped unmetered access for private users since 
early 1998. This service was available only in the Cologne area. Even in 1999, the reality for most 
internet users throughout Europe was access to the internet via a local, metered telephone 
connection.
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capital and private investors vigorously pursued internet opportunities in the late 
1990s.
The total public market valuation of US internet companies already in May 1999 
stood at approximately USD 300 Billion.46 Stock prices of internet firms were 
based on expected earnings, not on current earnings 47 Furthermore, firms were 
hastened through the development stages at an extraordinary pace. The Silicon 
Valley newspaper San Jose Mercury News stated already in 1998 that it was not 
uncommon for an IPO to occur 18 to 24 months after a company was founded.
The massive returns possible through a NASDAQ initial public offering (IPO) in 
the late 1990s and the speed of the offerings made possible increasingly risky and 
daring venture capital investments- the most striking example being perhaps the 
venture capital-financed, pre-IPO acquisition strategy of the web development 
company iXL in the USA and abroad. To finance its pre-IPO growth, iXL raised 
more than USD 60 Million. From its foundation in March 1996 to its public listing 
at NASDAQ in June 1999, iXL acquired 34 companies. It grew from 90 employees 
in January 1997 to approximately 1,300 employees by December 1998 48 It would 
have been impossible at the time to replicate the iXL story in Europe. Table 2 
below shows the massive amount of funding poured into internet start-ups by 
venture capitalists in the United States in the 1990s.
46 European public internet companies at that time had a total valuation o f less than USD 10 Billion. 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Equity Research Europe, "The European Internet Report," June 1999, 
page 167.
47 The stocks o f the so-called Internet "portal" services which offer Internet search enjoyed 
especially high valuations. In Fall 1988, for example, the stock prices o f Yahoo and Excite were 184 
and 88 times (P/E) that o f their 1999 expected earnings per share (EPS). The share o f Lycos, a 
similar service, was priced 107 times of their year 2000 EPS. Internet professional services 
companies did not enjoy multiples that high. CKS Goup, for example, achieved a P/E o f 15 times 
before its acquisition by USWeb Corp. (Reinvent).
48 Filing of iXL Enterprises, Inc. with US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(http://www.sec.gov/). S-l, 08.02.99. See also Waesche, 1999b, 201, 202.
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Table 2. Growth in venture capital investments USA in US$ billion.49
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Growth
1995-99
All industries 7.6 9.5 13.8 14.3 35.6 368%
Technology 4.0 6.0 8.5 10.8 32.4 710%
Internet-related 0.1 ca. 0.9 1.9 3.4 19.9 19,800%
But venture capital also was important beyond the financial dimension. In the US, 
well-known venture capitalists "opened doors" to partnerships and other business 
relationships. They provided a start-up with "legitimacy." It is not objective of this 
study to examine this point in detail, although some researchers still feel the process 
of adding value beyond capital by venture capitalists is as of yet imperfectly 
understood (Steier and Greenwood, 1995, 340).50 In preparation for an argument 
which will be made later, the following point is relevant, however: Some of these 
important "supportive" services provided by venture capitalists can be offered by 
alternative means as well. "Door opening" and "legitimacy" was provided for in 
Sweden by private individual investors.
In summary, it was a combination of different factors which helped US internet 
start-ups grow both at home and internationally. The most important were advanced 
demand conditions domestically- early transition from pioneer to mass consumer 
use- as well as aggressive capital markets.
49 Source: Price Waterhouse Venture Capital Surveys, now the PricewaterhouseCoopers Money Tree 
Survey. A measurement change occurred after 1998; the numbers before that year are cited slightly 
lower in subsequent surveys. The most recent data used was PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Moneytree 
US Report, Full Year & Q4 1999 Results.”
50 For a discussion of some of these value-added services beyond capital, please refer to MacMillan 
et al, 1988 and Timmons and Bygrave, 1986.
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The role of the USA: Multilateral or bilateral flows?
Was the internet in the late 1990s characterised internationally by multilateral flows 
with different parts of the world interchanging data in a complex pattern? Or should 
the early world-wide internet more aptly be described as a bilateral system wherein 
most data travels to and from the United Sates? This question will in different 
guises follow us throughout this study. A multilateral flow would match the vision 
of the networkist thinkers, which believed “their” network to be non-hierarchical 
and without a centre. This belief was supported by the technological underpinnings 
of the internet. Furthermore, the global electronic networks originally pioneered by 
financial services and multinational enterprises (MNEs), the predecessors to the 
internet, seemed to link the so-called “triad” of industrialised regions in a 
multilateral way.
Bilateral flows would signal dominance of the US supply of internet services; 
multilateral flows correspond to a scenario in which different countries are equal 
participants in an entrepreneurial “leapfrogging” contest. Indeed, existing data on 
internet flows did reveal the strong dominance of the US at the time and was highly 
bilateral. Unfortunately, it was impossible to tell whether this was due only to the 
architecture of the network. Data was often transported via the US while moving 
from one international location to the next.51
In the second half of the 1990s, however, the United States dominated the internet 
not solely in terms of its architecture. The largest group of internet users by far were 
located in the United States. It was, furthermore, very clear that the wave of 
entrepreneurial activity surrounding the commercialisation of the internet had its 
centre in the United States. This activity was financed by enthusiastic capital 
markets including a buoyant venture capital industry.
73
In fact, a strong case can be made that internet flows among businesses were, in the 
late 1990s, multilateral, whereas consumer flows were to a large degree still 
bilateral. As described in this chapter, internet innovations had their greatest 
“disruptive” potential in networking consumers and linking them to businesses. 
Most of the new services for consumers were pioneered by US entrepreneurs acting 
upon this opportunity. The timing in the mid- to late 1990s was perfect: Internet 
usage was moving in the United States rapidly from early adoption towards 
mainstream penetration rates. Approaching ubiquity increased the disruptive 
potential of the internet, a clear signal for entrepreneurs (Christensen, 1997). This 
was not the case in most other countries. There, early pioneers existed but the 
movement towards mainstream use was not apparent. The early adopters outside the 
United States took advantage of North American internet service offerings. Local 
offerings or services from other non-US countries did not seem as innovative and 
did not have a comparable depth.
Some of the more successful of the public and private firms in the United States 
soon realised that their services were attractive for international users as well. Some 
began to internationalise their business, by creating more targeted services for 
international users and by opening offices in other countries. Internationalising 
American firms did not enter virgin territory, however, but rather markets in which 
local entrepreneurs had been active for some time. Yet, these entrepreneurs could 
not address consumer opportunities with the same vigour and breath as in the 
United States. Entrepreneurs abroad were facing “unbalanced” demand for internet 
services due to some promising business use but laggard mainstream uptake among 
consumers. In addition, the start-up activities were undercapitalised. As a result, the 
strongest competition abroad for the US start-ups did not come from local start-ups, 
but from established media and telecommunications companies. A discussion of 
entrepreneurial activity outside of the USA is conspicuously absent in the this 
chapter. Using the case of Germany, however, much of the rest of this thesis will be
51 See the useful article by Kenneth Neil Cukier, “Global Telecom Rout,” Red Herring, February
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dedicated to explaining a case of development of internet entrepreneurship which 
was distinct from the United States. One of the objectives of the study is to 
understand how international growth of the internet- described in this Chapter and 
the next- actually signified a venture opportunity in countries other than the United 
States.
Before this discussion shifts to Germany, however, the next chapter, Chapter Three, 
will focus on the role of governments in the internationalisation of network-based 
services and the internet. In Chapter Three, the shifts discussed in this chapter will 
be linked to initial US government subsidies of the internet when it was a fledgling 
research network, the purposeful lack of effective direct regulation of internet 
services and the indirect effects of deregulation carried out by governments in 
financial services, telecommunications and FDI. The internationalisation of the 
internet cannot be correctly understood without discussing government 
contributions - especially US government contributions.
1999, pages 6 0 -6 4 .
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Chapter Three
Regulation and the Death of Distance1
As described in the previous chapter, in the second half of the 1990s, the internet 
represented a “global window of opportunity” for small firms. For the cost of setting up an 
internet site, a small firm could instantaneously achieve a world-wide presence and sell 
products or services to customers or businesses. Exchanging data in the private “intranets” 
of industrial multinationals was similarly distance insensitive. Distance insensitivity was 
unique at the time, because it stood in strong contrast to the pricing regime associated with 
basic telecommunication services, in which transnational connections were both distance 
sensitive and costly.
Drawing on a diverse set of literature, including practitioner thinking, economics and 
sociology, he previous chapter described the formation of two different types of globally 
connected data networks. One type were the private networks of industrial multinationals 
and their data-sharing partner companies. These networks served to co-ordinate world-wide 
business processes. The second type was an emerging, transnational consumer network. 
Both types of networks shared some common characteristics including embracing internet 
technologies as a world-wide standard. The most innovative internet start-ups dedicated 
themselves to connecting the two to create seamless “business webs” (Tapscott, Ticoll, 
Lowy, 2000). But the two shared a further characteristic, which was not discussed in the last 
chapter: They were both run over leased lines. By doing so, they bypassed the regulation 
regimes of basic telecommunication services. This impacted on the pricing of both, and 
allowed them to be generally distance insensitive.
1 This was the title of an Economist survey dedicated to developments in telecommunications and the internet. 
Frances Cairncross, "The Death of Distance," The Economist, 30.09.95.
2 This general statement was not true in all cases. The price o f cross-border basic voice services depended on 
bilateral agreements within an international accounting rate system. Pricing depended on the degree of 
competition allowed and the exact nature of the settlement. For this reason, the price of a telephone call 
between London and Paris could be higher than between London and New York.
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Distance insensitivity is commonly associated with technological factors such as the 
decentralised architecture of the internet and the co-operative peering system; these factors 
were discussed in the previous chapter. A further enabler, is, however, often overlooked: 
Government regulation. This chapter serves to describe the contribution of government 
policy to the growth of the internet. This chapter is important because, on an international 
scale, it discusses determinants which are again revisited in the case of Germany in the next 
part of the thesis.
Telecommunications policy was a crucial determinant. Firms using data networks such as 
the internet ran over leased lines and benefited from asymmetric regulation. The way 
international data networks were regulated was very different from the way basic 
telecommunication services were regulated. World-wide demand for the internet by both 
business users and consumers was deeply indebted to this regulatory asymmetry and the 
pricing regime it encouraged. It was even possible to argue that, to an extent, users of basic 
telecommunication services subsidised the use of the internet.
Next to distance insensitivity, a further- yet not uncontroversial- factor, which may have 
benefited start-ups, was the intentional lack of regulation in the areas of trade tariffs and 
cross-border consumer protection on the internet. It is argued here that the laissez-faire 
approach adopted by U.S. negotiators pre-empted international agreements. These 
agreements could have stunted small firm innovation and experimentation with new, 
internet-enabled business models on an international scale. Most important, perhaps, was 
the abstinence of government intervention in the demand-driven process of developing 
world-wide internet technological standards. The recent history of internet standards has 
shown that top-down government intervention in some cases was unnecessary and that 
“unaided” pressure by business users and consumers could lead to interoperability, at least 
through ’’open but owned" standards. Given the conditions of massive investment in the late 
1990s, there was no evidence that large software developers and network owners were able 
to use their market power to prevent interoperability. Although the largest and most 
influential software developer, Microsoft, at a certain point in time attempted to “embrace” 
the internet with its own proprietary standards, it failed. And this not because of the trial
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waged against it by the US justice system, but because of pressure by business and 
consumer users of the internet. Again, innovative small firms seem to have benefited.
In discussing this international "window of opportunity" for start-ups, it is impossible to 
ignore the role of the Clinton Administration. An Electronic Commerce Working Group 
was formed in December 1995, and Bill Clinton was proclaimed by his own officials as: 
"The first world leader to give the internet and electronic commerce a central role in his 
policy agenda" (U.S. Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, 1998, 5). The 
U.S. stance was mapped out a central policy document "A Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce" dated July 1997 (Clinton and Gore, 1997). It was endorsed by Bill Clinton and 
A1 Gore. Although the principles behind this document were not new and characterised 
U.S. negotiations in the IT area for some time, they were clearly articulated here. 
Negotiation was focused on creating optimal conditions for world-wide electronic 
commerce for U.S. firms; according to the rule: "What is good for U.S. internet start-ups is 
good for the world." In the words of A1 Gore: "...we are... helping to ensure that commerce 
goes digital, that business goes global and that innovation goes wild." (U.S. Government 
Working Group on Electronic Commerce, 1998, i).
The first part of this chapter will describe how data networks bypassed international 
telecommunications regulation. In the second part, a ‘telegeography’ of the internet will be 
presented. This section relies on research carried out by the TeleGeography research group; 
it showed that the global internet infrastructure was heavily dependent upon United States 
infrastructure acting as a world-wide "hub" and "data centre." The reason for this could be 
traced back to U.S. domestic policy which endorsed an important cross-subsidy privileging 
the internet, leading to both growth in use as well as massive infrastructure investment. The 
importance of this cross-subsidy shows that it was not just the fact that deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry was early which was critical for the development of electronic 
commerce in the U.S., but the way that deregulation came to pass. Due to the primacy of the 
United States in data networking, U.S. pricing of leased lines and its excellent infrastructure 
had an important impact on the world-wide direction of flows and usage. Infrastructure has 
also had a profound effect on the comparative size of national electronic commerce
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markets. It followed that for the purposes of many international start-ups, the world market 
was the U.S. market. Also for this reason, internationally co-ordinated attempts at 
government intervention were difficult to carry out without the participation of the United 
States. The third part of this chapter describes the intentional lack of regulation that existed 
in areas other than infrastructure, including the complex issue of technological standards. 
Then, an important question will be briefly problematised: Is a lack of international policy 
and regulation overall beneficial to small and innovative firms? There is no easy answer to 
this question. It seems certain, however, that mainstream success for an emerging world­
wide consumer internet eventually will require government framework intervention. The 
last part of this chapter examines an alternative to international co-ordinated policy- 
spontaneous occurrence of an internationally converging policy framework though 
regulatory competition among national governments. The key to convergence is 
transnational transactions and flows. The history of financial services is instructive here.
One caveat needs to be mentioned, however, before beginning the discussion. The aim of 
this chapter is to describe the role of government policy in creating a global network 
infrastructure for internet start-ups. The main political driver was U.S. government. Due to 
space constraints, "U.S. government" has been used as a general category and the internal 
political process is not discussed, save occasional references to the roles of the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, Department of Commerce, 
individual states and the Clinton Administration. In the subsequent analysis of the German 
policymaking process, efforts are made to expose the roles of different players.
Differences in the regulation of international data and telecommunications 
networks
A presence on the internet is automatically a global presence, at no additional cost. This is 
not only crucial for ventures which wanted to reach a world-wide consumer market but also 
for small companies that used the internet to share data with other businesses. Much has 
been written by network thinkers about the technological underpinnings of this
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‘instantaneous’ world-wide reach and the rise of a global standard associated with the 
internet. Less credit has been given to the role of asymmetric regulation.
Internet messages could traverse interconnected, separate world-wide data networks at zero 
marginal cost (Mason, 1998, 937, 938). As explained in the previous chapter, there were a 
number of technological and organisational reasons for this. Historically, internet networks 
passed data along in a co-operative fashion, relying on so called "peering" agreements. 
Usually, data lines were leased, and were charged according to the capacity of the line and 
not usage. Once the network infrastructure was in place, it could be used to carry vast 
amounts of messages simultaneously. In contrast, basic, switched-circuit analogue 
telecommunications had defined capacity limits. Furthermore, analogue signals had to be 
reinforced across long distances. Basic telecommunication services were more sensitive to 
distance and were often charged accordingly.3
But technology alone could not explain the price differences between international data and 
telecommunications services and the distance insensitivity of the internet. Up to 75% of the 
price of an international phone call was related to the costs of international settlements 
(Mason, 1998, 937). The international accounting rate system, which fixes the settlement 
rate, was firmly re-established after the Second World War and essentially was a set of 
bilateral pricing arrangements between national telephony monopolies. These bilateral 
arrangements were supported by an international organisation, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU).4 This international system traditionally functioned 
remarkably well. According to two policy experts: "The international telecommunications 
system is among the most successful examples of multilateral co-operation. The standards, 
rules, and regulations elaborated by the ITU and its subbodies have been widely respected 
by telecommunications common carriers, and the institutions themselves have avoided the 
crisis of legitimacy that has more generally affected the United Nations and its specialised 
agencies."5 This "cosy club" system contributed to an elevated price regime.
3 Analogue technologies are being improved and these statements may be invalidated in the near future.
4 For a discussion on the "Future of international settlements" see Cave and Waverman, 1998.
5 Ergas and Pogorel continue: "Compared with areas such as trade, finance or development assistance, 
international co-operation in telecommunications has been distinguished by the resilience o f the institutional
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However, private leased lines lay outside the international accounting rate regime; and the 
internet used leased lines. This position was confirmed in the agreements for services 
within the Uruguay Round (1993).6 In many developed countries, leased line data networks 
were liberalised before the GATS negotiations were completed. In Germany, for example, 
the PTO lost its monopoly on selling value-added network-based services (VANs) in 1989.7 
Thus, the process of liberalisation of basic telecommunication services on a world-wide 
level always was a step behind data lines- which were never regulated to the same extent. It 
should be noted that a WTO agreement on basic telecommunication services was achieved 
four years after the completion of the Uruguay Round, in 1997.8 Yet, the international 
accounting rate system still stayed untouched until the year 2000 due to a "gentlemen's 
agreement" between the signatory governments (see Cave and Waverman, 1998, 888, 889).
Regulatory asymmetry and competition led to massive investment in data networking 
infrastructure throughout the world. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the largest providers of 
VAN network services in Europe for business-to-business use were American firms; at that 
time they already were generating considerable revenues with data services.9 During the 
1990s, rising world-wide demand further accelerated investment decisions. In addition to 
investments by traditional telecommunications companies which wanted to benefit from
mechanisms on which it is based, the widespread acceptance and observance o f multilateral rules and 
regulations, and a relative lack of conflict between the technical function o f solving immediate problems and 
the claims o f contrasting ideologies and interests" (Ergas and Pogorel, 1994, 17-19). Among the reasons for 
this stability, the authors cite the necessity that international linkages between two domestic monopolies had to 
be provided jointly as well as "the small total number of participants and the high degree o f control exercised 
by each over its environment, by the dominance of an engineering/ public service culture and by a 
technological context whenever change was evolutionary" (Ergas and Pogorel, 1994, 18).
6 In the GATS Annex on Telecommunications, special considerations in the national schedules were made for 
private leased line data networks (Feketekuty, 1998, 82, 85).
7 Previously, the 1987 European Commission "Green Paper on the Development of a Common Market for 
Telecommunications Services and Equipment" proposed a fully open competitive environment for new, data- 
based services. The Green Paper influenced proposals for reform on a national level in two key markets with a 
strong public-service telecommunications tradition: Germany (the Witte Report, September 1988) and France 
(Thimm, 1992, 191).
8 The General Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services (GBT) entered into force on February 1998 
and included 69 signatory countries. Liberalisation of basic telecommunications in the EU was secured in 
accordance with the WTO schedule and went into effect in January 1998.
9 Noam lists the largest firms in the European VAN market in 1991: GTE Telenet ($500 million), IBM ($500 
million) and GE Information Services ($450 million). The top markets were the UK ($918 million), France 
($665 million) and Germany ($428 million) (Noam, 1992, 372, 373).
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offering international data services, new companies began to build extensive world-wide 
networks. One example was the CTR Group, New Jersey, whose project Oxygen was an 
unbroken, undersea fibre-optic network connecting 175 countries. Its estimated cost was 
$14 billion.10 These additional capacities were intended to be leased to internet service 
providers as well as other resellers of data services. In the late 1990s, investors thus 
expected that the demand for data lines would increase even more in the future. Although 
unlikely to be proved wrong, their prospects depend on government intervention. In several 
OECD countries some types of value-added data services were illegal.11 Furthermore, 
governments could theoretically intervene to break the asymmetry in regulation between 
international telecommunications and data network regimes.
In its technological structure, the internet is decentralised and this would make it difficult 
for governments or corporations to impose distance pricing even if they wanted to. But it 
would not be impossible. Despite its technologically rooted decentralised nature, the 
internet internationally was (and still is) subject to a high degree of ownership concentration 
as well as high traffic concentration in certain key points. One company, MCI WorldCom, 
owned a significant proportion of all world-wide internet lines, despite a ruling by the 
European Commission which forced it to sell part of its internet holdings. Furthermore, 
intercontinental internet traffic between Europe and the United States travelled mostly 
through a few, highly concentrated paths, mainly between Amsterdam and New York and 
London and New York. Both the largest owners as well as the data hubs represented 
possible loci for intervention. It would not have been impossible in the late 1990s to meter 
intercontinental traffic and to charge distance-sensitive fees. In fact, a volume-based charge 
for incoming transcontinental internet traffic was levied on academic users of the UK 
JANET network as of August 1998.12
Although the positioning of data networks outside the basic telecommunications regime 
seemed an established fact from a contemporary viewpoint, this was not always been the
10 Jonathan Burke, "Submarine Attack," The Red Herring, November 1997, 104, 106.
11 Such as voice over data services ("internet telephony") which was banned in one-third o f OECD countries if 
it involved a telephone on at least one end of the line (Mason, 1998, 937).
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case. Historically, there was tension between the two worlds. Incumbent 
telecommunications carriers tried to bring data networks back into the comfortable fold of 
telecommunications, resorting to both political and technological means. One example was 
the push for ISDN in Germany. ISDN was originally introduced as a data networking 
alternative to leased lines and the data networking standards of IBM, IBM-SNA. Although 
this undertaking probably was chimerical from the onset, it shows that the data network 
regime was perceived as a real challenge to PTO-style telecommunications already in the 
early 1980s. An account by Jill Hills described this conflict from the perspective of a 
contemporary, passionate observer (Hills, 1986, see especially the Introduction, 1-23).
The subsidised U.S. internet acts as a global hub
The U.S. in the late 1990s was the network hub and data centre of the world, both for 
business and in consumer use. Already in the late 1970s, the French Nora-Minc Report 
noted the preponderance of U.S. data centres.13 This was related to the fact that a large 
proportion of multinational industrial as well as financial corporations was American. The 
competitive advantage in data centres for business use was extended in the late 1990s to the 
commercial internet. During the 1998 football World Cup, for example, internet coverage 
of the French event was served mostly out of the United States for a mostly European 
audience. Hosting the service in Europe would have been less economical and less efficient. 
Disney's web sites for the European market were formerly hosted by AT&T in Amsterdam- 
they were moved to Hawaii in 1999 to benefit from its better network infrastructure.14 60% 
of all users of the internet were located within the United States. An estimated 80% of all 
electronic commerce transactions occurred within the U.S.A.
12 The "Announcement of the Start of Usage Charging for Transatlantic Traffic" from 31.07.98 can be found 
on the web page http://www.ja.net/press_release/charging.html.
13 Eli Noam mentioned the U.S. headstart in on-line databases in his book on telecommunications in Europe. 
He cites an OECD report that listed 1983 sales of on-line data services in Western Europe as amounting to 
less than 10% of sales in the United States (Noam, 1992, 402).
14 Kenneth Neil Cukier, "Global Telecom Rout," The Red Herring, February 1999, 60-64.
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The research group TeleGeography analysed the global data network at length in 1998. Not 
only did most of the data originate from the United States; often, data flows between 
different countries, for example Germany and France, were channelled across the U.S. as 
well. One statistic was especially instructive: In Europe, no two nations were connected to 
each other through more than 700 mbps, whereas total bandwidth to the U.S. amounted to 4 
gbps.13 There were two related reasons for this. One was that the internet backbone network 
in most countries outside the United States was not centrally planned. Most internet service 
providers, noting that much of the flow was between their users and servers located in the 
United States, leased a network connection to the U.S.A. and did not bother with domestic 
connections. The few domestic or intra-European requests could be routed across the 
U.S.A. The second reason for the global hub function of the U.S.A. was that the network 
infrastructure within the States was excellent. New ventures such as Level 3, Qwest, IXC 
and Williams invested large sums in building a long-distance domestic data infrastructure 
which could be put to use for both corporate as well as consumer data networks (Pospischil, 
1998, 747, 748).
The excellence of the domestic U.S. internet infrastructure was, in part, due to direct and 
indirect subsidies which promoted usage growth and acted as an incentive to investment. 
The internet backbone network was originally constructed as a research network connecting 
several universities scattered across the United States. This centrally planned and federally 
financed research network was the foundation for the later, privatised internet.
Even more influential for user demand and private infrastructure investment, however, was 
the indirect subsidy of the internet in the United States. This indirect subsidy began as an 
unintentional consequence of evolving regulation in the aftermath of the AT&T break-up 
and was later supported by the federal government in order to encourage growth of the 
internet. U.S. regulation historically dictated that local telephony service should be 
packaged with the connection fee. In much of the U.S.A., therefore, a flat fee was charged 
for unlimited local service. This local service was cross-subsidised through a charge on 
long-distance service, which represented about 40% of long-distance carrier's costs and was
15 Kenneth Neil Cukier, "Global Telecom Rout," The Red Herring, February 1999, 61.
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levied by local telecommunications carriers. This charge, however, did not apply to internet 
service providers.16 The emerging commercial internet thus profited in two ways from this 
regulatory structure. Firstly, local access to an internet service provider was part of the flat 
local fee and thus appeared "free" to the user. Secondly, internet service providers did not 
have to contribute to the upkeep of this cross-subsidisation because they were a data and not 
a voice service. It could be argued that this regime effectively meant that long-distance 
telephony users subsidised internet use through their payments (see the excellent discussion 
by Pospischil, 1998, 750, 751). With the growth of internet use, this imbalance was bound 
to upset local telephony carriers. The FCC considered in April 1998 to amend this 
asymmetrical regime, but postponed a decision in this sensitive area (Pospischil, 1998, 752, 
753). Throughout the 1990s, federal policy emphasised the protection of the emerging 
internet industry.
The dominance of U.S. networking infrastructure in the global system of flows is one 
example of how domestic policies "spill over" into the international realm. Very apparent 
were the advantages for companies that chose to host their international services from a 
location within the United States. From the dominant U.S. position in data networking 
followed some critical realities for both business and government. Start-ups from countries 
outside the U.S. adjusted to U.S. standards and usage patterns. The world market was the 
U.S. market. Attempts at international co-operation between governments would probably 
have failed without participation of the U.S. For this reason, U.S. policymakers could act in 
a strategic and pre-emptive way, blocking any possible international agreements which 
could be based on the strong, international and co-operative regulatory traditions in 
telecommunications.
16 Rachelle Chong, "Controlling Tendencies," The Red Herring, January 1999, 116.
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Intentional lack of regulation in other areas
"...The Administration wants the internet to provide an open and stable 
environment with a minimum of government regulation for trade and 
commerce.1’17
"For all the rhetoric of an internet free trade zone, will the United States readily 
accept an internet that includes Thai child pomographers, Albanian tele-doctors, 
Cayman Island tax dodgers, Monaco gambling, Nigerian blue sky schemes, Cuban 
mail-order catalogues? Or, for that matter, American violators of privacy, 
purveyors of junk E-mail or 'self-regulating' price-fixers? Unlikely. And that other 
countries will feel the same on matters they care about" (Eli Noam quoted in 
Magaziner, 1998, 534).
The international reach and pricing structure of the internet and other data networks would 
in itself have been sufficient to amount to a massive window of opportunity for small firms 
with global ambitions. It is possible to contend that the international manoeuvrability of 
firms was further increased by an intentional lack of regulation in other areas, this applies 
especially to the lack of international technical standard-setting through governments. But 
what appeared to some as a welcome recess from government intervention seemed to others 
an uncertain, volatile environment. And the debate needs to be clearly differentiated 
according to specific issues; in some areas, government intervention may seem more 
necessary than in others.
In this section it will be shown that, if it wanted to, the U.S. government could have, alone 
or in co-operation with partners, intervened and significantly have changed the course of 
development of the internet.18 In various issues and in various multilateral and bilateral 
fora, however, U.S. government negotiators argued for a temporary "hands-off* stance. 
Laissez-faire was the cornerstone stance of U.S. policy towards the internet, heralded on the 
1st of July 1997, when Bill Clinton and A1 Gore released the "Framework for Global
17 Testimony o f John McPhee, Director, Office o f Computers and Business Equipment, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department o f Commerce, before the Senate Committee on Finance, United States 
Senate, July 16,1998.
18 In a thought-provoking article, Eric Helleiner described the many ways in which governments could co­
operate to control monetary transactions in the age o f the internet. Some o f the examples he cited were the 
1988 Basle Accord on capital adequacy standards as well as the OECD Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
designed to combat international money laundering (Helleiner, 1998, 392),
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Electronic Commerce."19 The document contained the key foreign policy stance of the U.S. 
and was designed by Ira Magaziner, who was Senior Advisor to the President until 
November 1998.20
In May 1998, 132 WTO member countries signed a one-year moratorium on any form of 
internet tariffs.21 U.S. negotiators claimed it would be difficult to retract on this concession 
and viewed this agreement as one of their greatest successes in 1998.22 At that time, the 
easiest to implement form of tariff on internet transactions and services would been a "bit 
tax" on traffic volume. Luc Soete, Professor of International Economics at Maastricht 
University, was its most vocal advocate. As Chairman of the European Commission’s High 
Level Group of Experts on Social and Societal Aspects of the Information Society (formed 
in 1995), he proposed that the idea of a "bit tax" should be further studied as a redistributive 
mechanism in a world moving from tangible to intangible goods and as a substitute for 
European VAT and U.S. state sales taxes. It was also suggested as a means of combating 
"information pollution" on the internet (Soete and Kamp, undated).23 Soete’s call for study 
was misunderstood as a policy recommendation and was quickly rejected by both the 
European Commission (EC, 1997-157,19) as well as by Ira Magaziner, who took credit for 
preventing a "bit tax" from materialising. Nevertheless, the concept refuses to die, 
especially among those constituencies that stand to lose the most from eroding VAT and
19 The "Framework" represented a departure from previous National Information Infrastructure policy. 
Announced on September 15,1993, as "The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action," this 
initiative emphasised a greater government role in promoting private sector investment via tax and regulatory 
policies as well as 'universal service' goals. Essentially, it was a domestically oriented document (Neuman, et 
al, 1997,20-23).
20 Magaziner was the key person in pushing the U.S. stance in international fora as well as the main contact for 
the U.S. internet industry, the "evangelist for the internet industry in a global marketplace." Jeri Clausing, 
"Magaziner, Head o f U.S. Internet Policy, Plan to Resign," New York Times, Cybertimes, 06.11,98.
21 In addition to this agreement, passed on May 1998 as a "Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce," 44 
WTO members in March 1997 signed an agreement to eliminate tariffs on computer and telecommunications 
equipment trade from the year 2000 (Information Technology Agreement, ITA), This should boost U.S. 
exports and contribute to a growing data networking infrastructure throughout the world.
22 According to an EDG News Service story from 29,05.98, "Magaziner outlines U.S. Internet policy, white 
paper expected soon," by Nancy Weil.
23 One redistributive use that was recommended by die High Level Group was financing the European social 
security system. A detailed information archive on the "bit tax" issue can be found on the "Taxing cyberspace" 
home page o f the Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT): 
http://meritbbs.unimaas.nl/cybertax/caybertax,htmt. On that site one can also access Soete and Kamp, undated.
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sales taxes,24 Jorg Tauss, a German parliament member from the Socialist Democratic 
Party, joked in an interview that one fourth of Bill Gates' wealth stems from unpaid German 
value-added taxes 25 Serious studies of tax effects of internet transfers are thus far not 
known to the author, however. They would have to take into consideration the economic 
effects of greater cross-border trade including lower input prices of digital goods and 
services purchased and accessed over the internet
Next to a "bit tax," other modes of imposing tariffs on international electronic transfers 
would also have been possible. Points of data flow concentration were not the only 
"bottleneck" points of government intervention. The international payments system also 
was a very promising target. The majority of payments over the internet were carried out 
with credit cards, and credit card transactions were controlled by a limited number of 
players.27 There were further examples of centralised financial "choke points," 95% of all 
international dollar transactions moved through a central clearing point, the CHIPS network 
in New York (set up in 1970). It is important to note, however, that the most potent 
financial control points were located in the United States and to a lesser degree the United 
Kingdom, giving policy makers in those countries greater power to intervene in worldwide 
financial flows. This was demonstrated when the U.S. threatened to cut off access to CHIPS 
to encourage international co-operation in combating money laundering initiatives 
(Helleiner, 1998, 394-396).
24 The size o f internet-based transactions was significant already in 1998. That year, internet consumer sales 
amounted to $8 billion. In the United States, all but five states collect sates taxes, and they derive half their 
total revenue from them. John Simons, "States Chafe as Web Shoppers Ignore Sales Taxes" The Wall Street 
Journal, 26.01.1999, Many countries outside o f  the U.S. also fear loss o f value added taxes. It was estimated 
that Germany forfeited about DM 5 billion alone in 1999 in lost VAT due to goods and services sold directly 
to German customers over die internet instead o f  from a German location. Ulrike Wirtz, "Steuerkick im 
Internet," impulse Das Untemehmermagazi«, 3/99, 164-168, estimate p. 168.
25 Meeting with J5rg Tauss, MdB, 25.03.99, Bundeshaus, Bonn.
26 A further "strategic site" that Saskia Sassen identified was the digital production process, involving the 
multimedia industry. It was located in the world’s largest cities and was very concentrated in terms o f  
infrastructure, talent and buildings (Sassen, 1998,178).
27 Even if electronic cash as a more anonymous transaction form would have been popular in the 1990s- which 
it was not- it would been linked to institutions transparent to government, such as banks or other financial 
services corporations. The reason for this was that most consumers would have not trusted electronic cash 
distributed by organisations unknown to them. This argument regarding electronic cash can be found in 
Helleiner (1998,400-403).
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Most of the literature discussing internet policy issues today in the late 1990s argued that 
government intervention on the internet in any form would have been very difficult 
Common statements ran like this: "The generic properties of the new networks render them 
inherently unfriendly to monopolies, hierarchies and centralised control" (from Neuman, et 
al, 1997, xvii). Examples such as Singapore are cited; governments are unable to control 
unwanted information flows into the country. What was often unmentioned was that Asian 
states such as Singapore or even China viewed the internet as a means of modernisation and 
access to a global electronic market. If they had wanted to reduce access massively they 
could have. In other countries, the internet naming system (Domain Name System, DNS) 
was used to impose payments on content or service firms who want to register themselves
A r t
with a native address. Japan was a prime example here; in order to qualify for a .jp- 
Address, companies had to have a business location within the island country and pay 
relatively high fees.
The most direct way governments could have intervened was by directly approaching key 
firms developing internet services or software. Both the U.S. and French governments, for 
example, negotiated with Netscape on the issue of encryption policy. Building on a very 
useful metaphor proposed by Peter Swire and Robert Litan, "elephants" were difficult to 
hide- even on the internet- whereas "mice" could easily escape government control (Swire 
and Litan, 1998,200-204). An international start-up company with expectations to become 
a major, high-growth public company had to act like an "elephant" and not like a "mouse." 
The laissez-faire choice the U.S. government made and endorsed internationally could 
therefore not be fully explained with the impotence of governments in internet issues; 
rather, it was an intentional choice. As Magaziner remarked in an interview when asked to 
look into the future: "I think there are possibilities for establishing agreements for 
international tax standards" (Magaziner, 1998,532).
The United States, however, argued that trade tariffs at an early stage would have inhibited 
the development o f electronic commerce: "We... think there should be no discriminatory
28 Mueller argues that national entities as Top level Domains (TLDs) such as .de for Germany provide national 
authorities with welcome points o f control (Mueller, 1998, 103).
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taxes on the internet, no bit taxes, no internet access taxes and no internet telephony taxes 
that would stifle the development o f the medium" (Magaziner, 1998, 530). And, indeed, the 
non-imposition of tariffs was a benefit to firms selling goods and services over the internet 
Mostly, these were American companies, however. It would be amusing to imagine a 
counter-factual scenario of U.S. trade policy within a reversed situation where most 
electronic commerce would have originated from Europe.
Regarding tariffs, U.S. negotiators maintained that they were acting in the interests of an 
emerging industry. This was consonant with U.S. policy on consumer protection issues. 
Here, U.S. federal officials endorsed self-regulation and technological solutions.29 Self­
regulation was the central policy concept of the White House; it was viewed as a natural 
means of governance for the internet. This was argued also by lobbying groups from the 
internet, hardware and software industries, as well as some non-profit associations that were 
associated with internet self-governance.
In an interview Ira Magaziner explained the U.S. stance in the following way:
"As we discussed [industry self-regulation]... with others around the globe, 
governments that tend to be more regulatory by instinct, we tried to explain it as a 
matter of practicality rather than ideology. It's not that we don't care about privacy; 
we do care very much, but we think this is a more effective way to enforce it" 
(Magaziner, 1998, 529).
He continued:
"Part of what we see as a paradigm shift in the Digital Age versus the Industrial 
Age is that, increasingly, government's role will be to empower people to protect 
themselves rather than having them rely on their government for protection" 
(Magaziner, 1998,535).
However, just as it was unrealistic to believe that governments could not have enforced 
trade tariffs if they had wanted to, it was equally unrealistic to state that governments could
29 One technological solution was the PICS rating system for content advocated by the private internet 
standards body World Wide Web Consortium (W3C),
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not have acted directly to protect consumers on the internet from fraud or misuse of private 
data if they had wanted to. 68% of internet fraud, for example, occurred on popular and 
well-known internet auction sites such as eBay.30 This was because the well-known internet 
brands were also what most consumers were attracted to and which they trusted. These 
firms were ’’elephants," not ’’mice.’’ Self-regulation in the U.S.A, resulted in insufficient 
consumer protection on the internet, as U.S. trade authorities noted in an extensive survey 
of electronic commerce sites.31 A spokesperson from a U.S. consumer group stated that 
"self-regulation has been a lot of smoke and mirrors.’’32 The first annual report by the 
federal government admonished private industry that progress was required in self­
regulation in 1999. The status quo at the end of the 1990s thus benefited firms and 
emerging internet business models, but not necessarily consumers. But also here, benefits 
for consumers in terms of lower prices especially of digitally accessible goods and services 
need to be taken into consideration. Most importantly, the long-term benefits for consumers 
from innovation in business processes catalysed by the new ventures should not be ignored.
U.S. negotiators extended the argument for self-regulation into the international arena 
whenever different types of key issues were raised. Thus, they opposed the imposition of 
what they called non-tariff barriers in three main areas: Cultural safeguards, digital 
signatures and privacy protection laws. In the cultural realm, the U.S. secured bilateral 
agreements with Japan and France in May and June 1998 that internet content should be 
exchanged openly and not be subject to cultural or language quota provisions of any sort 
(U.S. Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, 1998, iv). The latter two 
areas, digital signatures and privacy protection, were more controversial, because they 
involved not only a means by which government could block imports but also promote 
exports. They also involved technical standards. U.S. negotiators were suspicious of all 
European attempts that aimed at standard setting, the general U.S. opinion being that: 
"Concerns about the American communications infrastructure are deepened by the 
realisation that extraordinary well-financed, co-ordinated plans for system enhancement are
30 Louise Kehoe, "Microsoft and eBay in 'piracy' row," Financial Times, 26.02.99, 21.
31 The report, dated June 1998 and titled "Privacy Online: A Report to Congress," can be accessed on the U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission web site http://www.ftc. gov/. According to the report, 85% o f commercial sites 
collect personal information, but only 14% notify consumers o f  the company's data practices.
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being undertaken in Europe and Asia" (Neuman, et al, 1997,14-18). These types of fears 
were strongest in the 1980s and early 1990s, when U.S. economic ascent was not yet 
apparent. Nevertheless, they still lingered on in the 1990s and could be encountered in 
policy statements and academic literature.
Although fraught with internal contradictions,33 a Europe-wide law for data protection was 
passed in 1995 and came into effect in October 1998. The main goal of the law was to 
remove significant differences within the European Union regarding data laws, which made 
it difficult to operate across borders. Although an issue apparently restricted to the internal 
market, the law also forbade the export of personal data into countries which had data 
protection laws that the European Union regarded as insufficient, including the United 
States.34 In this way, the law threatened U.S.-based data centres, including those run by 
internet services, which contained information on citizens of European countries. As in 
other examples, the transnational nature of data networks operated to "export" essentially 
domestic laws into other countries. Again, U.S. negotiators viewed European data 
protection laws as "non-tariff' barriers and instead argued for self-regulation. In doing so, 
they elevated the goal of nurturing a new business sector over consumer privacy concerns.35
There were two major areas in which U.S. government principles were not in line with the 
overarching goal of encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation, however. These were 
legislation on encryption and intellectual property. In both areas, the emphasis on self­
regulation was reduced and government intervention was advocated. To support domestic 
law enforcement efforts, the White House continually attempted to enact so-called "key- 
escrow" legislation. Key escrow legislation would have made it obligatory for companies
32 Jeri Clausing, "Internet Commerce Study Stresses Self-Regulation," New York Times, Cybertimes, 30.11.98.
33 Especially when applied to client-server systems, intranets, extranets and laptops. The inconsistencies were 
pointed out in the timely book by Peter P. Swire and Robert E. Litan (1998,58-75).
34 United States data protection laws were not uniform. In some specific instances, for example, academic 
records and video rental facilities, it was very strict, in others, almost non-existent (Swire and Litan, 1998, 
170-172; Noam, 1992,398).
33 One study commissioned by the industry privacy group TRUSTe tried to show that electronic commerce 
would double if  web sites widely adopted privacy programs. This argument tried to support the contention that 
consumer protection would have been good for internet business. The conclusion was partially invalidated by 
another result from the same research, which showed that up to 40% consumers do not distinguish privacy 
from security issues.
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offering encryption products to include a ’’back door" for policing efforts. Lobbying by 
industry and consumer privacy groups prevented federal government from progressing on 
the law's introduction (Magaziner, 1998, 532,533; U.S. Government Working Group on 
Electronic Commerce, 1998,22,23). It was ironic that such a law, if passed, would have 
been regarded as a "non-tariff" trade barrier-just like European digital signature or personal 
data privacy legislation. Furthermore, non-U.S. politicians pointed out that U.S. 
government control over encryption keys in electronic commerce had the ability to enable 
U.S. industrial espionage activities on foreign firms.
A parallel and related issue to key-escrow was barriers preventing the export of strong 
encryption outside of the United States.36 The export barriers were opposed by internet 
start-ups such as Netscape who would have liked to develop and export strong mass 
consumer encryption products. The export barriers allowed several non-U.S. companies, 
such as the German firm Brokat, to sell encryption products to the world-wide market.37
The U.S. policy emphasis on self-regulation was not applied in the area of intellectual 
property rights either. It was frequently argued that strong intellectual property rights 
encouraged innovation and investment by allowing companies to cash in on their 
achievements. Some researchers pointed out, however, that intellectual property protection 
could stifle innovation if it is too rigidly defined. Discouraging reverse engineering of 
software products, had the potential, for example, to limit the possibility for incremental 
innovation of existing products. The relationship between intellectual property and contract 
laws in the information age also was unresolved. Some argued that the ease of digital 
replication mandated an extension of contract law, i.e. previously non-licensable products 
such as information should be licensable. Others believed that this would inhibit innovation 
by further increasing possibilities for protection. In the United States, this debate was 
waged around the proposed model law Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code
36 An update on export guidelines in 1998 enabled the export o f encryption products in some areas and to 
some countries (U.S. Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, 1998,23).
37 In a California state report, drafted by state and industry groups, addressed the issue is explicitly:
"Therefore, while U.S. policies are not keeping strong encryption technology out o f  international markets, they 
are keeping out U.S. encryption technology" (Electronic Commerce Advisory Council, 1998, III-9).
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(Samuelson, 1998,809-826). The model law seemed to serve not only as a model for state 
legislation, but was also meant to inspire globally recognised commercial law rules.
The complex issues raised in the late 1990s have not been resolved and it is certain this 
political process -  especially at an international level- will continue to unfold. In the 
meantime innovation and investment continue despite regulatory uncertainty.38
The issue of technological standards
"The benefits of electronic commerce will only be achieved if interoperability is 
ensured at a global level. The European Community and its member states have 
consistently been committed to international standards, and expect its major 
trading partners to act likewise" (EC, 1997-157,11).
The issue of technological standard-setting is a difficult one and it was a major issue of 
contention between the United States and the European Union.39 The European 
Commission, as well as specific countries such as Germany, formulated policy "ensuring 
interoperability in a competitive environment" (EC, 1997-157,5,6), one example was the 
further support of standardisation projects.40 This emphasis on standardisation as a policy 
tool dated back at least to the 1978 Nora-Minc report to the French president.
A good example was the issue of digital signatures. The digital signature was an encryption 
technology used to authenticate messages sent over a network. Using digital signature 
technology, for example, signed contracts could have been exchanged electronically. 
Widespread use of this technology would have been beneficial for diverse busmess-to-
38 Most recently, for example, in the music industry in the case surrounding the venture capital-financed 
internet start-up Napster.
39 U.S. negotiators viewed it as a major achievement that they were able to convert a world-wide conference in 
Brussels on standards “Building the Global Information Society for the 21st Century" in October 1997 into a 
business-dominated affair, although the original plans called for a forum directed by governments and 
international organisations (U.S. Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, 1998, iv, 20).
40 Despite its emphasis on interoperability throughout its central policy document "A European Initiative in 
Electronic Commerce," the possibility o f de facto interoperability achieved through industry collaboration was 
recognised (a U.S. document would call this "self regulation"). But this not without pointing to the role o f the 
European standards bodies CEN, CENELEC and ETSI. (EC, 1997-157,10,11).
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business uses as well as government procurement initiatives. The emphasis, however, was 
on the word "widespread." As with any other network technology, digital signatures also are 
subject to network effects, meaning that the technology becomes more valuable and useful 
the more users put it to use.
Two different policy approaches were followed regarding digital signatures: Germany 
domestically introduced a legislative foundation for the use of digital signatures; the 
Clinton Administration heavily opposed any government intervention arguing that industry 
has to develop the technology further* although several U.S. states went ahead regardless 
and introduced their own digital signatures legislation in the late 1990s. German legislation 
only dictated procedures such as the setting up of "trust centres" which would distribute 
signature IDs. It also contained some technological remarks, pertaining to the use of smart- 
card hardware systems. At the time the law was introduced, German policy makers stressed 
the model character the law could have on EU and other supranational rule-making. At the 
time, the European Commission also supported a "necessary regulatory and institutional 
framework supporting such technologies," (EC, 1997-157, 13) and recommended that 
world-wide agreements on digital signatures" be adopted (EC, 1997-157,18).41 The result 
was an EU directive based on the German precursor. U.S. federal government seemed to 
fear any initiatives in the realm of digital signatures, especially those which were directed at 
introducing international standards. Despite the non-technological framework character of 
the German law it was understood as an international standard-setting initiative much like 
other technological standard-setting efforts.42
This was not the first time U.S. policy has been suspicious of international technological 
standard-setting initiatives. The role of standards as a tool for competition policy was
41 The Commission from the mid 1990s began to move towards a more U.S.-style self-regulatory approach 
(see EC, 1998-586,3).
42 "The United States believes it is not wise at this time to attempt to identify a single model that these 
transactions will use or to develop a legal environment using a single model. Indeed, such an approach would 
prevent the market from testing different possible approaches and prematurely impose a particular model on 
all electronic commerce, inevitably limiting its growth... A few governments... are establishing detailed rules 
for electronic authentication which the United States considers to be premature, burdensome, or unnecessary" 
(U.S. Government Working Group on Electronic Commerce, 1998, 14,15).
95
described in the following words by American telecommunications specialist Alfred 
Thimm:
"National governments have employed various aspects of industrial policies to 
help their national telematics champions obtain the global market share necessary 
for survival. In this context international telecommunications standards have not 
only become a device to assure network interconnection, compatibility and 
interoperability but a complex policy system to attain strategic enterprise 
objectives" (Thimm, 1992, 221).
For example, in the early 1980s, the U.S. held the view that it was too early to implement 
an international standard for videotex systems.43 The debate surrounding ISDN and the 
international CCITT-ISO standard was similar; only AT&T expressed its support.44 The 
U.S. Department of Commerce officials viewed all European standard-setting initiatives 
and the telecommunication monopolies that proposed them, especially the German Post and 
Telephone Administration as "mercantilistic enemies of free trade," according to Thimm 
(1992, 225).
In these two instances, however, U.S. worries were misplaced and the international 
standards initiatives failed to achieve the business breakthrough its advocates from the 
telecommunications industry expected 45 Digital signatures did not achieve the level of
43 A videotex standard was promoted through the international standards body Consultative Committee on 
International Telephone and Telegraph (CCITT). It was supported by European and Canadian 
telecommunications carriers as well as AT&T, but not by the U.S. computer industry (Noam, 1992, 382, 383).
44 Again, European telecommunications companies accepted an open, international standard for digital 
networking as an alternative to private standards used by the computer industry. Firm European standards for 
ISDN were established by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in July 1990. The 
international standard forwarded by the Consultative Committee for International Telephony, Telegraph- 
International Standards Organisation (CCITT-ISO) was used as a basis for the European standard. 
Contemporary analysts, such as Thimm (1992), praised European policy on ISDN standards and the resulting 
uniform telecommunications landscape in contrast to heterogeneous U.S. implementations. Already then, 
however, Thimm warned that "The rate o f technological innovations, however, has made the ISDN copper 
cable 64 kbits networks obsolete almost before they will have become operational" (Thimm, 1992,192-204, 
quote p. 193, AT&T note p. 226). And: "...The PTTs, especially the DBP, emphasised investments in ISDN 
network transmission systems and switches, and failed to encourage the equipment manufacturer to develop 
attractively priced business or residential terminal ISDN equipment until the physical network was almost 
completed." Thimm calls ISDN an "engineering-driven innovation" and mobile telephony a "market-driven 
innovation" (Thimm, 1992,235-236, quote p. 236). Compare to Noam, 1992, 360-368.
45 On a domestic level, however, ISDN was a platform that was used to justify massive modernisation 
investments on the part o f the German PTO and Siemens. It can also be linked to the efforts o f the German 
Bundespost to introduce usage-based pricing for data lines (Noam, 1992, 355, see discussion 360-368). The
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importance in facilitating electronic commerce its proponents had supposed. In another 
case, however, European standard-setting was highly successful in an economic sense. This 
is the oft-cited example of the European digital mobile telephony standard GSM (General 
systeme mobile). GSM created a unified, European mobile telephony space and contributed 
to the success of European players Nokia and Ericsson on the world market. GSM was a 
typical, European-type standard which closely defined technological specifications. Thimm 
has described it thus: "A tightly written book of technical specifications the size of a 
medium city's telephone book" (Thimm, 1992, 102). Two UK network operators, 
Vodaphone and Cellnet, adopted the standard even before it was fully approved by the 
newly founded European Technical Standards Institute (ETSI) and launched GSM services 
in 1992 (Thimm, 1992, 172). The recent history of GSM has served as a justification for 
standard-setting policy in other areas. German businesses were very competitive when it 
comes to encryption and digital signatures and a successful international agreement at this 
time would support their export activities- thus German policy-makers argued.46
But the discussion surrounding technical standards culminated in the final years of the 
1990s in the debate surrounding the next generation mobile telephony standard, UMTS. 
Given the success of GSM, the United States felt that this time it needed to participate in 
the definition of a world-wide standard. The agreement between the major 
telecommunication equipment vendors surrounding UMTS was heralded as a victory for 
European telecommunications. The delays required in bringing about this standard were, 
however, detrimental to start-ups in Europe which wanted to introduce innovative new 
services based on next generation packet-based mobile telephony. The Japanese operator 
DoCoMo, on the other hand, did not wait for UMTS to materialise, and introduced its own 
standard, “i-mode,” early.
ISDN roll-out did provide national market opportunities for some German family-owned enterprises such as 
Hagenuck and ANT (Thimm, 1992, p. 232, 233).
46 In Germany, at least four different start-ups were competing in this space: Brokat Infosystems, Utimaco, 
Netlife and Me-Technology. Brokat and Me-Technology announced a merger in March 1999 ("Die 
Softwareanbieter Brokat und Me-Technology fusionieren," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18.03.99,23). 
Already in the late 1990s, Germany had a 15-year tradition in online banking and businesses had managed to 
gather substantial experience in the related technological issues: secure transactions, encryption and 
authentication.
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The European approach is deeply influenced by traditions from the telecommunications 
world and can be labelled "engineer-driven." The policy on UMTS is but the most recent 
example in a history of public standard-setting digital signatures, ISDN and GSM. PTOs 
have used standard-setting as a means to introduce greater flexibility in their purchasing 
decisions and thereby reduce their dependence upon equipment suppliers- which would 
have more to gain by implementing proprietary standards. The same conflict existed in the 
internet world; open standards were advocated by service firms that demanded 
interconnecting software and hardware. Despite their touting of open standards in the age of 
the internet and their desire to gain more users through interoperability, firms that were 
overwhelmingly software-based still viewed proprietary standards as the "breadwinners of 
last resort."47 In their perceptive commentary on recent software business models, Michael 
Borrus and John Zysman introduced the concept "open but owned." "Open but owned" 
systems were open systems meant to be interconnected while their core functionality 
remained proprietary (Borrus and Zysman, 1997, 151). "Market-driven" U.S. policymaking 
sided with the software industry and denounces international standard-setting initiatives as 
premature and elements of European industrial policy. Arguably, the U.S. approach 
amounted to industrial policy as well. The "hidden agenda" to U.S. negotiation is to delay 
rule-making while the dominant players in the internet field, mostly U.S. firms, established 
themselves and their "open but owned" standards. The benefits of "engineer-driven" or 
"market-driven" technological standards are not clear-cut, and vary according to the specific 
historical moment.
The debate on small firm innovation and regulation
In their recent book on privacy and data protection, Swire and Litan briefly summarised the 
debate on innovation and regulation. On the one hand, the existence of rules and regulations 
seem to dampen innovation especially on the part of small start-up companies. Start-ups
47 Sun's strategy with Java software is instructive here (see: Luc Hatlestad, "Briefing Java," The Red Herring, 
June 1998, 84-140). See also Saskia Sassen's insightful discussion on standard setting and business objectives 
in the age o f the internet: "The issue today, it seems, is once again to set standards, and to do this by providing
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focus on change and often do not have in-house legal resources to direct at legislation. On 
the other hand, it is argued, for example, that lack of data protection has not benefited firms 
because privacy concerns have prevented more consumers from using the internet. The 
authors conclude that privacy protection rules would have a beneficial impact on the 
development of the internet over time, but the lack of rules on an international level has not 
had much of an impact on rapid, pioneer growth. Thus far, user growth has been strong and 
most users seem to be more concerned about security than about privacy issues (Swire and 
Litan, 1998, 76-89).
Start-up firms frequently do not have the necessary legal resources required for competition 
in environments with significant regulation. This was confirmed by the experience of 
internet companies which were addressing divergent legislation in different European 
countries.48 The same problem existed in the United States as well, as the country has 
30,000 tax jurisdictions.49 As a result, specific national laws of other countries on the whole 
were being ignored by internationalising internet start-ups, and this even applied to firms 
operating in subnational entities when faced by considerable regulatory and taxation 
differences within a country (as is the case within the United States). Start-ups were 
concerned that their disregard for national and state laws would one day be used against 
them -  but it was impossible to take into consideration every myriad country law a global 
service might have infringed upon.50
Ambiguity on issues such as the taxation of cross-border sales as well as in trademark 
protection, consumer protection or commercial codes will, over time, hurt companies as 
they and the markets they operate in become more mature. It is important to note that there
the software for free, eventually, to control access and browsing standards and thus be able to charge" (Sassen, 
1998, 185-188).
48 A survey undertaken within the European Commission in which 80 responses by internet firms were studied 
revealed that legal costs for cross-Europe services already were considerable in the late 1990s. One figure 
cited was DM 70.000/ year (EC, 1998-586, 8,9). In the study o f German internet start-ups presented in 
subsequent chapters, 77% of selected firms called for internationally harmonised laws and controls (Appendix 
B, Main Survey Results, Table 30).
49 John Simons, "States Chafe as Web Shoppers Ignore Sales Taxes," The Wall Street Journal, 26.01.1999.
50 Research in the field o f management studies and entepreneurialism has shown that internationally oriented 
start-up companies are very concerned about regulation. The research is inconclusive, however, in establishing
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is an essential difference between international business-to-business electronic transactions, 
which existed for a long time and have reached stages of maturity, and business-to- 
consumer transactions, which raise new, unresolved issues when they are conduced 
electronically across borders.
Internationally operating rules or a correspondence of national rules will be necessary over 
time. Parts of an international rules framework are already in place. The WTO Agreement 
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) seeks to protect copyrights through 
an international dispute settlement mechanism. The WTO General Agreement on Trade and 
Services (GATS) has- at an early date- addressed some of the unique issues arising from the 
electronic trade of services, including the division of services into four "modes" of supply, 
one of which includes electronic cross-border transmission (previously, services were 
considered non-tradable).51 The WTO Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce, which 
was announced at the May 1998 Ministerial Conference, included a one-year customs duty 
moratorium on internet transactions and was complemented by the mandated formation of a 
WTO work programme to study electronic commerce policy. The goal of the work 
programme was to "confirm the rules on electronic commerce that already exist in the WTO 
[such as TRIPS and GATS]- to avoid undermining existing rights and obligations by 
treating electronic commerce as if it were outside the normal trade regime." A further 
intention was to "identify any weaknesses in the existing legal structures that need to 
strengthened or clarified."
In addition to the WTO, the issues surrounding electronic commerce attracted the formation 
of committees and work groups in a wide array of different international organisations at a 
very early stage. Within the OECD, a "neutral, fair and simple" framework for electronic
whether internationalisation occurs in a quest to actively seek out areas with the least amount o f regulation or 
whether the regulation problem simply increases when firms internationalise (McDougall, 1989, 388, 398).
51 Services transmitted transnationaly across data networks are labelled as "cross-border services" and are 
defined in the following way: "Services supplied from the territory o f one member to the territory o f another" 
(Altinger and Enders, 1996, 307, 308). Jagdish Bhagwati pointed out already in 1984 that in extending GATT 
to services, the "disembodiment" o f services through technologies should be taken into consideration 
(Bhagwati, 1984). For a discussion of trade in services and the WTO see Feketekuty, 1998.
52 See "A Borderless World," a speech by Renato Ruggiero, Director-General, World Trade Organization, to 
the OECD Ministerial Conference, Ottawa, 7. October 1998. Other speeches by Ruggerio are relevant as well 
and can be accessed over the WTO web site.
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taxation was worded on, similar issues were being discussed in the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum and within the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). A 
government-private sector Committee of Experts on Electronic Commerce has also been 
established. A G-10 "Working Party on Electronic Money" has been established. The Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision issued a "Risk Management for Electronic Banking and 
Electronic Money Activities" report in March 20, 1998 which outlined key issues relating 
electronic money and financial services technologies for banking supervisors. Already in 
1996, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) developed 
a "Model law on Electronic Commerce" which suggested some guidelines for migrating 
from paper to digital contracts. In 1997, UNICTRAL proposed to examine the issue of 
uniform rules on digital signatures.53 Finally, further international treaties relating to 
intellectual property protection and electronic transmission were forwarded through the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO).54
However, neither the existing framework nor some of the newer initiatives effectively 
address some of the more subtle, yet profound challenges that global electronic commerce 
poses for the first time. A good example of some of these issues is trademark law and the 
internet domain name system (DNS). It is clear here that the trademark system, which has 
thus far operated territorially, is ill-equipped for an aterritorial system such as the internet. 
US attempts to solve the problem on an international scale have been highly controversial. 
One central question always recurs: "Who supervises what?" This question relates to a wide 
range of issues such as taxation and consumer protection. The difficulties of addressing the 
questions raised by electronic commerce on an international level become clear when one 
examines the attempts by the European Commission in building a coherent legal framework 
in Europe by the year 2000 (EC, 1998-586). It achieved some of its objectives. For 
example, the European Commission instituted a country of origin principle in determining 
jurisdiction (EC, 1998-586, 13, 14). In the United States, the opposite stance was taken in 
targeting the jurisdiction of destination (Magaziner, 1998, 531; The Electronic Commerce 
Advisory Council, 1998, B-l).
53 "Planning o f Future Work on E-Commerce: Digital Signatures, Certification Authorities and Related Legal 
Issues," from February 1997.
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The tasks ahead are complex. The issue here is the creation of a efficient and fair worldwide 
market mechanism, including consumer protection, for goods and services exchanged over 
the internet. This market mechanism would replace the currently operational myriad 
domestic markets. There are two possible ways through which rules could internationally 
converge. International co-operative agreement is only one of these. Competition and the 
convergence of national, unilateral policy-making can have definite cross-border 
cumulative effects as well. The subsequent section will discuss how the latter process has 
already set in. The history of national policy convergence in the financial services and 
telecommunications, even environmental regulation, is instructive.
International policy convergence: The lesson from financial services
The lack of specific, international laws in the electronic commerce area could be contrasted 
to the considerable array of domestic laws that affect electronic commerce. In theory, a firm 
exporting its services through a global network needed to be concerned about legislation in 
every country in which it may have a client. Especially in the consumer area, would have 
been a very difficult task- as pointed out in the previous section. Considerable legal costs 
would have to be borne in order to operate in several countries at once. It is in this instance 
that the global logic of the internet seemed at first glance to make national lawmaking 
redundant at best and obstructive at worst. Writing about the privacy protection rules of the 
European Union, Swire and Litan concluded that enforcing the rules unilaterally in Europe 
would have required severe enforcement efforts:
"If, however, the Directive is primarily hortatory,... crash efforts to comply will 
seem expensive and unnecessary. Many businesspersons have expressed the view 
that 'they just can't do that'- the European Union will simply not be willing or able 
to enforce the directive as written" (Swire and Litan, 1998, 156).
54 The "WIPO Copyright Treaty" and the "WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty" o f December 1996.
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The overall effect of the U.S. negotiation stance endorsing non-intervention and self­
regulation was that firms could proceed with international expansion and a development of 
their innovative online business models without being obstructed by globally co-ordinated 
policy efforts. U.S. policy was mainly pre-emptive and tactical. It was designed to prevent 
co-ordinated supranational efforts that could have seriously harmed international electronic 
commerce development of U.S. firms- at the time.
While the ‘mice’ were perhaps unconcerned, the ‘elephants’ were worried. Those firms that 
did worry about legislation in the late 1990s were significant ventures which were 
establishing foreign subsidiaries in the main electronic commerce markets. Some American 
internet companies based in Germany, for example Yahoo!, were at pains to adhere to local 
data protection laws. Before they were removed early in 1999, French laws prohibiting the 
use of encryption were a major block to the development of online business models in 
France. The export barriers on encryption technologies had a similar impact on internet 
firms based in the United States.
It is obvious that, in some cases, it is advantageous to operate from a location with the least 
domestic legislative burdens. A tendency for countries to compete for entrepreneurs could, 
therefore, lead to a so-called "race to the bottom." This has been called the "Delaware 
effect" after the U.S. state that adopted relatively lax incorporation laws. It is the "Delaware 
Effect" which the European Commission wanted to avoid by initiating its harmonisation 
project targeting electronic commerce-relevant laws in Europe. But there are also well- 
documented cases in which local policy-makers adopted the laws of a strict legislative 
entity. One of the cases is environmental standards on automotive emissions. It made sense 
for multinational automotive manufacturers to adhere to the toughest local laws for reasons 
of corporate image and uniformity on production. The toughest laws were found in 
California. The state had a broad impact on laws in other states and countries. David Vogel, 
studying the worldwide impact of Californian emission regulation has termed this the 
"California Effect" (Vogel, David, 1995).
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The lessons from the worldwide financial services industry are very important in this 
discussion. They show that industries that are intensely globally connected do not 
necessarily tend to "race to the bottom." Instead of the "Delaware Effect," the "California 
Effect" in many cases more aptly describes regulatory trends in financial services. The basic 
argument runs thus: The more globally interconnected an industry becomes, the more 
important it becomes to establish rigid business standards and transparent, codified rules. 
This spells an end to the "cosy clubs" of the past (Cemy, 1996, 92). In an article on 
regulatory competition, Henry Laurence describes how financial services players 
themselves proposed to be regulated more strictly for two reasons: They wanted to enter 
foreign markets which they wanted to be as transparent as their own and they wanted 
foreign, mobile investors to have confidence in their own services (Laurence, 1996). Within 
a very short amount of time, both Britain and Japan-joined later by Germany- enacted strict 
rules devised to prevent insider trading. In Germany, bankers were very aware of the fact 
that transparency would be the price for participation in the global game (Lutz, 1996, 10). 
Another author discussing financial sector reform, Andrew Sobel, uses the term "inside- 
out" to explain change initiated by domestic groups which strategically use international 
pressures to overcome domestic opposition (Sobel, 1994, 1-20). This is not the place to 
discuss the considerable differences approaches and conclusions of the aforementioned 
authors (Sobel emphasises domestic actors, Laurence focuses on the role of mobile 
consumers of financial services), but they all describe how domestic shifts can lead to an 
overall, world-wide policy convergence and more transparent, codified systems, without the 
involvement of internationally co-ordinated public policy initiatives.
Researching the telecommunications industry, Steven Vogel has arrived at a comparable 
conclusion in his book Freer Markets, More Rules: "Hence we have wound up with freer 
markets and more rules. In fact, there is even a logical link: liberalisation requires 
reregulation" (Vogel, Steven, 1996, 3, author's italics). The European telecommunications 
industry has moved from informal, opaque regulation to a more transparent, rules-based 
regime. Deregulation of telecommunications has gone hand in hand with the establishment 
of new regulatory agencies. This is an American model that was adopted first in the UK in 
1984 in the guise of OFTEL. Again, a global logic of international convergence of
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regulatory regimes seems to be at work, the common explanation being that global market 
players demand transparency and similar market conditions in the different countries they 
operate in. In an important essay, Eli Noam asks if instability in the form of either 
regulation or liberalisation in an interconnected system does not work globally like a 
contagious process (Noam, 1994). Echoing the roles taken by the London Stock Exchange 
and by Japanese banks, Siemens itself was instrumental in tearing down the "court supplier" 
system it has most befitted from historically (Humphreys and Simpson, 1996, 114).
In studying the "California Effect," however, David Vogel hastens to point out that one of 
the main reasons why California's strict standards triumphed was that its automobile market 
was substantial; it was especially important for German exporters, who had a major 
influence on the EU (Vogel, David, 1995,261-263, 268-270). It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that, according to some researchers, global convergence in different industries is 
leading not only to greater transparency and more formal rules, but also to specific types of 
governmental roles which most closely approximate the current U.S. approach.55 A further 
example is the increasingly important role competition policy plays in the European Union, 
a role again foreshadowed by competition policy in the U.S.A.56 In his essay, "The Rise of 
the Regulatory State in Europe," Giandomenico Majone summarises this trend:
"In sum, neither privatisation nor deregulation have meant a return to laissez-faire 
or an end to all regulation... Thus neither American deregulations nor European 
privatisations can be interpreted as a retreat of the state, but rather as a redefinition 
of functions. What is observed in practice is a redrawing of the borders of the 
public sphere in a way that excludes certain fields better left to private activity, 
while at the same time strengthening and even expanding the state's regulatory 
capacity in other fields like competition or environmental and consumer 
protection" (Majone, 1998, 195).
55 But even U.S. policy has been attracted to "ill-advised attempts] to micromanage" (Neuman et al), one 
example was the U.S. Telecommunications Act o f 1996 with its "100 pages o f detailed legal mandates" and 
"90 bureaucratic inquiries" (Neuman et al, 1997, xiv). Another example, possibly, is intellectual property 
protection.
56 Anyone discussing the hands-off policy U.S. federal government adopted to promote the growth o f the 
nascent internet industry must also mention how it simultaneously has acted to curtail the powers o f firms that 
have achieved considerable size and influence, Microsoft and Intel. In both the hands-off approach as well as 
the anti-trust action, the US government arguably acted to protect start-up interests.
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Despite policy convergence and the trend towards independent regulatory agencies and an 
emphasis on competition policy, the permanent differences between the United States and 
Europe are worth emphasising. One of the primary differences that remain despite some 
movement towards each other is in the area of technological standard-setting. From about 
1998 there have been indications that on the level of the European Commission, on the one 
hand, a convergence in legislative approaches with the U.S. approach favouring industry- 
led interoperatability initiatives is occurring.57 In the United States on the other hand, there 
seems to be the realisation that government can have a limited role in standard setting 
together with industry; the definition of the UMTS standard is the example here.
Conclusion
Global data networks- both the consumer internet and corporate internet-based data 
networks- are today remarkable in two ways. First, they are distance insensitive. Second, 
they embrace internet standards as world-wide standards. Both the "Death of Distance" as 
well as the world-wide adoption of internet standards provide especially start-ups with 
unique opportunities. This chapter was dedicated to describing how distance insensitivity 
was not just related to much-touted technological aspects of the internet and the unique co­
operative peering arrangements that characterised it throughout much of the 1990s, but also 
government regulation. Government regulation was asymmetrical; the internet enjoyed a 
favoured position outside international telecommunications arrangements. Regulatory 
asymmetry was a critical factor without which demand for worldwide standards and data 
services cannot be properly explained.
The notion of global networks should not be misunderstood, however. To a large extent, the 
world-wide network was the U.S. network. The United States was the world's network hub.
57 A communication by the European Commission emphasised "a light, enabling and flexible approach" and 
self-regulation (EC, 1998-586, 3). The "U.S.-EU Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce" released in the 
U.S.-European Union Summit in Washington on 05.12.97 stated: "That industry self-regulation is important. 
Within the legal framework set by government, public interest objectives can, as appropriate, be served by 
international or mutually compatible codes o f conduct, model contracts, guidelines, etcetera, agreed upon 
between industry and other private sector bodies" (see http://www.useu.be/).
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It also was the location where the most value was added to network services, were the 
majority of electronic commerce services and data centres were hosted. And the majority of 
internet users and consumers were located there. This was a result of many factors, but 
prominent among those was domestic telecommunications deregulation, which privileged 
internet services and thus encouraged network investment and use. Politically, the network 
topography of the U.S. also put the Clinton Administration in a privileged position in 
international electronic commerce framework negotiations.
In contrast to distance insensitivity, government intervention was not a factor in 
establishing the internet as a world-wide network standard. One of the main objectives of 
the Clinton Administration was to keep the development of internet standards "market 
driven." The critical role of standards was obvious to all policy-makers involved in 
international negotiations. Without a minimum degree of international interoperability, the 
world-wide network would fragment into different isolated parts. A global network exists 
only as long as there are global networking standards.
Standards can range from minimum-level basic networking protocols to complex "digital 
signature" systems, which establish authenticity. The latter include both technological 
specifications as well as organisational arrangements. In the previous chapter, the point was 
made that global demand, generated by businesses as well as consumers, led to the 
widespread use of internet standards in both corporate and consumer networks. Corporate 
users sought independence from software companies such as IBM and abandoned 
“company-only” standards. This led to the rise of “intranets” and “extranets.” Consumers 
forced change upon traditional proprietary online services such as AOL and Microsoft 
Network and on “country-only” online services such as Germany's BTX or France's Minitel. 
Today, it seems that the internet will remain open, benefiting users and those small firms 
developing services for the internet. Nevertheless, the balance that existed regarding 
internet standards during the late 1990s was precarious; the largest software companies 
tried vigorously to introduce proprietary elements. The standards balance was actually 
being propped up by a massive ‘investment bubble, ’ which sped up development o f open 
systems, privileging users over company revenue generation. Without the ‘bubble,’ internet
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commercialisation would have taken a far more proprietary course. And the openness of the 
system in more general terms still now could be reversed, as one scholar has argued (Lessig, 
1999).
The ‘window of opportunity’ created by distance insensitivity and demand-driven world­
wide standards needs to be put into perspective, however. Local laws and politics did matter 
as well, affecting the extent to which small firms could take advantage of the "window." 
Although start-up firms largely ignored the domestic legal and taxation frameworks of the 
numerous countries they were "exporting" their services into, they were affected by the laws 
of the country they operated in. And the legal framework was only one aspect among many 
influencing the domestic conditions for entrepreneurship which also included local internet 
usage patterns, the effects of telecommunications deregulation, investment patterns, 
partnership opportunities and the quality of staff and managers. National governments 
played prominent roles in influencing many of these factors. In fact, the role of U.S. 
government in developing a global marketplace by promoting internet technologies 
domestically was just discussed in this chapter. As a result, the U.S. electronic commerce 
market was the global market.
In non-U.S. countries, government policy acted to "refract" the opportunities posed by 
global networks, causing small firms to develop along unique, national trajectories. The 
effects of government actions are explored in the subsequent chapters, which focus on the 
German case. Yet, the degree of "refraction" may be decreasing as governments outside of 
the US have become aware of the determinants which were linked to the success of new 
internet ventures. Although major differences in policy approaches persist (main examples 
are standard-setting initiatives and SME policy), policy competition has already lead to 
policy convergence. The world-wide harmonisation effects of unilateral, domestic efforts in 
areas of strong international flows have already been observed in the case of the reform of 
financial markets and telecommunications. There are few alternatives to convergence if 
flows are to remain global. In the longer term, convergence caused by competition will be 
combined with some form of international policy co-ordination as the electronic commerce 
market matures.
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Policy convergence does, however, raise new questions, which will be explored in the next 
chapters. One of these questions is the distinct timing of policy convergence in different 
countries. Policy convergence often does not happen simultaneously in different countries. 
Even in moments of simultaneous convergence, the involved institutions can remain 
distinct. This has been demonstrated by Mark Thatcher using the example of 
telecommunications policy in France and the United Kingdom (1999). For these reasons, it 
seems crucial to study the timing of policy convergence and the institutional landscape in 
detail, i.e. the specific, national pattern of policy convergence. One of the main objectives 
of such an effort would be to understand the economic effects of such specific patterns of 
convergence. In this study, dedicated to policy convergence in the internet era, the specific 
economic effect studied is the impact of entrepreneurial innovation. If the internet did 
represent a global innovation opportunity in a Schumpeterian sense, policy convergence 
may simply have come too late in some countries to be of help to ventures addressing this 
unique opportunity. To arrive at answers, a detailed country-level examination seems to be 
necessary; this is offered in the subsequent Part Two of the study.
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Part II -  National Political Economy 
Chapter Four
Policy Shifts and Political Compromise in the Kohl Era
The division of this thesis into two parts, the first international and the second national, is 
deceiving. The objective of the first part was to show in what ways the two realms have 
been fused into one. Formerly separate marketspaces have become enmeshed by technology 
to such an extent that domestic agents such as small firms could become ‘instant 
internationalisers.’ But it is also the objective of this thesis to discuss ways in which the 
international and the national remain distinct despite the opportunities presented by the 
internet, thus the division of the thesis into two parts. To show distinctiveness, we will 
depart from the world-wide perspective and zoom into one geographic segment of the 
global network: The German economy.
As outlined in the Introduction, Germany is interesting because of the apparent reversal of 
entrepreneurial dynamism towards the end of the 1990s. While small German firms have 
been at home in the world market for decades, the economy seemed to have become rigid 
and unentrepreneurial in recent times. In terms of telecommunications policy, Germany 
embarked much more slowly on liberalisation than the first tier reformers, USA, UK and 
Japan and Scandinavia. Enterprises in the IT industry were regarded as domestic adopters 
and not global leaders, with the exception of a single company, SAP. This seemed to 
suddenly have changed in the last years of the 1990s, as numerous internet ventures were 
founded and listed on the stock exchange.
To understand how the national economy is both part of and yet distinct from the 
international network economy, the concept of "refraction1 was discussed in the first 
chapter. Why not just use the term "distortion" used by neo-classical economists for 
decades? Whereas "distortion" is negative, "refraction" is a neutral term, a term that 
emphasises that government policy may have positive as well as negative effects. Another 
quality of the term "refraction" is that it emphasises the fact that government policy is not
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simply a one-way effect on firms. “Refraction” is not a direct relationship, instead, it is 
distributed. It is the combined result of the activity of several different players embedded in 
an institutionally conditioned domestic environment.
In this case study on Germany, which together with a comparative chapter makes up the 
second part of the thesis, the effect of "refraction" on internationally oriented start-ups will 
be examined in depth. To do this, the roles of three different types of actors need to be 
discussed: National government, the incumbent national telecommunications operator and 
new ventures. This chapter focuses on relevant national government policy but is sensitive 
to how different types of firms participate in the policy-making process. Most instructive is 
the policy relationship between government and the dominant national telecommunications 
operator. This chapter and the next will focus on this relationship and examine it from the 
perspective first of government and then of the operator. In both chapters, the involvement 
of the small players, the start-up firms themselves, will be analysed as well. For example, in 
Germany, their voice was less influential in the formulation of telecommunications policy 
than in the government scheme promoting venture capital. In the end, an integrated picture 
can be presented in which interconnections between the actors are emphasised. To start, 
however, the focus is on policy-making on a national level. Two specific policy arenas were 
especially relevant for internet start-ups: Telecommunications liberalisation and technology 
policy. Technology policy included programs supporting venture capital.
Policy changes in both arenas were initiated during the Kohl era. The ruling coalition from 
1982 to 1998 consisted of the conservative people's parties CDU and CSU as well as the 
liberals, the FDP. When they assumed power, this constellation emphasised that they stood 
for change, a "Wende." In both policy arenas discussed here, policy shifts actually took 
place. In telecommunications liberalisation, the outcome was influenced by political 
compromise.
In the first part of the thesis, the choices made in the U.S.A. regarding telecommunications 
liberalisation were described. These choices had an impact on the pricing of internet access 
for consumers and firms. This was because, during the commercialisation of the internet,
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basic telecommunication services still provided the main access route to the internet. Since 
the liberalisation of basic telecommunications followed different paths in different 
countries, the impact of liberalisation cannot be generalised and equated to the U.S. 
experience. In the 1980s, when liberalisation of basic services was underway in the U.S.A., 
the UK, Japan and the Scandinavian countries, German policy-makers generally thought 
this step to be unnecessary. The focus was on global competition in telecommunications 
equipment, mobile telephony and value-added services; these were the primary candidates 
for liberalisation. Only some policy makers and advisors saw the importance of basic 
services competition in sparking consumer and firm uptake of "information society" 
services.1 The backers of full liberalisation gained ground only in the 1990s, after a more 
than a decade of CDU-led government. And, although liberalisation of basic services was 
decided upon in 1996, the results of corporatist policy compromise as well as the specific 
liberalisation schedule contributed to a continuing regime of high and metered internet 
access prices well into 1999.
Whereas German economic policy makers were laggards regarding basic 
telecommunications liberalisation, they were among the first in the world on the level of 
national government to institute new framework legislation for the "information society." 
Already 1997, a so-called "Multimedia Law" was designed by the Ministry of Research and 
Technology (BMFT, actually the BMBF)2 and passed by parliament. The law enshrined a 
basic stance towards "information society" issues, which was held by the BMFT as well as 
the Ministry of Economics (BMWi) in the Kohl era. The "Multimedia Law" pre-empted 
policy by the Interior Ministry and the federal states ("Lander") which both for different 
reasons were regarded as potentially able to stifle the development of the "information 
society" in Germany. Although it was developed in consultation with individual start-ups in
1 One o f these was Wemhard Moschel, who fittingly described Germany's first step towards 
telecommunication liberalisation in the late 1980s as "nibbling on the edge o f a monopoly," ("Knabbem am 
Rande eines Monopols"). Quoted by Susanne Schmidt in her footnote 35 (1991,216). Moschel is a professor 
o f economic law and a member o f the liberal Kronberger Kreis. (Lehmbruch, 1992, 38).
2 Depending on the emphasis o f the ruling coalition, the focus o f the Ministry o f Research and Technology 
(BMFT) has changed. Under Kohl, the scope o f the Ministry was extended and it was called the 
"Bundesministerium fur Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie" (BMBF) the "Federal Ministry 
for Education, Science, Research and Technology." Journalists usually referred to it simply as the "Future 
Ministry." To avoid confusion, the old term will be used here and the ministry will be consistently called the 
Ministry o f Research and Technology (BMFT).
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multimedia and internet fields, the law was a state-led initiative, the objectives of which 
had been defined by policy-makers and reflected their perceptions of the needs of 
entrepreneurs.
For well over thirty years, the German federal government has sought to close the 
"technology gap" between Germany and the U.S.A.3 From the beginning, policy-makers 
had sensed that their dual approach to "catching up" was insufficient. This approach 
consisted of combining industrial policy focused on subsidising research and development 
in a few privileged electrotechnical firms with a broad, "diffusion-oriented" programme 
emphasising technological uptake of the SME sector. What was missing was specific policy 
targeting young, high-growth technology companies. U.S. leadership in IT and 
biotechnology was clearly attributable to young companies. To emulate this development at 
home and enable the formation of innovative start-ups, German policy-makers 
experimented with different types of programmes from the late 1970s. By 1989, the 
Ministry of Research and Technology had veered away from credits and subsidies in this 
area and launched two successful schemes promoting private venture capital investments. 
The best known of these was developed in close consultation with individual entrepreneurs; 
here, however, in a formal, specialist forum supported by the work of the independent 
Fraunhofer research institutes.4 It was carried out by a public/ private body, the 
Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft (tbg) of the German Equalisation Bank (Deutsche 
Ausgleichsbank, DtA), an institution founded in 1950 and very firmly rooted in the German 
tradition of promoting SMEs.
Before looking at these three policy areas individually, however, the chapter will begin by 
discussing the status quo in Germany towards the end of the 20th century, in terms of its 
economy and its policy-making approach and institutions. An important issue is to what 
extent the German policy community was dependent on corporatist compromise in the Kohl 
era. When attempting to roll back the state in telecommunications the ruling coalition could
3 Peter Humphreys has described how the "technology gap" was thematised by the ruling Social Democrats in 
the early 1970s, leading, among other things, to the founding o f the Ministry o f Research and Technology 
(BMFT) in 1972. Furthermore, the first commission was put together at this time to examine the "expansion o f  
the technical communication system," the KtK (Humphreys, 1988, 187-189).
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only overcome institutional barriers to change through a corporatist compromise. This had a 
detrimental effect on the opportunities for internet ventures in Germany.
The German economy: Impact of unification and social programs
Key policy decisions which have had an effect on internet entrepreneurship in Germany 
were made against an backdrop of macroeconomic and fiscal developments. In contrast to 
the "long boom" of the "new economy" in the second half of the 1990s in the U.S.A., 
Germany faced increasing hardships, which began to recede only in 1999.5 Among these 
were the costs of unification, the social program "crisis," high "structural" unemployment 
and a net outward FDI balance. The first three factors contributed to a continual budget 
deficit, which lingered in the background of all policy-making. Although the budget deficit 
was smaller in 1998 compared to 1997, this was in large part attributable to singular income 
flows such as privatisation income and investment reductions (Sachverstandigenrat, 1998, 
10, 127-141). The privatisation and sale of shares of the telecommunications incumbent, the 
Deutsche Telekom, was one of these singular income flow sources. Under the Kohl 
administration, therefore, telecommunications policy was influenced by two contradictory 
policy objectives: Maximising the value of the incumbent and introducing competition into 
the industry. Selling shares of the former monopolist carrier offered only short-term 
financial gains. A German panel of economists concluded that achieving longer-term 
financial sustainability would mean cutting subsidies dramatically and a thorough reform of 
social programs- challenging objectives that were not achieved in the Kohl era 
(Sachverstandigenrat, 1998, 10).6
4 For a history o f the Fraunhofer research institutes, see Trischler and vom Bruch (1999).
5 Average estimates for the period from 1996-1998. USA: GDP growth 3.6, unemployment 5%; Germany: 
GDP growth 2.1, unemployment 10% (Sachverstandigenrat, 1998, 29,32, 33).
6 The Kohl era will be remembered also as one in which, despite its liberal leanings, extended support to ailing 
coal industry up to the year 2000- in response to massive coal worker demonstrations joined in by leading 
SPD politicians (Donges, 1997,208). Agriculture and other areas were a special cases which was subsidised 
already under Erhard and were excluded from the "Cartel Law" (Donges, 1997,203). For an overview o f  
subsidies see OECD (1998,124).
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Although it faced high unification costs, the Kohl administration was unwilling or unable to 
radically cut government spending in subsidies and social programmes. The emphasis was 
on compromise. This section will focus on three related economic policy issues especially 
important to the entrepreneur: taxes, labour market regulation and labour costs. An 
examination of these factors affecting small, "knowledge-based" firms comes to a more or 
less balanced combination of negative and positive factors. Economic policy certainly left 
much room for improvement, but in itself did not represent a severe handicap for 
entrepreneurs based in Germany relative to other, more specific pressing issues such as 
telecommunications liberalisation.
There was disagreement in Kohl's Germany about the actual gravity of the problems the 
economy and its enterprises faced as a whole. Left-leaning press and politicians- then in 
opposition- often argued at the time that the problems were not as bad as they seemed.
Their agenda was to keep some of the social market policies in place and modernise others 
to create a new version of a flexible yet socially acceptable social market economy, a 
"participatory Society" ("Teilhabegesellschaft") (Kleinert and Mosdorf, 1998, 173). Instead 
of a conflict between the state and the market, synergies between market, state and society 
were emphasised (Kleinert and Mosdorf, 1998, 182). At the time, it was not evident that 
this agenda would under SPD rule be used to initiate cost cutting and reform to a far greater 
degree than attempted under Kohl’s Germany. Cost cutting and reform were actually 
strongly advocated at the time only by the conservative and liberal press in Germany, which 
was joined by Anglo-American publications in painting a "sick man in Europe" image.7 The 
main problems raised were high government spending levels and inflexibility and over­
regulation in many areas of the economy, especially the labour market. Both the right and 
the modem left were united in one belief, however: "Germany needs a new entrepreneurial
o
wave." In fact, the new Social Democrat-led coalition that assumed power in the Autumn
7 The title o f a study by Merrill Lynch from March 1999 described Germany as the "sick man o f Europe." 
Cited in Tony Barber, "German Economy: Structural Weaknesses are Seen as Bar to Recovery," Financial 
Times, Survey, "The Pink Book, The European Economy," 28.05.99, p. 8.
8 The quote comes from the Social Democrat and Green politicians Hubert Kleinert and Siegmar Mosdorf 
(1998, 214). See also the section "Innovator und Firmengrtinder: Die Saulen eines Standortes" ("Innovators 
and Entrepreneurs: The Pillars o f the Economy") in a book co-authored by Lothar Spath, a former leading 
CDU politician who now is in industry (Henzler and Spath, 1997, 153-156).
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of 1998 identified the internet with entrepreneurship and job-creation. One statement does 
not require translation into English: "Intemet-Business ist Jobmaschine."9
Despite this pessimistic view from commentators more or less sharing a similar ideological 
platform, Helmut Kohl's coalition government did not conclusively address the symptoms 
of the "sick man." Although a "Wende," a change, was announced when the Kohl coalition 
replaced the Social-Liberal government in 1982, significant changes were not realised in 
those economic policy areas where it would be most controversial, such as simplification of 
the corporate tax system and reduction of the personal income tax burden.10 Some singular 
initiatives, which were important to entrepreneurs and their financiers, were successful, 
such as the removal of personal taxes on capital in 1997. In general, many entrepreneurs 
were dissatisfied with policy-making. Their dissatisfaction, however, had its origin in 
disillusion with the scope of reforms and a pragmatic forecast of where Germany would be 
heading if it further travelled down the road of "rotten compromise."11 The actual 
conditions "knowledge-based" entrepreneurs faced regarding taxation levels and the labour 
market were surprisingly positive, although they could certainly have been improved as 
well.
The largest tax disincentive entrepreneurs face in Germany were in the form of high 
personal income taxes. These were aggravated by the so-called "solidarity tax" instituted to 
cover part of the costs of unification.12 High personal income taxes were a barrier to hiring 
skilled "knowledge" employees from other parts of the world. One entrepreneur based close
9 Part o f the title o f a press release by the Economics Ministry. The complete title reads "Internet World '99 in 
Berlin. Mosdorf: Innovation partnership between the state and the economy marks Germany's path into the 
information society -  Intemet-business is a job machine." Press release number 74/99, Bundesministerium fQr 
Wirtschaft und Technologie BMWi, Dienstbereich Berlin, 18.05.99.
10 Germany was known for the Byzantine complexity o f its corporate tax system. Speed was lost as 
entrepreneurs adjusted their operations to the tax system. Several proposals were made during the Kohl 
administration to simplify the tax structure across the board and thereby also make it more palpable for 
entrepreneurs. One example was the Ulldahl model, preferred by many entrepreneurs. Under Helmut Kohl, 
however, tax reform was severely compromised. Gerhard Schroder managed to address these issues more 
effectively.
11 One entrepreneur equated Kohl coalition with the politics o f "rotten compromises." (Interview, Living 
Systems AG, 18.04.99).
12 Due to unification tax, Germany is the only OECD country which saw its peak income tax rate rise overall 
in the past decade, to 57%. This rise was only 1% if viewed over the whole period, but this must be compared 
to falling rates in most other OECD countries by over 10% (Sachverstandigenrat, 1998, 192).
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to the Swiss border, for example, had little success is attracting Swiss physicists to 
complement his team as programmers.13 The success of Silicon Valley was to a great extent 
based on highly skilled employees arriving from all over the world and a rapid demographic 
turnover (Cohen and Fields, 1999, 109, 126-127). Yet, one of Silicon Valley's barriers to 
further growth was quotas on visas imposed by U.S. government. Therefore, whereas the 
problems were of a different nature in the U.S. and Germany, the constrained flow of 
immigrants seemed a growth barrier in both countries. Although entrepreneurs could easily 
have employed more highly skilled people and the study carried out in this project 
suggested that most ventures were chronically understaffed, the labour market was 
apparently not worse than in other highly industrialised countries.
In one respect, however, the labour market for "knowledge workers" such as programmers 
or consultants seemed better in Germany than in California. Anecdotal evidence suggested 
that in contrast to the high workplace mobility in California, highly skilled employees were 
both more loyal as well as cheaper in Germany. The German internet software start-ups 
Intershop, Brokat and Poet, for example, had sales offices in the U.S.A. but carried out 
most of their programming in Germany.
Were corporate taxes high or low in Germany? It depended on whom you asked. On an 
international scale, corporate taxes were not among the top in the world.14 They were to a 
great part tied to the profits of the company (with the sole exception of property taxes), and 
a start-up without profits was hardly subject to taxation. To an extent, the same conditions 
exist in the U.S.A., U.K. and the Netherlands but not in France (Licht, Hemer and Kulicke, 
1998, 26, 27; see also Sachverstandigenrat, 1998, 193). A big plus for German 
entrepreneurs, however, was the capital gains tax structure, which serves as a start-up 
incentive. In fact, share holdings under 25% which were held for more than six months 
were not subject to a capital gains tax (Licht, Hemer and Kulicke, 1998,27).
13 Interview with Living Systems AG (18.04.99).
14 This point is emphasised by Stefan Welzk in an instructive but emotionally charged paper (1998).
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Assessing the balance of benefits and obstacles faced by firms in Germany became the 
national sport of almost all publications in the 1990s- the "Standortdebatte." One recurring 
aspect of this debate was the attempt to gauge the overall state of the German economy by 
examining foreign direct investment (FDI). From the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, the net 
balance of FDI for the past years in Germany was negative, suggesting to some observers 
that Germany was steadily losing comparative locational advantage. Outward stock 
increased from DM 100 to DM 223 billion when the period from 1983 to 1989 is compared 
to 1990 to 1996. Inward stock also increased, however, from DM 23 to DM 47 billion 
(Tuselmann, 1998, 296, 297).15 While more recent figures show a strong increase in FDI 
inward stock in 1999, it is still dwarfed by outward flow. Much of the rise in inward stock 
reflects the global trend of consolidation and merger activity in specific industries.16
The world of multimedia and internet start-ups also saw increased cross-border merger 
activity. Here, however, the balance between outward and inward FDI seemed reversed. 
New technology players were interested in a German location because of its large absolute 
number of internet users, the corporate market, its favourable know-how base and its 
position in Europe. In 1998 and 1999, at least five German internet and multimedia start-
1 7ups were acquired by U.S. or Swedish firms. German internet start-ups, on the other hand, 
only in May 1999 began to acquire U.S. companies.18 If there was a net FDI inflow when
13 Heinz-Josef Tuselmann has contributed to the location debate by compiling different studies on the
motivations for FDI by German firms. He argues that FDI is motivated by the lure o f foreign markets and not 
the pressure o f rising locational costs. Rising FDI is a global, not a German trend. Furthermore, he
demonstrates that capital investments abroad contribute to job creation at home, negating the common 
argument that "jobs are exported." As a consequence, what worries the scholar is not outflow o f capital but 
rather the relatively meagre trickle o f funds being invested in Germany by outsiders. This indeed seems to 
indicate the unattractiveness of the German location in a world that is becoming more interdependent 
(Ttiselmann, 1998).
16 Birgit Marschall, “GroBfiisionen treiben Direktinvestitionen in Deutschland auf Rekordhohe. Finanz- 
Engagements von Auslandem 1999 nahezu verdreifacht. Deutsche Untemehmen sehen Auslandsinvestition als 
Standortsicherung,” Financial Times Deutschland, 15.08.99, page 11.
17 In 1998, three German internet and multimedia start-ups were bought by U.S. players, InnoMate (by 
USWeb), Lava (by iXL), ABC Bucherdienst (by Amazon.com). Another small German multimedia start-up 
was acquired by the Swedish player Spray. On 04.01.99, Adobe Systems Incorporated acquired internet 
software start-up GoLive Systems, Inc., which had a sales office in Menlo Park, California, but carried out its 
software development in Hamburg.
18 The first purchase abroad was a small New York-based firm, Fountainhead Management, Inc, which was 
bought by Intershop. Two weeks later, Brokat Infosystems AG bought Transaction Software Systems (TST), 
Norcross, Georgia. Purchases by large German firms in the internet sector such as Bertelsmann's acquisition 
o f a share in Bamesandnoble.com date back to 1998. "Intershop kauft sich in New York ein," HighText
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looking exclusively at technology start-ups, this would not only suggest the importance of 
the German location but also the handicap of German small firms in embarking upon 
international expansion. This is the question that will be examined in the next chapters.
Policy-making in Germany
Most legislation in Germany is a joint effort of parliament and the responsible ministry. In 
both policy-making arenas, specialists are often charged with working on legislation 
proposals and drafts. This is especially the case with technical issues.19 Ministry 
bureaucrats, for example, are able to work in their areas of proficiency with a minimum of 
interference from other ministries. They have been described as "experts with specialised 
knowledge for problem solving" (Mayntz and Derlien, 1989, 295). The German parliament 
("Bundestag") combines responsibilities of public, partisan debate with legislative output. It 
is, therefore, a mixture of the British "debating parliament" and the U.S. style "working 
parliament" (Sontheimer and Bleek, 1998, 278). Much of the legislative work in Bundestag 
is carried out in working committees staffed by specialised parliamentarians of different 
parties.20 It is said that cross-partisan consensus is enhanced by these committees, where the 
opposition works together with the coalition government in an environment which is 
removed somewhat from public scrutiny and thus also party politics. They are also sites for 
corporatist compromise, because representatives of interest groups can participate either as
Verlag, 03.05.99; "Brokat iibemimmt Softwarehaus TST," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11.05.99, page 
24.
19 According to Ziegler, technological issues require long-standing specialist relationships between scientists, 
engineers, technicians and skilled workers (Ziegler, 1997, vii-ix). "Age-old political tasks" include those o f  
"exercising power, brokering interests and negotiating compromise." Technology issues, however, involve 
"establishing technical parameters, exercising expertise and fulfilling performance standards" (Ziegler, 1997, 
9). In the German case, it seems very relevant to describe the specialist orientation o f both parliamentarians 
and ministry officials as relating to technology issues and labelling them with Ziegler's term "politics o f  
competence" (Ziegler, 1997, 2).
20 Other factors further reinforce the specialisation o f parliamentarians. A contest o f specialised proficiency 
takes place during the negotiations between parliamentarians and ministry officials. Parliamentarians need to 
be able to "stand up to" the arguments o f ministry bureaucrats (Sontheimer and Bleek, 1998, 293). In contrast 
to some other countries, a large proportion o f parliamentarians in Germany are politicians who have made 
politics their exclusive career (Sontheimer and Bleek, 1998, 296-298).
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members or invited speakers.21 In summary, specialisation in policy-making is reinforced 
by political institutions. Specialisation also synchronises nicely with two important aspects 
of German policy-making: The Rule of Law and corporatism. It also needs to be seen in 
conjunction with the distributed nature of executive power in Germany.
Instead of a pyramid, the German system spreads executive power into the separate 
ministries in the shape of a "focused network" (Mayntz, 1980, 144). Katzenstein has used 
the term "Departmentalisation" (Katzenstein, 1978, 319, 320). In fact, the term "Chancellor 
Democracy," introduced to describe the powerful institution of the chancellor during the 
times of Adenauer, cannot really be applied to the contemporary system. Helmut Kohl, for 
example, is regarded as having acted more as a manager and mediator, a guardian of the 
status quo and not a strong executive force (with the exception of his role during 
unification). Individual ministers are autonomous and powerful. A chancellor can usually 
reshuffle them only after an election. The chancellor is constrained by party politics since 
the party is his prime vehicle through which he can carry decisions into the ministries, the 
parliament (Bundestag) and the federal states (Lander)23 For all of these reasons, 
chancellors "will actively set policy goals and directives in only one or very few selected 
fields, limiting themselves to managing the process of collective decision making" (Mayntz, 
1980, 139, 146). Telecommunications policy was not one of Helmut Kohl's highest 
priorities; it was not on "the agenda of the boss" ("Chefsache").24 Instead, it was a steady, 
continuous process which conformed to German policy-making.
21 In media and telecommunications policy, commissions are a preferred policy instrument, starting with the 
"Commission for the Development o f the Technical Communication System" ("Kommission fur den Ausbau 
des technischen Kommunikationssystems," KtK), established by the ruling Social Democrats in 1974. 
Hoffinann-Riem discusses the role o f commissions explicitly in relation to media policy (1990, 174).
22 See the paper by Clay Clemens, "The Chancellor as Manager" (1994). For a well-written popular account of 
Helmut Kohl, read Johannes Gross' chapter on the chancellor (1995).
23 Yet, parties are also under pressure in some issues to bow to the fundamental obligations o f consensus. In 
opposition, the SPD was very much conscious o f this and tried not to appear as a "policy blocker." In a 
different context, Gordon Smith has called this phenomenon o f German party politics "Yes-But" opposition 
(Smith, 1976, 392; see also Sontheimer and Bleek, 1998, 287).
24 Johannes Gross describes how Kohl ignored his obligation to set a key policy orientation 
("Richtlinienkompetenz") and instead used the more flexible propagandistic device o f the "Chefsache" (1995, 
82, 83).
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German economic policy making has been equated with two very different traditions: The 
"Rechtsstaat" (the Rule of Law) and a reliance on corporatist methods and institutions to 
carry out certain programs and solve deadlock. The Rule of Law describes the state as the 
originator of a legally defined order and leads to what Dyson has called a "juridification of 
policy" (1992, 9, 10). It reflects the Hegelian vision of an independent, enlightened state 
that guides its people (Smith, 1976, 398, 400,401). This idea transcends party differences 
in the Federal Republic. Both 1950s Ordoliberal free-market thought as well as the German 
interpretation of Keynesian supply-led economics in the late 1960s were enshrined in what 
were meant to be landmark laws. When Ludwig Erhard was Minister of Economics, the so- 
called Cartel Law of 1957, the "Law on Restrictions on Competition," was enacted.25 It was 
the first important German competition law, a previous effort in the interwar period was 
largely ineffective.26 A decade later, in 1967, the Social Democrat Economics Minister Karl 
Schiller contained his countercyclical policy in the "Law for the Promotion of Stability and 
Economic Growth." This was accompanied with prescriptions for economic and 
technological progress, which contradicted Erhard's previous emphasis on fair competition 
(Kiister, 1974, 78). The limited practical success of both laws, however, illustrates that 
although much of the political process sees its objective in law-making, other forces are at 
work.
Embodied in the institutional landscape is the reliance on corporatism in responding to 
challenges and change. Although the Cartel Law was meant to break the power of large 
corporations in Germany whose market powers had begun to limit competition, the law in 
its four decades of existence was not wielded as was intended. To a great extent, large 
enterprises managed to retain the dominant hold they had in their national economies 
(Vernon, 1974, 6) and played political roles within a corporatist system. Similarly, despite 
Schiller's attempt to contain Keynesian economic policy in a law, this policy was not 
followed through in Germany as it was in other countries (Kreile, 1978, 199; see also Sally, 
1995, 88-93). Also, in the 1990s, law making targeting telecommunications and multimedia
25 Walter Eucken, one o f the founders o f the Freiburg School and influential Ordoliberal thinker in Germany 
immediately after the Second World War, thought one o f the most important obligations o f a Rechtsstaat was 
to prevent the distortion o f markets through monopolies and oligopolies (Sally, 1998, 109).
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was one of the main responses by German policy-makers to the perceived challenges of the 
"Information Society." But, telecommunications legislation also included the formation of a 
new regulatory body which was equipped with carefully prescribed power to meet its 
objectives, which included lower internet access prices in the “local loop.” Until this body 
could begin its work in 1998, however, corporatist compromise had delayed and limited the 
scope of liberalisation leading to high access prices well into 1999.
There are two interrelated uses for the term corporatism in political science. The first refers 
to a theoretical framework for analysing the politics of interest groups. It can be contrasted 
to institutionalist and pluralist approaches, if the former is seen as focusing on the structure 
of particular public agencies and the latter as discussing the formation and power of interest 
groups. While pluralist approaches emphasise the bottom-up formation of interest groups, 
corporatist literature investigates the top-down involvement of different interest groups by 
the state (Streeck, 1994, 9-11). The role of government as instigator is critically important. 
Corporatist literature has in the last decade been combined successfully with institutionalist 
approaches to emphasise diversity in capitalist systems (Streeck, 1994, 8, 9, 19-21). As 
noted by Razeen Sally, however, all these approaches share a preference for analysis in 
aggregate units, such as national government, industry associations and trade unions (Sally, 
1995, 2).
A second use of the term corporatism occurs when it is applied to actual structures and 
methods in policy-making. Here, a triangular relationship between the state, peak industry 
associations and trade unions is being referred to. Another important force is the banks, 
which have historically maintained close linkages to top industrial concerns via board 
membership and shareholdings. The economic historian Werner Abelshauser calls 
corporatism a "triangular pattern of wheeling and dealing" (Abelshauser, 1984, 286). 
Although found in most countries during the 20th century, including Europe, Asia and 
South America, formal corporatist structures are often identified with Germany, especially 
during the interwar period. Corporatism arose out of a desperate attempt by the bourgeoisie
26 In the U.S.A., the Sherman Act dates back to 1890 and the Clayton Act to 1914. For a brief comparison, see 
Herdzina (1993, 133).
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to retain political and economic control in the light of imminent anarchy- as described by 
Charles S. Maier in his classic book on the subject (1975). For many years, corporatism was 
exclusively identified with this undemocratic alliance between the three main economic 
groups. It has often been noted how, until 1992, the International Encyclopaedia o f the 
Social Sciences defined the term Corporatism as: "See fascism" (Czada, 1994, 39).
Pre-war "authoritarian corporatism" mutates into "neo-corporatism," "liberal corporatism," 
or "democratic corporatism" (Streeck, 1994, 11).27 Although he was forced to revive 
corporatist administration of the economy temporarily during the Korean Crisis, Erhard 
tried to cleanse German government from the stigma of corporatism 28 Similarly, the classic 
industry peak association, the "Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie" (the "Federation of 
German Industry" BDI), dominated by the largest German corporations, saw itself as an 
independent entity after the war. Its own perception of its mission was to respond in 
strength to the "corporatist stranglehold of the state" (Czada, 1994, 58, 59). This reflected 
the fact that industry structures gradually opened up with ongoing Americanisation after the
27 Social science sometimes can be short-sighted, as Czada's analysis o f the "career" o f the term corporatism 
shows. Just a few years ago, the term was almost exclusively equated with what we would today call pre-war, 
authoritarian coporatism. Today, a very broad interpretation o f the term corporatism is used so frequently, that 
it almost becomes meaningless. "As a theory, corporatism did not so much gain depth as breath," Czada 
writes. Nevertheless, the scholar believes the diversity o f the term is one of its strengths (1994, 39-41). With 
this blessing, corporatism is also in this thesis used to refer broadly to a process o f a negotiated, distributed 
decision-making supported by government between key interest groups. It fits very well with an institutional 
analysis o f Germany, which is part o f a general research agenda emphasising the diversity o f capitalist 
systems. The broad definition of corporatism resembles what other commentators have called the typical 
"stakeholder" model o f German capitalism and what yet others label a consensual system. It corresponds to 
John Zysman's "negotiated" power system in a taxonomy relating to financial systems, which also includes 
"state-led" and "market-led" (Zysman, 1983, 7,233). Using Arend Lijphart's model o f "majoritarian" and 
"consensual" democracies, Humphreys states that Germany is marked by a complex mix o f the two, but 
emphasises the "consensus" elements, which lead to slow change and incremental policy making (1992, 105- 
107). Katzenstein emphasises the stability o f the German system as well, but notes how it was combined with 
"widespread experimentation" from the 1980s (1989,6). Much of this analysis goes back to Andrew 
Shonfield, who emphasised the unique aspects o f German capitalism. Shonfield prefers, however, to use the 
term "organised private enterprise" (Shonfield, 1969, 239-264).
28 See Abelshauser (1984) for a brilliant and succinct analysis o f this historical development. In Germany, the 
corporatist system received its severest blows in the first few years after the Second World War, when U.S. 
occupation forces delegated a dismantling o f industry concentration. This policy was supported by the post- 
World War mood as well as by Erhard's disdain of industry associations (Lehmbruch, 1992, 39). The industry 
associations persisted, however, and already in the 1950s, Erhard was forced to co-operate with them. During 
the Korean Crisis, Erhard was faced with the task o f implementing a partially planned economy with explicit 
orders from the U.S.A. Instead of embarking upon a dirigiste course, however, he took recourse to what he 
saw as the lesser evil by allowing high-level joint economic administration o f peak associations and 
government. But the form o f co-operation was very different from the period before the Second World War, 
and became increasingly different after the Korean Crisis.
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war (Berghahn, 1985, 324-330). Due to globalisation, further erosion of the power of the 
main institutions of corporatism such as the BDI can be observed today. The third 
corporatist partner, the unions, also started to become more independent-minded. In the 
1970s, critical currents appeared, which attacked the co-operative stance the German unions 
traditionally occupied.29
It is important to note, however, that although formal corporatism has disappeared, the 
tendency for government, industry and the unions to co-operate on policy formation is still 
strong in Germany. In fact, it appeared again prominently in the issue of 
telecommunications liberalisation. But other aspects of Germany policy institutions also 
reappear in this chapter. The promotion of venture capital was carried out very effectively 
in a “departmentalised,” specialist forum. “Rule of law” concepts are evident in the need 
felt by German policy makers to design a general legal framework for the “information 
society,” a need which was at the time not shared to the same extent by entrepreneurs. 
Before these specific policy instances can be discussed, however, two important preambles 
to the discussion taken from the history of German policy-making in the field need to be 
briefly highlighted.
Preamble one: The national videotex debacle
The development of the videotext system in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s was an 
example of state-led technology policy. It was also, incidentally, a showcase for 
corporatism at work in post-war Germany. The story is told in detail by Volker Schneider 
(1989, 69-167). A British public telecommunications engineer invented the videotex system 
in 1972. The invention consisted of the clever combination of different, already existing 
technical systems. It immediately caught the attention of the German Postal and 
Telecommunications Ministry, the BPM. An independent commission examining the
29 Humphreys cites the heavy industry union's slogan "Microchip = Jobkiller." Another trade union slogan 
was: "Defend against the dangers o f the new media" (1988, 197).
German communication system, the KtK,30 also identified it as an important issue for 
examination. After videotex, called Bildschirmtext (Btx) in Germany, was demonstrated at 
the 1977 broadcasting trade fair in Berlin, the BPM invited all important industry 
associations to discuss the development of the system. Three key industry sectors saw it as a 
chance to either comer a new market (the banks and retail industry) or as a potential threat 
(the newspapers). As groups that supplied the services for a public teletex network, they 
formed their own industry organisation in 1982, the Btx-Anbietervereinigung (Btx-AV). It 
had approximately 100 founding members. Btx-AV was dominated by larger businesses; 
only one out of 40 seats in the Kuratorium was reserved for small service firms. This 
association acted as the main spokesperson for business groups and was a negotiation 
partner for the BPM, which developed the system together with IBM. In addition, the 
association was instrumental in convincing state governments to find a political 
compromise over jurisdiction of the new system. Lastly, the unions were also involved in 
the development of Btx. Together with the Social Democrats and the state governments 
they demanded that the system be heavily regulated: Service suppliers had to register 
themselves, there were certain consumer protection and data security features. The SPD 
also successfully defeated a proposal for self-regulation by the industry groups.
The German approach to videotex was secured in a state law, the Staatsvertrag for Btx, 
which was signed in early 1983. Of the three countries developing videotex as a public 
system, Germany was the only one which regulated it through legislation (see Schneider, 
1989, 127, 128). One and a half decades later, the architects from the BMFT of the 1997 
"Multimedia Law" sought to avoid that the federal states could hold a similar gateway 
function in the commercialisation of the internet.
It is astounding in what short time period a successful corporatist system unique to videotex 
developed. This system comprised technological development, roll-out, supply of services 
and a legal and political framework. When Btx was officially launched at the Berlin
30 The "Kommission fur den Ausbau des technischen Kommunikationssystems," KtK, was instituted by the 
Ministry o f Research and Technology, BMFT, to discuss how technological progress in communication 
systems could be promoted in Germany. It began its work in 1974 and submitted a report in 1975 (Schneider,
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broadcast fair in 1983, all major elements were in place. Despite this effort, Videotex itself 
was not successful. In contrast to France, the German government did not heavily subsidise 
the use of the system. Government involvement was focused only on building the 
infrastructure and acting as an instigating partner in a corporatist alliance. Little effort was 
spent on reducing the price for using the system to be borne by consumers.
Preamble two: The research network debacle
It has often been pointed out that German policy-makers tend to shy away from direct 
involvement in the economy (Katzenstein, 1978, 305; Vernon, 1974, 1974, 7). In fact, 
corporatism can sometimes provide a means to (co-) manage the economy without direct 
control or ownership.31 But there have also been numerous instances of dirigiste 
intervention historically. In recent times, the government ran or financed economic 
activities or was involved directly in major technological decisions, mostly via what 
Juergen Donges has disapprovingly called the "sectoral ministries" (1997, 202). Examples 
were the BPM or BMBF. These direct efforts were so widespread, another economist, 
Joachim Starbatty, labelled them: “The reality of daily mercantilism” (Starbatty, 1999, 170, 
171). One such story has just been told: The development of a public videotex system.
1989, 83-86). See Humphreys (1988, 187-199) for an English-language description o f the role o f KtK and the 
development o f Videotex in Germany.
31 A specific example can be found in Abelshauser (1984, 308) and a general mention in Czada (1994, 42, 43).
32 In early 19th century industrialising Prussia, liberal policy-makers had to engage in drawn-out conflicts to 
dismantle many mercantilist state initiatives intended to promote industry and innovation. Through its mining 
corps, Prussia directly owned several mines. The glamorous historical accounts o f industrialisation written in 
the 19th century by Heinrich von Treitschke and Gustav Schmoller emphasised and greatly exaggerated the 
pioneering and direct role o f the Prussian state. For an excellent description o f the battle between liberals and 
mercantilists in Prussia's early industrialisation, read Eric Dorn Brose's account (1993). Today, some 
economic historians believe Prussia's direct involvement was counter-productive. In a later phase of 
industrialisation, during the construction o f the railroads, the Prussian state was initially not involved in any 
way. The railroads were privately financed and built (Fremdling, 1975,129). But the historical debate 
continues today. The founding myth of the Federal Republic and its "Wirtschaftswunder" is universally 
attributed to the Marshall Plan, a substantial transfer o f funds to jump-start the economy. The Marshall Plan 
has had an impact on policy-making ever since its inception. A similar jump-start based in some ways on the 
experience o f the Marshall Plan was attempted in the new, East German states. The actual effect o f the 
Marshall Plan on the German economy, however, is object o f a highly contested debate. For example, the 
prominent economic historian Werner Abelshauser tried to show very early that it was not the Marshall Plan 
that was responsible for the "Economic Miracle," but rather the largely intact capital base o f Germany in terms 
o f machines and know-how (Abelshauser, 1983). A further interpretation o f economic revival emphasises the 
Erhard’s liberal free-trade stance of the young nation after the Second World War (Buchheim, 1990).
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Although government adopted a corporatist approach to secure the supply of services and 
reach political compromise with the states, it set up and ran the infrastructure. Through the 
Bundespost, it was also involved in technological decisions such as making the system 
compatible to IBM mainframe computers. The second milestone in the development of a 
communications infrastructure in Germany was the construction of an academic and 
research network in the 1980s and 1990s, the "Deutsches Forschungsnetz" (DFN). DFN 
was a debacle as well.
The fact that the DFN was a child of the Kohl era would lead one to assume that the public 
sector would take care not to involve itself directly or would, alternatively, plan for a 
withdrawal as soon as the system stood. As in other countries, the deployment of a network 
linking universities and research institutions was subsidised by government, in this case the 
BMFT. Unlike other countries, however, the network was not run in a way that would 
prepare it for privatisation, nor did it encourage spin-offs to industry. In fact, as described 
by a well-known German internet expert, Werner Zorn, in a short and precise paper (1998), 
the German research network organisation was antagonistic to private business.
Interestingly, the German research network ("Deutsches Forschungsnetz" DFN) was 
founded in 1984 under the auspices of BMBF Minister Heinz Riesenhuber. In his Ministry, 
Riesenhuber emphasised a reduction of subsidy programmes. He also intended the DFN to 
be a catalyst for "entrepreneurial spirit" ("Untemehmensgeist"). This is why the DFN was 
founded as an association ("Verein"), which was officially independent of the BMFT. But 
the DFN promptly veered into a different direction as intended, partially because it was 
dependent upon government funding. From 1984 to 1990 it exclusively promoted the use of 
the ISO open networking standard OS I and not any other alternatives, such as the internet 
protocol TCP/IP. In Europe, the UK and the Scandinavian countries had a more open and 
experimental approach, which also allowed the implementation of the U.S. research 
networking standard. Furthermore, the DFN realised its network not in co-operation with 
private enterprises, but with the government-owned Bundespost. The Bundespost ran its
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service to the DFN using the ISO/OSI affiliated standard X.25 CCITT/ISO.33 Furthermore, 
the DFN even after 1990 fought to keep its domain of universities and research institutions 
a monopoly by refusing access to its network by private internet providers. It was, therefore, 
very difficult to establish private internet access providers in Germany; as in other 
countries, most of the initial content was to be found on academic servers linked to the 
DFN (Zorn, 1998, 203, 204). Zorn concludes his paper by writing: "Today we know that the 
internet established itself in Germany not because of BMFT subsidies but despite them" 
(1998, 198). In fact, internet ventures established themselves in a space that was, albeit 
strongly dependent upon telecommunications infrastructure and other political conditions, 
not a direct result of German policy-making.
Taking the long road to telecommunications liberalisation34
Today, Germany is frequently described as one of the most liberal telecommunication 
regimes in the world. Foreign telecommunications firms can enter the market on the same 
terms as domestic players. An independent regulatory body, the RegTP, watches over an 
asymmetrical regulatory regime, which imposes price controls on the incumbent operator, 
the Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG). It ascertains "fair" prices derived from data obtained 
from outside the DTAG. In fact, the prices for interconnection fees charged to competitors 
are considered low even by the competition itself. As a result, prices- especially long­
distance prices- have fallen rapidly. The complaints about the RegTP and its President, 
Klaus-Dieter Scheurle, by DTAG executives can be seen as a further sign that the 
regulatory body is doing its stipulated task well. The market share of the incumbent has
33 X.25 CCITT/ISO was a hierarchical packet-based service and was very different to the decentralised 
networks that TCP/IP systems enabled. In a research project at the Max Planck Institute for the Study o f  
Societies, Dr. Raymund Werle and his colleagues are analysing the development of research networks under 
technological and political aspects. Werle emphasises the open, decentralised capabilities o f  TCP/IP. In fact, 
TCP/IP was used to replace the "Network Control Program" o f the U.S. research network Arpanet in January 
1983 precisely because it did not require a centralised network architecture. Werle contrasts TCP/IP to the 
hierarchical approach o f ISO/OSI and X.25, which was used by the Bundespost. At that time, every X.25 
switch needed to be told the route it should send its packages on by a (central) computer. This approach was 
both more costly and required a centralised "watchdog" authority such as the Bundespost. With technological 
advance over time, the difference between TCP/IP and ISO/OSI became less relevant.
34 Susanne Schmidt used this phrase to describe German telecommunications liberalisation in the title o f one 
o f her papers: "Taking the long road to liberalisation" (Schmidt, 1991).
128
actually fallen more rapidly than in other countries that underwent liberalisation. These 
observations seem even more surprising given the fact that 10 years earlier, Germany was 
universally seen as one of the closed markets in the world, dominated by a monopoly and a 
clientist purchasing system favouring a handful of domestic "court suppliers" (Lehmbruch, 
1992, 40). Germany was criticised as being the "Fortress on the Rhine," as cited by 
Humphreys(1992, 111).
In telecommunications, Germany moved from public to private ownership and from direct 
involvement to regulated competition. This instance of reregulation has also led to German 
government removing itself from direct involvement in technological decisions in the 
telecommunications realm. The commercialisation of the internet began in the midst of this 
process and took place outside of government's auspices- unlike the development of earlier 
networks such as public videotex Btx and the research and academic network DFN. This 
does not mean, however, that government did not influence the development of the internet. 
The telecommunications regime, especially the pricing of local basic services, had a critical 
impact on the development of the internet in Germany. Government policy in other areas 
also needs to be examined, such as legislation targeting internet services. Lastly, 
government policy as it impacts the formation of venture capital markets was important.
Rolling back the state in telecommunications was not easy. It was only possible with 
significant compromise involving what essentially were the three corporatist partners, 
because major institutional hurdles had to be overcome. One of these was changing the 
German Basic Law, and this required a parliamentary majority of two thirds. Another was 
dismantling the public ownership system with its thousands of employees, some of whom 
had the status of public servants. Given this constellation, corporatism mattered. In the 
United States, interest group resistance was much weaker and institutional barriers 
preventing change were low.35
35 In a recent book on comparative telecommunications policy, Volker Schneider depicts this contrast in a very 
useful chart (1999, 257).
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For these reasons, liberalisation was a drawn-out, three-step process: The first postal reform 
of 1989 divided the Bundespost into three separate services, the postal (Deutsche Post), 
banking (Deutsche Postbank) and telecommunication services (Deutsche Telekom). The 
second postal reform was passed in 1992 and came into effect Summer of 1994. At this 
stage, the Deutsche Telekom and the other services were privatised. No market 
liberalisation occurred at this stage. Finally, the Telecommunications Law 
("Telekommunikationsgesetz" TKG) of 1996 instituted asymmetric regulation and 
unrestricted competition in basic services. A new regulator, the Regulierungsbehorde fur 
Telekommunikation und Post (RegTP) was set up under the auspices of the Economics 
Ministry to ensure and maintain a competitive landscape.
Marked by a process of political compromise, it was clear that the outcome of liberalisation 
would be unique to Germany. Essentially, it required that the telecommunications landscape 
be liberalised while trying not to weaken the incumbent carrier, the DTAG. Realising these 
two contradictory aims required a lot of imagination on the part of the proponents of 
liberalisation in the political process. They placed their hopes on the financial muscle and 
business acumen of new telecommunications competitors coming from other industrial 
segments: heavy industry and energy. It was hoped that these giant conglomerates would 
speedily become "national full service carriers." These conglomerates- some of them were 
monopolists in their sector- were unable to launch full services, however, and entered the 
competitive era in 1998 only with so-called ‘Call-by-Call’ or ‘Pre-Selection’ services 
(Gerpott, 1998, 263). This led to severe competition in long distance telephony. Internet 
access pricing over local telephone connections remained untouched by competition for a 
long time, however.
Another hope of the political proponents of change was technological: They believed in an 
alternative means of access by which competitors could bypass Deutsche Telekom's local 
phone lines. This was "wireless local loop" technology. One of these wireless systems, 
DECT, was a standard defined by the European standards body ETSI in 1992.36 According
36 For a short discussion of DECT as it pertains to Germany, see Gerpott (1998, 38-54). Gerpott lists eleven 
different wireless local loop pilots in Europe in December 1997 (1998,48).
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to Dr. Martin Mayer, a CSU parliamentarian who was active in a number of relevant 
commissions: "At that time, we all believed that competition would come through the 
wireless local loop. Everybody spoke about DECT. Cable telephony, on the other hand, 
seemed an experiment. I must note, however, that the association of private telephony 
carriers (VATM) did argue for a separation [of the cable TV network]." (interview
23.04.99).37 But although DECT indeed had looked promising in 1996, in 1999 it was still 
in the pilot phase in most countries. It also required greater investments than was originally 
anticipated.
These hopes turned out to be wishful thinking. The first companies that after liberalisation 
in January 1998 actually offered internet access packages in a bundle with telephony 
services were the "regional full service carriers." One of these companies, NetCologne, 
offered a combined flat rate fee access package including 60 hours of internet surfing a 
month for DM 65 (interview, NetCologne, 30.04.99). But only a few "regional full service 
carriers" launched their services in the first year of liberalisation. In fact, for a long time, 
NetCologne was the only provider offering flat rate internet access. The great majority of 
internet users in Germany still had to pay local, metered connection fees to the DTAG for 
many months after liberalisation occurred.
Most policy-makers and observers acknowledged that, even in 1999, pricing of local calls 
had a prohibitive effect on internet usage.38 It is interesting to note that before 1982, local 
calls in Germany were charged according to a flat rate o f 0.23 DM per call. Even after this 
time, however, local calls continued to be cheap: One minute for 0.03 DM. It was only in
37 This view about the viability o f DECT was confirmed in interview 31.05.99 with Greens parliamentarian 
Dr. Manuel Kiper. He added, however, that the access solution over cable TV already at that time was 
considered more readily available and less costly to develop. Arne Bomsen, a parliamentarian who is currently 
the Vice President o f the RegTP, also believed in DECT in late 1996. In a newspaper article, he emphasised 
that a greater allotment o f frequencies for the wireless local loop. Arne Boemsen, "Wirtschaft: Serie: Mit dem 
Ende des Telekom-Monopols ist es nicht getan: Wettbewerb erfordert Marktregulierung: Pladoyer fur eine 
Liberalisierung mit AugenmaB," SiXddeutsche Zeitung, 07.11.96, p. 36.
38 "We desperately need competition in the last mile to the user," says the CSU parliamentarian Dr. Martin 
Mayer in an interview (23.04.99). The same view can be found in the statement by the FDP party in the 
Enquete-Kommission. The FDP calls for: "A reduction in internet access tariffs through regulation, because 
new competitors will not be active in reducing local call prices in the near future" (Enquete-Kommission,
1998, 149). The same view is echoed by the statement o f the SPD and Bundnis 90/ Die Griinen (Enquete- 
Kommission, 1998, 141-144).
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preparation for competition that prices were raised 400% to 0.12 DM per minute (Kubicek,
1998, 1098). DTAG lowered its prices only in those areas where there was serious 
competition. In fact, the development of prices seems to indicate it was even able to raise 
prices for local access. Dieter Wolf, the president of the German competition authority, the 
"Kartellamt," stated in early 1998: "The cartel fortress of the Deutsche Telekom are local 
calls." Even some politicians of the former opposition, the SPD, acknowledge this in
1999. In an interview, Jorg Tauss, Social Democrat Member of Bundestag, succinctly 
stated: "Prices for long-distance calls have fallen, the problem is with local calls" (Interview
25.03.99). Siegmar Mosdorf was clearer: "Obviously, the Deutsche Telekom will use her 
traditional advantages derived from the former monopoly structure as long as possible" 
(Interview 10.05.99). Competition in internet access pricing began to arrive only after April 
1999.40 Phil Dwyer of the research firm Jupiter Communication's London still wrote in 
1999: "Telephone usage is metered and that alone will continue to hold back the growth of 
online advertising, content and commerce ventures in Europe by inhibiting internet 
usage."41 It was a telling statistic that users of AOL spent an average of 55 minutes a day 
online in the U.S.A., whereas in Europe this figure was just 17 minutes.42
There was ample opportunity in 1995 and 1996, when the Telecommunications Law, the 
TKG, was drafted, to create an alternative, competitive direct access network by splitting 
the cable TV system off the incumbent43 It is ironic that this network was originally built
39 "Telekom weist die Vorwurfe des Kartellamts zurtick. Wolf: Die Telefonpreise sind rechtswidrig genehmigt 
worden. Rexrodt will vermitteln," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.02.98.
40 Only in Spring o f 1999, three years after liberalisation was decided upon, the conditions for internet access 
began to change in Germany. From the 1st o f April 1999, DTAG used its ownership o f both local phone lines 
and its ownership o f the largest ISP, T-Online, to offer cheaper combined access to the internet. Thereby, it 
vastly undercut its competitors, whose customers have to pay the phone connection and the ISP separately. 
This was seen as a misuse o f DTAG's market power in local telephony services as well as internet service 
provision and was attacked by its main competitor, AOL Europe. Ralph Atkins, "Interview: Andreas Schmidt. 
Preaching the Internet Gospel across Europe," Financial Times, 27.05.99, p. 13.
41 Henrik Ravn, "Jupiter Communications: European Online Households Triple by 2003, But Usage Will 
Remain Low. Free Access Will Not Cure European Internet Woes Without Incentive Programs," Press 
Release, Jupiter Communications, LLC, London, 18.05.99.
42 Ralph Atkins, "Interview: Andreas Schmidt. Preaching the Internet Gospel across Europe," Financial 
Times, 27.05.99, p. 13.
43 The economists Andreas Freytag and Bemd Jager urgently recommended a separation o f cable TV from the 
Deutsche Telekom (Freytag and Jager, 1996,232). In 1999, the cable TV network was estimated as feeding 
6.5 million households in Germany and partially connecting another 11.5 million. William Boston,
"Microsoft, Bertelsmann Are in Talks For Stake in Deutsche Telekom Unit," The Wall Street Journal 
Interactive Edition, 21.05.99.
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by the Postal and Telecommunications Ministry under CDU leadership to activate 
competition in the media industry. Since its inception, it lost money because DTAG was 
unwilling to cannibalise its own ISDN telephony and multimedia services by upgrading it 
for two-way usage.44 DTAG management themselves had always been aware that splitting 
cable TV would have been an obvious thing to do from a competition policy viewpoint. 
Already at the end of 1997 the Deutsche Telekom started to outsource its cable TV services 
into a separate company, "DeTeKabel." It may have hoped that by bringing other 
shareholders into the company, it could pre-empt a complete loss of control. The sale 
process started only in 1999 and would continue for several years. And it was not German 
government action that DTAG management feared, but the EU (Gerpott, 1998, 70,71). EU 
competition authorities had earlier also prevented an intended partnership between the 
DTAG and the German media giants Bertelsmann and Kirch 45 This section will discuss 
why the incumbent was kept whole in 1996 and also why two other important concessions 
were made: Retaining control over the largest national online service, T-Online, as well as 
allowing the Deutsche Telekom one and a half years to prepare for competition.
Liberalisation was marked by a tough battle between the ruling coalition and the opposition. 
To change the existing public telecommunications regime, the Basic Law needed to be 
changed with two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament. Change was therefore only 
possible with concessions and the Telecommunications Law marked a compromise. In 
order to describe the nature of the compromise adequately, however, a closer look needs to 
be taken at the partisan conflict. In fact, there were modernisation proponents and staunch 
advocates of the status-quo on both sides, and it was the modernisers on each side which 
contributed to the eventual success of liberalisation. But the modernisers had significantly 
different visions of the future: The ruling coalition parties were opposed to state 
involvement in technology policy and had earlier criticised the Bundespost's involvement in 
technological decision-making. The opposition SPD advocated technological innovation
44 Although a separation o f cable would have allowed competition to begin offering alternative access 
services, converting coaxial cable into broadband internet services is not a simple task. An upgrade for 
internet services in 1999 was estimated in 1999 to cost DM 3.4 billion. William Boston, "Microsoft, 
Bertelsmann Are in Talks For Stake in Deutsche Telekom Unit," The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition, 
21.05.99.
45 "Telekom: Oberflachlich und falsch," Der Spiegel, Number 17,20.04.98.
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under the auspices of a national champion.46 This difference is crucial and reaches back to 
the beginnings of the "technology gap" discussion in the 1970s 47
From the 1980s, the process of telecommunications deregulation has been described in 
terms of a battle between a coalition for change and its opponents. And it was only in the 
1990s that the coalition for change began to gain ground. From 1985 to 1987, the 
telecommunications policy commission, the so-called "Witte Commission," named after its 
chairman Professor Eberhard Witte, which included the broad scope of concerned interest 
groups, was marked by heavily dissenting positions (Schmidt, 1991, 214-215). Its 
corporatistic mission resulted in the moderate first postal reform of 1889, the "Bill to 
Restructure the Post and Telecommunications of the German Bundespost" 
("Poststrukturgesetz"). To describe how difficult it was to pass the reform bill, Humphreys 
cites Schneider and Werle that 50 different organisations participated in bitter hearings by 
the Bundestag committee. In the end, however, the bill was passed more easily than was 
expected- thanks to the corporatist process it had been through (Humphreys, 1992, 118, 
121-124).
The first proponents of change were the computer industry, especially the German company 
Nixdorf and, to a lesser extent, IBM, who attacked the purchasing policies of the state-
46 This point is made by Herbert Kubicek, basing himself in part on a dissertation by Dieter Klumpp (Kubicek, 
1998,1094).
47 One o f the major economic and social policy debates in the 1970s and early 1980s surrounded the issue o f  
media liberalisation. The question whether to allow private broadcast media or not was at first glance a 
conflict that ran along party lines. The CDU and CSU, at that time in opposition, believed that the existing 
public media system was left leaning and blamed the media for an erosion o f their power (Hoffmann-Riem, 
1990, 180). The SPD was staunchly opposed to private media. Media jurisdiction lay with the federal states, 
not with the national government After the CDU and CSU assumed power in 1982 together with the FDP, 
Postal and Telecommunications Minister Christian Schwarz-Schilling used his control over the federal 
telecommunications system to build a nation-wide coaxial cable network (Hoffinann-Riem, 1990, 182). This 
development added complexity to the debate. It became apparent that modernisers were to be found in both 
parties. Especially relevant is that some policy-makers in the modernisation faction o f the SPD emphasised 
technological progress without emphasising competition. Technological progress was viewed as a result o f  
enlightened state policy. In contrast to Schwarz-Schilling, these SPD modernisers advocated the instalment of  
a nation-wide broadband fibre optic cable integrated services network (Hoffmann-Riem, 1990, 181). This was 
a technology that still had to be developed instead of the widely available, standard, relatively low-cost coaxial 
system. SPD modernisers also were responsible for launching the nation-wide public teletex Btx service. For a 
good overview o f the media policy battle, see the chapter "The Controversy over the Introduction o f New 
Media" in Humphreys (1994, 193-238).
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owned carrier.48 They were backed by the rising frustration which was felt among the 
German Chamber of Commerce, the BDI and the Bundespost adversary, the Association of 
Bundespost Users ("Verband der Postbenutzer," VPB) (Humphreys, 1992, 115)49 Another 
critical player in the late 1980s was the BPM, the Bundespost Ministry itself. It was 
convinced reform was necessary to address the "technology gap."50 In fact, the BPM was 
generally perceived by other participants as the central policy actor advocating reform 
(Humphreys, 1992, 124).51 Lastly, the EC also played an important role. The European 
Commission's influential telecommunication Green Paper of 1987 called for 
liberalisation.52
In the 1990s, however, the position of the proponents of change was considerably 
strengthened through Siemens, the former "court supplier" now intent on entering the U.S. 
market and thus favouring liberalisation at home. Siemens had an important role to play in 
the corporatist system of telecommunications policy; this role was institutionalised it by 
being a member of the Administrative Council ("Verwaltungsrat") of the Bundespost 
(Humphreys, 1992, 110). The important shift was first signalled during the CeBIT computer 
trade fair in Hanover early in 1987, when a Siemens Vice President expressed approval of 
greater liberalisation of the Bundespost (June, 1989, 272-273). Siemens was crucial in 
tipping the balance also because of its direct and indirect links with large industrial 
companies and banks as well as its regional importance to Bavaria, home of the ruling
48 To reduce pressure, the state-owned carrier included these companies in its circle o f equipment suppliers 
(Schmidt, 1991,212-215).
49 It is important not to overemphasise the role o f the group o f corporate users. However, Schmidt has 
included them in the "telematics coalition." In the UK, the “telematics coalition,” also consisting o f suppliers 
o f value-added services and data-processing companies, were a powerful force for change. In Germany, the 
Bundespost was one o f  the main suppliers o f some of these "telematics" services for businesses and made sure 
its most important clients, such as the banks, were given special concessions (Schmidt, 1991, 213-214).
50 German policy-makers were not alone. Indeed, scholars have observed this development all over the world 
and have characterised it as a "complex interweaving o f liberalism with mercantilism" (Dyson and 
Humphreys, 1990,2).
51 This matches Steven Vogel's observation o f privatisation world-wide that it was the state, and not interest 
groups, that were decisive for reform. Vogel mentions that interest groups were hopelessly divided; Knudsen 
adds that most beneficiaries o f the reform were new market entrants that did not exist yet when the reform is 
first embarked upon (Vogel, Steven, 1996, Introduction; Knudsen, 1998,29, 30).
52 On "indirect effects" of EC measures, see Mark Thatcher's paper on the subject (1996, 179, 185, 195). 
Schmidt examines the underlying conditions that favoured a progressive stance o f  the EC in 
telecommunications in comparison with the difficulties the Commission encountered in the energy sector 
(Schmidt, 1998, 180-181). Knudsen describes how the EU level contributed to a breaking o f the German 
"joint-decision trap" (1998, 35-37).
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coalition partner CSU (Junne, 1989,271-272). An exogenous factor was the unification of 
Germany and the accompanying budget deficit. Building up a new telecommunications 
infrastructure was very costly: An estimated DM 60 billion was estimated to be spent from 
1990 to 1997. It was argued that part of these sums would be shifted to the private sector 
through telecommunications reform (Thatcher, 1996, 193, 194).
The opposition included the SPD and the Postal Union. The loss of 60,000 jobs was 
forecast. The opposition also included representatives of rural areas, especially in the 
CSU, who were against liberalisation because they believed that the concept of universal 
service would be compromised. By the end of the process, however, the SPD and the Postal 
Union, the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG), carried the measure. The DPG, although it is 
one of the more left-wing unions, from the mid 1990s emphasised the competitiveness of 
the DTAG which it equated with employment opportunities and high-skill quality 
competition (Darbishire, 1995, 177). In doing so, the Union showed that corporatist support 
of modernisation outweighed leftist critique.
Without the modernisers of the SPD and the union, the shift to support liberalisation would 
not have succeeded. The SPD, however, saw the DTAG as the motor of innovation and thus 
wanted to keep the former PTO integrated. Cable TV and the online service were for this 
reason not considered for separation. Reaching a compromise was so important that the 
CDU/ CSU did not further press for a separation either. In fact, only one Member of 
Parliament had publicly appealed for a separation of the cable network from the Deutsche 
Telekom, the Greens politician Dr. Manuel Kiper.54 In believing that an integrated "national
53 In contrast, the telecommunication industry as a whole grew by 102,000 from the passing o f the 
Telecommunications Law in 1996 and in 1999 another 91,000 were estimated to be employed by the new 
telecommunications competition. Frank Dohmen, "Telekommunikation: An der falschen Stelle. 1st die 
Telekom fur den rauhen Wettbewerb noch nicht stark genug? Die rot-griine Regierung in Bonn will 
nachhelfen -  Zum Nachteil der Kunden," Der Spiegel, Number 46, 09.11.98; see also a newspaper article 
from 1996: Gerhard Hennemann, "Wirtschaft: Serie: Eine Behorde auf dem Weg zum Weltuntemehmen: Die 
Konkurrenz der Telekom ist auf Draht: Nicht nur am lukrativen deutschen Markt formieren sich potente 
Wettbewerber," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 17.10.96, p. 30.
54 Dr. Kiper viewed a reduction o f the breath o f the Deutsche Telekom's services as necessary for a full and 
speedy development o f  a competitive landscape (interview, 31.05.99). Dr. Kiper was a member o f both the 
"Ausschufi fur Post und Telekommunikation" as well as the Enquete-Kommission "Zukunft der Medien." He 
evaluated the position o f ANGA, the association o f small- and medium-sized cable TV companies and had, 
together in a delegation with with other parlamentarians visited Californian technology companies during the
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champion" would become a prime force of innovation, the SPD disregarded completely the 
contemporary discussion in the U.S.A. and the rise of new data-networking competitors. In 
this way, German telecommunications liberalisation embarked on its own, particular 
"Sonderweg." In the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996, the so-called "Baby Bells" or 
local phone services, were not allowed to own more than a 10% share of cable companies. 
In the U.K., the incumbent was not allowed to own any share cable TV networks (see 
Freytag and Jager, 1996, 231). In fact, the main competitive threat to the incumbent carriers 
in these two countries came from the cable TV companies (Gerpott, 1998, 283).
It turns out that for the commercialisation of the internet in Germany and in influencing 
usage patterns, two further concessions that were granted the newly formed DTAG also 
were crucial: Retention of the largest national online service, T-Online, and a period of one 
and a half years from Summer 1996 to the End of 1997 during which it could prepare for 
competition.55 Just as the cable TV issue, these concessions can be traced back to the SPD 
vision of an innovative "national champion" as well as the fiscal considerations of the 
Finance Ministry, which wanted to sell its stakes in the DTAG for a high price. To cite the 
dry commentary of Dr. Martin Mayer, a Bundestag Committee member addressing the issue 
of the Telecommunications Law: "The SPD wanted to prevent liberalisation; this is why 
there were concessions such as the grace period" (interview 23.04.99).56
Even after liberalisation, the DTAG retains "excellent networks" in Bonn "dating back to 
the days of public ownership," according to an article in the newspaper Handelsblatt. For 
this reason, the article continues, "political attacks at the regulatory agency mirror almost 
verbatim statements of the Deutsche Telekom."57 After election of the SPD-Greens 
coalition in late 1998, the new Economics Minister Werner Muller publicly announced that
deliberations for the Telecommunications law and had studied both wireless local loop technologies as well as 
cable TV access for internet and multimedia.
55 Andreas Freytag and Bemd Jager argue that there are no "economic reasons" justifying the grace period and 
that the competition should have been allowed to enter the market right away (1996, 219, 237).
56 Arne Bomsen, an SPD-parlamentarian and later Vice President o f the RegTP, criticised the widespread 
arguments heard within the SPD that competition would hurt the IPO o f the Deutsche Telekom. Arne 
Boemsen, "Wirtschaft: Serie: Mit dem Ende des Telekom-Monopols ist es nicht getan: Wettbewerb erfordert 
Marktregulierung: Pladoyer fur eine Liberalisierung mit AugenmaB," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 07.11.96, p. 36.
57 Donata Riedel, "Meinung und Analyse: RegulierungsbehOrde fur Telekommunikation gerat unter Druck der 
Partien. Politiker miBtrauen dem Wettbewerb," Handelsblatt, Number 129,09.07.98, p. 2.
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he was the "agent for the people and the employees of the Deutsche Telekom."58 The SPD 
Minister of Economics of the State of North-Rhine Westphalia, Wolfgang Clement, as well 
as the Chairman of the Postal Workers Union (DPG), Kurt van Haaren, recommended 
changing the Telecommunications Law to the benefit of the incumbent operator.59 The 
Finance Ministry also complained to the chief regulator and warned him not to attack the 
DTAG too much. The financial pressure on German policy-makers as well as the emphasis 
on preserving current employment bolstered the "national champion" view in which the 
DTAG was seen as the main German global competitor, chief employer and sacrosanct 
contributor to the coffers of the Finance Ministry.60 Even Mosdorf, one of the main 
modernisers and as the top "Information Age" expert of the SPD supposedly a champion of 
start-ups, subscribed to this view: "We want the DTAG as largest player in her field to be in 
the global top league. We have no interest to break it up and sell it off cheaply" (interview
10.05.99). In contrast to the SPD-view, the Managing Director of a competitor to the 
DTAG viewed "the obvious mingling of regulatory and finance policy as standing in 
complete contrast to international rules and can be compared to market behaviour in the 
Third World."61 Despite strong opposition against its work and the fact that its scope for 
action was limited and predefined, the RegTP was able to usher competition into the 
German telecommunications landscape effectively. The effects of competition were not felt 
by internet users immediately, however.
It is the strikingly persistent faith in the "national champion" which has stifled the 
entrepreneurial process, by preventing effective competition in access through preventing
58 Frank Dohmen, "Telekommunikation: An der falschen Stelle. 1st die Telekom fur den rauhen Wettbewerb 
noch nicht stark genug? Die rot-griine Regierung in Bonn will nachhelfen -  Zum Nachteil der Kunden," Der 
Spiegel, Number 46, 09.11.98; "Regulierung: Bericht des Wirtschaftsministers. Kabinett stellt sich hinter 
Telekom," Handelsblatt, Number 214, 05.11.98, p. 1.
59 Heinz Stuewe, "Leitartikel Wirtschaft. Die Telekom und die Wahlen," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
10.09.98; "Boemsen wamt SPD vor Anderung des TKG," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 11.09.98, p. 24; 
"Postgewerkschafl: attackiert den Regulierer. Kurt van Haaren: Bonner Behorde setzt nur auf Preissenkungen, 
'Rexrodt ohne Sachverstand," Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 15.09.98, p. 17.
60 "Scheurle: Telekom-Aufsicht muB politisch unabhangig entscheiden. 'Regulierungsbehorde tragt nicht nur 
die Verantwortung fur den groBten Anbieter," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 04.05.98.
61 Frank Dohmen, "Telekommunikation: An der falschen Stelle. 1st die Telekom fur den rauhen Wettbewerb 
noch nicht stark genug? Die rot-griine Regierung in Bonn will nachhelfen -  Zum Nachteil der Kunden," Der 
Spiegel, Number 46,09.11.98; Donata Riedel, "Meinung und Analyse: Finanzstaatssekretar Jurgen Stark 
kritisiert die Regulierungsbehorde. Telekom baut Druck auf Scheurle auf," Handelsblatt, Number 080,
27.04.98, p. 2.
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the sale of cable TV and through delaying the process of liberalisation until 1998. Policy 
makers could theoretically have stimulated internet uptake by consumers and small firms 
much more rapidly and effectively than was the case. But policy makers had to operate in a 
corporatist environment. The "national champion" view, which was embraced especially by 
the Social Democrats, also allowed the ownership of the local access network as well as 
content and services through T-Online to remain in the hands of a large former PTO. And 
this despite the fact that the entrepreneurial and innovation process took off in the U.S. 
precisely because the internet drove a wedge between network owners and firms offering 
new services.
Multimedia legislation: The "Rechtsstaat" offers its services
As was pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, German economic policy makers see 
themselves primarily as law-framers. This corresponds to the vision of a "Rechtsstaat." The 
German approach has often (but not always) been characterised by the attempt to create a 
legal framework without getting directly involved in an industry through ownership or 
mandate. The framework does, however, contain extensive security and quality 
considerations. Government involvement in traditional German industry sectors such as 
machine tools is typical of this approach: Government combined non sector-specific general 
market rules as well as sector-specific encouragement of standards and certification 
schemes. The objectives of these secor-specific initiatives were to provide a secure and 
high-quality work process and work environment with a maximum of industry self­
regulation. Certified occupational categories are one example.
The arrival of the internet age put German policy-makers once again into the perceived 
position of having to define a general legal framework to increase business certainty and 
introduce quality certification schemes. The implicit objective was to use such initiatives to 
bolster the international competitive advantage of small- and medium-sized German firms 
and start-ups. Standard-setting attempts were extended as offers to firms, not as mandatory, 
market-restricting obligations.
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The "Information and Communication Services Act" (Informations- und 
Kommunikationsdienste-Gesetz" IuKDG), in short, the so-called "Multimedia Law," was 
passed by the Bundestag in July 1997 and came into effect on the 1st of August 1997. Its 
main intention was to pre-empt the possibility at a federal level that state jurisdictions enact 
licensing obligations for providers of "individual communication services" such as online 
and internet services (Gerpott, 1998, 329). Whether this would have been a real threat at 
that point in time is debatable, as will be discussed below. The law also contained other 
elements, such as defining responsibility over content and reducing the scope for over- 
zealous policing efforts. It offered a certification and standards scheme for digital signatures 
as well as data protection legislation. Here, the main aspects of the law will be discussed 
briefly together with its intended objectives. Overall, this legislative initiative did not harm 
the entrepreneur in Germany but it is also not clear whether it thus far has been of great 
advantage.62 It seems to have arisen more out of a need perceived by policy-makers than out 
of acute entrepreneurial issues.
The German digital signatures law which was passed together with the so-called 
"Multimedia Law" was to a great extent misrepresented in the international press. It also 
was the implicit target of criticism by the Clinton Administration Working Group on Global 
Electronic Commerce. It was viewed as an initiative of the German government designed to 
create a mandatory global digital signatures standard for the benefit of its own growing 
encryption and smart card sector. When asked about this perception on the part of press and 
the U.S. Working Group, a parliamentarian involved in the legislation stated: "If the 
Americans really think this, that is fine. This is precisely what we want to do, to challenge 
them" (Dr. Michael Meister, Interview 22.03.99). The objective of the law was indeed to 
improve the competitive advantage of domestic industry. But it addressed this task by 
providing an institutional, legal framework typical of other efforts in German industry. It 
was not designed in the market-closing way in which it has been internationally 
represented, but as a non-mandatory offer. Its main elements were the establishment of
62 Except in the niche sector of encryption services, where German firms profited immensely from a lack o f  
export, import and domestic use prohibition.
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standard recommended guidelines and a certification scheme.63 Certification schemes have 
been used in German industry for decades to insure a high standard of industrial production. 
German policy-makers had hoped that voluntary standards and a certification scheme would 
encourage internet users to conduct more transactions such as the ‘signing’ of legally 
binding documents over the internet and to carry out these tasks using German software and 
hardware products. It could be argued that these ideas were too early for the market; 
consumers were just becoming acquainted with the internet and the services policy-makers 
had in mind did not exist yet. Although entrepreneurs at the time regarded digital signatures 
and encryption in principle to be important issues, especially in an international context, 
they did not believe the law had any impact on their business.64
The "Multimedia Law" contained data protection and privacy stipulations in the 
Teleservices Data Protection Act ("Teledienstdatenschutzgesetz" TDDSG).65 This Act 
mandated how private data can be collected, how it is stored and how it can be sold. There 
is also an identification obligation for service and information providers. The stipulations in 
most cases are straightforward to apply and do not extend the scope of European Data 
Privacy legislation. Like its European counterpart, however, the data protection law was 
generally viewed as necessary by most internet firms to establish consumer trust, even if 
they would theoretically rather do without laws.66 Unlike European privacy law, however,
63 It purposely did not contain any barriers to entry by foreign firms and no import restrictions. It cannot be 
seen as "engineer-driven" since it did not contain any technological stipulations (in contrast to the GSM 
standard, for example). "Technical openness" was one o f the main concepts o f the bill (Engel-Flechsig, 
Maennel, Tettenbom, 1998, 30). Furthermore, it was compatible with other digital signature schemes and 
companies are free to choose which systems to use. The setting up o f trust centres, necessary for signature 
certification, was devised as a third-party initiative controlled by the telecommunications regulatory body 
RegTP. The RegTP merely issued "root" rights. What the law did do, however, was set high obligatory 
requirements which a digital signature must adhere to if it was to be used as a legally binding, non-reputable 
confirmation o f identity. Given these standards, it was necessary to use devices such as smart cards and special 
hardware to make the signature secure. Nevertheless, the law remained an offer. The same principle was in 
1999 adopted in EU advanced electronic signatures legislation, where two different digital standards levels 
were introduced as offers from which industry can choose. It was conceivable that for "signing" a tax form, a 
high German-type standard would be used, but for purchasing a book over the internet a lower security level 
would be sufficient.
64 According to the globalstartup survey, only half o f the entrepreneurs thought the “Multimedia Law” was 
relevant to their business. Appendix A, Table 26. For international laws, see Table 27.
65 For detailed analysis o f the TDDSG see the overview by Engel-Flechsig, Maennel and Tettenbom (1998, 
22-28).
66 An excellent discussion o f the TDDSG from the viewpoint o f firms is contained in a report by the BMBF 
(1997,41-62).
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the TDDSG does not contain "export" clauses, which could be viewed as an electronic trade 
barrier.67
The “Multimedia Law” was also driven by another objective, which was political. Already 
in 1992, Kenneth Dyson wrote about "a new contest for power within German regulation" 
(Dyson, 1992, xiv, xv). Especially intense was the battle in Germany between federal 
government and the states (“Lander”) over control of what is widely seen as the next 
leading economic sectors. As the political scientist Fritz Scharpf pointed out, the 
advantages of federalism were often emphasised in the post-war period as a device to 
prevent the abuse of state power. Now, however, it seems to be fashionable to criticise 
federalism as a system that reduces the ability of federal government to act flexibly and 
decisively in an environment marked by change. Although Scharpf framed his analysis on 
the European Union and on the system of interlocking federalism- in which legislative and 
fiscal powers are wielded by the federal government and implementation is the 
responsibility of the individual states- it can easily be generalised (Scharpf, 1994,221).68 
This has led to an even more intensive criticism of the federal system, under the label 
"particularism" ("Kleinstaaterei"), where state power is seen almost universally as blocking 
effective new media policy.
In contrast to this prevailing view, it could be hypothetically argued that the needs of 
entrepreneurs could be met by less centralised responsibility and more flexibility and 
competition on a state (“Lander”) level. In the 1980s, inter-state competition insured that 
even SPD-led states staunchly opposed to media liberalisation would soon jump on the 
bandwagon and encourage the formation of private broadcasters, led by Hamburg and 
North-Rhine Westphalia (Hoffmann-Riem, 1990, 190; Humphreys, 1988,205-206).69
67 The EU privacy law stipulates that personal data o f EU citizens cannot be exported into or stored in 
countries in which a similar standard o f privacy legislation does not exist.
68 Although Germany has a system o f interlocking federalism, this is not the case specifically in media policy, 
where the individual states have powers that transcend mere rights o f implementation. Scharpf notes this on 
page 225 (1994).
69 Interestingly, a similar phenomenon occurred over a century earlier during the industrialisation o f Germany. 
It is commonly argued that the splintered and fragmented nature of the German territories into many small 
states has hindered the development o f the railroad network. The economic historian Rainer Fremdling has 
argued that quite the opposite was true, namely, that inter-state competition led to rapid growth o f the railway 
system (Fremdling, 1975, 132).
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The possible lesson to be learned is that state-level competition can lead to overall 
convergence of policy without the need for centralised authority. “Spontaneous harmony” 
can come about through policy competition, as discussed in the previous chapter. Local 
resistance to convergence and the establishment of an isolated "fortress" could cause 
electronic flows to be diverted and could cause harm to the local economy. Today, local 
state governments are intent on attracting internet entrepreneurs and multimedia firms. 
Some of their policy, such as some ill-constructed technology parks and wrongly staffed 
and positioned venture capital companies under state control (MGBs), was misguided and
7 0has at best contributed to learning. This will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section on the promotion of entrepreneurship in Germany. Newer efforts tend to head into a 
different direction by emphasising network access as well as urban small-firm clustering. 
But although the regional policy goals are largely the same, a diversity of approaches 
existed at the end of the 1990s. North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) and Bavaria both 
emphasised internet access. Through its municipal energy companies, NRW was an indirect 
owner of NetCologne, a privately operating "regional full service carrier." Bavaria directly 
launched its own online service which generated much enthusiasm for the internet in rural 
areas. A plethora of other regional initiatives exist across the country. The "California/ 
Bavaria Business Forum," for example, was an attempt to help Munich-based start-ups in 
their internationalisation strategy. The most active state governments were NRW, Bavaria 
as well as Hamburg and Berlin which combined to form a "Multimedia Corridor."
Although regional policy competition can be viewed as positive and differences are reduced 
over the longer term in areas in which successful policies establish themselves, the federal 
government tried to centralise jurisdiction of the internet and multimedia services by 
arguing that while regional policy was laudable in principle, specific responsibility of the 
states over internet issues would lead to fragmentation and inefficiencies. This view could 
be found both in the Bundestag, the former Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT)
70 There are, however, examples o f successful technology parks as well as successful MGBs.
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as well as among other contemporary observers.71 This issue is what the so-called 
"Multimedia Law" was about. Its intention was to stipulate responsibility over content 
ownership and, by doing so, explicitly removed most state control in new media issues. One 
parliamentarian involved in multimedia legislation asked: "What if local states would ask 
for licences modelled on radio licences from firms that run large web sites? The 
imagination of state leaders goes wild if they are provided with too much power." Officials 
in the Economics Ministry rightly pointed out that individual states had rights over the Btx 
videotex system and that this was a barrier to development. With the "Multimedia Law" the 
BMFT succeeded to a great extent in limiting state power, although, even here, a “Media 
Services State Contract” (“Mediendienste-Staatsvertrag” MDstV) was necessary and the 
compromise solution required allowing states power over broadcast-like media services, 
"Mediendienste" (in contrast to "tele-services" targeting the individual user).72 This was 
probably the greatest weakness of the law, since firms offering video services for 
individuals seem to be in an overlapping, uncertain legal space. One lawyer therefore called 
this compromise the "Achilles Heel" of internet development in Germany (BMBF, 1997, 
27). This interpretation was probably exaggerated, however: In designing the "Multimedia 
Law," the BMFT actually minimised the power of the states and in this regard, and it was 
much more successful than others before them in meeting this objective. The Media 
Services State Contract was seen as the lesser evil necessary for compromise.
Next to a policy battle with the states, however, stood another objective- reducing the 
possibility for over-zealous policing efforts in on-line content. These efforts were 
pronounced in the Interior Ministry as well as among local prosecutors for different reasons. 
The content ownership issue was an important one for all firms offering content or internet
<7*5
access. The law reduced the amount of responsibility that network providers had over
71 "Medien: Rechtsexperte pladiert fur Grundgesetzanderung und einheitliche Rahmenbedingungen. Ein 
Mister Internet fur Investoren in den Multimediastandort Deutschland," Handelsblatt, Number 143,29.07.98,
p. 6.
72 For detailed description see Engel-Flechsig, Maennel, Tettenbom (1998).
73 The seriousness o f this issue for firms became evident in two issues involving local courts: XS4A11 as well 
as the Felix Somm case in Bavaria. One well-known internet expert in Germany has apparently commented 
that the one active contribution Germany had for the development of the internet is the criminal indictment o f  
internet access providers (BMBF, 1997, 114). XS4A11: This case involved radical left-wing content located on 
a server in the Netherlands. German authorities tried to stop German web site owners from linking to this 
content. Felix Somm: The former managing director of CompuServe in Germany was charged by a local
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third party content they carried. A criminal law and computer law expert praised the 
"Multimedia Law" as a very clear and liberal law. His only worry is precisely that local 
policing efforts misunderstand the implications of the law (BMBF, 1997, 94).
It needs to be noted, however, that the German federal government responded quickly to the 
early stage of internet commercialisation by using the law as an nonintrusive means to 
experiment with new policy frameworks. Exactly this learning, experimental approach to 
regulation is what the German internet and media expert Axel Zerdick from the Freie 
Universitat Berlin recommends and believes is suited to "the internet economy" (Zerdick et 
al, 1999, 260). Specific law-making on a federal level in the multimedia and internet sector 
did not harm electronic commerce and did not stunt entrepreneuship in a major way.
Perhaps it has also prevented some contra-productive legislation on a state level, and also 
stifled possible initiatives by the Interior Ministry.74 However, policy-makers on a federal 
level looked down upon the ability of state level policy makers to design regional initiatives 
to encourage internet uptake and start-up activity. Actually, policy experimentation on a 
state level was vibrant and led to some successes- the best example probably was the 
aforementioned initiative NetCologne.
The entrepreneur community was only dimly aware of the “Multimedia Law,” however.
The law has to be characterised as a government initiated project, which arose out of the 
perceived needs of entrepreneurs as envisioned by federal specialists. It failed to address 
many of the real issues faced by internet entrepreneurs which existed in the areas of 
regulation, taxation, financing and internet access. Although the designers of the law had 
actively sought out the advice of entrepreneurs, the general feeling among policy-makers on 
a federal level in general was that entrepreneurs were themselves not politically active 
enough. One member of staff on the Enquete-Kommission, for example, was a little hurt by 
the lack of desire on the part of entrepreneurs of a strongly proactive government: "And 
those start-up firms that we did talk to gave us very little to work with. They do not have a 
lobby and do not frame political demands. They only kept repeating they wanted lower
Bavarian court for hosting pornographic content which members o f his service had privately placed on their 
home pages.
145
telecommunication prices" (Lutz Reulecke, interview 25.03.99). In fact, until July 2000, 
there was no political lobby group for internet entrepreneurs.75
Promoting the "garage entrepreneur"
A vast number of programs exist at the EU and national level directed at small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).76 Germany is, in fact, known for its innovative, 
"diffusion oriented" programs encouraging technological uptake among a broad range of 
SMEs (Ergas, 1987). These programmes targeted at SMEs generally on the EU need to be 
differentiated from more focused support schemes for high-growth technology start-ups. 
Whereas the SME support schemes are focused on the needs of SMEs in more traditional 
sectors of the economy such as machine tools or medical research, newer programmes such 
as BioRegio,77 InnoNet, Business Angels Netzwerk Deutschland (BAND) e.V. are tailored 
specifically to the needs of technology start-ups. Others, such as MEDIA@Komm.. seek to 
encourage the use of digital signatures by public administration. All these initiatives intend 
to promote the formation of new, high-technology networks in Germany involving 
entrepreneurs, private financiers and regional and national policy-makers.
74 The Interior Ministry sought to enforce strict encryption laws.
75 Internet entrepreneurs did not feel well represented in other groups that existed historically, such as the 
German Multimedia Association (dmmv), formed in August 1995. As a result, the European Net Economy 
Forum (ENEF), was founded as a political lobby group by 15 German internet start-ups on 24.07.00. The 
speaker o f the ENEF, Kilian Lenard, explained his reasons for helping launch a new association: “To build our 
own representation within an existing association would have been much more difficult than starting an 
association o f our own. The dmmv, for example, still has not formed a division concerned with the issues 
faced by internet entrepreneurs.” The first issues the ENEF addressed were immigration laws for IT specialists 
(the German “Green Card” debate) as well as capital gains taxation for private equity investments by private 
investors and venture capital groups.
76 The efforts by German government directed at SMEs need to be seen in conjunction with the European 
Union 4th and 5th Framework programmes. Although the initial EU Framework Programmes in the early 
1980s focused on the "Technology Gap" and benefited the so-called "Big 12 Roundtable" companies in the 
information technologies sector, newer programs have a strong SME focus and their primary goal has been co­
operation between SMEs o f different European countries. The EU have promoted the G7, now G8, program 
on "Global SMEs" in which essentially the same emphasis on small firm cross-border exchange is lifted from 
an European to a global scale. It has to be furthermore pointed out that domestic support for SMEs did not 
wane while EU support was on the rise. On the "Big 12 Roundtable" and a concise comparison o f EC and 
national R&R expenditures see John Peterson's research (1996).
77 More praise for BioRegio: "Deutschland 2000: 'Es gilt, einen Schatz zu heben,' Der Spiegel, Number 35,
24.08.98.
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Yet, is important to emphasise that there were links between traditional programs for SMEs 
and the institutions charged with carrying these out and the newer, high-growth schemes. 
Some already have been discussed, such as the certification program for digital signatures. 
This section will focus on the promotion of venture capital in Germany, two institutions 
oversaw the effort, the Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft (tbg) of the German 
Equalization Bank (Deutsche Ausgleichsbank, DtA) and the German Development Bank 
(Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau, KfW). The DtA was founded in 1950 and extended credit 
to manufacturers and craftsmen. The KfW started in 1948 with the objective to finance the 
reconstruction of Germany. Both public/ private institutions drew upon funding provided by 
the Marshall Plan.
None of the diverse range of programs targeting high-growth firms mentioned at the 
beginning of this section such as InnoNet or BAND, were as important as the schemes 
promoting venture capital in Germany. While the KfW program provided a re-financing 
program to venture capital funds and extended guarantees, the tbg directly invested in start­
ups, side-by-side with a venture capitalist or a private investor. For this reason, the tbg was 
the better known of the two schemes.78 The BMFT must be credited for developing these 
programs without which venture capital funding would have dried up in Germany in the 
decade from 1989 to 1998. The mechanism used was a "co-venturing" concept in which the 
tbg doubled investments of venture capital firms and private investors without diluting their 
stake. This greatly reduced the risk that venture capitalists faced. The scheme, like that of 
the KfW, left the investment decisions to the market, meaning that private know-how could 
be exploited and governments did not have to make technology decisions.79 The tbg and 
KfW programs could not be combined in a single investment.
78 Actually, there were two important tbg programs, the BTJU and the BTU. "Business Investment Capital for 
Small Technology-Based Firms" (BTU) lasted from 1995 to 1999 but was recently extended into the next 
century. Its predecessor, "Business Investment Capital for New Technology-Based Firms" (BJTU) ran from 
1989 to 1994. Both schemes were varieties of the "co-investment" concept. Including the investment activated 
by the refinancing scheme, the total investment through BJTU amounted to DM 314 million over six years. A 
total o f 336 firms benefited (Kulicke, 1997b). The BJTU programme prided itself with the low failure rates of 
its firms. The low failure rate o f 17% may also have reflected an overly cautious approach by the programme 
administrators, however (OECD, 1997a, p. 24).
79 A further positive aspect o f the tbg program was the speed o f its investment decisions. The wait was reduced 
from 12 months to three weeks (TVM Interview). The institution could afford to be fast because it mainly 
relied on the investment decisions o f its co-investors from the private venture capital market. In addition, the
147
tbg and KfW support was essential for the survival of the German VC sector until the Neue 
Markt had fully emerged as a viable exit option during the course of 1998. Without these 
programs, early internet start-ups such as Brokat and Intershop would not have been funded 
out of Germany. In interviews carried out in 1998, all venture capitalists that were consulted 
credited these programs with helping venture capital survive Germany in the 1990s. One 
high-level official in the Ministry of Economics characterised the benefits of the program in 
this way: "In this program, we show that the state can allow the market to handle important 
decisions. By the way, one cannot learn how to manage technology start-ups in a seminar. 
One has to do it oneself1 (interview 11.05.99).
Three different developments had led to the creation of these equity investment support 
programmes in Germany.80 One was the emphasis of the Minister of Science and 
Technology Heinz Riesenhuber on cost-savings and a reduction of what was called 
"Zuschussfinanzierung," subsidy financing. "Zuschussfinanzierung" was to become a word 
to be avoided in the Ministry. Indirect support of the enterprise was emphasised over direct 
subsidy of specific research projects. It was thought that government should not involve 
itself in making technology decisions on behalf of private businesses. Another factor was 
the ongoing positive experience in the Netherlands with publicly supported start-up venture 
capital equity programmes. The success of the self-sustaining venture capital industry also
paperwork required also matched that normally required for private investments; the business plan was the 
norm.
80 A similar program emphasising equity investment had already existed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Instead o f declaring private equity investors as partners as in the later BTU scheme, the earlier equity program 
was launched in co-operation with 36 banks. The inspiration for the programme had come from the 
Netherlands, which began very early to support the growth o f equity start-up investment to promote innovation 
and entrepreneurship. The program was discontinued in Germany, however, probably because the involved 
financial institutions, being banks, were the wrong partners. For several years, Germany had no equity support 
scheme. The Ministry o f Research and Technology reverted back to credit support schemes. One o f these was 
called "Promotion o f New Technology-Based Firms" (TOU) and was comprised o f non-repayable subsidies, 
credit guarantees and consulting services. From 1983 to 1988, a total o f 319 firms received DM 240 million in 
subsidies for development work and 258 potential firm founders received subsidies totalling DM 8 million for 
perfection o f their business plans (Kulicke, 1997b, p. 107, 112-114). This direct government support 
programme was not continued, however, after it ran out in December 1988. It was revived with some 
alterations for the new federal states as "New Technology-Based Firms in the new Lander" (TOU/ NBL) in 
May 1990 to December 1995 and "Promotion and support of New Technology-Based Firms in Selected 
Regions" (FUTOUR) in January 1997 (Kulicke, 1997b, p. 114). Until the end o f 1999 FUTOUR is expected 
to support the foundation o f 250 firms in the new federal states (BMBF and BMWi, 1998, p. 71).
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• 521was apparent in the U.S.A. Another decisive factor was an analysis of experimental 
predecessor programmes targeting young technology companies on a federal level by the 
Ministry. The new equity-based BTU programme was merely the last in a series of federal 
programmes targeting young technology-oriented companies, albeit with a credit and 
subsidy emphasis. These programmes had been examined in detail by an independent think 
tank, which was part of the association of Fraunhofer Institutes. The Fraunhofer Institutes 
also researched the effectiveness of other programmes at a state level, such as technology 
parks and MBGs.
In fact, the various Fraunhofer Institutes served as an intermediary linking entrepreneurs to 
the public bodies. Researchers from the Institutes were in contact with entrepreneurs, 
collecting feedback, aggregating it and making concrete design recommendations. The 
forum of policy discussion therefore consisted in this case entirely of specialists, of 
Ministry experts from the BMFT, of the program administrators at the tbg as well as the 
researchers from the Fraunhofer Institutes.
Table 1. Investments by the tbg compared to total venture capital investments in technology 
in Germany (in EUR millions)82
tbg Total technology 
investments in 
Germany
tbg proportion of 
total
1996 44 182 24%
1997 109 331 33%
1998 198 664 30%
1999 388 1,317 29%
The total volume of investment in young, technology-based firms by the tbg was 
significant. When one compares it with the total amount of technology venture volume in a
81 U.S. government passed legislation in 1958, which created the Small Business Investment Corporation 
(SBIC) program. This program included loan guarantees permitting participants to leverage their private 
funds. The program must be credited as an important early step towards the creation o f formalised, 
independent venture capital industry in the United States (Kenney, 2000, 5).
82 Technology investment data from: EVCA, Yearbook 1998, Yearbook 1999 and Yearbook 2000. Technology 
investments in Germany were defined as the sum of investments in the following sectors: "Communications," 
"Computer related," "Other electronics related," "Biotechnology" and "Medical/ health related." Constant 
exchange rates were used for all three years: 1 EUR equals 2.0 DM. tbg data from tbg internet site. 
http://www.tbgbonn.de/. data was dated 10.05.00. Accessed on 20.08.00.
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given year in Germany at the time, however, its importance relative to private investments 
becomes even more apparent (See Table 1 above). The amounts invested through the tbg in 
1997 represented a third of total technology investments in Germany.
The BMFT must also be credited for having shied away from national technology park 
schemes, with the exception of a series of parks in Eastern Germany. Technology parks 
were favourites of regional policy makers.83 Interest in setting up these parks peaked in 
1985 and 1986, with 43 new centres set up in those two years alone (Kulicke, 1997b, p.
119). Regions also extended special subsidies to entrepreneurs, but these were mainly 
focused on structurally weak areas.84 Lastly, regional promoters also sought to address the 
financing of high-growth enterprises. Entrepreneurs- especially in IT and biotechnology- 
were complaining that bank officials were unwilling to extend credits to them without solid 
securities. Realising that bank credits were an unsatisfactory means of promoting young 
software and biotechnology firms, promoters were inspired by the equity financing model 
of the U.S. venture capital (VC) community and especially also the U.S. program 
surrounding the Small Business Investment Corporation (SBIC). The result was the creation 
of regional investment vehicles, the "Mittelstandische Beteiligungsgesellschaften" (MBGs). 
These were founded in many states. They were, however, unable to operate like real VCs. 
Firstly and most importantly, their public nature dampened incentives to maximise profits. 
Secondly, investment managers had little know-how in software and biotechnology. As a
83 The model for the technology park was the original "technology park" around Stanford University. In the 
1980s, German local state governments wanted to promote entrepreneurship and believed the needs o f start­
ups were concentrated in two areas, lack o f funds for infrastructure and office facilities and a need for 
specialised consulting services. The schemes were only moderately successful; many high-potential companies 
avoided the parks altogether. A problem that can be equated with some, but not all parks, was that the policy 
objective o f promoting start-ups was combined with the objective o f promoting slow growth regions, mostly in 
insignificant cities or rural areas. Instead o f moving away, most high growth firms want to be in a city, which 
provides them with quality service facilities as well as easy access to other players in telecommunications, 
software and media.
84 Here, objectives o f promotion o f structurally weak geographic areas overlapped with support objectives for 
small and medium-sized firms, especially if  they drew on European Commission funds. Hessia, for example, 
offered a programme to support hiring o f additional personnel (called "Programm zur Forderung der 
Humankapitalbildung durch Innovationsassistenten oder -assistentinnen"). They only applied to selected 
regions such as parts of Fulda, Hersfeld-Rotenburg, parts o f Kassel. Growth areas were excluded. One 
managing founder described the support programme schemes with the following words: "Being in Diisseldorf, 
you always lose. On the EU level, the money goes to Spain. The federal government targets former East 
Germany. And in Northrhine Westphalia, funds go to 'structurally weak' areas, but not to DUsseldorf. We 
considered opening an office in former East Germany, but it would not have been worth it" (Lars Heiden Jorg 
Fullenbach Realisationen interview).
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result, companies financed by MGBs generally did not do as well as those that were 
financed by private venture capital firms (Kulicke and Wupperfeld, 1996, p. 220,221). 
Nevertheless, in 1995, these investment firms counted for 60% of all investments in SMEs 
(Kulicke, 1997c, p. 140-142).
In summary, it was the separate learning experiences on a federal and state level as well as 
the desire to move away from subsidy financing which resulted in the initiation of two very 
successful equity support schemes administered by the tbg and the KfW. The salient point 
was that they both involved the venture capital community as private partners. The 
redirection of funds from direct credit subsidies to indirect support of private investors was 
not accomplished without resistance. In fact, a high-level Ministry official remembers that 
the press as well as entrepreneurs had strongly criticised the departure from the previous 
subsidy scheme: "There was great lamentation by entrepreneurs, industry associations and 
journalists. They cried out: 'A great program will be destroyed.' At that time, the Ministry 
displayed a great amount of courage" (interview 11.05.99). This meant that German 
entrepreneurs in the early 1990s were still unaware of the benefits of venture capital 
investment and of the culture of Silicon Valley-style rapid growth. This was confirmed by 
other studies, but has changed considerably in the late 1990s, as will be shown in the 
subsequent chapters. What it also apparent through the episode is that the Ministry of 
Research and Technology (BMBF) had the ability to initiate unpopular programmes and 
could steer away from consensus if the issue was deemed sufficiently technical and 
uncontroversial. The difference to telecommunications policy was considerable. This 
“technical” policy-making process was highly formalised including the previously 
mentioned “experts with specialised knowledge” and a public private intermediary in form 
of a research institute. Technology policy was in this instance highly effective in reaching 
its target of encouraging venture capital investments in Germany at a time when public 
markets in Germany were still not receptive to listings of young technology start-ups.
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Conclusion: The access sacrifice
Policy-makers have for thirty years tried to close the so-called "technology gap" between 
Germany and the United States. Policy mistakes were made and government in the Kohl era 
tried to learn from them. And, in fact, some mistakes were not repeated. From the 1980s, a 
partial shift occurred in technology policy. Instead of subsidising specific projects directly, 
government officials in the Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) tried to redirect 
funds at the corporate level, letting private business decide how to use the money most 
effectively. The most successful of these programs were the venture capital support 
schemes realised through the public/ private organisations Technologie-Beteiligungs- 
Gesellschaft (tbg) and the KfW. The funds channelled towards start-ups and the guarantees 
extended to venture capitalists kept the German venture capital market alive until the 
alternative stock market "Neue Markt" invigorated the industry. Without the tbg and the 
KfW, there probably would have been no German internet start-ups backed by venture 
capital firms in Germany in 1996 and 1997 (such as Intershop and Brokat) and know-how 
regarding high-growth entrepreneurship would neither have been cultivated in start-ups not 
in venture capital firms. Key policy-makers in the Kohl coalition such as Riesenhuber did 
not believe government should be involved in downstream technology decisions; he was 
responsible for sending the signal which resulted in the development of these public/ 
private promotion schemes. Interestingly, the success of these schemes also seems to have 
been dependent on the fact that the issue was not of interest to the general public. Policy 
was designed in an isolated forum by specialists, which introduced the new programs 
despite resistance by some entrepreneurs.
Institutions and traditions of German policy-making emphasise the idea of the Rule of Law, 
or "Rechtsstaat." Although there are numerous contemporary and historical examples of 
German government intervention, emphasis- in both popular political camps- is placed on 
creating a framework for the development of market and society. Framework legislation is 
viewed as superior to direct intervention in achieving the objective of a vibrant market 
economy. The "Multimedia Law" of 1997 sought to provide a straightforward legislative 
framework for the development of electronic commerce in its early stages. It was designed
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as a temporary law, set for re-evaluation. For example, it initiated a digital signature 
certification scheme. The law's main purpose was to insure that providers of online and 
internet services could offer these services freely without licensing or similar obligations. It 
was feared that state governments would have imposed these, as they did in the case of Btx 
videotex. Yet, the law was a largely state-led initiative, sparked by the German Rule of Law 
tradition, in areas where entrepreneurs did not perceive an obvious legislative need.
Despite public statements to the contrary, direct, state-led initiatives are frequent in 
Germany. One example of a state-led initiative gone wrong in Germany in the online arena 
was Btx, the German public videotex project of the 1980s. Again, it arose out of a 
perceived need by government. Initiated before the Kohl era but continued throughout it 
until privatisation in 1995, millions of DM were spent on Btx. Btx never proved popular 
because it stood awkwardly between the U.S. and French models of on-line development. 
U.S. government on the one hand built a public internet infrastructure but commercialised it 
at the earliest instance, removing its own presence almost completely. Cross-subsidisation 
of internet access was not paid for by government. Telephone users subsidised their own 
“flat rate” local access to the internet via their telephone long-distance connections. French 
government, on the other hand, incorporated Minitel into its universal service obligation 
and insured that the system was rolled out to a great number of households. In effect, in 
both the U.S.A. and France, access was subsidised. In the U.S.A. access was subsidised by 
telephone users in an intense competitive landscape and an asymmetric telecommunications 
regime favouring internet access providers over local telephony companies. In France, 
Minitel access was a government target and was publicly realised, for example, by giving 
away terminals. In Germany, Btx was jump-started by government initiative, but the access 
pricing issue was ignored. It was assumed that even though the service was prohibitively 
expensive, it would be used. In addition, it was a closed, country-only system which offered 
only selected services and no international choice.
Some German policy makers were aware of the importance of low-cost consumer access to 
data network such as the internet when they were drafting and negotiating the 
Telecommunications Law of 1996. But, despite the Btx lesson at home and the examples of
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the development of internet services in the U.S.A. The internet access issue was sacrificed 
in order to achieve the compromise necessary for achieving telecommunications 
liberalisation. Compromise meant incorporating at least some of the wishes of the main 
opposition party, the SPD and the third player in the corporatist triangle, the postal worker's 
union DPG. Liberalisation was carried out while letting the incumbent remain in control of 
both possible means of internet access in Germany: The telephony and cable TV networks. 
Wireless local loop technology did not appear as rapidly as expected, as an alternative, third 
means of access. Already in 1996 wireless technology seems to have been used merely as 
an excuse to justify the compromised course of liberalisation. Local access pricing could 
only begin to be addressed after 1998 by the independent regulatory body, the RegTP, 
which then, however, acted conclusively. The delay had already happened by then, and even 
RegTP could not end prohibitive access pricing immediately but had to wait for the market 
to react to its activity. This will be discussed further in the next chapter. If competition for 
access was not possible, what about the "French way:" Direct public subsidies for on-line 
access? This was out of the question given the pledge by the ruling coalition to reduce 
government spending and roll back the state.
It is instructive to contrast policy in the telecommunications area with that in the financing 
of high-growth technology start-ups. In the specialist, “departmentalised” forum charged 
with the promotion of venture capital a highly effective public/ private program was 
designed and executed. Government gave support, but it did not take full ownership. 
Telecommunications policy, however, was highly controversial and corporatist compromise 
seemed the only way forward.
But the story of high, metered internet access costs well into 1999 cannot be told by 
focusing on government alone; the involvement of the Deutsche Telekom is crucial as well. 
The next chapter will concentrate on explaining the rationale behind the actions of the 
Deutsche Telekom. A crucial question emerges out of the fact that Deutsche Telekom was 
both telecommunications operator as well as an internet provider- through T-Online. Why 
did the “national champion” not promote the use of its internet service among consumers 
and small firms more if it recognised the internet as one of its most important future areas
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of business? In other words, why was the Deutsche Telekom on its own accord unable to 
act as a force for innovation in Germany -  a role that some policy-makers in Germany, 
especially among the SPD, had trusted her with.
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Chapter Five 
Deutsche Telekom and Internet Access in Germany
In Germany, a range of different government policy initiatives had an impact on the global 
opportunities of local ventures. Measures in two arenas were especially important for 
internet start-ups: Telecommunications liberalisation and the promotion of venture capital. 
Policy making in both arenas was discussed in the previous chapter. Both arenas require 
further examination, however, because direct government action alone cannot explain the 
evolution of internet ventures in Germany. The next chapters will focus on other actors. 
This chapter, which delves into internet uptake in Germany, is based on the premise that 
direct government action taken to encourage the growth of the internet through the research 
network DFN was ineffective and misguided. Much more important was the interaction 
between government and the dominant telecommunications player, the German postal 
service and later Deutsche Telekom AG (DTAG). It is this relationship which has impacted 
upon the mass uptake of internet services more than any other factor because it influenced 
the pricing of internet access for homes and small firms. The actions of the dominant 
telecommunications player cannot be understood merely as a straightforward consequence 
of government action, however. It is crucial to understand DTAG company strategy as well. 
Much of the focus here is on the activity of a single firm, and most of the chapter will be 
dedicated to understanding what caused Deutsche Telekom to act in the way it did. At the 
end of the chapter, however, the competition of DTAG will also be discussed briefly 
because of their role in introducing cheaper internet access after liberalisation in 1998.
As a result of the specific course of telecommunications liberalisation embarked upon in 
Germany, the formerly public, now private, telecommunications operator owns most of 
network infrastructure enabling access to the internet. In 2000, two years after liberalisation, 
Deutsche Telekom still owns more than 99% of all fixed telecommunications lines to the 
German home. It retains significant stakes in several cable TV broadband access networks 
across Germany with a total of 18 million active subscribers. It also owns a majority stake
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in the largest internet access provider in Europe, T-Online, with 6 million subscribers.1 T- 
Online is a public company Deutsche Telekom spun off in April 2000. In the last chapter, 
the political compromise was described which resulted in the liberalisation of the German 
telecommunications market under the condition that the dominant player retain control over 
these key assets. Here, the emphasis will shift to how DTAG has used these assets from the 
year of the Telecommunications Law's passing and the public listing of Deutsche Telekom 
in 1996 through to liberalisation in January 1998 and the immediate period thereafter.
This study has already highlighted how growing home use of the internet and small 
business access transformed business processes in a wide range of consumer and business- 
to-business markets. Through ubiquitous internet access, consumers and small firms were 
integrated into electronic business networks connecting service firms, manufacturers and 
suppliers. The German government has been trying to encourage this development through 
means such as the “Multimedia Law.” The most important initiative, however, with an 
impact on home use and small firm uptake of network services was telecommunications 
liberalisation. The idea driving liberalisation was that increased competition would drive 
down prices and benefit consumers. Policy makers concerned about the uptake of internet 
services in Germany among consumers were from the very beginning aware of the 
importance of local call prices in the “last mile,” since the local telephone line was the main 
means of accessing the internet. And accessing the internet was prohibitively expensive in 
Germany due to local call tariffs. Upon liberalisation, however, these were the last prices to 
start falling, after international and long-distance calls. Prices started falling only when 
internet access pricing was introduced by the internet service providers as separate from 
overall local call tariffs. There were three major milestones for internet access pricing in 
Germany, with in all cases tariffs by Deutsche Telekom’s internet provider T-Online closely 
following the offerings of its competitors: In Spring 1999, a significant reduction in internet 
access prices occurred, still, however, on a metered basis (“Intemet-by-Call”). Since then, 
metered prices fell steadily. In Spring 2000, for the first time, ISDN-based flat rate internet 
access offerings became widely available throughout Germany, with monthly all-inclusive
1 This number includes 500.000 subscribers in France, which were added through the acquisition o f Club 
Internet. "T-Online jetzt mit mehr als 6 Millionen Kunden," Press Release, T-Online, 27.07.00.
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prices falling below DM 100 (RegTP, 2000, 31, 32). For September 2000, Deutsche 
Telekom announced flat rate broadband access to the internet through “T-DSL.”2 The story 
continues to unfold, however. The low ISDN flat rate fees of Deutsche Telekom were 
criticised by competitors who found it unable to compete with the ex-monopolist on that 
pricing level. Several offerings were taken from the market, paving the way for a 
withdrawal by DTAG. Apparently, flat rate usage was much higher than originally 
expected.
Before Spring of 1999, however, internet access prices in Germany were prohibitively high, 
restricting usage. In fact, Germany consistently ranked among the most expensive countries 
among the OECD for internet access. Especially important for this analysis is the period 
from 1996 to 1998, from the public listing of Deutsche Telekom and the passing of the 
telecommunications law to actual liberalisation in 1998. This period coincided with the 
take-off of the internet in the United States and in a few other countries. After January 
1998, the national telecommunications regulator, RegTP, controlled the prices of the 
Deutsche Telekom. From this moment on, Deutsche Telekom was not free to lower its 
prices without permission; RegTP was concerned that the dominant operator could outprice 
the competition and that this could act as a disincentive to infrastructure investment. A 
further important question to be answered here, however, is why even after liberalisation in 
1998 it took another full year for the competition to introduce attractive internet access 
packages. After January 1998, it becomes important to analyse the competition because it 
was they which, initially, took the lead in establishing competitive prices.
The route taken by the Deutsche Telekom from 1996 to 1998 was by no means self-evident. 
It cannot be extrapolated solely by analysing government actions and viewing the actions of 
the dominant carrier as a direct response. A publicly listed company striving to increase 
shareholder value is expected to maximise profits. As a company involved in the rapidly 
changing "network economy," however, DTAG was also expected to justify higher 
valuations by positioning itself for future earnings. The internet and broadband internet
2 See also the Press releases o f T-Online: "T-Online bietet Flatrate fur 79 Mark pro Monat," Press Release, T- 
Online, 26.05.00; “T-Online offeriert T-DSL-Flatrate fur 49 Mark pro Monat,” 17.08.00.
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access were long before 1998 clearly viewed as one of the most promising future growth 
segments. It is not clear, therefore, why DTAG did not embrace this young market. 
Deutsche Telekom was not just the dominant telecommunications operator, it also owned 
the main German internet service provider, T-Online. Arguably, DTAG could actually have 
selectively introduced lower internet access rates while keeping general local call rates high. 
This strategy was actually embarked upon in April 1999. Yet, Deutsche Telekom retained a 
high price for all local phone calls from 1996 until liberalisation and several months 
thereafter. Next to the possibility that the management of the Deutsche Telekom simply 
underestimated the “disruptive technology” of the internet (see Christensen, 1997) there 
may also have been technical reasons why Deutsche Telekom could not have followed this 
course earlier. This theme will also be explored here. But what about the cable TV 
network? DTAG could also have used its cable TV network to introduce broadband internet 
access services to millions of households and small businesses. In this case, DTAG's 
defensive strategy ruled out such a move.
This chapter will focus on the issues which prevented Deutsche Telekom from acting as a 
catalyst for widespread internet access in Germany. DTAG’s own objectives simply did not 
correspond to those of an ideal ‘national champion,’ which some politicians believed she 
was. It needs to be noted, however, that the same question applies also to the competition, 
which, although it was able to prepare for January 1998 well in advance, took so long to 
effectively address internet access and broadband internet access.
The global cost challenge and the telecommunications industry
Throughout the 1990s, traditional telecommunications carriers were battered by the 
advances of new entrants. The new players waged what one could describe as a 'cost 
challenge.' The cost challenge first began in the United States but quickly moved to world 
markets, in the wake of telecommunications liberalisation. The challenge came in two 
varieties, which were very much interrelated: One was in terms of market strategy. New 
entrants engaged in ‘raisin-picking’ and focused on the most lucrative clients: Multinational
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companies and financial services firms. These new entrants, among them the so-called 
metropolitan carriers, shied away from the high costs of a mass access network.3 The 
second cost challenge came in the form of technological change and the fact that new 
internet-based networks were cheaper to install and maintain than conventional circuit- 
switched networks. The incumbent carriers had to react by cutting their own costs with 
aggressive infrastructure modernisation schemes and lay-offs while at the same time 
developing new strategies which would leverage their broad reach and well-known brand 
names. This was a difficult position to be in and Deutsche Telekom faced the challenge 
together with most other incumbents.
New entrants worked with a much lower cost structure than traditional carriers because they 
used internet-based data technologies instead of circuit-switched technologies.4 When 
internet-based technologies (called 'packet-switched networks') were used by the first new 
entrants in the mid-1990s, they were largely regarded as technologically inferior to the 
circuit-switched networks of the main carriers. Packet-based networks were viewed as 
especially inferior for the transfer of so-called 'streams' such as voice- the bread-and-butter 
of telephone carriers. Obviously, circuit-switched networks, which were first developed in 
the 19th century, had been undergoing constant improvement. During the 1990s, for 
example, switches were digitised to offer intelligent services such as call waiting or call
3 "Raisin-picking" allowed specialised telecommunications newcomers to prosper. They managed to reduce 
the market share o f the incumbent carriers in the lucrative segment o f multinational clients with large volumes 
of data flow. Up to one fourth o f total expenditures of internationally operating financial institutions are spent 
on telecommunications services (Welfens and Graack, 1996,29). In this case, scale weighs against the 
incumbent carriers, while new, specialised challengers build only where necessary. One o f the best known 
entrants is Metropolitan Fibre Systems (MFS). Started in 1987, the company has built fibre rings in major 
financial centres including New York, London and Frankfurt. It was allowed to operate in Frankfurt even 
before liberalisation from September 1995 due to a special agreement with the City o f Frankfurt (Gerpott, 
1998, 276). MFS has since been acquired by WorldCom for $14 billion (in August 1996), whose ambition it 
was become the leading communications provider for multinational enterprises. Others have followed the lead 
o f MFS, such as COLT, City o f London Telecommunications. Refer to the excellent interview with Paul 
Chisholm, CEO of COLT in the trade publication Global Telecoms Business. "COLT: Building its Capital in 
Europe's Business Centres," Global Telecoms Business, July/ August 1998, pages 14-20. See also Beth Gage 
and Christine Heckart, "Telecoms Players Go Down Evolutionary Path," Global Telecoms Business, April 
1998, 36-38. The barriers to entry were low in this market segment and the new challengers vigorously 
competed among themselves.
4 MacKie-Mason and Varian have explained the cost advantage of packet-switched networks compared to 
circuit-switched networks masterfully: "[With circuit-switching,] a fixed share o f network resources is 
reserved for the call, and no other call can use those resources until the original connection is closed. This
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forwarding. To the incumbent carriers, it seemed impossible that internet technologies 
would be able to catch up. This type of error of judgement on part of dominant enterprises 
is not uncommon in the history of technology, as Clayton Christensen shows in his book: 
The Innovator's Dilemma (1997). Christensen argues that incumbents often underestimate 
the cost-cutting potential of initially inferior technologies. Inferior technologies thrive first 
in market niches, niches that are too small to warrant action by large firms. But although 
they are first used in low-price niches, inferior technologies can potentially threaten the 
incumbent's business by "suddenly" appearing in a much-improved guise.
During the second half of the 1990s, packet-based network contenders "grew up," 
confirming Christensen's research.5 The maintenance of these new networks is much 
cheaper than that of traditional telecommunications networks, perhaps even l/27th.6 In the 
United States, new challengers such as Qwest, Level3 and IXC used internet-based 
architecture to offer low-cost long-distance connections to businesses and consumers. 
Project Oxygen ambitiously intended to embrace the world with a global, packet-based 
320,000-km ring. The rise of the internet came as a complete surprise to almost all 
incumbent carriers.
In Germany, internet-based telecommunications contenders also thrived. Some emerged as 
independent internet providers in the early 1980s in Germany and are now owned by major 
US or European data communications challengers.7 Although Deutsche Telekom generated 
more revenue from data networking than its main contenders, competition was severe and 
the incumbent was only able to achieve its lead in the year 1998 (see Table 3). Deutsche
means that a long silence between two teenagers uses the same resources as an active negotiation between two 
fast-talking lawyers" (MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1998, 33).
5 Andy Zimmerman has examined how Christensen's arguments apply to the telecommunications industry in 
the late 1990s, faced by internet technologies. Andy Zimmerman, "The Innovator’s Dilemma: Will 'Bad' 
Technologies Win?" Global Telecoms Business, November/ December 1998, pages 44-47. See also: Tony 
Jackson, "Book Review: Bad Ideas That Win Markets," Financial Times, 14.11.97, page 12.
6 A Level3 executive cited in Oliver Roberts and Robert Samuelson, "How Refrigerators Will Surf the Net," 
Global Telecoms Business, May 1999,44.
7 Xlink was acquired by KPNQwest, a joint venture between Qwest and Royal KPN, Uunet by MCI 
WorldCom, DPN by the US venture capital-financed company Via Net Works and Nacamar by Netherlands- 
based World Online (whose investors included the Sandoz Family and Intel). World Online was later subject 
to an insider trading scandal. The German concerns Bertelsmann and Debis co-owned the data networking
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Telekom therefore faced pressures from metropolitan carriers, data networks as well as 
from other strong contenders.
But Deutsche Telekom was not alone; most incumbents were confronted with the same 
challenges. At first, they addressed the strategic issue of “cherry picking.” Global alliances 
such as Global One, WorldPartners and Concert were formed among most large 
telecommunications incumbents in the first half of the 1990s.8 The concept that fuelled 
these alliances was that lucrative multinational business clients desired a world-wide "one- 
stop-shop."9 These alliances of two, three or more operators did not fare well, however, 
because members viewed themselves as competitors and governance structures had not 
been agreed upon. Traditional telcos realised that only full network ownership allowed 
them to offer valuable global services to multinational clients. Furthermore, money could 
be made by keeping the client “on the own network” as long as possible. By this time, new 
contenders, especially WorldCom, had already started to build their global network through 
an acquisitions spree aided by capital markets. WorldCom showed the established carriers 
how to build a "real" global network through acquisitions based on its high valuation (the 
company's shares trading at the time at 40 times of the subsequent year's estimated
specialist Mediaways over which AOL Germany was run (for the most comprehensive summary, see Lux and 
Heinen, 1999).
8 During the first half o f the 1990s, the initial response by the largest telecommunications firms to 
liberalisation and the arrival o f new competitors were global alliances. For example, "WorldPartners," formed 
in 1993, comprised o f AT&T, KDD (Japan) and Singapore Telecom. That same year, British Telecom (BT) 
and MCI agreed to ally as "Concert." Deutsche Telekom's group, first called "Phoenix," then "Global One," 
was an alliance between France Telecom and Sprint, the third largest US long-distance carrier. Neither o f the 
carriers was allowed to enter the home market o f the others. This restricted the possibilities for Deutsche 
Telekom to expand into the largest telecommunications market, the USA. Moreover, "Global One" was not a 
success. Deutsche Telekom sold its stake to France Telekom in January 2000. Nicole Harris, "Partner's Rift 
Spurs Concerns for Global One," The Wall Street Journal Europe, 10.-11.09.99, page 3. For details on 
"Global One" see Gerpott, 1998, 225-229.0ther alliances, such as "WorldPartners," fared a little better, but 
did not reach expectations. "WorldPartners" was also unravelled. Co-operation between BT and AT&T was 
being explored from the Summer o f 1998. Although BT and AT&T stated then that they did not plan to 
merge, BT's "Concert" would be integrated into the new co-operation and the partners would base their new 
alliance on common design standards and tighter network integration. Alan Cane, "WorldPartners and 
Unisource to be Unravelled," Financial Times, 21.01.99, page 27. See also on the same page: Tracy Corrigan 
"Deal with BT Completes Reformation o f Once-lagging AT&T" and Alan Cane, "Seeds Sown Over Dinner 
Table."
9 For a study in German language on globalisation and telecommunications focusing on Deutsche Telekom, 
see Patema, 1996.
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earnings). World-wide acquisitions were forthwith viewed as the main means to achieving a 
true global presence using integrated data networks.10
Yet the battle for multinational clients was a difficult one, and not necessarily one that the 
established incumbents were very well prepared to fight. Firstly, their businesses were 
much broader than those of the specialised challengers. Secondly, their technological base 
was more costly and older than that of the new entrants. Acquisition was viewed as one key 
to success, especially the purchase of international mobile phone networks. Yet, there were 
only a few good properties available. A new "story "(to use a term borrowed from financial 
analysts) was needed to invigorate the share values of the incumbent carriers, which were 
slipping compared to those of their much younger challengers. Just in time, a welcome 
solution for the incumbent carriers appeared on the horizon. They would be the providers of 
broadband mass internet access to homes and small businesses.
Incumbent carriers have three key assets: They own well-recognised brand names, have 
customer relationships with millions of people and are centres of expertise in mass 
broadband market businesses. These assets were viewed as important factors in building a 
service for mass internet access. Some incumbents, such the European incumbent 
telecommunications operators and the US regional bell operating companies (RBOCs), 
supply local telephone access to households and small businesses. These fixed lines could 
be upgraded to enable broadband internet services via ADSL or other technologies. Other 
telecommunications firms gained access by buying into cable TV networks. Starting from 
1998, broadband mass internet access became the magic formula for almost all 
competition-plagued incumbents.11 By discovering internet broadband, incumbents could
10 MCI owned internet backbone providers previous to the acquisition by WorldCom. WorldCom had also 
bought IP-based networking businesses, especially important was that o f CompuServe, which it acquired for 
$1.2 billion in September 1997. See Richard Waters, "A Bid Aimed at Domination," Financial Times,
03.10.97, page 26; Tony Jackson, "Internet takes on the Phone," Financial Times, 02.10.97, page 21; Daniel 
Bogler and William Lewis, "Bid Backed up by Strong Share Price," Financial Times, 02.10.97, page 28. The 
hold MCI-WorldCom had over the world-wide data network structure triggered a response by the European 
Union, which asked the carrier to divest part o f its internet holdings.
11 AT&T, which was excluded from local access in 1982 ("Modification of Final Judgement"), could again 
engage itself locally thanks to the Telecommunications Act o f 1996. It did so by buying cable TV networks, 
such as TCI in 1998 (for $59.4 billion). See the background article by Richard Waters and Alan Cane on 
Telecommunications mergers and acquisitions: "Making Connections," Financial Times, 26.04.99, page 21.
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start developing a young market using its own assets and expertise. As long-distance 
revenues shrink further, internet broadband will compensate -  so it was hoped. But 
broadband internet access made sense only in combination with alternative pricing 
mechanisms, such as a flat fee or volume-based fees. Metered fees, even low metered fees, 
served as a disincentive to internet usage, especially for using the types of video or audio 
services which broadband access could have enabled.12 Deutsche Telekom pursued the 
vision of flat-rate broadband later than other telecommunications firms. It tried to position 
ISDN internet access as a broadband solution until it rolled out T-DSL broadly in 2000. 
ISDN could not fulfil the capacity demands for broadband, internet use. And, until that 
year, all of its services were metered offerings. Furthermore, Deutsche Telekom succeeded 
for a long time in preventing cable TV to be used for broadband internet access.
Deutsche Telekom in the cost trap
"The problem for telcos is that voice is falling in its profitability, and their 
revenues are coming under attack from all sides... The temptation therefore to see 
internet calls as a 'cash cow1 to be milked while good times last is a strong one.
The first provider that has the confidence to offer a cheap, fast internet service will 
quickly take market share. Only time will tell whether they can make money."13
"Carriers are reluctant to cannibalise existing revenues, although this should be 
done as quickly as possible. Cannibalisation is an investment in growth, which the 
computer industry understands. With forward-pricing of high bandwidth
Its long-distance competitor Sprint also provided local broadband access. Sprint began piloting a new 
broadband internet service called "ION" in mid-1998 (with the actual roll-out occurring throughout 1999). 
ION was paid for by volume ("by bit"), not by time metering. Furthermore, Sprint claimed that ION, which 
essentially meshes traditional with internet technologies, reduced its network costs by over 70%. See Sprint 
1998 Summary Annual Report, pages 20-25. Also see: Oliver Roberts and Robert Samuelson, "How 
Refrigerators Will Surf the Net," Global Telecoms Business, May 1999, pages 43 and 44; Randall Hancock 
and Charles Gerlach, "IP Revolution Transforming the Global Telecoms Industry," Global Telecoms Business, 
June 1998, page 42. For a general discussion o f Sprint see Gerpott, 1998, 145-147.
12 Phil Dwyer, a consultant with the research firm Jupiter Communications, stated in May 1999: "Telephone 
usage is metered and that alone will continue to hold back the growth of online advertising, content and 
commerce ventures in Europe by inhibiting internet usage." "European Online Households Triple by 2003,
But Usage Will Remain Low," Press Release, Jupiter Communications, London, 18.05.99.
13 Chris Cherrington and Sapna Capoor, "E-commerce and the Opportunities for Telcos," Global Telecoms 
Business, May 1999, 51.
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connections, the telcos could build the growth markets of the future, right in their 
own backyards."14
In his ongoing research, the telecommunications consultant Thorsten J. Gerpott analysed 
the transformation of the Deutsche Telekom from a public operator to a private 
telecommunications group engaged in global competition. In his updated book on the 
telecommunications landscape of Germany from 1998- one of the few comprehensive 
overviews available thus far on recent developments- Gerpott presented a grim picture of 
DTAG's transformation process (1998, 2-3, 163-235). This was confirmed by other research 
(Zerdick et al, 1999, 69). Gerpott believed that Deutsche Telekom was faced with a cost 
trap out of which it extricated itself only very slowly. This cost trap was not only 
detrimental for the firm and its shareholders but also for the cause of mass internet access in 
Germany. This is because Deutsche Telekom, as Gerpott claimed, was using full proceeds 
from local phone calls to cross-subsidise its other operations and above all to disguise its 
efficiency figures. Indeed, data from 1995 showed that Deutsche Telekom scored extremely 
low in terms of employee efficiency, compared to other telecommunications incumbents.15
However, since that time, DTAG achieved impressive progress. In fact, the years from 1995 
to 1998 were marked by a massive catching-up effort. The former monopoly carrier lowered 
its employee base from 1995 to 1998 by about 50,000 people, mostly through schemes such 
as early retirement and by not filling vacant positions.16 Further cuts were complicated by 
the fact that 47% of Deutsche Telekom's employees were still classified as public servants 
at the end of 1998, a privilege for life that granted special status.17 Nevertheless, through 
the reduction of employees from 1995, Deutsche Telekom managed to improve both its 
revenues per employee as well the number of phone connections per employee.18 Despite
14 Francis Mclnemey and Sean White, "Are Telecoms Giants Suffering from Tunnel Vision?" Global 
Telecoms Business, December 1998/ January 1999, page 45.
15 For a summary o f Gerpott's argument see Gerpott, 1998, page 189, especially also page 211, for price 
comparisons see pages 191-197. Also: "Boses Erwachen," Der Spiegel, 8/1999, pages 112-114.
16 English language Deutsche Telekom Annual Report 1998, page 23 as well as Gerpott, 1998, page 187.
17 English language Deutsche Telekom Annual Report 1998, page 23. See also Gerpott, 1998, page 102. The 
reduced employee base o f Deutsche Telekom in 1998 was completely compensated for in the overall 
telecommunications industry by the hiring activity of new entrants (RegTP, 1999b, 5).
18 Deutsche Telekom’s net revenue per employee in 1998: DM 390 Thousand (in 1995: DM 305 Thousand), 
household connections per employee: 260 (in 1995: 183). In the number o f household connections per 
employee (including ISDN connections) in 1998, it scored better than two very well-run incumbent operators:
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these ongoing efficiency gains, Deutsche Telekom did not lower its prices for internet 
access, however, in the period from 1996 to 1998.
That DTAG kept its prices high is evident through international comparisons. Some 
researchers in Germany challenged the legitimacy of carrying out international price 
comparisons (Albach and Knieps, 1997). In an interview with a news magazine, DTAG 
Chairman Ron Sommer has also questioned the validity of international price comparisons 
by citing structural differences in the world telecommunications industry. One example he 
used was the fact that German fixed telecommunications lines are required to be placed 
underground, whereas in the US or France, masts can be used.19 These arguments are 
difficult to prove or to disprove. True cost structures will only become apparent with strong 
competition in local access.
One detailed international price comparison of 1996, which was commissioned by the 
association of DTAG's competitors, VATM, concluded that prices paid by large business 
users in Germany were in line with international standards, but that local call prices were 
very high. This finding was confirmed by OECD estimates reported in 1997 and again in 
1999 in "Communications Outlook," a useful study which actually compared internet access 
prices. In this study, internet access prices were split up into local call charges and internet 
access charges. Although independent German internet access providers (ISPs) seem to 
have charged very little relative to international rates, this advantage was erased by the 
extremely high local call prices German users are charged by the Deutsche Telekom.20 In 
the 1997 survey, Germany was on rank 20 of the 25-country survey, the cheapest countries 
occupying the first positions. Countries such as USA, Sweden, France and the Netherlands 
offered cheaper access than Germany. In the 1999 survey, Germany had slipped even 
further, to position 29 out of 30 countries.21
Royal KPN (258) and Telia (207). Source: Annual Reports. In net revenues per employee, DTAG lay in- 
between the positions o f Royal KPN (DM 446 Thousand) and Telia (DM 356 Thousand). For 1995 estimates 
see Gerpott, 1998, page 188.
19 "Interview: Das nenne ich Enteignung," Focus, 28/1997, pages 202-204.
20 Vigorous competition existed in Germany among internet providers. This is documented by the two 
excellent overview books to the German internet provider market, Lux, 1995 and Lux and Heinen, 1997.
21 The OECD survey cited compared off-peak access prices based on 20 hours internet use in 1998. OECD, 
1999, page 187, for calculations details please see pages 175 to 186.
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A German telecommunications activist, Karl-Heinz Dittbemer, examined internet access 
pricing on an individual company basis in 1998. In his comparison, standard internet user 
costs (20 hours/ month) were included as well as costs faced by "power users" and small 
firms (100 hours/ month). The more the internet was accessed by a single user, the more 
prohibitive German costs became compared to US costs (see Table 1). This was a direct 
result of Deutsche Telekom's metered pricing policy in the local loop until 1999, which did 
not differentiate if the local line was used for a phone call or for an internet connection. 
Other sources, which were less systematic, also indicated that the German "power user" and 
small firm faced phone bills of around DM500 / month due to internet use in 1997.22 On 
November the 1st, 1998, internet user groups carried out a national strike in Germany in 
which they stopped using the internet and "blackened" their home pages.23
22 For an excellent summary article which discusses many o f the points mentioned in this chapter, refer to 
Michael Wilde, "Uberdreht, Wegezoll auf deutschen Infobahnen," c't, 12/97, page 86.
23 James Glave, "Germans Plan Internet Strike," Wired News http://www.wired.com/:. 01.10.98; Tilman 
BaumgSrtel, "Intemet-Streikwelle in Deutschland baut sich auf," Telepolis, http://www.heise.de/tp/. 02.10.98.
Table 1. Comparison of selected internet access costs USA/ Germany in 1998 in DM. 
Normal home usage of 20 hours/ month and "power use" by homes and small businesses. 
Adapted from a table compiled by Karl-Heinz Dittbemer.24
20 hours/ month 100 hours/ month
Local call 
rate
Internet
provision
Total Local 
call rate
Internet
provision
Total
USA
AT&T -(♦) 35.90 35.90 - 35.90 35.90
Southwestern
Bell
35.90 35.90 - 35.90 35.90
@Home (TV 
Cable)
- 53.90 53.90 - 53.90 53.90
Germany, nig it time rates
T-Online 36.32 62.00 98.32 181.57 302.00 483.57
Nacamar 36.32 39.00 75.32 181.57 39.00 220.57
Mannesmann
Arcor
(Intemet-by-
call)
145.80 145.80 721.80 721.80
Germany, business hours
T-Online 96.84 62.00 158.84 484.18 302.00 786.18
Nacamar 96.84 39.00 135.84 484.18 39.00 523.18
Mannesmann
Arcor
193.80 193.80 961.80 961.80
NetCologne -(#) 39.00 74.00 - 159.00 194.00
* One-time monthly flat-rate for the local phone service was required, but is not included in this 
listing. All local calls are inclusive with this monthly payment. This applies to most US regions, but 
not all.
# NetCologne charged a one-time monthly flat-rate of DM 35 for local dial-in. This service was 
only available in the Cologne area. There was no difference between night rates and use during 
business hours. These prices were the initial prices in January 1998.
To summarise these findings: Internet access prices were high in Germany due to the 
metered price of the local phone call. In 1996, local call prices were raised by Deutsche 
Telekom and remained at this high level until liberalisation.25 The revenue stream DTAG
24 Internet Site: "t-off: Fakten zum Internet" compiled by Karl-Heinz Dittbemer, Freie Universitat Berlin. 
http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~dittbern/Telekom/Internet Facts.html. Accessed on 06.10.1998.
25 It is not unusual for local call prices to rise before liberalisation o f a telecommunication market. Local call 
prices rose in Britain, for example (Gerpott, 1998, 113). The incumbent usually wants to reap the rewards in 
an area which will be addressed last by the competition. It also wants to be able to start lowering its prices 
from a higher level rather than from an already low level. To defend this move, the incumbent usually argues 
that local call prices were subsidised to realise political objectives during the period o f public ownership. In 
Germany, unification costs for a new phone system in East Germany made the issue more complex. In April 
1991, a debate ensued whether a long-planned rise in local phone call rates should be increased further to 
compensate for these investments. Public opposition prevented this further rise and only the scheduled tariff 
changes came into effect (Robischon, 1999, 213-220). Finally, in 1996, in preparation for competition,
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derived from internet users through its local call lines was not insignificant, but according 
to the author's estimates accounted only for 1% to 4% of total revenues and between 6% 
and 21% of local call revenues (they could lie somewhere between DM 698 million and 
DM 2,557 million in 1998). The contribution of local calls to net income is unknown; 
overall, that the fixed-line telephone business generates the overwhelming amount of profits 
for DTAG. Deutsche Telekom used the income stream generated by its local call fees to 
reduce her debts.
Deutsche Telekom raised its local call prices substantially as part o f a comprehensive tariff change. After an 
outcry that then already included internet users, Deutsche Telekom introduced "CityPlus," a local call rebate, 
in January 1997 (which was improved slightly in May 1998). The relief for small firms and "power" private 
users was minimal, however. The rebate could be acquired by paying a given fixed amount o f money monthly, 
but a peak 50% savings was achievable only at a usage o f 10 hours a month. Thereafter, the savings rate 
quickly fell, at 100 hours it amounted to only 5%. Internet Site: "t-off Fakten zum Internet" compiled by Karl- 
Heinz Dittbemer, Freie Universitat Berlin. http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~dittbern/Telekom/Intemet Facts.html. 
Accessed on 06.10.1998. In effect, local call prices were raised in 1996 in Germany and not lowered until 
1999. For a useful table summarising pricing developments in different tariff zones see Deutsche Telekom AG 
20-F Form filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, April 15, 1999, page 28. See also page 32.
26 In 1998, there were an estimated 3.2 million internet users in Germany who accessed the net an average o f  
19 hours a month (the rest o f an estimated 6.9 million total users accessed the internet less frequently). This 
was the result o f a representative survey carried out by G+J EMS in August 1998 ("3,2 Millionen Menschen 
taglich im Internet anzutreffen," G+J EMS, Press Release, 08.09.98). EMS estimated that the most popular 
access times were between 09:00 and 12:00 and between 18:00 and 22:00 hours. For the first time slot, 
business rates would apply, for the second evening rates. For calculation purposes, I have assumed that every 
one o f the 3.2 million users spent half o f his time accessing the internet from his office computer during work 
hours and half at home in the evening. I assumed average use o f 20 hours a month, 10 from the office and 10 
from home. Some offices were connected to the internet via a local dial-up phone line provided by Deutsche 
Telekom, but others had a leased line connection. All home use, on the other hand, occurred over the local line 
of DTAG. If all internet access during office hours was made over leased lines and none over local phone 
lines, sales could be estimated to be DM 698 million (revenues would be generated only through home use). If 
all office calls were dial-up, DTAG would receive a total o f DM 2,557 million in revenues (including home 
use). Rates for business hour and evening use are obtained from the calculations o f Karl-Heinz Dittbemer (see 
Table 1). These estimates between DM 698 million and DM 2,557 million applied only to internet access 
revenues generated for DTAG by local calls, not by internet provision via T-Online or selling leased line 
services. Total sales associated with internet access therefore were probably much greater. Local call revenues 
through internet access solo would have accounted for somewhere in the range o f 6% to 21% o f total local call 
revenues and between 1% and 4% of the total net revenues o f Deutsche Telekom (according to Annual Report 
1999 of Deutsche Telekom in English language, pages 15, 37, 112). T-Online calls accounted for about 6.5% 
of all local call traffic, this figure can be found in the F-20 Form o f Deutsche Telekom filed with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission April 15, 1999 on page 54.
169
Chart A. Debt o f Deutsche Telekom in millions of DM.27
140
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
The debt o f DTAG was large by international comparisons.28 In part, the debts were caused 
by modernisation o f Eastern Germany's phone system after unification in 1989.29 
Unification investments started impacting the accounts o f DTAG from the year 1991 
onwards (see Chart A). But research shows that DTAG's debt was high already previous to 
1991 (Gerpott, 1998, 175, 176), indicating that investments were already prior to 
unification financed in part not by cash-flow but by debt. This is confirmed by Chart B 
below, which shows that cash flow used for investments outweighed cash flow from 
operations in 1990, a year that does not include unification investments. This unsustainable 
situation continued up to the year 1994. From 1995, Deutsche Telekom's Chairman Ron 
Sommer focused on reducing his firm's debt burden- in part by cutting investment.
27 Debt figures from 1994 to 1998 were obtained from the Annual Reports o f  Deutsche Telekom after 
privatisation. Debts in the years 1992 and 1993 were obtained from Annual Reports previous to privatisation.
28 In 1995, Deutsche Telekom's debt-to-equity ratio o f  15.4% was below that o f  most international carriers 
(Gerpott, 1998, 180). To reduce debt, investments were cut from a level o f  around 40% to 50% o f  revenues to 
around 20% o f  revenues. Only in 1996 did the investment level rise to 40% o f  net revenues, before being 
lowered again the next year. 1996 was the year when proceeds from the initial share offering were realised, 
investments were paid for by the listing proceeds, not by resorting to further debts. By 1999, the debt problem 
was less severe than before, as shown in Chart A.
29 Annual Report 1998 in English language: "Networking Visions. Globalizing Actions." Page 100.
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Chart B. Net Cash Flow of Deutsche Telekom 1990 to 1998 as a Percentage of Revenues30
50%
-60%
□ Net cash from operations ■ Net cash used for investing
But debt was only one of the financial worries of Ron Sommer. The other was earnings. But 
whereas debt was lowered mainly by reducing investment levels, it is probable that high 
earnings from local calls were necessary to boost profits. For her earnings, Deutsche 
Telekom was to an extremely high degree (94%) dependent on her fixed-line business, a 
significant part of which was the local calls service.31 The financial industry often compares
30 Adapted from Gerpott, 1998, 176. Gerpott's chart runs only to the years up to 1994. In its 1996 Annual 
Report, Deutsche Telekom applied new accounting principals in line with its privatisation and adjusted its 
figures retroactively up to 1993. In this chart, the adjusted figures are used from 1993 to 1998, for the 
previous years, figures corresponding to the old accounting principals are used. Net cash flows are calculated 
in percentage to total net revenues for that year.
31 Fixed-line revenues make up a 57% o f  DTAG's total revenues 1998. Almost a third o f  fixed-line revenues 
are generated by local phone line service. But the fixed-line business was even more important for DTAG's 
profits. In 1998, an income o f  DM 9.4 million was generated in this business area compared to total income 
before taxes o f  DM 10.0 million. Although DTAG has been successful in developing mobile telephony in 
Germany despite early competition (8.6% o f  revenues), it has not fared well in its international acquisition 
strategy (3.7% o f  revenues). Until its purchase o f  One-2-One mobile phone network in the UK enabled by a 
second offering in 1999, DTAG's only substantial investment o f  real value was in the Hungarian operator
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earnings per share (EPS), an indicator which Deutsche Telekom would have won beauty 
contest with (refer to Table 2).
Table 2. Basic earnings per share (EPS) o f selected telecommunications operators in US$ 
and return on equity for the year 1998 (calculated from annual net income and year-end 
share price #).32
EPS Return
on
equity
AT&T 3.59 25%
France
Telecom
2.49 14%
Sprint 1.98 7%
Mannesmann 1.79 10%
Royal KPN 1.61 12%
Deutsche
Telekom
0.91 9%
# Some Annual Reports simply list EPS without explaining how it was derived and not 
differentiating among different types of EPS calculations. Here, basic earnings per share are being 
referred to which is calculated using net income.
The pressure to improve DTAG's financials was high due to the planned tapping o f capital 
markets in 1996 and 1999. These were the years in which the original listing and the 
secondary placement of Deutsche Telekom were accomplished. After the secondary 
placement, the path was clear for a fresh, future-oriented strategy. On April 1, 1999, 
significant price cuts for internet access through Deutsche Telekom's ISP, T-Online, came 
into effect.33 There was a further reason other than the financial ones, however, why a 
strategy focusing on the young internet access market may not have been feasible before 
liberalisation. This was the outdated network infrastructure of the Deutsche Telekom.
M ATAV. The M A T A v group includes a mobile phone operator Westel 900. Global One was loss-making. 
Overall until 1999, DTAG was unsuccessful at developing new revenue streams; it was highly dependent upon 
its fixed line business. English-language Annual Report 1998, pages 60 to 62. See also the comment on 
Deutsche Telekom's international strategy in The Economist: "European Telecom s in a Tangle," The 
Economist, April 24th, 1999, page 83.
32 Source: Annual Reports. For details on these figures, please refer to Table 10 at the end o f  this chapter.
33 Earnings in the first two quarters o f  1999 slipped considerably due to reductions in long-distance prices and 
loss o f  market share. These results were announced in August 1999, the secondary placement was carried out 
earlier, in July 1999. Reductions in internet access prices through T-Online carried out in April 1999 had only 
a minimal effect on earnings reports for the first two quarters o f  1999.
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Infrastructure challenges faced by Deutsche Telekom
As described in the previous chapter, Deutsche Telekom was highly regarded as a force for 
technological innovation in Germany. This image was remarkably persistent among 
German politicians of all parties, although it was probably most widespread among the 
Social Democrats, where it has a long history. The "national champion" image was 
surprising given the low level of service the public carrier confronted ordinary Germans 
with for decades. Most Germans would probably have explained this by differentiating 
between the service quality of the Deutsche Telekom and the actual technological quality of 
its network infrastructure. Thorsten Gerpott drew together different indicators of the state of 
DTAGs network infrastructure before privatisation in 1995 to show that at the time the 
technology was apparently not much better than the service (1998,200). Deutsche Telekom 
vigorously modernised its infrastructure from 1995. Infrastructure investments were 
consistently high in international comparison (OECD, 1999, 69-84). Germany, for example, 
achieved 100% digitisation of its access lines in 1997 up from 56% in 1995 (OECD, 1999, 
77).34 Yet experts, such as the Bonn-based internet consultant Harald Lux emphasised that 
the modernisation of DTAG’s infrastructure was a difficult and lengthy process. The 
modernisation initiative was massive, and priorities had to be set.
34 Germany moved to a digitally switched network much slower than the other European countries, for 
example, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands and Sweden (Welfens and Graak, 1996. See also Gerpott, 
1998, 183). Digitisation does not automatically mean better network quality; what it does mean, however, is 
that telecommunications carriers running a digitised network are gaining expertise in computer-based systems. 
Deutsche Telekom was late at acquiring this know-how. The organisational structure o f the Deutsche Telekom 
was partly responsible for the fact that the carrier adhered to its traditional electromechanical technology base 
as long as possible. Compared to France Telecom and BT, the public predecessor to the Deutsche Telekom, 
the Deutsche Bundespost, was more decentralised and more process-oriented (Pospischil, 1993, 610,611). 
The Deutsche Bundespost was very late in moving towards an objective-led management structure and strong 
client focus. Client focus still seemed amiss in the new organisational structure o f 1999, where a single Board 
Member is responsible for "Sales" and no separation is made between business and private clients, as was 
commonplace in most other telecommunications carriers. This marks a return to DTAG's original universal 
"Sales" approach o f the beginning of the 1990s (Gerpott, 1998, 202, 203,207). See also "Telekom: Zaudem 
und Z6gem," Manager Magazin, Dezember 1997, pages 43-47. The Deutsche Bundespost has therefore been 
described as a "Machine Organisation" (Mintzberg quoted by Pospischil, 1993, 610). It worked as a whole by 
standardising its work processes- which were linked to a historical technological base. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the Deutsche Telekom was late in building an internet-based data network backbone.
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As has been described in the previous chapter, the Deutsche Bundespost relied on its X.25 
network for its data services. X.25 needs to be administered in a much more centralised 
fashion than internet-based IP networks. It is also not very efficient as a backbone network 
for internet access. When Deutsche Telekom began to offer indirect internet access through 
a gateway to its T-Online members in October 1995, it ran the internet service over X.25. It 
was not able to cope with the ensuing demand for internet traffic. Traffic moved slowly and 
the service was not reliable. According to internet consultant Harald Lux, DTAG engineers 
were at the time scrambling to add network bypasses (interview, 10.07.99). In contrast, 
other internet providers in Germany had from 1995 already build up IP-networks and were 
vigorously competing among each other.35 Deutsche Telekom began building its IP trunk 
network in Summer 1996 and seriously expanded it only in the year 1997. T-Online became 
a full internet service only in 1997 (Lux and Heinen, 1997, 34, 62; Schneider, 1997, 152). 
Whereas in 1997, Deutsche Telekom still trailed other internet providers in Germany in 
revenue, it was able to assume the number one position in 1998 (Table 3).
Table 3. Top Six Internet Providers in 1997 and 1998 and their turnover in DM millions 
(Lux and Heinen, 1999,9, 13)
1997 1998
Xlink 49 Deutsche
Telekom*
100
Uunet 45 Uunet 87
Deutsche
Telekom*
40 Mediaways 70
DPN 39 Nacamar 60
Mediaways 30 DPN 56
Nacamar 30 Xlink 53
* Estimate without T-Online sales.
One technology has been purposely left out of the discussion thus far: ISDN. When 
Deutsche Telekom's network infrastructure was spoken of in a positive light, usually it was
35 Nacamar began offering internet service in early 1995 with a leased line to the USA (interview, 12.07.99). 
Next to MAZ, Hamburg (provider since 1994), and Contrib.net, Berlin (started 1994), Nacamar was one o f  
the first internet providers without links to the German DFN university network. The oldest German providers, 
which emerged out of DFN, were EUnet Deutschland and Xlink. The German EUnet was started in 1985 in 
the University Dortmund. EUnet is now part of Uunet. Xlink began offering internet provider services out o f  
the University o f Karlsruhe since the early 1980s. EUnet and Xlink were privatised in 1992 and 1993. These
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ISDN which was being referred to. The ISDN initiative of DTAG was indeed remarkable. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, ISDN uptake in Germany was far behind that of France. By 
the end of that decade, Germany sported the highest ISDN penetration in the world (See 
Table 4). In absolute numbers also, Deutsche Telekom reigned over more ISDN 
connections than any other carrier (Gerpott, 1998, 201). Nevertheless, the value of an ISDN 
network is debatable.
Table 4. Percentage ISDN lines to main lines (EITO, 1999, 404, 405).
1997 1998
Germany 16% 24%
France 6% 11%
United Kingdom 8% 12%
USA 3% 4%
Japan 8% 10%
Two benefits of ISDN are cited: Intelligence and bandwidth; the real advantages of both are 
ambivalent. In the second chapter, part of the discussion of global network developments 
focused on the "intelligent network," of which ISDN is the ultimate manifestation. The 
"intelligent network" approach is coveted by many traditional telecommunications carriers 
because it puts them in control of new, value-added services. It requires a centralised 
approach to offering these services and therefore allows little leeway for independent 
service offerings or innovations. Most services that can be offered over ISDN, such as call 
waiting, can be realised more cheaply over conventional networks. Other services that are 
possible by combining a "stupid network" approach such as an internet-based network with 
computers on the periphery of the network cannot be offered by ISDN alone at all. A further 
advantage of ISDN, its broadband ability to carry a large volume of data, is being 
overshadowed by newer technologies, especially xDSL, which allows far more data to flow 
over a conventional copper line. By ambitiously adopting a single technology, ISDN,
providers all owned backbone access in 1995, which they resold to dozens o f internet presence providers 
(Lux, 1995, 24-26, 57-61; Lux and Heinen, 1997, 33).
36 "x" is a variable denoting various types o f DSL technologies, such as ADSL.
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Deutsche Telekom may have manoeuvred itself into its own version of a German 
"Sonderweg."37
For several years, Deutsche Telekom touted ISDN as its broadband solution. As will be 
discussed in the next section, it purposely ignored possibilities for developing the 
broadband capacities of its cable TV network. It also started late on offering broadband 
xDSL- announcing business service by April 1999 and home service from late Summer 
1999. The mainstream roll-out of “T-DSL,” as Deutsche Telekom called its service, was 
initiated with a flat rate offering from September 2000. Competitors such as Nacamar 
already offered xDSL services to its clients in the Spring of 1998 (interview, 12.07.99). At 
the beginning, DTAG wanted to market xDSL together with ISDN. DTAG wrapped ISDN 
with xDSL into a combined T-DSL/ ISDN package as part of an overall strategy to, in the 
words of Ron Sommer, "transform Germany into the greatest online nation" (author's 
translation).38 It gave up on this strategy with the roll-out of flat-rate “T-DSL” in Fall 2000; 
the new service could be subscribed to over analogue lines as well. If it would have adhered 
to its ISDN-only strategy longer, Deutsche Telekom would have found itself 
technologically isolated and dependent upon a technology that may not be developed further 
as vigorously as other, more widely used options. Retrospectively, the ISDN effort may 
seem a massive and costly investment which completely bypassed market needs at a time 
when it would have made more sense to build a powerful internet backbone and roll out 
cheap mass internet access. Deutsche Telekom would have won over a user base which 
later would have subscribed to high-bandwidth access services over other technologies -  
such as xDSL or cable TV.
37 "The adoption o f ISDN may lock the system in to a distinct path o f development favouring the centralised 
network, since future investments must also be compatible with interrelated components in the chosen system" 
(Davies, 1996, 1171).
38 Dr. Ron Sommer, Vorstandsvorsitzender Deutsche Telekom, "Auf den Weg ins online-Zeitalter. Tendenzen, 
Entwicklungen, Strategien aus Sicht der Deutschen Telekom," "Redemanuskript anlaBIich des Intemationalen 
Presse Kolloquiums am 27. Januar 1999 in Frankfurt," could be found in press release section of Deutsche 
Telekom's web site. Accessed 02.02.1999. The original reads: "Unser Ziel ist ehrgeizig: Wir wollen 
Deutschland zu der Online-Nation Uberhaupt machen."
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German cable TV: Left to stagnate?
Compared to other countries, Germany is generously endowed with coaxial cable TV 
connections. Over 18 million households are receiving cable TV services and another 7 
million are connected to the network and are potential subscribers. This means that a full 
two-thirds of all German private households can be potentially reached by cable TV. The 
German cable network is the largest cable TV network in Europe in absolute numbers 
(RegTP, 1999b, 19; Gerpott, 1998, 8-9). Until 2000, this network was controlled by a single 
company, which put this enterprise in the enviable position of being able to roll out 
broadband internet access, cable telephony and media services directly into millions of 
homes and small businesses.39 But Deutsche Telekom’s vision for the German cable future 
was quite distinct from the mass broadband internet access initiative just described.
In the USA and the United Kingdom, cable TV access to homes was used by competing 
telecommunications operators to offer new telephony services. In the UK, cable TV allowed 
Mercury to bypass the local loop of BT. In the US, cable TV access was also used to offer 
broadband internet access, a prominent example was the company @Home. AT&T invested 
in cable company TCI in 1998 in order to offer broadband internet access to homes.
In Germany, the cable TV network was controlled until 2000 by the incumbent carrier, the 
Deutsche Telekom. This was the result of government compromise surrounding the 
Telecommunications Law of 1996. That the public predecessor organisation to the 
Deutsche Telekom was originally in 1982 put in control of the cable TV network and 
oversaw its construction was the result of political action, as well, as has been described in 
the previous chapter. The running of the network was also politically controlled, with the 
responsibility over broadcasting assumed in part by the local state governments. Deutsche 
Telekom was charged with carrying private and public broadcasting over its networks and 
was paid around DM 3 million annually for this service.40 Although this is not a sum that
39 A large initial investment would be required to upgrade the coaxial network for two-way communication. 
Various estimates for the upgrade investment exist, the highest being DM 5 billion over five years. "German 
cable: Telekomplicated," The Economist, August 21st, 1999, page 63.
40 "Neue Goldgrube," Manager Magazin, Dezember 1997, page 47.
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was able to cover the costs of the coaxial network, Deutsche Telekom was allowed to 
exploit the additional capacity largely as it pleased. From 1995/ 96, for example, DTAG set 
aside two channels for digital television- a project that was conceived as a joint venture 
between the telecommunications carrier and the two German media giants Bertelsmann and 
Kirch. The joint venture was not realised, a matter which is discussed below. What 
Deutsche Telekom explicitly avoided, however, was to cannibalise its ISDN plans by 
offering broadband internet access or telephony services. Deutsche Telekom separated the 
realms telephony, internet access and media broadcasting clearly by running parallel 
networks.
The investment sum required to update the German cable TV network is relatively high. In 
part, this is due to original government policy; in part, however, to an intentional strategy of 
neglect by Deutsche Telekom. In order to swiftly provide a broadcast medium for private 
television, the original cable TV network was built using low-cost coaxial standard 
technologies available at the time. As a result, cable TV in some German regions runs over 
old lines that are costly to upgrade to allow for the two-way transfer required for internet 
access (Gerpott, 1998, 36-38). On the other hand, some housing blocks in the "new"
Eastern German states were connected recently and offer easy upgrade opportunities. Then 
there is the added difficulty that two-thirds of all customers do not receive their service 
directly from the Deutsche Telekom, but through one of 6,000 local, small service firms 
(RegTP, 1999b, 20). Some of these companies are represented in the cable TV service firm 
association ANGA, and the association has spoken favourably of an upgrade of the cable 
TV network and welcomes the offering of new services such as internet over the network.
In fact, ANGA is antagonistic towards the DTAG as network owner and argues that the 
telecommunications carrier has purposely limited cable carrying capacity.41 In late 1996, 
parts of the cable TV network were modernised but the capacity was upgraded to allow only 
for two additional digital TV programs- and not more, although it would have been 
technically feasible 42 Six pilot projects, in which DTAG purportedly tested new, interactive
41 "20 Milliarden-Preis fur Telekom-Kabelnetz utopisch. Unabhangige Produktgestaltung der Kaufer nicht 
sicher," Press Release, ANGA, 11.03.99. Can be accessed on http://www.anga.de/
42 Dusan Zivadinovic, "Auf der Bremse: Telekom verzdgert den Ausbau ihres TV-Kabelnetzes," c't, Heft 8, 
1997, page 115.
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cable services were run at "a pace rather below average compared to US commercialisation 
efforts," to use Gerpott's carefully worded phrase (author's translation, Gerpott, 1998, 218, 
219).
Cable TV was a loss-making operation for Deutsche Telekom from the very beginning. The 
service was loss-making because it was reduced to carrying media programming and was 
not expanded to include lucrative income sources, especially telephony and internet access. 
Deutsche Telekom viewed these services as competing with its most important money­
maker, the local loop. Cannibalisation was not an option for the telecommunications carrier. 
In fact, there has only been one attempt on the part of DTAG to generate a positive income 
flow from its cable TV holdings. In 1994, a joint venture for digital pay-television services 
over cable was announced by Deutsche Telekom, Bertelsmann and the Kirch Group. The 
joint venture was not realised for several reasons.43 The most obvious reason was that EU 
competition authorities indicated that year and again in May 1998 that they would not 
tolerate the alliance, if it remained exclusive.44 Also, as was just described, Germany's 
federal states had a say in the development of broadcast media and their involvement added 
an unknown dimension to any deal.
In addition, however, Deutsche Telekom was asking a high price for its network service, an 
annual payment of at least DM 12 million as well as a share of sales 45 DTAG also charged 
households for its access to the cable TV network. As one editorial in a well-known 
German business daily stated in 1997 using a well-known German metaphor: "Like a 
sausage, TV cables have two ends. On both ends Deutsche Telekom cashes in... And both 
ends will be expensive for Telekom's clients."46 In order to make cable TV access an 
attractive mass market proposition, different revenue streams need to be combined, as has 
just been pointed out. If media broadcasting alone is required to pay for the network,
43 By 1999, Bertelsmann decided to move away from pay-television altogether by selling a large part o f its 
stake in the pay-TV company Premiere. One Bertelsmann executive stated: "The television world in Germany 
is really complicated. We will have more freedom and more flexibility on the internet." "Bertelsmann's Big 
Leap," The Economist, August 24th, 1999, page 90.
44 "German Television: Karel's Service," The Economist, May 30th, 1998, page 88.
45 "Interview: Das nenne ich Enteignung," Focus, 28/1997, pages 202-204.
46 Lukas Weber, "Im Netz verfangen. Digitale Kabeltraume der Telekom," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
22.05.97, page 17.
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individual subscribers to the service would have to pay considerable fees. This was clearly 
stated by Herbert Ungerer, head of telecommunications at the competition unit in the 
European Commission, DGIV: "The cable network cannot thrive only on television 
distribution, not even on additional digital television distribution, or on attempts to 
monopolise programme rights to increase pay-TV rates."47
Since Deutsche Telekom was the only major European telecommunications incumbent with 
control over cable TV, the EU competition authorities were long critical of the situation. 
Deutsche Telekom was very aware of this and sought to delay a forced sale of its assets. It 
did so by publicly announcing that it intended sell the network. The actual sale began only 
in 2000, under optimal conditions for the Deutsche Telekom. Firstly, the cable TV network 
was sold not as a whole, but split up into regional units.48 Secondly, the right to supply 
programs and services was secured in contracts that were transferred to the 100% Deutsche 
Telekom subsidiary MediaServices GmbH 49 Thirdly, DTAG retained significant stakes in 
the units, which allowed it certain blocking powers. The Financial Times quoted a London- 
based analyst stating: "Telekom's whole intention is to make it very difficult [for the new 
entrants] to compete with them."50
The renaissance of T-Online51
The history of T-Online in its previous incarnation as the teletex service Btx has been 
described in the last chapter. Now, T-Online is referred to by the Deutsche Telekom as an
47 Ungerer was explaining why telecommunications operators with cable stakes (i.e. Deutsche Telekom) will 
themselves feel the need to divest their cable TV holdings: "A telco with cable in his portfolio finds it 
incredibly difficult to cannibalise his own operations in the telephone network. At the same time he cannot 
justify investments for developing rapidly the broadband capabilities of the telephone network, since he has a 
cable network for broadband distribution. This is a very unsatisfactory situation." "Ungerer: Levelling the 
Playing Field in Europe," Global Telecoms Business, December 1998/January 1999, page 34.
48 The first regional unit sold (in February 2000) was Northrhine-Westphalia; here, DTAG retained a 45% 
stake. Then, the Hessian network was sold in March 2000; DTAG retained 35% ownership. Baden- 
Wiirttemberg was sold in May 2000; DTAG retained 45%.
49 "20 Milliarden-Preis fur Telekom-Kabelnetz utopisch. Unabhangige Produktgestaltung der Kaufer nicht 
sicher," Press Release, ANGA, 11.03.99. Can be accessed on http://www.anga.de/
50 Jeremy Grant, "Deutsche Telekom Keeps its Foot in the Door," Financial Times, 16.08.99, page 19.
51 Refer also to an article in Tornado-Insider.com. Niko Waesche, "Germany Goes T-Online. The T-Online 
Renaissance Grips the German Internet," Tornado-Insider.com, September 1999, Number 5, pages 27 and 28.
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internet access service. As such, it is the second largest world-wide, although it trails AOL/ 
CompServe's world-wide figures by a large amount. In Europe, T-Online is Europe’s leader 
with its 6 million subscribers (as of July 2000). The true significance of T-Online only 
becomes fully apparent if one compares its subscriber base to the total number of internet 
users in Germany (see Table 5). Although the two numbers cannot be directly compared, 
the number of T-Online subscribers amounted to about one third of total internet users in 
Germany from 1997 to 2000. However, T-Online use has historically, in international 
comparisons, been extremely expensive. This was due especially to the metered cost of the 
local telephone connection, but also due to a prohibitively high original cost of using T- 
Online, which was itself metered.
How can this paradoxical situation be explained, namely that an expensive service such as 
T-Online has gained such popularity since its relaunch in late 1995? There were two 
reasons. Firstly, T-Online has benefited from its past life as Btx and its links to the 
incumbent telephone company. Secondly, DTAG has made sure that T-Online was 
expensive, but not much more so than other internet services, which also had to rely on 
access via local phone calls. In contrast to the stable (high) price of a local phone call until 
1999, the price for using T-Online has been lowered several times, reflecting a defensive 
pricing policy, following the market.
Compared to the expectations surrounding the launch of Btx in the late 1970s, the German 
postal service's videotex system was a failure. Btx was heralded as a service that would 
revolutionise the German home. In fact, the estimated number of one million users by 1985 
was not reached until early 1996 (Schneider, 1989, 119-125).52 By 1994, the Deutsche 
Telekom had all but given up on the service and outsourced much of the effort associated 
with it. It let a small Karlsruhe-based software developer devise a more user-friendly 
graphic interface called "KIT." Another small company, l& l, was charged with the 
marketing the service (Schneider, 1997, 151). To outside observers, the final symbol of 
sinking confidence was the signing of a letter of intent with Bertelsmann's brand new AOL
52 At year-end 1995, there were 965,400 members in T-Online. Deutsche Telekom, Annual Report 1996, 
German language, page 30-31.
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Europe service, announced in November 1995. Deutsche Telekom would give up its 
objective of being the main electronic link to the home- the goal of the original Btx. The 
agreement stipulated that AOL would be focused on an entertainment-based home service, 
whereas T-Online was relegated to transaction-oriented uses such as home banking.53 The 
alliance eventually was forgotten as concerns were raised by EU competition authorities 
and the apparently imminent threat of the Microsoft Network (MSN) waned (Microsoft had 
cannibalised MSN in favour of its new internet strategy).54 Nevertheless, the service that 
was renamed T-Online had arrived at its nadir.
Btx could claim one resounding success. During the first half of the 1990s, it had managed 
to establish itself securely in one industry, if sex services are ignored. Whereas the other 
range of retail services offered over Btx stagnated, online banking flourished and became 
the "killer app" of Btx. Online banking met a demand that was perhaps created in part by 
limited bank opening times in Germany. After Btx had reached its low point in 1994/1995, 
the downward trend was reversed, however. In October 1995, the service was given a new 
name, "T-Online" and was equipped with a gateway to the internet (Schneider, 1997, 151, 
152). User numbers went steeply upwards, as is evident from Table 5 below; yet, 
importantly, growth did not outpace the trend of general internet adoption in Germany.
53 "Der Markt filr Online-Dienste Wird Neu Geordnet," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22.11.95, page 23; 
"EU-Kommission priift Online-Kooperation," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 07.12.95, page 18. A 
statement on the intended partnership between AOL and T-Online can be found in the English language 
Annual Report 1995 o f Deutsche Telekom on a central spread labelled "The Forum." Here, Bertelsmann 
executive Thomas Middelhoff is quoted referring to AOL as "experience-oriented" and T-Online as "benefit 
oriented."
54 Only a few months after Microsoft had launched the proprietary online service Microsoft Network (MSN), 
the software giant decided to cannibalise its own service in favour o f its free software product, Internet 
Explorer. For commentary see Yoffie and Cusumano, 1999, pages 76, 80.
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Table 5. Number o f T-Online subscribers compared to total number o f internet users.55
T-Online
subscribers
internet users Proportion
1997 1.9 4.9 39%
1998 2.7 6.9 39%
1999 3.3 9.9 33%
2000 5.5 18.0 31%
The companies charged with software development and marketing of Btx/ T-Online had 
proven that the service could be saved and that new users could be won over. In fact, most 
observers claim that the marketing expertise and drive of l& l were the main reasons 
behind the revitalised service; l& l would continue to work for the service and became one 
of the foremost online marketing firms in Germany. It carried out a public listing on the 
Neue Markt in 1998.56 But another important factor behind the success of T-Online was 
that it continued to offer the core Btx service of online banking. Almost all German retail 
banks offered a Btx service. Thus, T-Online was the only German online service from 1996 
allowing both internet access and banking. In fact, the presence of German banks on Btx 
and the security problems associated with the internet were disincentives for many German 
institutions for developing internet banking. Many banks only began to offer internet-based 
services independent of T-Online in 1999.
A further advantage of T-Online over other online services was its link to the telephone 
service. Small payments for T-Online services, such as the business information database 
GENIOS, were charged over the public telephone bill. Again, the insecurity associated with 
the internet and the reluctance of many new internet users to offer credit card information 
over the internet meant that the combination T-Online and phone bill was a strong one. 
"This advantage of T-Online in offering a micropayments mechanism very early on should
55 The year 2000 figure o f total T-Online users in Europe was 6 million, because 500.000 users in France o f  
the T-Online subsidiary Club Internet need to be included. For T-Online data: RegTP, 1999b page 14. See 
also Deutsche Telekom Annual Report 1998 in English language, page 51. For 1999 and 2000, press releases 
of T-Online were used instead of RegTP data because T-Online’s figures represent mid-year estimates and 
RegTP’s numbers are year-end. The GfK statisticts, which attempt to capture the number o f  internet users in 
Germany are also mid-year figures for 1998, 1999, 2000 and an end-year figure for 1997. The GfK-Online- 
Monitor is carried out by GfK Nuremberg together with G+J Electronic Media Service (EMS). The statistics 
used were from the first, second, fourth and sixth waves respectively. These can be accessed on the web site 
http://www.ems.guj .de/.
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not be underestimated," emphasised Stefan Ktihler of the rival online service Callisto 
Germany.net (interview, 13.07.99). Germany.net tried to launch its own micropayments 
mechanism over the internet but the option could not compete with the ease of phone bill 
invoicing.57
Consistently from 1997 up to 2000, T-Online's lead was so great, that other online and 
internet services were competing only among themselves. For the press speaker of 
Germany.net, the third-largest online service, the objective was clear: "Our goal is to 
overtake AOL in Germany. AOL has 800.000 members, we have 660.000. We believe we 
can do it... T-Online we cannot reach. It is just impossible" (interview, 13.07.99). Yet, the 
price for using T-Online was high.58 When T-Online was first relaunched in 1995, a user 
accessing the internet was required to pay three metered fees simultaneously: A metered fee 
for the local phone call, a metered fee for using T-Online (6 Pfennigs per minute during 
business hours) and a third metered fee for internet use via the T-Online gateway (of 10 
Pfennigs per minute).59 Over the years, T-Online became cheaper to remain competitive 
with services such as AOL, CompuServe, MSN and independent internet providers. 
Although competitive prices existed on the level of the services itself, however, Deutsche 
Telekom was able to extract a "toll" from all internet users regardless of which service they 
were using- the local phone call. It is this price tag on internet access which remained 
essentially unchanged from 1996 to 1999; it is discussed at length in a previous section.
56 l& l was renamed United Internet.
57 As o f December 31, 1999, the microbilling option of T-Online over the telephone invoice will be 
discontinued by T-Online itself. Why stop a service that has proven a competitive advantage? Jurgen 
Grutzner, a press speaker for the association o f Deutsche Telekom's competitors, VATM, speculates that this 
termination was a preemptive move designed to prevent the German regulator from stipulating that DTAG 
would have to offer the same service to its competitors- as it has done, for example, with the rebate offered T- 
Online for the use o f its new internet backbone (interview, 14.07.99). With 3,2 million users in 1999 and 
rising, T-Online seemed to be strong enough to do without its link to the phone service.
58 In a trade publication, a telecommunications consultant dryly noted that the true expertise o f a 
telecommunications operator was in finding prices for new services which reflected the value a customer 
placed on it and not the cost o f offering it. For many years, US telephone companies were able to charge an 
additional fee for touch-tone dialling although the service actually meant net savings for the companies that 
offered it. Andy Zimmerman, "The Innovator's Dilemma: Will 'Bad' Technologies Win?" Global Telecoms 
Business, November/ December 1998, page 44.
59 "T-Online und drei groBe Konkurrenten," Table in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20.01.96, page T2.
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Finally, on April 1, 1999, Deutsche Telekom reduced the overall price for accessing the 
internet in Germany. Internet access was forthwith available from T-Online for 6 Pfennige a 
minute (circa US$ 2.12/ hour), a combined price which included the local access call. For 
the first time, therefore, Deutsche Telekom differentiated the price of the local phone call 
from the price of internet access, paving the wave to further price cuts for internet users. It 
is crucial to emphasise the importance of this development for Germany. A new era began, 
one in which access prices continued to fall. Pricing reflected both cost savings through 
technological advances as well as access competition. An old era ended, in which the 
demand for internet services and time spent online was restricted by high and unchanging 
access "tolls." This has also led to a flood of new users for T-Online. A press release of 
Deutsche Telekom stated: "Now its clear: The new pricing model increases the usage of the 
internet in Germany."60 This discovery came quite late: Why in April 1999, 15 months after 
liberalisation and three years after the passing of the Telecommunications Law? The same 
discovery process seemed to have occurred with the introduction of flat rate internet access 
through T-Online in Spring of 2000. Here, the relevant press release declared that 200,000 
new clients could be won over through the flat rate in two months “even without a special 
advertising campaign” (author’s translation).61
German internet consultant Harald Lux has emphasised that the April 1 pricing move of the 
Deutsche Telekom was, like those made previously with T-Online, a defensive strategy 
(interview, 10.07.99). It was a response to pricing initiatives made by newer competitors 
offering an intemet-by-call service. The reaction by the Deutsche Telekom was to
60 "T-Online jetzt mit iiber 3,3 Millionen Kunden," Press Release, Deutsche Telekom, 07.07.99.
61 “T-Online jetzt mehr als 6 Millionen Kunden," Press Release, T-Online, 27.07.99.
62 Because it intended to give as many new competitors as possible entry to the market for telecommunication 
services, the German regulator has set relatively low interconnection prices to allow call-by-call competition. 
Call-by-call service is when a user selects to use a different telephony provider than the Deutsche Telekom by 
dialling an initial code before each call. Obviously, telecommunications competitors still argued that some 
interconnection prices were high. Yet they vastly undercut the proposals made by Deutsche Telekom and also 
allowed a large number o f new competitors to start offering their services. Competition first focused on the 
long-distance market, because it sported high margins. In long-distance telephony, Deutsche Telekom 
purportedly lost around 30% of its market share within the first year o f liberalisation, a statistic that is 
unmatched by previous liberalisation efforts in the US and the United Kingdom. But interconnection could not 
only be used to offer long-distance telephony, but also internet access. Because prices tumbled steadily in the 
long-distance segment, the first call-by-call internet services were introduced in Fall 1998. These new pricing 
schemes undercut the prices that Deutsche Telekom charged subscribers o f its own T-Online service. The 
interconnection fee is a metered fee- this is important because it effectively prevents companies providing
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introduce a package of combined local access and T-Online fees. The new fee structure 
resembled intemet-by-call fees.63 Although April 1, 1999 heralded the arrival of a new era 
in internet pricing, it still did not amount to a revolution. Both the call-by-call internet 
services as well as the T-Online service were still metered offerings, meaning that the user 
was penalised for the time he remained online. As has been pointed out previously, this 
discouraged intensive use of the internet. Yet, metered interconnection prices reflected the 
switched network infrastructure of Deutsche Telekom's local phone service. Deutsche 
Telekom initially wanted to retain metered pricing also for its broadband xDSL offering, 
although xDSL is pure packet-based network, "because our clients would not understand 
volume-based pricing plans" (Lux, interview, 10.07.99).64 In Fall of 2000, T-Online 
actually introduced flat rate pricing for T-DSL, after it had already started offering flat rate 
fees for its conventional internet access half a year earlier.
The option to bypass Deutsche Telekom’s metered pricing regime by "renting" a direct 
subscriber line from the incumbent has theoretically was possible since liberalisation in 
Germany. This possibility, introduced by the national regulator, was initially unique in 
Europe. Allowing so-called "unbundled access to Deutsche Telekom's subscriber lines" was 
the most radical step RegTP embarked upon, much more so than low interconnection rates, 
because it paved the way for unmetered internet service. Indeed, the pressure of the 
increasing number of flat rate offers through the competition finally led to T-Online’s own 
flat rate service in Spring of 2000.
But progress was slow. There were not many carriers in Germany in the first year of 
liberalisation renting a direct subscriber line. Two reasons can be cited. The first were
intemet-by-call services from offering other fee structures. This fee represents an effective "bottom line," 
below which prices cannot sink unless the service company is to face constant losses. For interconnection 
pricing policy, see Gerpott, 1998, pages 84, 85.
63 The German regulator, which has to sanction all new pricing schemes o f the incumbent, allowed the new 
offering, provided Deutsche Telekom announce it as "3 plus 3 Pfennige" representing the local call and T- 
Online use. Although this seems to represent a step backwards by returning to a separate local call fee 
structure, this is not the case, because 3 Pfennige as a constant rate vastly undercuts a local call price made 
during business hours. This move by RegTPs was intended as a transparency obligation on the incumbent. It 
was combined with the obligation that Deutsche Telekom hand the same rebate it offers T-Online for the use 
of it internet backbone to internet service providers renting the backbone from DTAG.
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strong uncertainties caused by political lobbying and pricing negotiations with RegTP by 
both Deutsche Telekom and her competitors.65 Most importantly, firms intending to offer 
this service had to have costly billing systems in place. The start-up costs were, therefore, 
much higher and were only faced by a small number of local "city carriers." Other 
competitors focused first on the lucrative long-distance market, until tumbling prices erased 
their margins. Had the competition been financed through capital markets, this situation 
might very well have been very different, as will be discussed in a subsequent section.
Upon liberalisation, only two companies rented direct access, these were the so-called "city 
carriers" NetCologne and ISIS in Dusseldorf. Of these two, only NetCologne launched a 
flat-fee ("capped") internet service on liberalisation. Cologne immediately became known 
as "Surfer's paradise."66 In offering the service upon liberalisation, the "city carriers" had 
actually gone ahead with establishing direct connections to consumers before the pricing 
and political framework was certain. Other competitors followed their lead only late 1999; 
by then, however, a number of firms invested in this type of service offering. This 
development, which was crucial for the future development of internet access in Germany, 
will be examined in detail in the last section of this chapter in conjunction with 
infrastructure investments. Up to late 1999, the reality faced by consumers and small firms 
was metered pricing.
Deutsche Telekom: "A bad loser?"67
The main immediate worries of Deutsche Telekom in the first year of the liberalised market 
were its shareholders and the regulator. The shareholder's view was especially important 
because DTAG intended to raise fresh funds through a second public offering, realised in
64 See also the editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "Schlagaustausch online," Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.08.99, page 22.
65 "Druck der Politik zeigt Wirkung: AnschluBmiete fur Telekom-Mitbewerber auf 25,40 Markt 
heraufgesetzt," Press Release, VATM, 08.02.99. See also: Deutsche Telekom AG F-20 Form filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, April 15,1999. Page 18, 19.
66 "Koln Traumstadt fur Surfer," c't, Heft 1, Januar 1998, page 36.
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July 1999. The debt situation needed to be improved, the balance sheet needed to look 
good. The regulator also was crucial because, more than the competing entrants themselves, 
his moves impacted directly on the ability of DTAG to make money. Low interconnection 
prices, for example, made it possible that the incumbent lost around a third of total long­
distance minutes in the first year. National long-distance telephony prices fell by more than 
70% (RegTP, 1999a, 8). It is, therefore, not surprising that Deutsche Telekom's strategy in 
the first year of the liberalised market was not marked by major initiatives in internet 
access. This needed to wait for the subsequent year, until April 1999. It is also not 
surprising that DTAG needed to demonstrate its savvy in two regards: In corporate strategy 
and in its political manoeuvres. The battle that ensued in 1998 between the regulator and 
Deutsche Telekom was an intense conflict in which the incumbent carrier pulled all 
possible levers, including its good connections with the newly elected Social Democratic 
Party.
Through its lobbying efforts, Deutsche Telekom was able to create uncertainty over the 
crucial issue of "unbundled access" to its subscriber lines.68 In May 1997, the Postal 
Ministry had decided that Deutsche Telekom had to offer this powerful service option, a 
decision that DTAG pleaded against. Full certainty in this decision was delayed as 
described in the previous section. Court proceedings were still underway throughout 1999.69 
Some of the public manoeuvres of Deutsche Telekom were criticised by the press as "bad 
loser behaviour." Deutsche Telekom executives did not shy away from publicly attacking 
the regulator's decisions by appealing to the share value of DTAG. Indeed, the DTAG share 
was owned by "an army of 2m ordinary Germans, the vanguard of popular capitalism in the
67 The trade publication Global Telecoms Business states that Deutsche Telekom is increasingly being 
perceived as a "bad loser" due to the "alacrity with which it has turned to litigation." Global Telecoms 
Business, "Yearbook 1998/ 1999," page 49.
68 Gerpott, 1998, 78-80, for issue location o f interconnection nodes see 86-87, overview chart page 66.
69 In January and February 1999, RegTP accepted some o f DTAGs arguments and stipulated a rental price o f  
DM 25.40 a month, which represented a rise from a provisional price of DM 20.65 set in March 1998. 
Deutsche Telekom demanded DM 37.30 a month, whereas competitors desired a price between DM 15 and 
16. In addition, Deutsche Telekom charged one-time switching costs of between DM 200 to 340 per client. 
Germany is the first European country that allows entrants the right to unbundled access. Deutsche Telekom 
AG F-20 Form filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, April 15, 1999. Page 18, 19. See also 
pages 32 to 34, containing summaries o f legal proceedings. Compare to Gerpott, 1998, 78, 79, 86; and "Druck 
der Politik zeigt Wirkung: AnschluBmiete fur Telekom-Mitbewerber auf 25,40 Markt heraufgesetzt," Press 
Release, VATM, 08.02.99.
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country" (The Economist)?0 Political lobbying is to be expected in any competitive 
situation. However, due to the fact that the government still was a majority shareholder, this 
strategy carried particular weight with the German financial ministry and not only the 
German shareholding population.
Deutsche Telekom has also tried to "sabotage" the competition's efforts by other means.
The "city carrier" NetCologne, for example, was dependent upon the goodwill of Deutsche 
Telekom to switch new clients over from its own to the NetCologne network. Initially, this 
goodwill was lacking and DTAG only switched "a handful" of customers over each day, 
stating this was their capacity limit. Only by appealing to the regulator was this policy 
amended (VATM, interview, 14.07.99). Similar complaints were filed with the regulator by 
new entrants, ranging from technological issues such as placing resistances into xDSL line 
connections to billing problems. It is important not to exaggerate these issues, however. 
They were not universal. In one example, Deutsche Telekom's service for its competitors 
proved remarkably reliable, namely, in enabling call-by-call and preselection telephone 
punctually on 01.01.1998 (Gerpott, 1998, 89). The most important result these local 
"sabotage" efforts had, however, was to make it painfully obvious to new entrants how 
dependent they were on the network of the Deutsche Telekom.
Telecommunications infrastructure investment and capital markets
The German regulator enabled local subscriber line services even while alternative routes to 
offer direct internet access to consumers such as the cable TV network and wireless still 
were blocked. As was discussed in previous sections, RegTP allowed the "rental" of 
"unbundled subscriber lines" from Deutsche Telekom for a monthly flat fee. The long 
political delays associated with this option also delayed the impact this option could have 
on the German telecommunications landscape until early 1999. But here, as elsewhere, 
government policy and the actions of the national regulator do not tell the whole story.
70 "A Bad Telecoms Merger," The Economist, April 24th, 1999, page 19. See also: "Launching Deutsche 
Telekom," The Economist, October 26th, 1996, page 105-106.
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Despite uncertainty, a limited number of "city carriers," majority owned by municipal utility 
companies, offered unmetered "capped" internet access already early 1998 via this route. 
They did not wait for full regulatory certainty before launching their service. Yet, the 
surprising fact that municipal utility companies were the pioneers of access infrastructure 
and unmetered fees in Germany came with strings attached: The "city carriers" financed 
their growth through earnings derived from other businesses and did not tap the potential of 
capital markets. Despite their early start, the progress of the "city carriers" was slower than 
it could have been.
Two different types of utility players are involved in offering telecommunications services 
in Germany. On the one hand, large utility conglomerates, mostly private, control the 
national supply and therefore own backbone routes throughout the country which they are 
using to build up national trunk telecommunications networks. On the other hand, local 
utility firms, usually owned by the city or region, own rights of way to the home which they 
can potentially use to install new access lines. Unlike the cable TV network, however, no 
significant mass of subscriber lines along the rights-of-way of the utility suppliers existed in 
the mid-1990s; they had to be built from scratch. Municipal utility players founded the "city 
carriers" for the explicit reason to take advantage of these rights. Yet, the actual 
infrastructure investments -  which were costly and risky -  proceeded slowly. To some 
degree, investment was trapped in these companies. Since they were municipally owned, 
they were unable or unwilling to tap capital markets, for example through a spin-off, in 
order to embark upon an aggressive investment strategy. Instead, they financed growth 
through returns from their monopoly businesses. In contrast, a further type of competitor, 
the younger telecommunications start-ups (which were listed on the alternative stock 
market Neuer Markt), did not inherit the privilege of their own rights-of-way. These were 
the companies that could potentially have financed a high risk and high cost investment 
strategy focused on local access. The result of this paradoxical situation was that, although 
local access infrastructure investment proceeded, it moved at a slower pace and is more 
risk-adverse than would potentially have been possible if it were capital markets financed.
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Here, three types of competitors to Deutsche Telekom in the period immediately following 
liberalisation will be discussed and their investment behaviour described. In part, the 
classification relies on that used by Gerpott in his book on telecommunications competition 
in Germany (1998, 261-275). The first competitor to be discussed here were the so-called 
"national carriers," the second the "city carriers" and the third the telecommunications start­
ups. The first group could be described succinctly with the phrase: "National energy 
conglomerates plus two." The national energy conglomerates included RWE, Veba and 
VIAG. The "plus two" were the German railway, which owned extensive rights-of-way 
throughout Germany along its rail tracks, as well as Mannesmann AG, an industry 
conglomerate which initially entered the telecommunications business without any sizeable 
rights-of-way. Mannesmann earned its reputation in Germany as the first challenger to 
Deutsche Telekom by running an alternative mobile phone network. From January 1997, 
Mannesmann engaged in a partnership with the German railways telecommunication arm, 
the DBKom, forming Mannesmann Arcor. Through DBKom, Mannesmann achieved 
rights-of-way and became a fixed line telephony competitor in addition to being a mobile 
phones operator.71 Between the "national carriers," a consolidation battle raged long before 
liberalisation in 1998. One national player has emerged more powerful than the rest: 
Mannesmann.72
71 Other investors in Mannesmann Arcor were AT&T, Unisource, Deutsche Bank and AirTouch. The 
Mannesmann group held the majority stake of this national carrier, however (Gerpott, 1998,269). It is 
important to note that the Postal Ministry granted the national energy conglomerates and the Bundesbahn the 
right to begin to market their trunk capacities already from July 1996, a privilege which provided these 
companies with a competitive head-start (Gerpott, 1998, 64, 65).
72 Between the national carriers, consolidation set in early. In fact, it began as soon as market liberalisation 
was expected in Germany, around 1995, before the actual passing of the Telecommunications Law. The 
reasons for early consolidation were numerous (see also Gerpott, 1998,286). Essentially, all o f the energy 
conglomerates "plus two" vied for the same asset: A national backbone network which could offer fixed-line 
telephony initially to large businesses and then to homes and small businesses. The second step was originally 
viewed as being dependent upon the promise of the "wireless local loop," a technology that took longer to 
develop for commercial use than expected. When the promise o f the "wireless local loop" moved further and 
further into the future, the market possibilities shrunk. In addition, all national players financed their 
investments from earnings derived from other sectors and not through spin-offs onto capital markets. This 
reinforced risk-averse behaviour. Ambitious returns on investments were expected at an early stage (in the 
case o f Mannesmann, the return on assets is expected to be 15% in the year 2000. Ralph Atkins, "Muscular 
Manager o f Tubes and Telecoms," Financial Times, 26.07.99, page 10.) In the beginning, RWE Telliance and 
Veba Telecom got together to form o.tel.o Communications, a telecommunications joint venture. Mannesmann 
managed to form a partnership with DBKom, the railways subsidiary, launching Mannesmann Arcor. VIAG 
Interkom remained solo and focused on developing the wireless local loop and mobile communications; but 
not after a series o f unsuccessful partnerships with international and domestic players. In the first year o f  
liberalisation, o.tel.o encountered problems (aggravated by a late start) and was bought by Mannesmann in
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Like its large competitors from the utilities industry, Mannesmann financed the growth of 
its fixed-line telecommunications services through earnings generated from other 
businesses, in this case, to a large degree through its lucrative mobile phone business. The 
rest of the industrial conglomerate Mannesmann was quite distinct from 
telecommunications and carried a different risk and rewards potential. Why didn’t 
Mannesmann spin off its telecommunications holdings to tap capital markets and embark 
upon a more aggressive expansion strategy? In this way, Mannesmann could have matched 
the speed of US-listed new entrants such as WorldCom and Qwest. But, whereas Anglo- 
American entrants financed their expansion world-wide through capital markets, European
•7 1
firms were slow to do so. The key to understanding this discrepancy is that a spin-off was 
risky since the spun-off company could be easily swallowed by a competitor, especially an 
Anglo-American competitor enjoying high valuations. How risky this was proven by the 
later acquisition of Mannesmann through Vodafone.
In terms of market capitalisation compared to revenue and in terms of market capitalisation 
growth, European telecommunications companies actually compared favourably to 
traditional US telecommunications companies (see Appendix C). In fact, the largest 
European telecommunications companies were doing better than their other European blue- 
chip counterparts which may have experienced comparable growth over the past months but 
still have lower valuations compared to their US-counterparts.74 It is only when selected
April 1999 for US$ 1.24 billion. On late start: Gabriele Kalt, "Bisher funktionieren meist nur die 
Servicenummern," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17.01.98, page 13. On o.tel.o acquisition: Ralph Atkins, 
"Mannesmann to keep o.tel.o Brand Separate," Financial Times, 07.04.99, page 28.
73 In 1999, this already started to change, however. A listing o f KPNQwest, a joint venture between Royal 
KPN and Qwest was announced in August 1999. Proceeds from the issue are to finance an expansion o f its 
internet-based fibre-optic network across 39 European cities. Gordon Cramb, "KPN Plans Mobile Phone and 
Data IPOs," Financial Times, 31.08.99, page 19.
74 Since the share price low point in Fall 1998 up to the Fall o f 1999, continental European and German 
industrial blue chips have matched the growth o f US blue chips. The Dow has risen about 45% from its low 
point and the Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50 Index has risen about 58% (from 2986 on 08.10.98 to 4714 on
31.08.98). Euro Stoxx 50 tracks 50 major shares in the European Union. The rise o f the German DAX has 
approximately matched that o f the Dow. Out of synch has been the UK FTSE 100, which has risen only 26% 
in the period under examination. Yet, all European markets started on overall lower price level compared to 
the USA. The price/ earnings multiple o f the Dow was 34 times, compared to 28 times o f the FTSE and 25 
times o f Euro Stoxx 50 (in August 1999). See Peter John, "Internet Explosion Leaves Footsie Out o f  Step 
With Surging Dow," Financial Times, 24.08.99, page 8 and Jorg Schreiweis, "Noch Stehen die Borsenampeln
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new Anglo-American entrants at the time were compared to European telecommunications 
operators, that multiples were very different.75 The gap increased in 1999- this was the 
effect of the so-called "internet bubble." If one considers that in October 1997, the entrant 
WorldCom (1996 revenues $ 4.5 billion) successfully bid for MCI (1996 revenues $ 18.5 
billion), European telecommunications players indeed looked very vulnerable and could 
have been threatened through a number of new entrants, not just Vodafone. Only in the year 
2000 did this discrepancy in valuations begin to collapse with the downturn of the capital 
markets. A large number of US telecommunications upstarts subsequently went bankrupt as 
easy access to capital disappeared.76
Like Mannesmann, the second group of telecommunications competitors to be discussed 
here financed their growth through earnings obtained from other businesses. Unlike 
Mannesman, they were small and regionally oriented. Furthermore, they owned one asset 
upon liberalisation that for the others was out of reach: Rights-of-way to the home. These 
were the "city carriers," telecommunications carriers founded by municipal utilities 
companies (Gerpott, 1998,270-275). It is difficult to generalise upon their strategies, 
because these were very heterogeneous. The differences could be accounted for by the 
distinctions inherent in the local markets themselves as well as the particular know-how of 
their management teams.
Upon liberalisation in January 1998, only two city carriers had significant services in place, 
based on "renting" of "unbundled" subscriber lines: NetCologne and ISIS in Diisseldorf 
(Gerpott, 1998, 305). Of these two, only NetCologne offered an innovative service package
auf Grim," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.08.99, page 24. Euro Stoxx 50 historical data was obtained 
from the Stoxx web site: http://www.stoxx.com/ on 01.09.99.
75 The reason cannot be examined in detail here. Part o f the overall trend has been to approach valuation o f  
companies using future earnings estimates. Since current earnings and revenue o f most "new economy" 
companies have been negative and negligible, future earnings and revenue estimates have been calculated- 
based in large part on the number o f users o f the service ("customer ownership"). A debate has ensued 
between "new economy" advocates embracing future-oriented valuations and those who point out the dangers 
of doing so. In most o f 1990s Germany, this debate was much less pronounced, with many firms being valued 
according to current revenues and earnings and not according to "customer ownership." This has changed with 
the boom o f the Neue Markt from 1998/1999 (Nacamar, interview, 12.07.99; Lux, interview, 10.07.99; 
DeTeCSM, interview, 09.07.99).
76 “Wrong Numbers,” The Wall Street Journal, 11.05.01, pages 1, A6.
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which included internet access.77 Later, throughout 1998 and 1999, other "city carriers" 
began to offer similar services. As has been pointed out already in previous sections, these 
services were introduced before regulatory certainty. The risk, however, of starting early 
was low because this group of telecommunications competitors intended to run their own 
subscriber lines into the home and small office over the longer term, taking advantage of 
their own rights-of-way. The investments in expensive billing systems and service teams, 
which had to be put in place for offering local service, could therefore be justified. 
Nevertheless, the municipal players were not quick enough to seriously compete with 
Deutsche Telekom in their respective regions until late 1999, perhaps even beyond. The 
speed of NetCologne was exceptional and did not represent the majority of its "city carrier" 
peers.
It was argued that "city carriers" could have represented powerful local competitors to 
Deutsche Telekom because they knew their region very well, had a recognised brand name 
and a well-established customer base (thanks to their parent companies). There was another 
aspect to the story, however. Werhard Moschel, one of the few vocal advocates of rigorous 
market liberalisation in Germany, criticised the fact that funds generated by local 
monopolies were being invested in the recently liberalised market (with the notable 
exception of City of Frankfurt which early on chose not to involve itself directly but instead 
allowed private firms such as MFS and COLT to compete).78 Moschel warned that the 
municipal owners of "city carriers" made life for other, independent new entrants in those 
cities difficult. Pointing to the public ownership of "city carriers" competing in a liberalised 
market, Moschel warned that privatisation should not only be "formal" but also "material."
7QHe concluded: "The future cannot be won in this way." A further important perspective 
could be added to Moschel's argument, however, which he did not explicitly state. The 
municipal players were unable or unwilling to tap public capital markets for funding their
77 NetCologne, founded already in October 1994, was owned by the municipal utility company, but local 
savings banks (Sparkassen) had minority stakes.
78 For a background article on Frankfurt and its efforts to compete as a financial centre against London see: 
"Telekommunikation, ein wichtiger Standortfaktor fur die Finanzplatze," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
22.02.96, page 15.
79 Wemhard Moschel, "Der Staat auf dem Riickzug," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30.05.98, page 15.
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high-cost, high-risk undertaking. As a result, their initiatives did not exhibit the rapid pace 
they could potentially have acquired.
The third and final group of telecommunications competitors to be discussed here were 
genuine telecommunications start-ups listed on the Neuer Markt. MobilCom, Debitel, 
TelDaFax and Drillisch have achieved valuations ranging from about DM 400 million 
(Drillisch) to DM 7,000 million (MobilCom) in 1999.80 Investors expected them to be 
major players in the future telecommunications landscape in Germany. They were in a 
difficult fix, however. As of 1999, all local rights-of-way were blocked by a former 
monopolist, Deutsche Telekom, or by the municipal carriers. In light of this fact, early local 
access investments based on the option of "renting" subscriber lines would have been risky 
before regulatory certainty. Instead, the telco start-ups focused initially on long-distance 
telephony and on securing access to national trunk lines.81 Thus the stars of the Neue Markt 
which have benefited from stock market euphoria and "the internet bubble" (Perkins) had a 
difficult time to enter the market of local internet access -  despite the unique possibility 
offered by the national regulator in "renting" subscriber lines.
MobilCom began to offer direct subscriber lines in 26 cities at the end of 1999, entering this 
market two years after the municipal "city carriers" (interview, 13.09.99). This timing was 
similar to that of the "national carrier" Mannesmann Arcor, which launched its subscriber 
line service in ten densely populated German cities from September 1, 1999.82 Like the 
telecommunication start-ups, Mannesmann Arcor waited for regulatory certainty before 
considering starting an innovative local internet access service. Therefore, up to 1999,
80 "Telefon-Markt: Preisbrecher in Panik," Focus, 26/99, pages 200-204.
81 Competition is raging over national trunk lines, with MobilCom bidding for the o.tel.o network early in 
1999 but loosing out to Mannesmann. MobilCom was prepared to spend about DM 300 million to DM 500 
million on a fixed fibre optical backbone network. Ralph Atkins and Alan Cane, "MobilCom Plans to Add 
Fibre to Low-Cost Diet," Financial Times, 28.04.99, page 40. In July 1999, MobilCom was able to secure a 
long-term exclusive lease of the national trunk network o f GasLINE, a telco subsidiary o f a gas supplier based 
in Essen. This put MobilCom in a much better position to offer innovative internet services in Germany.
"Huge Cost Savings Via Optic-Fibre Network/ Significant Capacity Increases/ Large Reduction in 
Interconnection Costs," MobilCom Press Release, 15. July 1999 (from the web site http://www.mobilcom.de/).
82 "Arcor steigt in das Geschaft mit ISDN-Anschltissen ein," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.08.99, page 
16.
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Deutsche Telekom controlled almost all local access to the internet by homes and small 
firms and could impose its metered pricing scheme.
Conclusion
The critical question that ran through this chapter, therefore, was why the “national 
champion” did not act as a force for innovation in Germany, which policy-makers, 
especially those close to the SPD, believed it to be. This chapter explored the possibility 
that the Deutsche Telekom was in part unable and in part unwilling to follow an innovative 
strategy pursuing the young internet access market in Germany in the years from 1996 to 
1998. A closer look was therefore necessary. The material permitted three explanations why 
DTAG was unable to pursue a future-oriented course. Firstly, the management of Deutsche 
Telekom may simply have underestimated the “disruptive techology” of the internet (see 
Christensen, 1997). Secondly, Deutsche Telekom was under steep cost pressure in the 
whole period under examination. It also had to reduce its large debt. Thirdly, its network 
infrastructure was unprepared to meet steep demand for internet access and the company 
lacked know-how in the internet field. Most traditional telecommunications firms were 
facing similar problems in that period. The two latter problems were strongly aggravated by 
DTAG's history as a monopoly carrier before privatisation and its public listing in 1995/ 
1996. The management of Deutsche Telekom emphasises this correctly. Yet, an argument 
could also be made that DTAG could in some cases have acted less defensively in the years 
between 1996, 1998 and beyond, especially given the capital market's exuberant enthusiasm 
for a bold, "network economy" strategy in this period.
It is ironic given the politician's trust in Deutsche Telekom that while the carrier potentially 
was in the best position to act as a "main force for innovation in Germany" it actually 
hindered the uptake of mass internet use by imposing high metered fees. Throughout 1999, 
there were only three main modes by which private individuals and small firms could
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access the internet in Germany.83 In all three cases, Deutsche Telekom was able to control 
the underlying fee structure. Despite significant price reductions in 1999, private users and 
small businesses were confronted in Germany by metered fees and not flat fees -  a result of 
Deutsche Telekom's policy.84 The US internet evangelist Nicholas Negroponte stated: 
"Make local calls a flat fee and you would change Germany's economy more than any 
president could" (quoted in Zerdick et al, 1999, 77).
In a farsighted move, the national regulator provided a possibility through which unmetered 
fees could be offered in Germany and which side-stepped Deutsche Telekom's cost regime. 
This was the possibility of renting a so-called "unbundled subscriber line" to the home and 
small firms -  a possibility that was unique in Europe and has since been adopted by other 
countries. Initially, however, only a very limited number of competitors used this access 
mode. The reasons for the slow uptake of this powerful option were linked to the ownership 
structures in the German telecommunications industry and the firms’ ability to draw upon 
capital market funding. A full and rapid embrace of the opportunities of the local loop 
required risky, up-front investments. As a result, flat rate offers started becoming widely 
available in Germany only in 2000. The number of providers making flat-rate offerings 
increased from one in October 1999 to ten in June 2000 and the lowest monthly all- 
inclusive rental price fell from DM 249 to DM 77 (RegTP, 2000, 32). And, in Spring of 
2000, Deutsche Telekom itself distanced itself from its metered regime and also offered 
flat-rate access to T-Online. As a consequence, 200,000 new subscribers joined the
85service.
In fact, Deutsche Telekom has not stood still. Many of the future-oriented strategies that 
were missing before 1999 were embarked upon in that and the subsequent year. Local call 
pricing was differentiated and internet access costs were reduced in Spring of 1999. In April 
2000, Deutsche Telekom’s internet provider T-Online was spun off and listed. The mobile
83 (1) Over Deutsche Telekom's own internet service provider T-Online, (2) over intemet-by-call offers based 
on interconnection agreements with Deutsche Telekom or (3) through a phone call to a local dial-in point.
84 The ability for Deutsche Telekom to impose metered access in Germany and the detrimental effect this had 
on the development o f the economy was the theme of a short editorial in a German business daily: 
"Schiagaustausch online," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.08.99, page 22.
85 "T-Online jetzt mit mehr als 6 Millionen Kunden," Press Release, T-Online, 27.07.00.
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unit was to follow. Cash for new initiatives could be released in the listings. DTAG started 
selling its cable TV network in regional units in early 2000, retaining a minority stake in 
each unit. In March 2000, DTAG announced that it would acquire a majority stake of the 
systems integrator debis Systemhaus from DaimlerChrysler in order to build up its data 
networking expertise. It was not a coincidence that 1999 was the year in which a new, 
future-oriented Deutsche Telekom was bom, however. It was only in 1999 that DTAG's 
competitors began to focus on internet access, a year after liberalisation. In June 1999, 
Deutsche Telekom completed its secondary offering (raising US$ 10.2 billion), and further 
placements were barred by the German government for the near future. Therefore, public 
listings of spin-offs were attractive alternatives for Dr. Ron Sommer to access capital 
markets to finance his internationalisation strategies. And the sale of cable TV networks 
was embarked upon unwillingly to pre-empt action by the European Commission 
competition authorities.
The role of capital markets was central not only to understanding the strategy of Deutsche 
Telekom, but also the moves of competing new entrants. Several competitors of DTAG did 
not draw on funds obtained from capital markets and instead financed the construction of a 
new communications infrastructure through earnings derived from other business areas. 
This stood in contrast to the United States, where infrastructure investments were financed 
at a rapid pace through capital markets starting at massive scale in 1995. This difference in 
company strategy regarding capital markets financing was perhaps, apart from 
telecommunications liberalisation policy itself, the single most significant factor explaining 
differences in the development of network infrastructures in Germany and the United 
States.
The initiatives of two types of domestic actors, national government and the incumbent 
telecommunications operator, have been discussed thus far in Part II. Attention in the next 
chapter will be turned to the third type of actor under examination, the new ventures 
themselves. The activities of this third type of actor are especially important for this study. 
The ability of German internet ventures to participate in a global innovation opportunity 
essentially is a measurement of the strength of the refraction effect discussed in Chapter
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One. Can the development of the new ventures be regarded as largely independent of the 
influence of powerful domestic actors such national government and the incumbent 
operator or not?
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Chapter Six
Survey of Internet Entrepreneurship in Germany
When this research project was initiated in late 1997, very little was known about internet 
entrepreneurship in countries other than in the United States. There, entrepreneurs already 
had been pursuing internet opportunities for around two years.1 In other countries, however, 
including in Germany, remarkably little information existed on internet start-up companies, 
indeed, one was justified in wondering whether there were entrepreneurs pursuing internet 
opportunities at all. Only a handful of internet start-ups had entered media awareness, and 
most of these were not begun as internet firms and refocused on the internet only later.2 
Only a single German company had carried out a public offering at the time of the survey 
which could be labelled an internet company.3 Yet, practitioners in touch with the computer 
and software communities nevertheless suggested that an entrepreneurial wave was brewing 
in Germany. Some emphasised that German entrepreneurs were addressing the internet 
opportunity as actively as their US counterparts. This was apparently confirmed in the last 
two years of the 1990s, at this time the new German alternative stock exchange, the Neuer 
Markt, listed significant numbers of German internet ventures. A revolution in 
entrepreneurship seemed underway in Germany.
1 When referring to a date for the start o f the internet boom, US commentators usually agree on the NASDAQ 
listing o f the internet software company Netscape which occurred in August 1995. In the subsequent months 
after this listing dozens o f companies were listed in the United States. Some o f the highest profile internet 
companies were founded prior or shortly after the Netscape listing: Amazon.com was started in July 1995, 
eBay was founded in September 1995 and Yahoo! was transformed into a professional service during the 
course o f 1994.
2 These were software security and encryption firms ESD Information Technology Entwicklungs GmbH 
(Ddlzig, Leipzig), started in 1994, Utimaco Software AG (Oberursel, Frankfurt), founded 1983, and Brokat 
Systeme GmbH (Stuttgart), started in 1994. Two companies focused on internet software, Intershop 
Communications (Burlingame and Jena), founded in 1992, and Blaxxun Interactive Group Munich, started in 
1995 and supported by US venture capital. Two electronic commerce firms need also be mentioned, l& l 
Aktiengesellschaft, founded in 1988 as an online marketing service and ABC Bucherdienst GmbH 
"Telebuch," founded in 1991. "Telebuch" was later acquired by Amazon.com.
3 The alternative stock exchange for high-growth firms, 'Neue Markt,' Frankfurt, was only launched in 1997 
and listed (as o f 04.98) seven firms belonging to one of the following industry groups: Telecommunications, 
software, information technology and computer services. Only one o f these, l& l Aktiengesellschaft & Co., 
had direct internet relevance, l& l was an on-line direct marketing specialist and an internet outsourcer. 
Intershop Communications AG, which developed internet software for electronic commerce, listed in June 
1998.
200
Yet, still in 2001, the lack of consistent and thorough information readily available about 
internet entrepreneurship in Germany is a barrier to serious scholarship about the 
phenomenon. An important part of this project, therefore, was the collection of empirical 
data about internet start-up activity in Germany. A survey was carried out in Spring of 
1998. This early date was useful in two respects: Firstly, it pre-dates the most extreme 
manifestation of the stock market bubble, which was especially severe in Germany. 
Secondly, it allows a direct comparison of German ventures with the first generation of US 
internet start-ups. Insight into the state of internet entrepreneurship in Germany in 1998 
directly addresses the issue of the refraction effect, described in Chapter One.
The rationale for an empirical survey was twofold. The first reason was to help locate 
entrepreneurs, who could be interviewed. It was apparent that, in order to gain an 
understanding of the specific challenges faced by internet entrepreneurs in Germany at the 
time, conversations with decision-makers in a few high-profile companies would not 
suffice. In the course of the survey, 18 founders of German internet firms were interviewed 
in person. Venture capitalists and persons from the academic and research community also 
were interviewed. This material proved invaluable in identifying the main challenges 
internet entrepreneurs faced in Germany at the time. It also was a crucial guide for 
formulating guiding concepts, which were later addressed in further interviews with internet 
founders in different European countries.
The second reason for this survey of internet ventures, however, was to provide an 
empirical foundation to the project. One of the specific challenges faced here was the fact 
that no representative list of internet firms existed which could be used as a starting point. 
The categories “computer,” “software” or “telecommunications” were at once too broad, 
because they included companies not involved in internet opportunities and also too 
narrow, because they ignored internet firms focused on a diverse range of industries.4 This
4 One extremely valuable source o f information would have been the list o f companies co-financed by the 
Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft (tbg), a federal program promoting venture capital investment. To 
protect entrepreneurs, however, this data could only be accessed by researchers from a specific research 
institute. Such a list would have included almost all o f the highest growth internet start-ups at the time, due to 
the selection process o f the tbg and the popularity o f the program among venture capitalists. Recently,
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forced the author to find alternative means to locate internet entrepreneurs; the path chosen 
was widely marketed start-up “contest.” This “contest” was conduced at a time when the 
internet was just beginning to gain visibility as a US phenomenon and sufficient public 
interest existed. For this reason, the timing was good. The survey was carried out in co­
operation with a leading business publication and one of the most frequently visited web 
sites in Germany. It attracted significant interest. 140 firms signed up on the survey's 
dedicated internet site; of these, 123 met the criteria for an internet start-up. For more 
information about the procedure please refer to Appendix A at the back of this paper. Due 
to the publicity and positive response, it can be assumed, therefore, that a broad segment of 
internet entrepreneurs was aware of the survey and participated. A valuable pool of data 
was produced which is discussed in this chapter. Venture capitalists and other experts were 
asked to confirm whether the data matched their current perceptions. It did. Nevertheless, 
due to the lack of a representative list, it is impossible to carry out the usual statistical tests 
for bias in the sample. The data presented here should, therefore, be viewed as 
complementary to the qualitative information gathered in the interviews and should not be 
used in isolation.
Introducing the typical German internet start-up
The survey is comprised of data collected from 123 internet start-ups based in Germany. Of 
these, 23 firms were internet software companies. Examples of internet software were 
systems enabling electronic commerce, online publishing, knowledge management and 
financial transactions. The clients of these software start-ups were mostly firms offering 
services on the internet or building internal corporate services. An example of a software 
start-up was the COIN Corporate Interactive AG, a firm with at the time 23 employees 
founded the previous year in Hannover. It developed internet-based corporate business 
process software for insurance companies and other firms involved in repetitious data 
processing tasks.
however, a private data source, a credit information service, has been opened for academic research (Harhoff 
and Steil, 1997).
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The most popular firm type were web development agencies. 57 firms fit this classification. 
These start-ups had deep knowledge of internet business, but worked primarily on a project- 
by-project basis for corporate clients. Companies in this group were new media agencies, 
which offered services such as web site design, consulting and development and systems 
consultants, which worked on systems integration. Founders of web development agencies 
could be understood as 'evangelists' because much of their activity consisted in convincing 
others of the benefits of an involvement in internet and new media. Only a few adopted a 
high-growth path and were able to access venture capital financing.5
The third category was comprised of portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups and 
business-to-business (B2B) internet exchanges. 29 firms offered these types of internet 
services. They included companies involved in online retail services, content, services for 
the hotel and travel industry, information brokers and business-to-business platforms. They 
were the types of companies attracting media attention and very successfully raising venture 
capital in the United States. An example among the German survey participants was BPS, 
started in 1997 in Karlsruhe and at the time with 12 employees. The B2B purchasing 
platform connected SME fashion manufacturers to their clients, the boutiques.
The last group were 14 companies which did not fit into the previous three groups. Some of 
these were internet service providers (ISPs). They offered internet access for firms and 
individuals in a local area.
The data collected in the survey can be used to present the "typical" internet start-up at the 
time.
5 For more information regarding the role o f the so-called evangelists in Germany and their motivations, see 
Waesche, 1999a.
Chart 1. The typical German internet start-up in Spring 1998.
- The typical firm was 1.8 years old.
It had 20 employees, of which six were free-lance.
- It was highly likely (79%) to have been re-investing profits to finance its growth.
- Yet, the managing founders also estimated that would require DM 2.2 million of 
initial investment to jump-start high growth.
- The typical firm had a 11% chance to find a venture capital equity investor which 
would have provided this capital.
- It had a 5% chance of being funded through the federal Technologie-Beteiligungs- 
Gesellschaft (tbg).
- Had generated a turnover of DM 1 million in 1997.
- Expected a turnover of DM 3 million in 1998.
- Expected employee growth of 77% per annum.
- 52% of costs were employee costs, 15% were spent on hardware and software, 11%
on telecommunications and internet access and 17% on marketing and PR.
- In the typical firm, a team of two company founders were active managing partners.
Start-up funding and the "balancing act"
One immediate surprise in the survey was the apparently large proportion of venture 
capital-financed firms in Germany, 11%. Although this may partially be accounted for due 
to the bias of the survey, the figure still stood out as an unlikely result.6 It did not, for 
example, match the estimate by a German private equity research firm, Mackewicz & 
Partner. One of their publications at the time stated that only 5% of technology start-ups in 
Germany were successful in their search for a venture capitalist (VC). Nor does the 11% 
figure correspond to anecdotal evidence about the difficulties of locating and convincing 
German VC financiers to invest in a start-up, especially in the case of internet electronic 
commerce start-ups or web developers. At the time, German VCs had to act in a more risk- 
adverse way than their US counterparts, because the long-term success of the alternative 
stock market in Frankfurt, the Neuer Markt, was not yet apparent.
6 The survey explicitly called for leading companies in the internet arena. Venture capital firms were contacted 
and asked to notify their companies about the survey, therefore, it is very probable that more venture-capital 
firms participated than would have been representative o f the start-up landscape as a whole.
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In fact, the 11% figure represents, more than anything else, the lack of understanding about 
VC financing in Germany at the time among entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may have 
thought they had venture capital financing when, in fact, they were referring to other, less 
supportive types of private equity finance. Some private equity firms in Germany 
("Beteiligungskapitalgesellschaften") were unable to offer the range of services, the depth 
of specialist know-how and breath of contacts which were associated with US-style venture 
capitalists.7 For this reason, it was crucial to separate "real" VCs from other investor types 
in Germany which were mistakenly labelled VCs. The MBGs ("Mittelstandische 
Beteiligungskapitalgesellschaften"), for example, were generally not active investors and 
not profit-oriented; they receive only an interest rate payment return on their investment. 
These private equity investment funds were started in the 1970s and 80s by business 
initiatives and local chambers of industry and commerce with state-level public support.
The performance of the MBGs was confirmed to be under that of standard, profit-oriented 
venture capital firms. One research effort, furthermore, ascertained that the portfolio firms 
of MBGs further indicated that they were dissatisfied with their investor (Kulicke and 
Wupperfeld, 1996, 220,221; see also Kulicke, 1997c, 140-142). According to two different 
sources, there were only very few experienced and US- oriented venture capitalists in 
Germany at the time, and they formed a small subset of the total population of private 
equity investors (Wupperfeld, 1996, 248; Wupperfeld, 1997, 168; Freeman, 1998).
Indeed, from the data provided in the survey itself, there were indications that the 11% 
figure was too high. We knew, for example, that 5% of all firms received financing through 
the Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft (tbg). This percentage probably more accurately 
reflected the proportion of “real” VC-financed, high-growth firms in the sample (See Table 
1, below). The tbg provided entrepreneurs with the possibility of raising public money only 
in combination with an investment by a recognised venture capitalist or a high profile
7 Thomas Hellmann and Manju Puri evaluated the financial strategies o f a sample o f around 100 Silicon 
Valley start-up companies. The panel data was originally collected from 1994 onwards as part of the Stanford 
Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC). On the basis on this and other data, Hellmann and Puri conclude that 
venture capital-backed firms tend to receive more funding and are more liable to change their CEO in an effort 
to professionalize (Hellmann and Puri, 1997). In another paper, they show that firms following an innovator 
strategy are more likely to pursue venture capital financing in order to speed up their time to market. The 
securing o f venture capital therefore seems to be an important strategy among Silicon Valley firms racing to 
secure first mover advantages (Hellmann and Puri, 1998).
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individual investor (“angel”). Like the similar Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) 
program, the tbg co-venturing scheme actually lowered the risks for venture capital 
investors. Both the tbg and the KfW only worked together with venture capital firms they 
recognised as high-quality, profit-oriented investors.
Table 1. Forms of financing.
All firms Firms 
with VC 
financing
Firms
with
bank
loans
Firms 
with tbg 
support
Reinvesting
profits
79% 43% 88% 33%
Individuals 33% 14% 33% 33%
Bank loan 20% 21% 100% 17%
VC
financing
11% 100% 13% 83%
State
("Land")
program
8% 21% 17% 17%
Parent
company
8% 0% 4% 0%
tbg support 5% 36% 4% 100%
Other 5% 7% 8% 0%
Federal
program
4% 21% 8% 17%
(This table can also be found in Appendix A; there it is Table 3)
The most common form of growth financing for an internet start-up was by reinvesting 
profits. 79% of the companies included in the survey indicated that they financed their 
activities through what was often referred to as ‘bootstrapping.’ Indeed, self-financing of 
growth was the most common means of finance for all types of start-ups surveyed, 
including internet software firms and portal sites and electronic commerce start-ups and not 
just for web developers (see Appendix A, Table 4). The need to generate the positive cash 
flow required for self-financing, however, represented a significant constraint to growth. 
Software companies had to carry out more project-by-project work for their clients and 
could not dedicate themselves to the same extent to scalable products. Web development 
companies were dependent upon organic growth and could not acquire other firms in their
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field to capture valuable know-how. Electronic commerce players, portals and other 
innovative internet start-ups were handicapped because they had to carry out cash-flow 
positive activities "on the side" such as systems integration or web development.8
Moreover, a few German entrepreneurs preferred bootstrapping to giving up an equity stake 
to a venture capitalist.9 Many software and consulting firms have in the past grown to be 
successful with this means of financing. The most successful German software firm, SAP, 
was also bootstrapped, and combined this with an early stock market listing. This pattern, 
bootstrapping and an early public offering without involvement by an early-stage venture 
capital fund, could be observed in several computer and internet companies listed on the 
Neuer Markt in 1998 and 1999. It reflected suspicion to “outside control” in the company; a 
suspicion associated with the German “Mittelstand” tradition.10 However, the survey 
indicated that most of the internet founders questioned did not subscribe to this view. In 
fact, an astounding proportion (73%) of founders who embraced rapid growth also believed 
in the advantages of venture capital investment (Appendix A, Table 27).
But, intentions diverged from reality in many cases. And the constraints of bootstrapping 
were obvious. One founder described these in the following way:
"We had to wait for one and a half years for our first pay cheques as 
partners. We paid our rents by working part-time for Novell. Our employees 
were, of course, always our first priority and we were very tight on 
liquidity."11
8 A well-known example was the German internet portal web.de, which was built up in parallel to a cash-flow 
generating systems integration business. For more examples o f German companies financing their internet 
start-up businesses on the side through other cash-flow generating activities, see: Niko Waesche, "Tough 
Balancing Act for German Internet Start-ups," Tomado-lnsider.com Magazine, No. 2, May 1999, pages 24, 
25.
9 Interview with Netlife.
10 The traditional German “Mittelstand” start-up model has been identified with the lone engineer intent on 
keeping exclusive, patriarchal control of his company until he could bequeath it to his siblings. This attitude 
still existed in the late 1990s and was called 'Herr im Hause' ('Master in his own house') thinking or 'Blut, 
Scholle, Erbhof-Denken' ('Blood, earth, homestead mentality') (see, for example, Breuer, 1997, 326, 
"MentalitatsphSnomen;" Kulicke, 1997c, 130; Huhn, 1997, 86).
11 USWeb InnoMate interview.
207
The survey results reflected this "balancing act" of German internet start-ups trying to 
combine cash-flow positive project-by-project work with their high-growth, scalable 
offerings. Only about 40% of all selected firms generated most of their revenue (defined as 
75% or more) from products or scalable offerings. About one fourth of all selected firms 
were complete hybrids, generating substantial income from both product as well as project 
work. As expected, tbg financed start-ups most closely matched the revenue streams one 
would expect from high-growth firms (see Table 2, below). One needs to keep in mind that 
the group of 30 selected firms represented the most promising high-growth category among 
the survey participants. The task of web development was by nature project oriented. One 
clear result of the “balancing act” was that undercapitalised German internet start-ups could 
not address their specific area in the same vigour as a "pure-play" internet start-up could. 
Established media and telecommunications firms were not challenged by start-ups in the 
same way as they would have if they had faced more "pure-play" firms.
Table 2. Proportion of start-ups generating most of their sales from project work or product 
sales.
All firms % of total tbg financed
Mostly project-by-project* 10 35% 0
Mostly product, scalable 
offerings (“pure play”)
12 41% 3
“Hybrids” 7 24% 1
29 100% 4
(The categories are defined in Appendix A, where the table is listed as Table 18.)
Slow internationalisation
A further result of the “balancing act” was the slow pace of internationalisation of German 
internet start-ups in the second half of the 1990s. One of the original theses of the 
practitioner network thinkers, described in the introductory chapter, was that the global 
internet would enable small start-ups to acquire and serve clients in other countries, whether
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businesses or consumers. Any small firm could use the network to become instantly global, 
ran the argument. Reality seems to have been a little different, with only a few exceptions.12
Among all firms surveyed, only 2% of business customers were international clients and 
0% of consumers came on the average from outside Germany (Appendix A, Table 2). In a 
more detailed, second questionnaire handed only to internet software and internet electronic 
commerce firms, sales figures from countries outside of Germany were established. Two 
firms had a significant proportion of foreign sales, they derived over 90% of revenues from 
abroad (see Table 3, below). However, most start-ups had only a small share of 
international revenues. The average of foreign sales was 21%, the median was 10%. It is 
important to remember here that the survey explicitly asked the most internationally active 
German internet firms to apply. Furthermore, the low internet penetration in the German 
market should have motivated firms to enter other countries more rapidly than, for example, 
in the United States, where the domestic internet market was already at that time relatively 
large. One company that successfully targeted international markets from a early stage was 
the German internet software firm Intershop. But Intershop had the benefits of venture 
capital financing by a high profile, internationally oriented investor; bootstrapped firms had 
to prepare their internationalisation more carefully and had to move at a more gradual pace.
12 One German firm did correspond in a picture book-way to the network thinker's ideal. This company was an 
electronic commerce start-up selling airline tickets, TISS. The internet service compared up to 80 million 
airfares which were put to the disposal o f its registered users. Travel Information Software Systems GmbH 
(TISS) was a global internet start-up company with a staff o f two people based in Heilbronn, Germany. 
Astoundingly, only about one in ten of the bookings it referred originated in Germany, the majority were from 
the United States. Without a US sales office or any other physical presence on the other side o f the Atlantic, 
TISS was responsible for referring flights with a total value o f over five million Euro alone in the month o f  
October 1998. But this start-up was unique in the German internet landscape. Rudi Weissmann and Dirk 
Trostmann started the TISS service in 1995. The founder's slogan was: "Look big, keep small." Figures have 
been provided on the TISS homepage: http://www.tiss.com/. A succinct, yet detailed article on TISS: Indra 
Btittner, "Internethandel," Econy, Business in Bewegung, December/January, 04/98, pages 42,43.
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Table 3. Number o f firms with given percentage o f  foreign sales.
% foreign 
sales
Frequency %
90-100% 2 7%
80-89% 0 0%
70-79% 0 0%
60-69% 1 3%
50-59% 1 3%
40-49% 3 10%
30-39% 4 13%
20-29% 2 7%
10-19% 5 17%
0-9% 12 40%
30 100%
(This table can also be found in Appendix A; there it is Table 15)
Unbalanced demand for internet services
The two previous chapters focused on telecommunications deregulation in Germany and the 
laggard uptake of internet use among consumers. Business uptake was faster in Germany.
As indicated in the previous chapters, some larger businesses received preferential 
treatment by the monopolist telecommunications operator, Deutsche Telekom. Leased line 
prices, which affected large business use of the internet, for example, were below those of 
many other countries. Evidence from management research shows that leading German 
firms were upgrading their computer networks as part of an effort to "modernise" their 
operations (Ruigrok et al,1999, 52, 53). These were large German firms as well as advanced 
“Mittelstand” (SME) companies. In general, internet adoption by these companies, was 
much more rapid than among small businesses and consumers.13 The massive costs of
13 Early reports seemed to indicate that uptake among advanced small- and medium sized enterprises in 
Germany (the “Mittelstand”) were above the European average (European Commission DGXIII.A3,1997, p. 
26). Another source confirms that SME uptake o f information and communication technologies was higher in 
Germany than in other countries. The study credits trade associations, which provide information on 
information and communication technologies to 55% of German firms (DTI, 1998, Executive Summary). 
These types o f informational services were supplemented in 1997 by a one-time federal subsidy for SMEs for 
setting up an internet presence, a support scheme that was, incidentally, heavily oversubscribed. 1,000 SMEs 
were provided with up to DM 4,600 each for setting up their internet presence. Around 3,000 companies
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internet access among small firms and consumers resulted in an unbalanced uptake pattern 
in Germany which was highly unfavourable for internet start-ups.
As described in Chapter Two, the most advanced applications for the internet consisted in 
linking small businesses and consumers to each other and to larger firms in seamless 
"business webs." It was this breakthrough which transformed the internet into a “disruptive 
technology,” to use a concept developed by Clayton M. Christensen (1997). In the 1980s 
and early 90s, large firms had already begun to use the advantages of computer networks to 
exchange data among themselves. Yet, electronic data interchange (EDI) was expensive, 
and could not be used to link small businesses and consumers. With rapidly rising internet 
penetration among small firms and consumers in the United States, however, the benefits of 
lower transaction costs over networks could be extended, thereby creating wholly new 
opportunities. Start-up companies could exploit these opportunities first, because, in 
contrast to EDI efforts, large firms were not in control. Furthermore, the internet as a 
"disruptive technology" linking small firms and consumers was not given full attention by 
large companies.
In those countries, however, where internet uptake lagged among small firms and 
consumers, such as Germany, the range of possible internet applications was much more 
limited and in many cases reduced to "showcase" projects. Demand for internet services 
was, therefore, clearly unbalanced in Germany; consumer demand was low while business 
demand was higher. In fact, one web development and systems integrator company founder 
advised internet entrepreneurs in Germany to examine advanced internet demand structures 
in the United States before developing their own ideas:
"To start an internet company, one should first secure DM 250.000 to have a 
year's worth of breathing space. Then one should head straight for the airport 
and catch a flight to San Francisco to collect ideas."14
applied for the subsidy administered by the "Bundesamt fur Wirtschaft," Eschbom ("GewerbestraBen statt 
Gemischtwaren-Shopping," Computerwoche, 39191, p. 67).
14 GFT interview.
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Also for this reason, some firms such as Intershop maintained advanced technology groups 
in the USA while others insured cross-Atlantic information flow through partnerships with 
other small firms.15
Unbalanced internet uptake in Germany and primitive internet demand structures were 
reflected in the survey results as well. The client base of internet start-ups in Germany in 
early 1998 consisted largely of business customers. Most of these business customers 
actually were technologically advanced Mittelstand companies. Over 70% of sales to 
businesses were derived from the Mittelstand. Only a minority, 15%, of internet start-ups 
targeted consumers (Appendix A, Table 2 and 28). It is not wrong, therefore, to characterise 
the typical internet start-up in Germany in early 1998 as a firm carrying out project-by- 
project work for business customers while in parallel trying to experiment with new internet 
applications. This was very different from the United States, where 604 so-called pure-play 
internet firms were financed in 1998 by venture capital to focus on specific high-growth 
opportunities.16 The highest profile early start-ups such as Amazon.com, eBay and Yahoo! 
focused on where the internet was most “disruptive:” On extending the powers of the 
network to small firms and consumers.
Technology enthusiasts and management know-how
The most common problem of New Technology Based Firms (NTBFs) emphasised by 
German-language literature was that technology know-how was not matched with 
management know-how (Koschatzky, 1997, 1, 6; Pleschak, 1997a, 14, 15). The reason for 
this was that many founders started companies right out of university. In order for a NTBF 
to succeed, however, management know-how was considered crucial.
15 The COIN Corporate Interactive partnership with Liquid Edge, New York City, for example (COIN 
interview).
16 In 1999, this figure grew to 1,798 companies. “Moneytree US Report Full Year & Q4 1999 Results,” 
PricewaterhouseCoopers.
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This observation cannot be directly confirmed with this survey of internet start-ups in 
Germany.17 Barely any were founded right out of a science university. In fact, only one such
1 Q
start-up initiative was identified. Several start-up initiatives, however, took shape while 
the founders were taking business courses at a German university. In fact, business courses 
were the most popular type of course founders had taken at university, followed by 
computer programming courses.19 This evidence indicates that the typical internet 
entrepreneur in Germany was very different from the NTBF founder. NTBFs seemed to 
follow the traditional industrial strengths of Germany, areas such as precision tools and 
electronics. These were areas where the university system had its strengths.20
Nevertheless, the most accurate characterisation of internet founders in Germany in early 
1998 was a multi-skilled person with a university, but non-science, background but with an 
enthusiasm for technology. The founders of the companies surveyed here count among the 
very early adopters in Germany of consumer networks. A significant proportion of 
founders, over 20%, already encountered consumer network services before 1990, in this 
case the system of the German telecommunications operator, BTX (Appendix A, Table 20).
17 Nor could it be confirmed by examining the results o f the first pilot programme for NTBFs, TOU. Marianne 
Kulicke et al found that some entrepreneurs already had management know-how on founding and most could 
compensate for their deficits by learning on the job (Kulicke et al, 1993, 255).
18 They were not included in the survey because they had not founded their company by the time the data 
collection was completed. An interview was carried out, nevertheless (Verteilte Systeme).
19 Very important for internet start-ups seems to have been the combination o f different fields o f know-how, 
especially the fusion o f technological and management know-how. Often, this was achieved by creating teams. 
Partners in both iXOS and Brokat emphasised the managing founder team. The teams approach was an 
important element in a speed management strategy (Interview with Netlife, iXOS, Brokat). In Silicon Valley, 
the teams approach was widespread. One survey from 1996, which examined human resource strategies, 
revealed that most firms were started with two founders, although there also were companies with three, four, 
five, six, seven, nine or even with twelve founders. Among the German internet start-ups surveyed here, most 
firms had two founders as well, but there were fewer companies with three or four founders. The interview 
data on German start-ups, however, indicates the process o f composing founder teams may have differed to 
that in Silicon Valley. The research just quoted from 1996 examined different models o f  employment 
relations. One o f these models was the 'commitment model,' a long-term attachment in which peer control, 
cultural fit and loyalty mattered. Family and friends are usually listed as key partners in the creation o f the 
company. Among German internet start-ups, almost all founders interviewed had teamed up with friends, 
whereas less than 30% o f the Silicon Valley firms had chosen the 'commitment model.' For a short explanation 
o f the different employment models see Hannan, Burton and Baron, 1996a, 513. For family and friends among 
founding partners Hannan, Burton and Baron, 1996b, 271.
20 This is confirmed by comparative emperical data on NTBFs in Germany, Sweden and the UK. In Germany, 
over half o f all NTBFs are in the machine tools and precision instruments business, followed by electronics 
and chemicals/ pharmaceuticals. Only about 3% o f all NTBFs are involved in computer technology. This is in 
strong contrast to Sweden and the UK, where electronics dominate, but where over 10% o f  NTBFs are in 
computer technology (Licht and Nerlinger, 1997, p. 193-195).
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Very few of these early German internet entrepreneurs, however, had a strong international 
management background.21 This differentiated them from the internet founders which 
appeared in Germany in 1999 and 2000, which, in general, seemingly had more pronounced 
international management skills but were less firm on technology.
The early founders, which could be most accurately be labelled technology enthusiasts with 
universal skills, need to be viewed as distinct from the programmers and engineers they 
hired. While the surveyed start-up companies are working at 81% of their potential capacity 
due to problems in finding personnel (Appendix A, Table 18), this was a situation very 
much comparable to that in other countries, including the United States. However, loyalty 
among key technical personnel was better in Germany.22 In fact, some founders clearly 
indicated that availability of technical know-how was a locational advantage:
"There is no question that technical know-how is better in Germany than in the
USA. The applicants are better, the quality is better. In the USA or the UK I
require five engineers for the same task three carry out in Germany."23
Another relevant question was the existence of specialist know-how among German 
internet start-ups. In the late 1990s, two areas of specialist scientific knowledge found 
application and further development through the commercialisation of the internet: software 
agents (classified here under “knowledge management”) and encryption systems. The first 
was a requirement for advanced search features across vast amounts of unstructured 
information and for such applications as intelligent brokers. The scientific origins of this 
technology lay in research in artificial intelligence, artificial life, neural networks and
21 Foreign founders and managers in Germany added international management experience to German teams. 
One example was the constellation o f managers surrounding Fidelio, a Munich-based hotel software firm 
which later helped spawn at least two internet firms, Serenata and NxN as well as a developer o f software and 
hardware for the optometry industry and a call center software firm. Fidelio was started in 1987 by an 
American, Keith Gruen, and two Germans, Dietmar Miiller-Elmau and Dietrich von Boetticher. Vijay Sondhi, 
David Lehrer and Galen Bales, all of them Americans, Eric Fischer and Rick Spence, both are British and Rolf 
Schmiedke (Swiss) joined and left Fidelio at various stages. In 1997, Sondhi became CFO o f a high profile 
document management software company, iXOS. Recent immigrants to Germany have also been among 
internet firm founders, for example Arvin Arora from COIN Interactive or Xuan Baldauf o f Medium.Net. 
International experience is a very important criterion for VCs. For this reason, an experienced English 
software manager was placed at the helm o f Hyperwave, a company specialising in intranet publishing.
22 Interviews with Netlife and Lars Heiden Jorg Fullenbach Realisationen.
23 GFT interview.
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human/ computer interaction. The best-known research programmes in this field were the 
Software Agents Group at MIT's Media Laboratory, the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at 
the Free University of Brussels (VUB) and work carried out in Cambridge University. 
Among German internet start-ups, in this area of specialised technological know-how was 
underrepresented when compared to a US sample (Appendix A, Table 8, compare 
“Knowledge Management Software”). In fact, most well-known agent-technology firms 
were American and one, Autonomy Systems Ltd., was from the UK
The second area of specialist knowledge, encryption systems, was necessary for 
confidentiality and authenticity of internet transactions, which were major requirements for 
conducting business and especially banking over the internet. Using these techniques, a 
sales contract sent over the internet could be 'signed,' insuring its authenticity. Asymmetric 
encryption techniques, used on the internet, was pioneered in the United States in the 
1970s, but research was embarked upon in numerous countries due to its affiliation with 
military research.
In this area, German internet firms were very well represented and seemed internationally 
competitive. They had ambitious strategies for international expansion. The origin of this 
strength could be traced to the national teletext service, BTX, which found its most popular 
expression in on-line banking applications. Most German banks offered on-line banking 
over BTX and several in the late 1990s began to transfer these services to the internet.
Three of the companies interviewed in the course of this research, Brokat, ESD and Netlife, 
developed software for banks intending to offer on-line banking services over the internet. 
The issue of encryption, especially as an international standard, was a main issue of concern 
among founders of German internet start-ups (Appendix A, Table 25).
Much effort was put into securing and extending this competitive advantage in Germany. A 
consensualist alliance between the banking industry and associations formed to develop the 
open on-line banking standard HBCI (“Home Banking Computer Interface”).24 In order to
24 Positive uptake o f HBCI by financial service-oriented internet start-ups was confirmed in the Brokat and 
ESD interviews.
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promote both the use of encryption techniques as well as their development by German 
firms, the Federal Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Technology was 
instrumental in framing a multimedia and communications law in Germany, the 
"Informations- und Kommunikationsdienste Gesetz" (IuKDG). This law and its appendix 
relating to electronic signatures represent a framework for conducting legally binding 
electronic commerce. It also covered several other important areas such as responsibility 
over on-line content. It did not, however, address its own enforcement issues, which was a 
severe weakness.25
The comparison of the development of these two areas by German internet start-ups 
illustrated the concept of path dependence found within technological innovation and 
diffusion theory. The enthusiasm with which application of encryption technology was 
developed by internet start-ups could be contrasted to the difficulty in competing in an area 
where little research and development has existed in the past, in agents technology and 
knowledge management systems. Apart from the specialist knowledge issues, general 
computer engineer know-how and management experience seemed readily available in 
Germany in the late 1990s. And the strong desire to embark upon a high-growth 
entrepreneurial experience was there.
Wrong country, wrong time
At the beginning of this chapter, the typical German internet start-up was introduced: A 1.8 
year-old company with 20 employees. The founders were seeking DM 2.2 million in 
venture capital. These technologically well-versed founders saw the opportunities of the 
internet and embraced rapid growth. DM 2.2 million was not a substantial amount 
compared to the money raised in the United States at that time.26 Yet, it represented a lofty 
sum of money in a country and at a time when venture capital was just a trickle. Although
25 Due to this weakness, the law could be “ignored” in one high profile content responsibility case- in the case 
against Felix Somm carried out in Bavaria.
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the government sponsored venture capital programs mentioned in Chapter Five were 
laudable and allowed a minimum level of activity to persist, they were not extensive enough 
to initiate rapid growth. The venture capital boom, which would occur in Germany later in 
that year fuelled by the Neuer Markt had not reached the entrepreneurs yet. As a result, 
most entrepreneurs financed growth through positive cash flow.
It was also difficult for company founders to foresee that demand for internet access by 
consumers would shift into high gear in subsequent months. In early 1998, Germany was 
known for its laggard uptake among consumers, which was behind even the European 
average. The reasons for this have been described extensively in the two previous chapters. 
Those founders who expected rapid uptake in the future were nevertheless dependent upon 
generating income in the current market. For this reason, there were few alternatives to 
carrying out project work for business customers. This was highly problematic, because 
sophisticated internet applications at that time consisted in integrating consumers into new 
types of business transactions. Due to these constraints, the typical German internet start-up 
carried out project-by-project work to subsidise its more innovative ideas, often consumer- 
oriented, on the side. The game to play was a tough balancing act focused on generating 
cash which could be re-invested in growth. In order to realise their own ambitions, the 
internet founders were in the wrong country at the wrong time. They required better access 
to innovative financing as well as more advanced domestic demand structures than were 
available in Germany in early 1998. In contrast, therefore, to the idealistic visions of 
network thinkers, domestic determinants did play a crucial role also for internet ventures 
addressing global opportunity. The most interesting finding, perhaps, of this empirical 
survey, was that the resource allocation and strategy of German new internet ventures was 
considerably different from that of their US counterparts.
This survey of internet entrepreneurship in Germany was a single-country snap shot. It 
served to highlight the specific challenges faced by entrepreneurs. It is important now to 
extend the results of the data and place it in a comparative setting. The argument offered
26 Venture capital financed internet companies in Silicon Valley, received on average US$ 6 million each in 
the fourth quarter o f 1997 ("A telling statistic: Average investment up 50% since '92," San Jose Mercury
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here needs to be strengthened by relating the findings back again to government policy and 
national institutional determinants. The conclusions arrived at in this chapter are contrasted 
with the experiences of other countries. In the next chapter, material from the whole period 
between 1995 and 2000 will be taken into consideration for three further European 
countries.
News, 14.02.1998, from the web page http://www.sjmercury.com/).
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Chapter Seven
Internationalisation of Internet Start-ups from Four European Countries
Several contemporary business press articles have made the point that countiy-level 
institutional factors, such as internet access and the availability of venture capital were 
important determinants in internet-based entrepreneurship and the internationalisation of 
new ventures. While an important contribution to practitioner understanding, these articles 
failed to explore how these institutional factors impacted on the internet start-ups. 
Furthermore, they often discussed either internet access or venture capital, not the combined 
impact of the two factors. This combined view of two important county-level institutional 
factors is missing also in academic literature relevant to this topic; most work thus far 
concentrates either on venture capital and new firm formation or on telecommunications 
liberalisation. It is the objective of this thesis to discuss the combined impact of two 
country-level institutional factors within a rapidly developing global entrepreneurial 
environment. Of course, the institutional factors were changing as well. One could view this 
effort as a comparison of speeds of change of institutions vis-a-vis new ventures.
To come to terms with the level of detail required to explore linkages between changing 
institutional factors and market actors, this research focused on a single country, Germany, 
to present an initial, yet detailed, set of hypotheses. The laggard pace of consumer internet 
adoption in Germany and the initial lack of venture capital in Germany for internet start-ups 
had a deep impact upon firm strategy and resources. As a consequence, German internet 
start-ups were slow to internationalise, focused mostly on enterprise clients instead of 
consumers and adopted “mixed” resource allocation- including a significant amount of 
project work. They responded not to global opportunities, but to a ‘refracted’ version of 
these opportunities. Only when the institutional framework began to change conclusively 
from 1999, did strategy and resource allocation among start-ups also change and ‘pure play’ 
start-ups began to appear. The timing of institutional change thus insured institutional 
distinctiveness and path dependence- despite the fact that institutions eventually reacted to 
competitive pressures for global convergence. By the time the two institutional factors-
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internet access and venture capital availability- began to adapt conclusively, the ‘first 
generation’ of German internet entrepreneurs had already made their mark, established 
players had firmly entrenched themselves in the internet business and US start-ups had 
acquired prime internet assets. As a result, the local landscape for information technology 
entrepreneurs still remains distinct in Germany.
In this chapter, learning from the German case will be extended to three further European 
countries, to explore the “refraction” effect in other local environments. Unfortunately, it 
was not possible to delve into the level of detail presented for Germany. It was also not 
possible to extend the quantitative survey into other countries. Nevertheless, the 
information available about the development of internet ventures in other countries permits 
a testing of the concepts derived from the German case in different environments. This 
comparative section is also useful to gain further understanding about the German case 
itself. For example, the boom of venture capital in Germany from 1998 and the significance 
of the Neuer Markt can only be fully understood when compared to growth rates of venture 
capital in other countries.
Yet, a disclaimer needs to be extended to the reader. With the exception of Germany, 
continental Europe at the time populated mostly by privately-held internet start-ups. Public 
information on quoted companies obviously is much more easily accessed, more reliable 
and better to compare than what was available on private firms. Much of this discussion 
was based on news items, analyst reports prepared by investment banks and interviews with 
experts and journalists.1 Very little of this information is directly comparative. For this
1 Due to the initial success o f the Neuer Markt and the popularity of the growth exchange among internet 
entrepreneurs, Germany was home to the most transparent internet industry in Europe. 22 internet companies 
were quoted on the Neue Markt as of October 1999. With a combined market capitalisation o f EUR 6.3 
Billion, internet stocks comprised 12% o f the total market capitalisation o f  the Neuer Markt. Please refer to 
the analyst report DG Bank Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank AG Research, "Neuer Markt," October 1999. 
Many internet software companies were listed, including Brokat and Intershop. The three best-known web 
development companies, were listed on the Neuer Markt as well: Pixelpark, Kabel New Media and I-D 
Gruppe. In addition, there were several portal sites and electronic commerce start-ups; some o f the better- 
known on the Neuer Markt included Endemann!! (a holding owning three different, previously 
undercapitalised portal sites), iFAO (an electronic commerce travel service as well as software specialist), 
buecher.de (book retail) as well as Ricardo (an electronic commerce auction site). ConSors (an online 
brokerage) was classified as financial services, not internet stocks. Although the Neue Markt provided a 
researcher with unparalleled insight in Germany, more information on Germany and the rest o f Europe was
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reason, these findings should be considered tentative but should nevertheless provide a 
starting point for further investigation.
While the purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the development of institutional factors and 
internet start-ups in three new countries, the German case will be included in the narrative 
for comparative purposes. Thus, this Chapter represents a four-country survey, which 
includes two "large" economies as well as two "small" ones. Older management studies 
literature argued that internationally operating firms benefit from a large home market.2 
Porter, by pointing to more subtle, qualitative criteria contained in home demand, has been 
able to elegantly side-step this issue (1990). In fact, some of the largest multinational 
companies operate from small countries, leading to the argument that small countries foster 
internationalisation because their own markets are too constricted. The effect of economic 
size therefore needs to be taken into account. Lastly, this is a good moment to note that the 
local tongue of all countries studied here is not English. Much has been written about the 
supposedly English-centric internet, although, in reality, local languages dominate the 
internet in Europe.3 None of the countries here had an advantage over the others by being 
English-native, although English as a second language was stronger in the "small" countries 
compared to the "large" ones.
Originally, the intended comparison was between Germany and Sweden. In contrast to 
Germany, Sweden was a European country with a high internet penetration already in 1998. 
In that year, 27% of Swedes were internet users; this figure was roughly comparable to the 
proportion of internet users in the United States. Finland, although it had the highest 
internet penetration in the world at the time, has a very small population of 5 million and
still required, especially regarding the first generation o f internet start-up companies. Some o f which, such as 
OSM Online Software Marketing und Vertriebs Aktiengesellschaft (Neuried), have long disappeared due to 
financial constraints despite an innovative service. Only a few o f these "first generation" private internet start­
ups were listed on the Neuer Markt. They were rapidly being superseded by a new generation o f entrepreneurs 
equipped with venture capital financing and responding to a much improved demand structure. When I carried 
out a survey o f internet start-up companies in Germany in the beginning o f 1998,1 captured some o f this "first 
generation" activity.
2 This argument has found its way into the discussion surrounding economic change and technology, the idea 
being that small countries have problems maintaining contact with global technological shifts (compare with 
Freeman, 1988, 2).
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therefore was not selected. In further research, it would be rewarding to delve into the 
Finnish case. Finland has a very different history of telecommunications regulation from 
most other countries; in fact, it never had a monopoly. In order to adjust for the effect of 
country size, a European country roughly comparable to Germany and another roughly 
comparable to Sweden were selected. The United Kingdom was excluded because it is an 
English-speaking country. Although smaller than Germany in terms of population, France is 
useful for comparative purposes. Much is known about the development of online services 
in France, through the prevalence of Minitel. The French Minitel experience has already 
been referred to several times in this study. As a counterpart to Sweden, Holland was 
selected, although slightly larger in terms of population (see Table 2).
Special emphasis in this survey is placed on the period from 1996 to 1998. These years 
were a crucial time for internet entrepreneurship because, during this time span, the "first 
generation" of US ventures were beginning their vigorous expansion. For Europe, it was 
also an important time period. During these three years, domestic conditions in the Nordic 
countries including Sweden enabled a lead in internet uptake and the first Swedish internet 
companies such as Icon Medialab began their European expansion.4 Most start-ups in 
continental European countries, however, in this period focused on their home market and 
only begun internationalising in 1999. But the temporary success stories of 1999 and 
beyond only emphasised how troubled the previous years were.5 And several promising 
ventures, such as the German firms Lava, InnoMate, ABC Bucherdienst "Telebuch,” 
Alando.de and Ricardo were acquired by the U.S. players iXL, USWeb, Amazon.com, eBay 
and the British start-up QXL. The fact that the years from 1996 to 1998 represented a
3 In 1997, the largest proportion o f all websites (42%) in the EU were in the native tongue only and originated 
in non English speaking countries (European Commission, 1997, 28, 29).
4 Icon Medialab was founded in March 1996 and opened its first international office in Madrid in August the 
same year, as well as in San Francisco in December. In 1997, Icon Medialab opened offices in London, Kuala 
Lumpur, Copenhagen and Tampere (Finland). In May 1997, Icon Medialab hired its 100th employee. From: 
"Four friends founded Icon Medialab in March 1996," on the website o f Icon Medialab, 
http://www.iconmedialab.se/default/about us/historv/1997.html. accessed on 27.11.99.
5 ConSors was extremely successful among German internet brokerage companies, in a market space hotly 
contested by spin-offs from established players such as Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank and Hypo Vereinsbank 
(Direkt Anlage Bank). ConSors embarked on an aggressive internationalising strategy. It is important to point 
out, that ConSors was not a new venture; it was a spin-off from a smaller German private banking house.
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unique window of opportunity for internet entrepreneurs world-wide is a key assumption of 
this research.
The first section of this chapter will discuss the general institutional environment in the four 
countries analysed here. The key observation is that all systems began to change 
significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. In Germany and Sweden, changes were more recent 
and thus had a stronger effect on current entrepreneurship. In the second part of the 
Chapter, internet access will be examined in all four countries in the relevant period. 
Sweden had the most advanced demand structures. The regulatory environment in 
telecommunications will be studied in the next section; here, explanations are provided for 
differences in internet access conditions. Then, venture capital development in the late 
1990s is described; the growth of venture capital funding was strongest in Germany. In the 
fifth section, further relevant policy areas are briefly compared. The next part, which 
focuses on the actual development of internet start-ups in the four countries. This section 
concentrates on web development firms, because most know-how about firms and 
internationalisation is available in this business area. The final section concludes the 
Chapter with a review of Swedish development; it represented in several ways the strongest 
contrast to Germany and showed an early lead in internet start-up internationalisation under 
optimal home demand conditions.
Europe in trouble
The 1990s were a difficult decade for Europe, economically as well as socially. Of course, 
this was, to a degree, a perception caused by the success of the United States economy, 
especially in the second half of the 1990s, when low unemployment was combined in 
America with low consumer price inflation and high growth rates. The troubles in Europe 
were nevertheless real, and included high unemployment rates, government deficits in some 
countries as well as an overburdened health and social security system. Add to these 
difficulties those factors which "Eurosceptics" have grouped together under the term 
"Eurosclerosis," manifested in inflexible labour regulations and outdated tax laws.
Although all the European countries examined in this paper shared these problems to a
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certain extent, they encountered the full weight of these burdens at different times, and the 
timing difference is crucial for this discussion.
Table 1. Macroeconomic indicators, End 1997.6
GDP 
(US$ Bn)
Inflation
(1998)
Populati 
on (M)
Average
annual
growth
in real
GDP
1990-97
Unempi
oyment
rate
USA 7,783 1.6% 272 3.0% 5%
Germany 2,321 1.0% 82 1.4% 10%
France 1,542 0.7% 59 1.3% 12%
Nether­
lands
403 2.0% 16 2.4% 6%
Sweden 232 -0.1% 9 0.9% 8%
All four European countries discussed here did very well in the 1950s and 1960s. In each 
case, credit was given to a country-specific social and economic "model." Whether these 
"models" were indeed the reason for each country's growth is subject to intense debate; for a 
complete analysis, one would have to also examine external factors such as world trade. In 
addition, some scholars argue that growth was caused by domestic factors very different to 
or even contradicting the supposed "model" of the country in question. This point was made 
for Germany (see Giersch, 1992).
And these "models" were quite different from one another, the closest two being the 
corporatist approaches of Germany and the Netherlands. Sweden also shares some 
corporatist traits (see Katzenstein, 1985, 31, 34). Under the corporatist model, three so- 
called "stakeholders" (government, employers and the unions) together negotiate a partial 
redistribution of wealth in combination with private ownership of capital. This approach 
was complemented by a "diffusion oriented" stance in technology policy, which emphasised 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and the spread of information and new 
technologies to these companies (Ergas, 1987). Public resources were thus made available 
in smaller amounts and were tied to co-operation among firms and research organisations
6 Source: The Economist, Pocket World in Figures 2000, London, 1999 (in Association with Profile Books).
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(Ziegler, 1997, 198). This approach complemented the "skill-conscious" nature of the SME 
"Mittelstand" (see Wengenroth, 1999, 131).
Like Germany and the Netherlands, France also had to rebuild its economy after the Second 
World War, but, unlike those two countries, France was immediately re-immersed in further 
wars of independence in the colonies and a political crisis (see Wright, 1989, 6, 7). When 
the Fourth Republic was toppled and the Fifth was declared in 1958, French policy-makers 
believed they had to catch up. This process of catching up was carried out with high degree 
of state intervention and public ownership. This state-led, dirigiste approach was coupled 
with a "mission oriented" (Ergas, 1987) technology policy which oversaw the concentrated 
investment of significant sums in large-scale defence, aeronautics and electrotechnical 
projects. Government interacted with "national champions," while SME relations were 
underemphasised (Sally, 1995, 77). Government also dominated the financial system in 
what John Zysman has labelled a "credit-based system with administered prices" (1983,
104, 168, 169, 285). Despite the appearance of a "strong state," however, the system was 
not resilient and policy-making was splintered among several institutions, which one 
scholar has compared to a "Byzantine court" (Wright, 1989, 348, 349; see also Sally, 1995, 
75).
Finally, Sweden shares some traits of the corporatist countries, but also has characteristics 
in common with France. Government acted in a strongly redistributive manner by directly 
providing certain services such as health and social security. Swedish authorities sought, 
even more than the other countries described here, to reduce economic risk carried by the 
individual. Corporatist agreements existed between economic stakeholders. Its technology 
policy was ‘diffusion oriented’ (Ergas, 1987). Yet, like France, Sweden's technology policy 
was also marked by high defence expenditures. In addition, economic activity was 
concentrated among large firms, which Hans Sjorgen calls a "Schnapps Glass" structure. 
Sjorgen's glass has a wide top, thin neck and small base (Sjorgen, 1998, 159; see also 
Kurzer, 1993, 32). This was related to the fact that privately held wealth by the richest 
industrial families was relatively untouched in World War Two due to the Nordic country's 
neutrality. This was reinforced by weak anti-trust legislation, specific aspects of shareholder
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laws as well as tax policy (Andersson et al., 1996, 32, 33; Sjdrgen, 1998, 167). In the early 
1960s, for example, the Wallenberg family holdings employed around 13% of all workers 
in the private sector.7
In all four countries, the effectiveness of the respective "models" deteriorated gradually 
from the late 1960s, leading to a crisis of the "models" from the 1980s. The French 
"model," although instituted the latest, was challenged the earliest- together with that of the 
Netherlands. French governments under Fran?ois Mitterrand in 1981 and 1982 embarked 
upon a further dirigiste initiative, taking control of companies, infusing public capital and 
restructuring industries such as chemicals and electronics.8 From 1983 onwards, however, a 
significant shift occurred towards what Peter Hall has called "politics of austerity" while 
France was still under Socialist leadership, marked by the arrival of a new Minister of 
Industry. The additional weight of subsidies of loss-making operations could not be 
supported. But the Mitterrand government also had to wrestle with inherited structural 
problems and a delayed recovery of the international economy (see Hall, 1986, 195-202). In 
1986, a conservative coalition under Jacques Chirac was elected which continued these 
policies and strove to privatise nationalised industries; these initiatives had to be 
temporarily halted by the stock exchange crash of October 1987 (Hall, 1994, 177, 178; see 
also Wright, 1989, 344). In contrast to the tumultuous 1980s, France in the 1990s was 
marked by more evolutionary change.
The crisis of the Dutch corporatist "model" also arrived with vigour in the early 1980s. The 
crisis occurred for different reasons than in France, however. Here, the regulation of the 
labour market developed into what was perceived as an unbearable situation. But by the late 
1980s, the Netherlands economy seemed on track again. Unemployment stood at 14% in 
1983. In 1997, it was 6% (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997, 7). The "Dutch Miracle" of the 
1980s, a steady reduction in unemployment and increased growth rates, is credited to a
7 Wealthy families and the institutional investment vehicles controlled by them were closely interwoven into 
the financial and industrial world. These families are the Wallenbergs, Soderbergs, Bonniers and others. 
Petersson calls them "owners" and discusses their "inherited network" (Petersson, 1994, 179, 181,183). The 
Wallenberg figure stems from Kurzer, 1993,128.
8 Vivien A. Schmidt has a particularly positive view of the need for government-mandated industrial 
restructuring during the Mitterrand years (1996, 114-131).
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corporatist pact, the famed "Accord of Wassenaar" of November 1982. Unions "accepted 
without agreeing" to wage moderation in response to a reduction in working hours. Visser 
and Hemerijck have elegantly called this an example of "corporatism without consensus" 
(1997, 96-105). A period ensued marked by slow growth in real wages, growth of the part- 
time temporary worker industry and tax cuts (Solar and de Jong, 1998, 119). The Economist 
put it this way: "The Dutch welfare state has become increasingly unDutch."9 Because of its 
adjustment during the 1980s, like France, the Dutch system could make it through the 
1990s without major further shifts, although some observers are still quick to point out that 
labour markets are still relatively inflexible and unemployment rates higher than they 
should be. For them, recovery merely is "a reversal of past underachievements" (OECD, 
1998c, 4).
In the remaining two countries examined here, however, crisis of the local economic and 
social model and adjustment was delayed until the late 1980s. In Sweden, the delay of crisis 
was aggravated by the late entry of the country into the EU in 1995 and a correspondingly 
late dedication to tight monetary policy. In Germany, policy "re-engineering" was delayed 
due to the unforeseen unification project. During the 1990s, however, it became 
increasingly clear to many Germans that the government health and social security system 
had become dangerously overburdened. The lack of change evident in the Kohl and the 
beginning of the Schroder Eras led to further loss of confidence in the system and unleashed 
a private financial revolution. Large sums were shifted into stocks, a phenomenon 
previously unseen in Germany. This began with the successful public listing of Deutsche 
Telekom in 1996 and continued with a boom of growth stocks on the newly launched Neuer 
Markt from 1997. According to the Financial Times: "The popularity of the Neuer Markt 
among retail investors in Germany, indeed, is similar to the internet fever that has gripped 
the US."10 The success of the Neuer Markt can, therefore, be attributed to great extent to a 
domestic revolution in personal investment behaviour, sparked by economic uncertainty
9 Frits Bolkestein, "The Dutch Model. The High Road that Leads out o f the Low Countries," The Economist,
22.05.99.
10 Vincent Boland, "Survey -  Private Equity Finance, Exchanges Broaden Their Global Appeal, Junior 
Markets," Financial Times, 11.01.99.
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and a perceived crisis of the social and economic system. A boom in online brokerage 
accounts accompanies this development.11
Sweden also moved into crisis during the 1980s, but a particularly severe period began in 
the early 1990s.12 During the previous decades, the Swedish system of direct state provision 
of health and other services had grown disproportionally. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
unemployment was kept low, but government employment rose massively. High inflation 
was coupled with low growth (Petersson, 1994, 7). From 1991 to 1993, this system started 
to crack under its own weight; the government sector could not grow any further and 
unemployment shot up over 9% - a rate that was previously inconceivable under the 
Swedish "model" (Sjogren, 1998, 173). Government severely curtailed its expenditures, 
forcing the economy into a recession. Equity values fell, and the bankruptcy rate increased 
dramatically (Andersson et al., 1996, 28,29). But government "re-engineering" was 
accompanied by private sector changes as well. For example, several top staff of the best- 
known Swedish multinationals had to give up their jobs. Their severance pay, or ‘golden 
parachutes,’ were invested in start-up companies. In addition and more importantly, the 
managers dedicated part of their time and their network to helping the young firms.
Therefore, in both Sweden and Germany, crisis in the 1990s helped the entrepreneurial 
process along in very different ways. Both the personal stockholding boom which occurred 
in Germany as well as through the re-orientation of top managers towards start-up 
companies in Sweden can be linked to economic and social crisis in these two countries.
Domestic internet demand structures in Europe
In Chapter Two, following Porter, it was shown that all types of internet ventures discussed 
here were dependent less on high absolute numbers of users than on the sophistication of 
user demand. It was also argued that demand sophistication was linked to internet 
penetration rates and time spent online. In this section, the high demand sophistication in
11 "Prost, Germany's Online Stockbrokers," The Economist, 31.07.99.
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Sweden in the period under consideration is evident, as well as the fact that other countries 
began to catch up rapidly towards the end of the period.
Table 2. Internet penetration in 1998.13
Est. internet 
users 1998 
(M)
Population
(M)
Penetration
Finland 1.8 5.1 35%
USA 79 271.8 29%
Sweden 2.4 8.9 27%
Netherlands 1.4 15.6 9%
Germany 6.9 82.1 8%
United
Kingdom
4.3 58.5 7%
Italy 2.6 57.4 5%
France 2.5 58.5 4%
France 
(regular 
Minitel users)
15 58.5 26%
The difference between absolute user base and internet penetration is most striking when 
comparing Germany to Sweden. In 1998, Germany's internet user base was less than three 
times as large as that of Sweden while Germany's total population was about ten times as 
large. Sweden's internet market therefore was smaller, but more advanced than Germany's. 
This relationship also showed up in two further relevant statistics. The next table shows the 
number of internet servers prepared for secure electronic commerce transactions (Table 3). 
Again, Sweden had a clear lead. Its needs to be noted, however, that growth in Germany 
and France was just as impressive as Swedish growth.
12 Paulette Kurzer emphasises this delay in her book on political and economic change in Europe (1993, viii).
13 For sources o f internet user estimates please refer to Appendix D. The Finnish figure: Gallup Media (May 
1998); Italy: Osservatorio Internet Italia (May 1998); United Kingdom: NOP Research Group (March 1998), 
all countries courtesy of Nua Internet Surveys (http://www.nua.net/!. Population estimates were obtained from 
The Economist, Pocket World in Figures 2000 Edition, London, 1999 (in Association with Profile Books).
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Table 3. Estimated absolute number o f secure web servers for electronic commerce.14
Sept.
1997
Aug.
1998
Per 
100.000 
Inhabitan 
ts Aug. 
1998
Growth 
rate 1997 
- 1998
Finland 20 81 1.6 305%
France 65 250 0.4 285%
Germany 147 558 0.7 280%
Sweden 53 184 2.1 247%
United Kingdom 353 821 1.4 133%
USA 7,513 16,663 6.1 122%
Italy 88 193 0.3 119%
Netherlands 75 148 1.0 97%
OECD average 2.0 128
%
EU average 0.8 177
%
A further statistic (see Table 4) depicts internet advertising expenditures per internet user. 
In 1998, companies spent EUR 10 on internet advertising per user in Sweden, compared to 
only EUR 4 in Germany. The advertising figure is especially instructive for the purposes of 
this research; it reflects the vibrancy of the consumer internet in the countries under 
examination at the time. The results for all countries with the exception of Sweden were 
disconcerting in the period up to 1999; only in that year were U.S. levels from 1997 
reached.
Table 4. Estimated internet advertising spending per internet user in EUR (calculated from 
figures in Appendix D)15
1996 1997 1998 1999
(Est.)
USA 5 -6 9-13 22 25
Sweden 4 10 15
Germany 1 2 4 8
Netherlands 1 3 6 6
France 3-5 5 -7 4 -6
14 Source: OECD, Communications Outlook 1999, page 90. OECD obtained these figures from Netcraft. 
French Minitel user figure was obtained from OECD DSTI/ICCP/IE(97) 10/FINAL, 1998, page 31.
15 Constant exchange rates were used for all four years: 1 EUR was equal to 1.1 USD, 2.0 DM, 6.6 FF, 2.2 Dfl 
and 8.8 SEK.
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Advanced demand conditions in Sweden did not go unnoticed. Rapid internet uptake was 
especially attractive in combination with mobile phone usage, which was also very 
advanced in the Nordic countries. To exploit these conditions, U.S. internet companies 
moved to Sweden. Among these were research companies, hoping to pick up on emerging 
consumer trends, such as Jupiter Communications (strategic research) and Media Metrix 
(internet user statistics), as well as the advertising network Doubleclick.16
Telecommunications liberalisation across Europe and internet access prices
The laggard development of sophisticated internet demand may come as a surprise when 
one considers that consumers in all European countries discussed here have been long 
exposed to the concept of online services through their national teletex systems. Due to the 
existence of national teletex services, which were generally more successful in Europe than 
in the United States, the history of the consumer online experience and usage of electronic 
commerce dates back into the late 1980s and early 1990s. The online book retail company 
that Amazon.com acquired in Germany was much older than Amazon.com itself. 
Amazon.com was launched in July 1995. The German acquisition object, ABC 
Biicherdienst GmbH ‘Telebuch,’ was founded in 1991. Degriftour, a successful French 
internet travel site, was founded as a Minitel service.17 It was acquired by UK internet start-
16 Jupiter Communications, press release, "Jupiter Communications Acquires Swedish-based Intelligence AB, 
a Leading Scandinavian Research Company," New York, 05.08.99. In 1999, Jupiter's research network 
included offices in London, San Francisco, Stockholm, and Sydney. Media Metrix, press release, "Swedish 
Web User Habits Similar to US Users, Media Metrix Releases The Top 50 Swedish Web Sites at Home and at 
Work, First Available Internet Audience Ratings Outside the U.S. Provided by Media Metrix and its Partner 
SEFO Interactive in Sweden," New York, 01.06.99. Through a partnership, Doubleclick extended its 
advertising network's reach into Sweden before its IPO in February 1998, at that time, it had offices in 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom and partnerships in other countries as well. In Europe, Doubleclick 
was present only in Sweden, the United Kingdom and Spain. After the IPO, the international presence was 
expanded aggressively into many further countries. Filing o f Doubleclick Inc. with US Securities and 
Exchange Commission fhttp://www.sec.govA. S-l, 16.12.97, as well as Doublieclick web site.
17 In 1998, growth o f Degiftour's sales was attributable to the internet and not any more to Minitel. In 
December 1998,400 000 clients visited Degriftour's Minitel site and already 300 000 visited the internet web 
site. English abstract o f French article, "Degriftour's Web Site is Successful, Chez Degriftour, le Web 
Supplante le Minitel," Globalbase, Informatique, 22.01.99.
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August 2000. Online retail banking also had a much longer history in Germany than in the 
USA.
This did not mean, however, that, early electronic commerce demand in Europe was very 
sophisticated. Online banking over the teletex service Btx in Germany basically offered the 
same account management functions for several years; they were not extended into 
brokerage or insurance services, for example. Even the most advanced teletex country in 
Europe, France, did not see its services evolve into more than basic travel, financial, retail 
and sex offerings. The long teletex history in Europe shows that electronic commerce can 
stay on a humble level of sophistication- if depressed through high metered access rates.
Table 5. The most and least expensive countries for consumer internet access. OECD 
Internet access basket 1998, in US$ PPP. Charges for 20 hours internet use per month 
including telecommunications fees at discounted off-peak rate.18
New Zealand 46
United Kingdom 46
Portugal 46
Spain 42
Netherlands 40
United States 40
Turkey 38
Sweden 37
Australia 36
Italy 36
Norway 35
Denmark 32
Iceland 31
Canada 31
Finland 20
Czech Republic 75
Germany 68
Switzerland 67
Austria 64
Hungary 63
Greece 60
Luxembourg 53
Japan 52
Poland 51
Ireland 51
Mexico 50
France 48
Korea 48
OECD 47
Belgium 47
The highest access rates by far in 1998 of the countries examined here could be found in 
Germany and the lowest in Sweden. Yet, before embarking upon a discussion of 
telecommunications policy it is important to note that internet access prices did not explain 
laggard internet uptake in Europe alone; they were merely one significant contributing
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factor. There was not always a correlation between access costs and internet penetration. 
Countries existed where access costs were pricey in an international comparison, yet where 
penetration rates were quite good. This point was emphasised in an early study 
commissioned by the EU (European Commission, 1997, 23). In a recent OECD survey, 
penetration rates and access costs have been mapped (see Chart A. below). Some countries 
fit nicely on a downward sloping line, confirming a relationship between penetration and 
access costs. Other countries diverged strongly from the expected relationship, however. 
One of the best examples of divergence can be drawn from the relative positions of two of 
the countries in our survey, the Netherlands and Sweden. Access costs in those two 
countries were roughly similar. In fact, they were about on the same level as the USA. Yet 
internet penetration in these three countries varied considerably, the two leaders being USA 
and Sweden.
18 Source: OECD, Communications Outlook 1999, page 186. This included discount rates offered by the 
telecommunications operators, in France "Primaliste" and in Germany "City Plus." For calculation details, 
please refer to pages 175 to 186 of the original document.
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Chart A. Internet cost and host density (a measure of internet penetration) in various 
countries, 1998.19
Nt therlands
Germany
France*
Internet access cost (OECD=100%)
One o f the best ways to better understand the relationship between penetration and internet 
access costs may be through the insight that pure price is not the relevant issue. Instead, 
consumer-friendly pricing is crucial. The quoted OECD study noted that while some 
telecommunications operators offered low access rates, they did so in the middle o f the 
night when children or employed people often did not access the internet (OECD 
Communications Outlook, 1999, 183, 184). Pricing innovations and user-friendly pricing
19 Figures for 29 countries obtained from OECD Communications Outlook, 1999, page 86 (Internet hosts in 
OECD countries, including gTLDs by domain registrations per 1.000 inhabitants, July 1998) and page 186 
(Total basket o f  off-peak internet access rates for 20 hours online per month, 1998). A similar chart based on 
similar data sources can be found in OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard, 1999, page 23.
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were crucial for technology uptake. This was demonstrated by the massive boost given to 
mobile telephony services in the late 1990s in the United Kingdom, when pre-paid phone
9 0packages were introduced. The relationship between pricing innovations and internet were 
also confirmed with the introduction of unmetered access in Europe from 2000.
The Minitel experience also is instructive here. In the mid-1990s, Minitel reached an 
astounding penetration of about 26%, which made the Minitel the most successful Teletex 
service, with numbers able to match those of internet penetration in the most advanced 
countries (see Table 2). But Minitel reached a peak in 1994 and subsequently usage call 
volume started to decline. The main reason cited was high costs- especially the fact that 
usage of services was charged by the time spent online. According to OECD, this metered 
charging system discouraged use and proved to be a disincentive stunting further 
development (OECD, 1998a, 19-23).
The most consumer-friendly internet pricing innovation beyond doubt was unmetered
access - as offered in most of the United States and only from 2000 onwards introduced
broadly to consumers in Europe. The OECD-Table above (Table 5), which compares costs
for 20 hours of internet access, provides an abstract measurement which did not reflect the
discouraging effect of metered pricing. In fact, due to the artificial yardstick of 20 hours of
internet use, the United States did not even appear as the cheapest country in the OECD list.
Yet, the more the internet is used in the United States, the cheaper it became relative to
European countries. While an average user perhaps did not use the internet for more than 20
hours, the psychological impact of the "ticking clock" was discouraging. Metered access
9 1pricing, practised in almost all European countries, penalised internet use. As a result, 
time spent on the internet remained low (see Table 5.).
20 "Im britischen Mobilfunk sind Vorauszahler der Wachstumsmotor," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
03.11.99, page 28.
21 Several newspaper articles pointed to the adverse effects of metered pricing. For example: Paul Taylor, 
"Telephone tariffs put net take-off on hold," Financial Times, 27.10.99, page 16; "Schlagaustausch online," 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27.08.99, page 22.
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Table 6. Hours spent online per month in 1999 (according to Jupiter Communications).22
USA (AOL) 30
France
(Wanadoo)
10
Spain
(Telefonica)
10
UK (AOL) 8
Finland 8
Germany
(AOL)
7
There was a certain irony here. On the one hand, in the United States, unmetered access was 
established as the primary mode to charge for local calls when AT&T was split up into 
regional companies and a long-distance carrier. On the other hand, the price for a local 
metered phone call went up significantly in Europe in the 1990s due to telecommunications 
liberalisation. On the two sides of the Atlantic, therefore, telecommunications liberalisation 
had divergent effects: In the USA, an unmetered internet access model was established 
while in Europe a pricey, high-cost access structure appeared. Previous to liberalisation, 
governments on both sides of the Atlantic insured that call prices, especially local calls, 
were kept at "acceptable levels," in the USA by capping AT&T's prices, in Europe, by 
government ownership of the telecommunications operator. The overarching policy 
objectives were different, however. In the United States, policy addressed monopoly profits, 
in Europe the social concept of telephony as a universal communications device was 
appealed to. In hindsight, US policy objectives proved to be more robust while policy goals 
were easily re-interpreted in Europe.23
22 Numbers from Noah Yasskin, Phil Dwyer, "Free-to-Air Internet: Creating a Consumer Medium Out o f a 
Metered Network," Jupiter Communications, March 1999, page 5. Another instructive figure available stated 
that Americans spent 55 minutes per day online compared to 17 minutes online per day in Europe. This figure 
came from AOL. AOL, a popular internet and online service, was present in the US and several European 
markets and could therefore directly compare the effect o f metered pricing on time spent online. Ralph Atkins, 
"Interview, Andreas Schmidt, Preaching the Internet Gospel Across Europe," Financial Times, 27.05.99, page 
13.
23 Although competition was introduced to US long-distance telephony, local calls were still constrained in a 
tightly monitored monopoly structure, with regional "Baby Bells" having to offer affordable local call pricing 
packages. Even after 1996, with the passing o f a new Telecommunications Act, local carriers needed to 
demonstrate the existence of local competition before they can begin to act as fully independent companies. In 
essence, US policy did not budge, even when the local carriers applied significant pressure on the federal 
telecommunications authority, loudly objecting to the fact that that they were "subsidising" the growth o f  the 
internet.
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European policy makers allowed local call rates to rise, pointing to falling long-distance 
rates. National telecommunications operators argued that they had offered local calls below 
cost in the past. The term used was "rate rebalancing" and it was, in effect, a cosmetic 
measure meant to mimic competitive tariffs based on supposed cost structures. Yet, there 
was no competition in the local loop, which could have generated real competitive rates. In 
fact, "rate rebalancing" was a highly profitable exercise for the incumbent operators. The 
telecommunications operators were split off from the postal service. Then, the operators 
were partially privatised and publicly listed. All this occurred before fixed-line competition 
was introduced. In France, for example, the incumbent operator was privatised in 1997 and 
was exposed to fixed-line competition only in 1998. This allowed for an attractive 
"window" in which the returns on monopoly could be maximised without the responsibility 
previously linked to government ownership. This process was especially severe in 
Germany, where the incumbent telecommunications operator was burdened with debt 
incurred during and before the unification.
Several European countries diverged from this pattern, however. The country which 
diverged most strongly was Finland, which never had a telecommunications monopoly and 
featured one of the lowest metered internet access rates in the world. Although Sweden 
never had a real monopoly, its telecommunications environment was “monopoly-like.” In 
fact, Noam classified it as a “de facto” monopoly. Different government institutions could 
run their own telecommunication services internally, but there was no market competition. 
One competitor was allowed to launch its services in 1991; a formal law allowed further 
competition in 1993. In contrast to other countries, however, partial privatisation was 
carried out late in Sweden; Telia was only publicly listed in June 2000.
Therefore, the Swedish pattern of liberalisation was the mirror opposite of that in France, 
Germany and the Netherlands; in the Nordic country, competition was introduced first, then 
privatisation was contemplated (please refer to Table 7). "Rate balancing" occurred in 
Sweden as well, and local call prices were certainly raised; here also, the national operator 
Telia was using its local call advantage to counter long-distance competition. But, because
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Telia was exposed to fixed-line competition early, local call prices could not be raised quite 
as much as the incumbent might have wanted.24 Here, the Swedish "social democratic" 
inclination to allow competition between government-owned and private enterprises seems 
to have shown positive results. This interesting case, however, cannot be examined further 
here.
Table 7. Key dates of telecommunications privatisation and fixed-line competition.25
Privatisatio 
n / public 
listing
Government 
share after 
privatisation
Fixed line
competition
start
Germany 1996 61% 1998
France 1997 62% 1998
Netherlands 1994§ 44% 1997+
Sweden 2000 71% 1991/1993*
* In 1991, the first competing fixed-line network was launched in Sweden, Tele2 AB, owned by 
Cable & Wireless and Kinnevik. This broke the "de-facto" monopoly of Televerket (today's Telia) 
in fixed-line telephony (Noam, 1992, 211). In 1993, the Swedish telecom act was passed, enabling 
further fixed-line competition.
+ Local telephony was liberalised on 01.07.97 in the Netherlands. Royal KPN (then Royal PTT 
Nederland) faces competition in fixed-line services by Telfort (joint venture between British 
Telecom and Dutch railways) as well as Enertel (Dutch power companies and cable network 
operators consortium). Royal PTT Nederland demerged its mail, express and logistics activities in 
1998, becoming a pure telecom player, Royal KPN. The "new" KPN share was traded for the first 
time on 29.06.99.
§ Royal KPN was listed in Amsterdam in June, 1994. New York (October 1995), London (June 
1996) and Frankfurt (July 1996) followed.
In this section, the diverse experiences of Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden 
have been described. Yet, despite the complexity, lessons can be drawn from this material. 
Pricing and, especially, user-friendly pricing mattered and there were clear reasons why the 
pricing structure was prohibitive in some countries and not in others. In all countries, 
however, pricing was influenced by telecommunications policy inadvertently, i.e. policies
24 Telia owns over 90% o f  the local loop in Sweden. To compensate, the telecommunications regulator 
mandated an interconnection fee transfer when access calls were placed from local lines owned by the 
incumbent operator to the dial-in nodes o f competitors. The success o f competitive internet access offerings, 
especially that o f Tele2, created a situation in the years 1997 and 1998 in which Telia was a net payer for 
internet access calls. As a result, Telia was forced to lower its local call rates (Interview, Billinger, 21.12.99).
25 OECD Communications Outlook, 1999, For government shares, pages 32-33.
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were originally devised for completely different reasons completely unrelated to internet 
uptake.26 Policy makers were not aware of the importance of local call rates for internet 
uptake in the mid-1990s; in fact, many were not aware of the importance of the internet at 
all. They had underestimated the effect of the internet as a “disruptive technology” 
(Christensen, 1997). However, low local call rates were a top policy priority in most 
countries historically in Europe, because of social objectives. After privatisation of the 
telcos, the social objectives were to be met by market mechanisms. In Sweden, competition 
arrived early and the incumbent could not raise local call rates as much as it would have 
liked. In other countries, and here Germany is an extreme example, the window to 
competition was an opportunity and low local call rates were abandoned to maximise 
profits for the incumbent operator.
The European venture capital bottleneck
Historically in Europe, start-ups in knowledge-intensive service industries such as the types 
of internet ventures described here have had severe problems in securing adequate growth 
financing. In contrast to the United States, so-called "true" venture capital focused on early- 
stage technology start-ups was underdeveloped in all European countries - including the 
United Kingdom, which boasted a sizeable venture capital industry but which emphasised 
later-stage, less risky investments. Europe financed its growth mostly through bank loans, 
an instrument suitable only for "old" industries with significant capital stock and slow 
depreciation. The venture capital bottleneck influenced the entrepreneur's ability to succeed 
at home and abroad.
Due to the lack of venture capital, internet start-up models were favoured which did not 
require extensive up-front investment and could generate an early positive cash flow from 
which further growth could be financed. Europe, therefore, was home to the "bootstrapped" 
internet start-up. Web development companies were easier to finance out of earnings than 
portal sites. Start-ups operating portal sites often cross-subsidised their activities through
26 Thanks to Sam Paltridge, OECD Secretariat, for clearly making this point to me in a thought-provoking
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income from other areas. Prominent examples were the origins of Spray's portal and content 
services in the Swedish web development company of the same name, and the well-known 
German portal Web.de which was launched and for a long time run by Cinetic 
Medientechnik GmbH, a German systems integrator. The portals Spray and Web.de were 
spun off and are respectively financed by an industrial group and public capital markets, but 
throngs of smaller portals were in the 1990s still run "on the side."27 Still others, such as 
another popular German portal, DINO-Online, were run on an extremely tight budget and 
were later acquired. Instead of developing internet services, some players remained 
software companies concentrating on developing back-end solutions for electronic 
commerce clients and portal sites run by established media players and telcos.28
The venture capital bottleneck was the main reason why established telecommunications, 
media and retail companies were able to secure top positions among the most frequented 
sites in Europe (see Table 14.). If their competition from the ranks of start-up companies 
would have been more aggressively financed, the established firms would have encountered 
far more resistance in getting to the top.
Europe tried hard to establish a ‘true’ venture capital industry. In the 1970s and 1980s, an 
indigenous venture capital industry appeared in Europe but disappeared again at the end of 
the decade. An early ill portent was the problems encountered by the most innovative VC 
firm pioneering pan-European investments in the late 1970s, European Enterprises 
Development S.A. (EED) (Coutarelli, 1977, vi). EED was founded in France as early as 
1964 (Lorenz, 1985, 156). The main reason for the decline of the industry was the lack of 
what venture capitalists call an attractive ‘exit option,’ a strong, growth-oriented alternative 
stock market. A risk-embracing venture capital industry can only be sustained with such a 
public capital market- this exit opportunity allows high returns to offset losses in a VC's 
portfolio.
email exchange.
27 For more examples o f German companies which financed their internet start-up businesses through other
cash-flow generating activities on the side, see: Niko Waesche, "Tough Balancing Act for German Internet 
Start-ups," Tomado-Insider.com Magazine, No. 2, May 1999, pages 24, 25.
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Witnessing the decline of the industry, private as well as public initiatives attempted to 
break up the venture capital bottleneck in Europe. A private initiative was launched by the 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), which was founded with the objective of 
promoting venture capital in Europe. EVCA sought to tackle the problem head-on, in 
conjunction with venture capital groups Capricorn Venture Partners and Apax, and started 
an alternative, growth-oriented stock market modelled on NASDAQ in the USA. EASDAQ 
was opened in Brussels in 1996. EASDAQ has had some success and has provided venture 
capitalists with a new exit opportunity. Yet its progress as a pan-European growth exchange 
is hampered by the lack of an EU-wide regulatory framework for securities.29
Since 1997, EASDAQ has been overshadowed by a newcomer, the Neuer Markt, based in 
Frankfurt. Whereas Brussels had a small impact, the Neuer Markt considerably improved 
the situation for venture capitalists, mostly in Germany but also in other European 
countries. The liquidity of the Neuer Markt was much higher than that of EASDAQ or any 
other growth exchange in Europe, such as Nouveau Marche, and the valuations companies 
listed there achieved, were significant and comparable to those at NASDAQ. In fact, Neuer 
Markt had the largest market capitalisation of all the exchanges in the confederation of 
European growth markets, Euro.NM. Before the peak, in 1999, the Frankfurt-based 
exchange made up 81% of Euro.NM, while Nouveau Marche only contributed 13% and 
Amsterdam's Nieuwe Markt NMAX only 5%.30
28 Such as messaging software by the Media Service Group Aktiengesellschaft (Oldenburg, Germany), the 
business-to-business extranet catalogue software developed by BPS Online Bestellsysteme GmbH (Karlsruhe, 
Germany) and the internet casino software by Boss Media AB (VaxjQ, Sweden).
29 See an excellent article about the advantages o f an EU-wide framework, which, however, could benefit 
EASDAQ as much as it could boost the cross-border activities of Frankfurt's booming Neuer Markt. "No 
SECs Please, we're European, European Financial Regulation, Regulatory Muddle is Impeding Europe's 
Progress Towards its Goal o f a Single Market in Financial Services," The Economist, 21.08.99.
30 One French VC exclaimed: "The Nouveau Marche is terrible. There is no liquidity, only a few really good 
companies are listed there. EASDAQ also is in bad shape. Top French companies go for NASDAQ." The 
Euro.NM market capitalisation percentages from: "Europe's New Markets Flourish Despite Turbulence and 
Euro," European Venture Capital Journal, Source Express, 01.01.99.
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Table 8. Number o f new listings on Europe's growth exchanges, January to October 1999.31
Neuer Markt, 
Frankfurt
86
AIM, London 35
Nouveau Marche, 
Paris
20
EASDAQ 10
Nieuwe Markt, 
Amsterdam
1
Salvation came late, however. The impact of the Neuer Markt on the investment behaviour 
of venture capitalists in Germany was only felt from 1998 onwards, because it took time 
before the Frankfurt-based exchange could prove its robustness and build liquidity. The 
impact of the market beyond Germany was delayed even further as European VCs not based 
in Germany learned how they could approach a placement there. Because of the delayed 
effect of the Neuer Markt on venture capital investments, the first generation of internet 
start-ups in Germany have generally not profited from the new inflow of venture capital.
The second generation, launched in late 1998 and throughout 1999, initially did, but 
experienced the effects of the subsequent downturn very soon afterwards. In effect, private 
funding for internet ventures dried up before most of these companies could list on public 
markets. German venture capitalists had a dangerous proportion of their funds tied up in 
internet ventures when the downturn came.32
The success of the Neuer Markt and the struggle of EASDAQ demonstrated the crucial role 
of a tightly integrated, domestic capital market. To some, EASDAQ represented an 
idealistic European dream whose time had not yet come. The story of the two markets also 
represents a problem to those who expound the rise of global "unfettered," "casino" 
capitalism. While top US investment banks backed EASDAQ and channelled funds into it, 
companies listed there were arguably regarded as "orphan stocks" because they were not
31 "Flaute an den Wachstumsmarkten, Seit Juli kein Borsengang bei Euro.NM-Partnem des Neuen Marktes," 
iSuddeutsche Zeitung, 07.10.99.
32 “Teueres Abenteuer. Wagniskapital: Der Absturz vieler Intemet-Untemehmen verdirbt den Fonds die 
Renditen,“ Manager Magazin, May 2001, pages 27, 30.
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backed by any domestic financial community.33 Instead, local funds were poured into the 
Neuer Markt, coming in large part from the domestic retail sector- composed of private 
shareholders. The rise of the Neuer Markt has actually been accompanied by a powerful, 
new, popular movement embracing private shareholding in Germany.34 From 1997 to 2000, 
the number of Germans who invested in stocks directly or through funds had almost 
doubled to more than eleven Million.35 One of the executives at the German exchange 
joked: "Entire families that used to watch the soaps on TV in the evening are tuning to 
Bloomberg TV or the German equivalent."36 The next section will discuss this important 
shift in investment behaviour, which occurred in Germany in the second half of the 1990s. 
To relate this back to the large country/ small economy discussion it is, of course, important 
in this instance that the German economy is large and could also for this reason generate a 
high level of market activity domestically.
Other reasons frequently mentioned for the initial success of the Neuer Markt seem less 
crucial than the shift in investment behaviour, yet were significant as well: A strict focus on 
technology and media companies, a high degree of transparency including tight company 
disclosure rules, an advanced computer-based trading platform available in several 
countries as well as an innovative "adoption" policy specifying that at least two investment 
banks need to pledge market-making responsibility to each listed company.37 According to 
Institutional Investor. "The Neuer Markt... was part of a single-minded and highly 
organised initiative aimed at building up the German financial services industry, which
33 Paul Lerbinger, Managing Director of Investment Banking Division, Deutsche Bank, stated in a roundtable 
discussion: "EASDAQ will find it very hard to expand to become the hi-tech stock exchange o f Europe. Most 
o f the stocks listed there are in danger of becoming orphan stocks because they do not have a natural home 
market." From: "The New World o f German Equity," ABI-Inform, Euroweek International Equity Review 
Supplement, May 1999.
34 Hans Peter Roemer, Managing Director at Dekia Kapitalanlage, one o f the largest German mutual fund 
companies stated in Early 1999: "At the end o f last year we had 1.7 Million accounts held by private investors. 
In the first four months o f this year that figure rose by half a million, or by almost 30%. This is not just 
happening at Dekia. You see the same trend in every large German mutual fund company." He also declared: 
"Since the Deutsche Telekom flotation, German investors have become more aware o f the need to save for 
their retirement through equities." From: "The New World of German Equity," ABI-Inform, Euroweek 
International Equity Review Supplement, May 1999.
35 “Aktienfonds ziehen Millionen neuer Anleger an,” Handelsblatt, 02.08.00, page 1.
36 "The Neuer Markt's Wild Ride," Predicasts PROMT, Institutional Investor International Edition, 01.04.99.
37 "A German Coup: European Stockmarkets," The Economist, 09.01.99.
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included far-reaching changes in security and bankruptcy laws."38 Surely, the Neuer Markt 
would not have had such a convincing start without strictly implemented rules and an 
overarching strategy, yet, to a certain extent, similar rules and changes were instituted in 
conjunction with other European growth exchanges as well. One exception seemed to be 
the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, NMAX, which was less transparent and rigorous than the 
German, French and Swedish alternative stock exchanges. It was also less focused. "Our 
top company is a manufacturer of milking robots," remarked a Dutch venture capitalist 
dryly.39
Table 9. Early stage venture capital investments by amount of investment compared to total
« • 40venture capital investments.
1996 1997 1998 1999
USA N/A 32% 36% 42%
Germany 13% 15% 24% 32%
Netherlands 16% 20% 16% 20%
France 11% 7% 15% 19%
Sweden 1% 1% 12% 19%
United Kingdom 2% 3% 2% 2%
Venture capitalists in Germany and other European countries operating before 1998 had no 
way of knowing that new exchanges, led by the Neuer Markt, would soon enter a boom 
period. As a result, European venture capitalists made investment decisions that were far 
more risk-adverse than their colleagues in the USA. The best indication of this is the 
proportion of early-stage investments (Table 9). The only country with consistently 
significant early-stage investments was the Netherlands. Also, the absolute amounts 
invested in technology-oriented companies were much lower in European countries 
compared to the United States (Table 10). Only a few investments in internet start-ups were 
made, mostly in the software segment, which was considered "safer." And even the limited 
amount of investment that was made would not have existed without government programs 
specifically designed to promote venture capital and technology investments.
38 "The Neuer Markt's Wild Ride," Predicasts PROMT, Institutional Investor International Edition, 01.04.99.
39 See also: Jeremy Gray, "Survey -  Financial Times Guide to Investing in Europe, Take Dutch Courage, 
Investing in the Netherlands," Financial Times, 20.03.99.
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Table 10. Venture capital investments in technology. EUR Million.41
1996 1997 1998 1999 Growth
1996-99
Sweden 22 69 110 320 1,355%
Germany 182 331 664 1,317 624%
USA 5,000 7,545 9,818 29,454 489%
France 232 242 485 804 247%
United
Kingdom
636 1,165 1,820 2,128 235%
Netherlands 147 172 243 394 168%
In all countries where government venture capital promotion schemes existed for several 
years, the quality of the programs improved over time. The main innovation by government 
authorities consisted of integrating the know-how of the private venture capital industry 
into the funding process. All three countries with a history of venture capital promotion 
linked public support to private investment decisions in so-called ‘co-venturing’ schemes. 
Thus, government invested side-by-side with a venture capitalist (VC). In many countries, 
refinancing programs also existed. Here, VCs were provided with unsecured loans or 
guarantees.
In France, the existing research and development support body, ANVAR (National 
Research Agency), invested side-by-side with a venture capitalist.42 There also existed a 
refinancing scheme, SOFARIS (subsidiary of BDPME, Development Bank for Small- and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises), which guaranteed a percentage of the venture capitalist's
40 Source for the US figures: PricewaterhouseCoopers, "MoneyTree Current Quarter Highlights / Q4 *98" and 
“MoneyTree US Report Full Year & Q4 1999 Results” as well as "National Venture Capital Survey, Results 
for Fourth Quarter 1997." European data from: EVCA, Yearbook 1998, Yearbook 1999 and Yearbook 2000.
41 Source for the US figures: PricewaterhouseCoopers, "MoneyTree Current Quarter Highlights / Q4 '98" and 
“MoneyTree US Report Full Year & Q4 1999 Results.” In USD: 1996, 5.5 Billion; 1997, 8.3 Billion; 1998, 
10.8 Billion; 1999, 32.4 Billion. These figures are slightly, but not substantially, different from the U.S. 
figures listed in the PricewaterhouseCoopers, "Money for Growth, The European Technology Investment 
Report 1998," 1999, as well as other, earlier PricewaterhouseCoopers sources. Please refer to the internet site 
http://www.pwcmoneytree.com/. European data from: EVCA, Yearbook 1998, Yearbook 1999 and Yearbook 
2000. Technology investments in Europe were defined as the sum o f investments in the following sectors: 
"Communications," "Computer related," "Other electronics related," "Biotechnology" and "Medical/ health 
related." Constant exchange rates were used for all three years: 1 EUR equals 1.1 USD, 2.0 DM, 6.6 FF, 2.2 
Dfl, 0.7 UK Pounds and 8.8 SEK.
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investment, allowing him lower his risk. SOFARIS was launched in 1982.43 In France, 
these two programs could be combined, allowing a considerable degree of public leverage 
(Interview, Grossmann, 08.10.99). By the late 1990s, however, these were old programs. 
They targeted ‘technology’ investments in a narrow way; early innovations associated with 
the internet such as direct consumer-to-consumer trading (eBay) would not have been 
eligible for public support in France (Interview, Simoncini, 06.11.99).
In Germany, existing support schemes were upgraded considerably at the beginning of the 
1990s, and began to incorporate a public/ private approach. Older programs, in which the 
government funded start-ups directly without an accompanying private investment, were 
abandoned. Although the Ministry responsible for Research and Development initiated the 
re-orientation, two public/ private institutions that were originally founded to finance the 
reconstruction of Germany after the Second World War were charged with carrying out the 
schemes. Both institutions were close to the "Mittelstand" SME sector in Germany. The tbg 
Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesellschaft, a subsidiary of the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA) 
implemented the ‘co-venturing’ program, while the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) 
was responsible for the refinancing scheme. Both focused on ‘technology’ investments and 
traditionally supported start-ups in fields such as biotechnology, software and advanced 
materials.44 The definition of ‘technology’ was fairly open, however, and internet start-ups 
of the types discussed here have also been financed.
The most recent innovation in government support programs was carried out in the 
Netherlands, which also had a long tradition of public support for venture capital, dating
42 ANVAR has a particularly rocky history; it was launched in the late 1960s and abolished temporarily in the 
late 1980s by the conservative government coalition, only to be resuscitated again. Venture capital was 
supported by ANVAR from 1979 onwards (Lorenz, 1985,157).
43 In 1998, BDPME, together with the venture capital industry, raised FF 47 Billion (EUR 7.2 Billion) for
40.000 companies. English abstract o f French article, "40 000 Companies Benefited From the Support o f  
BDPME in 1998, 40 000 Entreprises Ont Beneficie du Soutien de la BDPME en 1998," World Reporter, La 
Tribune, 03.02.99. See also mention in Adam and Farber (1994,131). ANVAR invested FF 1.38 Billion 
(EUR 209 M) in 1,300 projects in 1998. English abstract o f French article, "ANVAR Invested FF 1.4 Bn in 
1998, L'Anvar a injecte 1'an passe 1,4 milliard de francs," Globalbase, Les Echos, 12.03.99. See also OECD 
(1999b, 19,20).
44 In contrast to France, the programs cannot be combined and the guarantees are a little lower- this makes the 
German schemes more compatible with EU regulations. French officials are now evaluating in what ways the 
SOFARIS fund can be adapted to regulations (OECD, 1999b, 124).
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back to April 1981.45 In October 1998, under the names Twinning Seed Fund and Twinning 
Growth Fund, a new pair of start-up funds which combined government with private capital 
were launched. Prominent entrepreneurs and venture capitalists ran the program, which was 
advised by US internet celebrities Esther Dyson and Vint Cerf.
Government programs in Germany, France and the Netherlands made an important 
contribution to the venture capital industry in each country. The programs saved the venture 
capital industry from extinction in the 1990s, until the effect of the alternative stock 
exchanges kicked in, which occurred in parallel to an increasing public market appetite for 
internet stocks. This is apparent when examining German data. While both the proportion 
of early stage investments (Table 9) and amounts invested (Table 10) improved somewhat 
between 1996 and 1997, the real boom came only with the impact of the Neuer Markt from 
1998. But the boom would have been impossible if a base of a precious few VCs would not 
have been present in Germany to react to the new opportunity 46
In Sweden, similar government support programs oriented towards high-growth companies 
were only recently initiated; older government programs were too slow and unfocused in 
their execution and high potential internet entrepreneurs did not take advantage of them.47 
As a consequence, the technology-focused and early-stage venture capital industry had a 
much harder time surviving. This occurred despite the fact that Sweden was one of the 
earliest adopters of the venture capital concept in Europe in the 1970s. Yet, the venture 
capital industry did not really disappear; it moved abroad and changed its approach. Funds 
were invested privately instead of in venture capital funds. We will delve into this issue 
later. It suffices at this moment to point out that fund investments by the Swedish venture 
capital industry were considerably lower than in the rest of Europe- although subject to 
impressive growth from a very low starting point in 1997 and 1998. The situation in
45 Particuliere Participatie Maatschappijen (PPM) was a guarantee scheme compensating venture capital 
companies for 50% o f loss on investments. It ran from 1981 to 1995 and was responsible for a massive rise in 
the supply o f venture capital (mentioned in Cowie, 1999,24; Adam and Farber, 1994, 131).
46 See Professor John Freeman's study o f venture capital in Germany, John Freeman, "Venture Capital and 
Growth Businesses in Germany," 03.11.98, University o f California, Berkeley, Manuscript.
47 Interviews with venture capitalists confirmed this: Parson (02.12.99) and Spangberg (17.11.99). For an 
overview o f Swedish programs see OECD (1998b, 148, 149).
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Sweden will further improve considerably when government initiatives channel pension 
money (API fund) into venture capital investments (Interview, Spangberg, 17.11.99).
Further relevant policy areas
Obviously, there were many other policy areas which were crucial for entrepreneurs in the 
internet field. One such policy area was electronic commerce legislation. Yet, here, even the 
country that by the late 1990s moved ahead the most rapidly in enacting new legislation, 
Germany, only began to provide some very basic pointers. Then, there were creative and 
useful government initiatives, such as Sweden's tax regulation change that allowed 
employers to provide computers for employees at home. Diverse activities such as the 
Swedish one were found in all countries. In 1998, France set aside FF 6 Billion for a broad 
set of measures, from education to "paperless government."48 Yet, these were not part of a 
concerted, aggressive effort focused directly on the needs of internet entrepreneurs 49 A 
crucial policy area, for example, included taxation issues and regulatory measures affecting 
entrepreneurs; they were not typical ‘cyberissues,’ but were more important. Here, however, 
all European countries had their share of problems (see especially Cowie, 1999, 31-38). 
Even the business climate in the Netherlands, a country which prided itself in coming the 
furthest in increasing flexibility and reducing regulatory obstacles, was, according to one 
entrepreneur: "Absolutely start-up unfriendly" (Interview, de Hoop, 26.10.99).
In none of the countries reviewed here, entrepreneurs felt that taxation and labour regulation 
was favourable. Of course, it would be astounding to find any country on earth where 
entrepreneurs are content with taxation and regulation issues. In Europe, however, the 
taxation of options (a crucial issue for internet entrepreneurs) was especially unclear and 
muddled; policy makers did not seem to understand why entrepreneurs grant options to
48 "Address by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin at the 20th Summer Forum on Communication," Service 
d'information du gouvemement (SIG), 26.08.99, Hourtin (can be found on http://vyww.intemet.gouv.fr/. 
accessed on 19.09.99).
49 On Sweden's regulatory initiative, see the mention in: Nicholas George, "Chilly Regions o f North Warm to 
the Net," Financial Times, 13.10.99, page 16.
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their employees. In the Netherlands, for example, options were taxed when they were 
granted, based on an estimate of the future ("phantom") value a company may have. This 
may have been fine for established firms, which could more or less accurately predict future 
earnings, but for start-ups it presented headaches. Some companies had to provide their 
employees with loans to pay the taxes (Interview, de Boer, 14.10.99). In Sweden, 
companies granting options had to move in a legal grey area in order to insure that the 
options were not taxed as income. "In Sweden, we live by the Eleventh Commandment: 
Don't get caught," commented one internet entrepreneur. In fact, many of the Swedish 
electronic commerce start-ups moved their official headquarters out of Sweden or were not 
set up there in the first place- citing the difficulty with taxation rules as applied to share 
options.50 In France and Germany, options taxation seemed to be a little clearer, although 
uncertainty remained in this key area also in these countries. Entrepreneurs in Germany and 
the Netherlands were in the recent past blessed with a removal of capital gains taxation 
(with holdings below 25% in the case of Germany and 5% in the case of the Netherlands), 
yet here also, statements by policy-makers were creating new uncertainty. From an 
entrepreneur's perspective, capital gains tax reduces his power to invest as a private ‘angel’ 
investor in new ventures or to start new businesses. Capital gains tax, therefore, can be 
regarded as a tax on future start-up activity, as United States experience in the 1980s 
shows.51
Labour regulation was the object of severe criticism by entrepreneurs, who were running 
risky start-up businesses and were, therefore, uncertain of their long-term ability to retain 
employees. Yet, all countries made it difficult to lay off employees once fully hired.52
50 English abstract o f Swedish article (World Reporter). "Linne and Spray Remain in Sweden, Linne och 
Spray stannar i Sverige," Dagens Industri, 20.09.99.
51 Cowie describes succinctly the US experience. Capital gains tax was raised in 1969 and lowered again in 
1979. Private equity commitments rose substantially as a result o f the reduction (1999, 32, 33).
52 It is useful to recall that entrepreneur's perception o f policy in these areas was based on the situation in the 
United States. Although US tax policy is much clearer and labour regulation in many aspects more flexible, 
Europe as a whole enjoyed an advantage to the US - which many entrepreneurs pointed out as well. Employee 
loyalty seemed to have been stronger in Europe, this was especially important given the dearth o f ‘knowledge 
workers’ with IT skills. In a way, this compensated for some o f the problems entrepreneurs encountered in 
Europe - one o f the reasons for extensive options programs in the USA was to improve employee loyalty.
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Public statements encouraging entrepreneurship in Europe were common but they were 
generally underscored with policy in those areas where entrepreneurs would feel real 
benefits, such as in options taxation and capital gains taxation. No country examined here 
moved much beyond public statements.53
The internet start-up experience in four European countries
In this project, different types of internet start-ups were classified. Three of these categories 
were examined in detail in the survey of German start-ups: Web developers, internet 
software firms and portal players. The portal category was broadly defined and included 
portal sites, business-to-business exchanges as well as electronic commerce start-ups. Due 
to the lack of data available on a comparative basis in most of these categories, this section 
will focus on web development firms -  which incidentally also have a long history 
throughout Europe because they did not require large up-front investment and could finance 
growth through earnings. Yet, the most ambitious intemationalisers among the web 
developers also required aggressive financing. They were also, and this has been stated 
already in Chapter Two, dependent upon advanced demand structures just like other 
internet start-ups. The most interesting projects were realised in high-penetration areas. This 
applied to all types of internet start-ups, not just web developers. At the end of this section, 
a brief glimpse will be cast on the situation among portal players in each country under 
examination, keeping in mind the dearth of comparative data.
Obviously, options programs also motivated employees and European entrepreneurs were eager to make use 
o f them.
53 For France, see OECD, 1999b, 18, 19.
Table 11. The largest independent web development companies in four European countries 
plus USA. End 1999.54
Country Firm Emplo
yees
Financing International Presence
USA USWeb/CKS 4.000 IPO (NASDAQ, December 1997) USA (37), Canada, France, 
Belgium, Germany (2), 
Luxembourg (2), The 
Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland (2), 
United Kingdom
iXL 1.700 IPO (NASDAQ, June 1999) USA (15), UK, Germany (2), 
Spain
Germany I-D Media 
AG
240 IPO (Neuer Markt, June 1999) USA, Germany (5), UK
Kabel New 
Media
230 IPO (Neuer Markt, June 1999) Germany (3)
France Cythere 75 Private France, USA
Pictoris 55 Minority investment by US-based 
companyAgency.com (July 1999)
France
Nether­
lands
NetlinQ 100 Private The Netherlands (4), USA, 
Germany (January 2000)
Lost Boys 200 Private The Netherlands, Spain
Sweden Icon
Medialab
850 IPO (Stockholm Stock Exchange O- 
List; SBI listing on June 1998)
USA (2), Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, Norway, Germany, 
France, UK, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain 
(2), Italy, Malaysia
Cell Network 480 Cell Network AB resulted out of a 
merger between the listed company 
Linnd Group AB, the Cell 
Consulting Group and Norway's 
New Media Science ASA. The 
merger was announced in May 1999. 
Linnd IPO (Stockholm Stock 
Exchange O-List)
Sweden (2), Norway, 
Denmark, France
54 Information from company sources published on their web sites (http://www.usweb.com/. 
http://www.ixl.com/, http://www.idmedia.de/. http://www.kabel.de/. http://www.cvthere.com/. 
http://www.pictoris.com/. http://www.cellnetwork.se/. http://www.lostboys.nl/), accessed in December 1999. 
Icon Medialab, Press release, "Icon Medialab Acquires Nicholson NY, A Leading US Internet Services Firm,"
22.11.99 (from http://www.iconmedialab.se/). Cell Network AB Press release, "General meeting o f the Linn6 
Group approves merger between Cell and NMS," 26.08.99 (from the investor information site 
http://www.huginonline.se/). Thanks also to Marc Simoncini (France), Roel de Hoop (Netherlands), Adriaan 
Meij (Netherlands) and Niels Valkering (Netherlands) for very helpful advice. Source on Cythere: Email from 
Christophe Tricaud, Cythere, 03.12.99. Source on NetlinQ: Jacob van Duijn, 03.12.99 (email). It is important 
to note that the leading German web development firm by employees (390) and international locations (USA, 
Germany (4), France, UK, Switzerland (2), Austria) was Pixelpark. Pixelpark, however, was majority-owned 
by Bertelsmann. Negotiations to acquire the first 50% took place at the end o f 1995. For an early history of  
web development companies in Germany, see Waesche, 1999a. In October o f 1999, Pixelpark carried out an 
IPO on the Neuer Markt, with 60% o f the public entity still owned by Bertelsmann Multimedia GmbH and 
20% by the co-founder Paulus Neef. Pixelpark, Press release (from the web site http://www.pixelpark.de/). 
"Pixelpark-Aktien erstmals am Neuen Markt notiert; Emissionspreis bei 15 EURO pro Aktie," 04.10.99. The 
Swedish web development firm Spray Network is not on the list because it was acquired by New York-based 
Razorfish. As a result, Spray Ventures had a 33% stake in Razorfish. "Spray to Compete Online With Yahoo, 
AOL in Europe," Reuter Economic News, 09.09.99. Compare this table to an earlier version including only 
US and Sweden-based firms as well as Pixelpark from late 1998 in Waesche, 1999b.
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The top German web development companies were all publicly quoted. Nevertheless, 
although they grew rapidly, their progress in terms of internationalisation was disappointing 
compared to the top players in the USA and Sweden. Also, their employee count did not 
match that of their US and Swedish competitors. In the home market, German web 
developers seemed to have been established firmly and initially proved themselves next to 
tough competition from the advertising and consulting industries. Although French web 
development companies boasted very strong technical skills, their growth and pace of 
internationalisation were not strong compared to US and Swedish competition. In contrast 
to Germany, where most top tier web development firms were listed on the growth 
exchange, some of the best-known French web developers remained private or were 
acquired. As in Germany and France, the top Dutch web development agencies built an 
excellent pool of technical know-how, but essentially remained national players. Two of the 
top web developers, Twinspark Interactive People and CyberConsult were acquired by 
international web development firms in Autumn of 1999.55 The contrast between the 
Netherlands and Sweden was instructive.56 Both were small countries, yet the consumer 
demand structure for internet services was much more sophisticated in Sweden than in the 
Netherlands. A strong lead in internationalisation was taken in Sweden by the largest web 
development companies, Icon Medialab, Spray Network, Linne Group (later Cell Network) 
and Framtidsfabriken. Icon Medialab and Cell Network were listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange. Icon Medialab and Spray Network established a strong presence in most major 
European internet markets as well as in Asia. The lead of the Swedish web developers vis- 
a-vis the European competition is clear from Table 11 above. The table shows the level of 
development at the end of 1999, some months before the market downturn. From 2000 
onwards, Swedish players encountered problems because, despite their mostly organic 
growth strategies, they had overextended themselves and their revenues could not cover the
55 Agency.com, Press release, "Agency.com Announces Acquisition o f Leading Dutch Interactive Firm,"
02.08.99 (from the corporate web site http://www.agencv.com/): CyberConsult, Press release, "Icon Medialab 
International neemt CyberConsult over 'E-vikings landen in Nederland'," 27.09.99 (from 
http://www.iconmedialab.nl/). Thanks goes to Roel de Hoop o f Hot-orange.com for the pointers.
56 My understanding o f the Swedish internet space was boosted considerably through numerous interesting 
discussions with Johan Jorgensen, former editor o f an IT-magazine and now COO of the internet start-up 
Municel.
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significant costs they were incurring. Swedish web developers were not alone, their US and 
German counterparts had to reduce staff significantly.57
Swedish electronic commerce companies such as Boo.com, Boxman, Dressmart and 
Letsbuyit.com (see Table 12, below) attempted to emulate the internationalisation success 
of the Swedish web development firms. Initially, they also seemed successful. In 2000, 
however, two of the firms mentioned here already had gone bankrupt, Boo.com in May and 
Dressmart in July/ August. Letsbuyit.com, after a delayed listing on the Neuer Markt, had to 
lay off about a fifth of its employees in August 2000 and subsequently hovered near
CO
bankruptcy for months. The most successful and earliest internationaliser, Boxman, went 
bankrupt in 2001.59
57 For the web developers, the most threatening development after the year 2000 next to the disappearance of  
easy funding was the reduction of IT expenditures by large corporations. For a review of the fate of web 
developers in Germany, see: “Intemetberater werden Ubernahmeziele. International Grofikonzeme bemUhen 
sich um Untemehmen wie Kabel New Media oder GFT Technologies," Financial Times Deutschland, 
16.05.01, page 4.
58 “Letsbuyit.com,” Financial Times Deutschland, 31.08.00, page 15.
59 The Swedish internet music retailer Boxman managed to start internationalisation early enough in the 
internet adoption cycle to profit from internet uptake in Europe. In fact, it started as early as its U.S. 
competition. Founded in December 1997, Boxman employed 120 people by December 1999. By that time, it 
managed to establish a recognised consumer brand in the Scandinavian countries as well as in France, United 
Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands. In September 1999, Boxman signed a major cross-promotion deal 
with the music television channel MTV. Boxman developed innovative international business models; it built 
a centralised warehouse in the Netherlands linked to its internet ordering system. In Scandinavia, Boxman 
secured 4-5% of total compact disc retail sales, including sales via traditional retail outlets. In 1999, between
3.000 and 5.000 orders were placed each day over the international Boxman web sites. Interview with Tony 
Salter, CEO, Boxman AB, 03.12.99. Please refer also to the analyst report by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 
Equity Research Europe, "The European Internet Report," June 1999, page 189. Further: Interview with Ola 
Ahlvarsson, CEO, Result Ventures Knowledge, 18.10.99. And: Kimberley A. Strassel, "Using an Old- 
Fashioned Approach, Boxman Becomes Big Hit in Europe," The Wall Street Journal, 08.07.99. See also: 
English abstract o f Swedish article (World Reporter). "Boxman Records Huge Losses, Boxman gor 
brakforlust," Finanstidningen, 18.09.99. In the article, the sales of the company were cited to be SEK 77 M 
(approximately EUR 9 M) in the first half o f 1999 with losses o f SEK 188 M (EUR 21 M). The article 
continued to state that Boxman raised a total o f SEK 400 Million (EUR 45 M) in venture capital.
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Table 12. Internationalisation o f Swedish electronic commerce start-ups. End 1999.60
Name Focus Head­
quarters
Founded International presence
Boxman Music
retail
London 1997 Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, 
France, UK, Germany, 
The Netherlands
Letsbuyit.com Group
buying
Amsterda
m
1999 Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, UK, 
Switzerland, Austria
EPO.com Financial
services
Stockholm 1998 Sweden, UK
Dressmart AB Fashion Stockholm 1999 Sweden, UK, 
Netherlands, Finland, 
Norway, Denmark
Boo.com Fashion,
sports
retail
London 1999 Sweden, UK, France, 
Germany, Finland, 
Denmark
While the Swedish web development and electronic commerce firms initially impressed 
European observers with their spectacular internationalisation strategies, Swedish portal 
start-ups could not be boastful. Like their counterparts from other European countries 
except France,61 Swedish portal start-ups met considerable resistance by a number of
60 Information from the web sites of the companies, accessed in December 1999. Also: "Ghost in the Machine; 
Will Boo.com Be Able to Meld What's Hot in Athletic Footwear Across Continents?" Footwear News, 
02.08.99.
61 Surprisingly, French portal start-ups did very well, by combining search services with public forums 
("communities"). There were a significant number o f independent portal players among the top 15 web sites, 
including the VC-backed firms MultiMania and iFrance. One reason for the significant number o f independent 
start-ups in the top ranks o f portal and community sites could have been the slow response to the internet by 
established French media companies - presenting start-ups with a unique window o f opportunity not available 
in other European countries. The internet only full came into French public consciousness in Summer o f 1999, 
according to the founder and chief executive o f iFrance, Marc Simoncini (Interview, 06.11.99). Again, 
however, like most European portals, French portal ventures did not internationalise much. Only one o f the 
leaders mentioned here, iFrance, was a fast international iser and by 1999 had expanded into French-speaking 
Canada, the Benelux countries and Switzerland. The competing portal service MultiMania in 1999 did not yet 
have an international business. "MultiMania concludes capital increase, preparing for bourse listing," Reuter 
Textline, Les Echos, 07.10.99. Electronic commerce firms also were slow intemationalisers. While a few 
electronic commerce players such as Chateauonline moved into neighbouring markets UK and Germany, most 
French firms focused on France, or, when they internationalised, they started with French-speaking countries 
or Italy and Spain. The Goldman Sachs-financed iBazar Group, which included the iBazar auction site as well 
as the online hosting site Chez.com and was later acquired by eBay, was present in France, Italy and Spain in 
1999. "Goldman Sachs funds invests in iBazar e-commerce site," Reuter Textline, Les Echos, 06.10.99. On 
Chateauonline see Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Equity Research Europe, "The European Internet Report," 
June 1999, page 190. German internet start-ups in the portal business were not successful, here, the space was 
dominated by telecommunications and media companies. DINO-Online (AIS Axon Internet Services GmbH)
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powerful, established telecommunications and media companies.62 As shown clearly in 
Table 13, below, established players have had an easy time in Europe building consumer 
internet brands with strategies which were very similar to those of their U.S. counterparts. 
The supply of entrepreneurs attempting to build internet brands was not lacking; the issue 
was supportive financing schemes through venture capital.
was an independent start-up but was acquired in January 1999 by the telecommunications operator MobilCom 
AG. The electronic commerce arena looked more promising in Germany. The appearance o f  internet broker 
ConSors Discount-Broker AG on the top 15 web sites list was symbolic o f the domestic strength o f electronic 
commerce start-ups in Germany as well as the rise o f popular shareholder culture in Germany- although, as a 
spin-off from an established German private banking house, it was not exactly an independent new venture. 
Yet, as with the other stellar domestic start-up stories, the internationalisation pace o f ConSors during the high 
points on the markets still was disappointing. ConSors only in July 1999 acquired an online stockbroker in 
France and in October 1999 established itself in Switzerland, but did not in 1999 move into other national 
markets. And ConSors was one o f the fastest intemationalisers in the industry. Other electronic commerce 
players, even among listed companies, were even slower to internationalise or focused on German-speaking 
neighbours. ConSors Discout-Broker AG, Press release, "ConSors erwirbt Mehrheitsbeteiligung an Axfin, 
Paris," 05.07.99; ConSors Schweiz AG, Press release, "Der gunstigste Discount-Broker der Schweiz heiBt 
ConSors Schweiz," 01.10.99. As in Germany, the top 15 portal sites in Holland in 1999 were dominated by 
telecommunications and media companies which quickly moved into the portal space. The most ambitious 
Dutch electronic commerce start-ups, such as Hot-Orange.com, had internationalisation plans did not execute 
them in 1999 (Roel de Hoop, Interview, 26.10.99). But as of yet, the strongest internet players in Holland 
were not the types o f ventures examined here. Instead, alternative, new breed data telecommunications 
specialist Equant and the Vianen-based ISP World Online (WOI) grew fast and internationalised very rapidly. 
WOI later encountered problems due to an insider trading scandal. These new telecommunications companies 
expanded rapidly across the Dutch border and benefited from advanced business-to-business demand for data 
communication services. Holland is home to some o f the world's largest multinational companies such as 
Royal Shell, AKZO, Philips and Unilever, and the country is the logistics and communication hub o f Europe. 
Amsterdam and Atlanta-based Equant owned a world-wide data network and, since July 1998, was listed on 
NYSE and Paris Bourse. World Online acquired one o f the oldest independent ISP pioneers in Germany, 
Nacamar. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Equity Research Europe, "The European Internet Report," June 1999, 
page 68. World Online International and Nacamar, Press release, "World Online erwirbt Mehrheitsbeteiligung 
an Nacamar. Zwei europaische Key Player im Bereich Internet Services biindeln ihre Energien," 05.08.99, 
Vianen, London, Dreieich.
62 Next to the telcos Telia, Tele2 (owns the ISP Swipnet) and Telenordia (Algonet), the Norwegian publishing 
group Schibsted was particularly strong in the Swedish internet through its stakes in Aftonbladet. Passagen 
was the Swedish portal o f Scandinavia Online (SOL), an internet company co-owned by Telia, Norwegian 
telco Telenor and Schibsted. Swedish Post's PostNet owned the portal site Torget.
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Table 13. Most popular 15 local web properties in August/ September 1999. Independent 
local internet start-ups marked in grey (excluding ISPs and online services).63
USA Germany France Netherlands Sweden
AOL Network FOCUS Online Voila -  Wanadoo 
(France Telecom)
World Online 
(WOI)
MSN/Hotmail
Yahoo! DINO-Online Yahoo France Lycos Passagen Natverk
Microsoft Sites Infoseek MultiMania Ilse Tele2
Lycos ConSors
BrokersWorld
Caramail World Access / 
Planet Internet
Microsoft
Go Network RTL Online AOL France 
(Cegetel)
Royal KPN AOL
Excite(S).Home ProSieben Online AltaVista Publieke
Omroepen
Yahoo!
Amazon AOL Homepage Chez.com Startpagina.NL Telenordia
Time Warner 
Online
Spiegel Online Les Echos IDG Altavista
RealSite Portfolio Coupe iFrance VNU Telia
Altavista Sites RZ-Online Club Internet 
(Lagadere)
De Telegraaf Aftonbladet
eBay DSF SportsWorld Excite Microsoft
Nederland
Torget
Go2Net Network DM-Online MSN Veronica Spray
LookSmart Suddeutsche 
Zeitung Online
Nomade Nederlandse
Spoorwegen
Lycos Network
Bluemountainarts.
com
Fun Online Lycos PCM Uitgevers Modem Times 
Group
ZDNet Sites Com! Online Infonie Versatel Telecom TV4
Therefore, if there was a single initial success story among indigenous European internet 
start-ups in terms of rapid internationalisation, it was the Swedish web development and
63 Most sources measured the popularity o f consolidated marketing "internet properties," not individual sites. 
Focus Online in Germany, for example, included different web sites such as the Focus magazine's web page as 
well as the GMX site, which was an internet start-up offering email and messaging services. Sources: USA: 
Media Metrix (can be found on http://www.mediametrix.com/). data from the month o f September. Germany: 
IVW Online Medien Reichweiten (can be found on http://www.pz-online.de/). data from the month o f  
September, France: Le Journal du Net quoting figures by Benchmark Group (http://www. i oumaldunet.com/). 
data from the month o f August, accessed on 25.09.99, Netherlands: Multiscope (Email Stefan Pauls to author, 
05.10.99), data from the month o f August, Sweden: Sifo Interactive Media / Media Metrix (Email Mikael 
Ohlsson, Research Manager, to author, 18.10.99), data from the month o f September. These sources all used 
different measurement techniques. It can be assumed that the German IVW figures were both inaccurate as 
well as not representative. Instead o f measuring unique visitors to a site using user tracking techniques (such 
as Media Metrix in USA and in Sweden), IVW measured ‘visits’ based on server-side software measurements. 
There was no way to distinguish unique visitors, this caused distortions between transaction-oriented sites that 
were frequently visited to check email or make auction bids. Furthermore, many top sites refused to participate 
by not installing the required software. These included the independent internet start-up Web.de as well as the 
American players Yahoo! and Excite as well as Deutsche Telekom's T-Online, the top portal in Germany. 
Special thanks goes out to Frederic Madre for guiding me through the French internet scene.
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electronic commerce firms. In fact, only the Swedish start-ups as a whole could keep up the 
with the international ambitions of US ventures.64 Yet, the Swedish players were not able to 
sustain their internationalisation effort and growth when the capital markets contracted after 
the year 2000. Coming out of a home market without a powerful domestic alternative 
technology stock exchange, their funding base was so weak that even the strongest new 
ventures could not survive. This fate was shared by most internet start-ups in other 
countries. What was remarkable, however, was how the Swedish players got so far with 
relatively little capital compared to their US counterparts. American web developers 
combined strong venture-capital backing and ‘cheap capital’ from NASDAQ to acquire 
European start-up companies. Swedish web developers, by contrast, initially moved abroad 
through organic growth and complemented this with minor acquisitions. Icon Medialab's 
shopping spree was an exception and it began to intensify only during 1999.65
Although Swedish entrepreneurs liked to praise the advantages of organic growth and 
frequently pointed out the dangers of acquisition-only growth,66 organic growth was not a 
choice, but rather a necessity. Although Icon Medialab and Cell Network were listed on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange, the capital they had managed to raise through this insignificant 
exchange was not comparable to what they would have generated through an IPO on the 
German Neuer Markt. For this reason, many Swedish players had considered listing on the 
rival German exchange.67 Funds provided by the venture capital industry for technology-
64 Other than Swedish web development firms, the only independent internet start-ups active in more than one 
European country in 1998 were US-headquartered companies. The search service and portal site Yahoo!, for 
example, launched in Germany, France, and the United Kingdom during 1996, in Sweden, Australia, 
Singapore, Korea, Denmark, and Norway during 1997, and Italy, Hong Kong, and Spain in 1998. See Filing 
of Yahoo Inc. with US Securities and Exchange Commission ('http://www.sec.gov/). 8-K/A, 12.11.99. Yahoo! 
could have remained content with focusing exclusively on the largest internet marketplace, the US- especially 
since competition in the United States is vigorous and encompasses established players from media, 
telecommunications and retail industries as well as well-funded start-up companies. Yet, US internet ventures 
developed innovative services for their advanced home market, which they launched abroad as demand 
improved elsewhere. US start-ups also profited from funding opportunities handed to them by angel investors, 
venture capitalists and growth-focused public capital markets.
65 These include the small Cologne-based shop killakanu (September 1998), Dutch agency CyberConsult 
(September 1999) and the New York interactive consultant Nicholson NY (November 1999).
66 A Swedish entrepreneur, Ola Ahlvarsson, celebrated the organic growth strategy, referring to Boxman and 
Dressmart: "In the music industry, it has been clear for a long time that you can't just create hits by throwing 
millions o f marketing dollars at a certain band. You need to create a convincing story that consumers and 
journalists just cant pass by. Once you manage to do this, roll it out in as many countries as possible" 
(Interview, 18.10.99).
67 See: "Sweden's Icon Medialab prepares for foreign IPO," Reuter News Service, 22.09.99.
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oriented start-ups were been almost non-existent in Sweden in the years 1996 and 1997. 
Instead, private investors have placed their own money into start-ups. But their funding 
capacity was limited. Government support schemes for promoting venture capital were only 
in development in the late 1990s, most notable was the re-orientation of Swedish pension
ro
funds into venture capital.
An informal network of angel investors with a high-calibre background was nevertheless 
very supportive of the Swedish internet start-up scene. The former top executive of 
Scandinavian Airlines, Jan Carlzon, was one of the initial backers of many start-ups 
including Boxman. It was characteristic of the Swedish start-up scene that the best-known 
Swedish venture capitalist at the time, Kjell Spangberg, invested his own private money out 
of San Francisco without being associated with a fund (Interview, Spangberg, 17.11.99). 
What was furthermore unique about Sweden was the survival of powerful, wealthy 
families, such as the Wallenbergs and its Investor Group. Investor AB backed Spray's pan- 
European portal initiative with a substantial amount of funding, approximately USD 62 
Million.69 An important characteristic of all of these backers was the strong personal 
support they offered, opening doors and adding instant legitimacy to an entrepreneur. 
Although the backing of Investor Group in Spray’s portal project was large even by US 
standards, the sums invested by informal investors, mostly private persons, often was paltry. 
The initial investment in Icon Medialab by a former media executive was reputed to have 
been SEK 250,000 (EUR 28,000) for 10% of the company. Swedish ventures, therefore, 
benefited from some of the immaterial advantages US venture capitalists provide without 
being exposed to the luxury of lavish funding. As a result, Swedish web development 
entrepreneurs developed a unique internationalisation strategy funding organic growth 
partially out of earnings generated by the advanced Swedish internet marketplace. The 
Swedish venture capitalist Par-Jorgen Parson of Cell Ventures put it succinctly:
"Swedish start-ups have less cash than their US counterparts because they are 
funded by angel investors. But what they do receive is smart capital in terms of 
network and access of people. This investment network has allowed Swedish
68 "Sweden Allows Pension Funds More Freedom," Financial Times, 25.06.99.
69 "Spray to Compete Online With Yahoo, AOL in Europe," Reuter Economic News, 09.09.99.
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firms to move much further, much faster, with less cash than others"
(Interview, 02.12.99).
But the advanced internet demand structure in Sweden was also crucial. Web developers 
and electronic commerce firms perfected services in their home country which were in 
many ways more advanced than competing services in other European countries. The 
internationalisation effort they carried out was impressive, although most companies 
eventually disappeared because they ran out of cash before they had managed to achieve 
break-even.
Why Sweden?
We compared two large and two small European countries. Although several different 
variables were discussed here, size did not seem to matter much. Part of the reason for this 
is that all countries under examination here were "small" internet market places: Germany 
had almost 7 Million internet users in 1998, but this figure was less than three times as 
large as the number of Swedish users (see Table 2). Compared to 79 million internet users 
in the USA, all country markets discussed here were small. Yet, one central argument of 
this paper has been that absolute market sizes and absolute investment figures may not have 
been as important as qualitative aspects relating to the domestic market and the financing of 
new ventures. If internet demand was sophisticated such as in Sweden, perhaps, as a home 
base, "small is beautiful." The advantage of his domestic market was described by Ola 
Ahlvarsson in the following way:
"Sweden is an ideal starting place for internet entrepreneurs. Here, we develop 
internet services before moving out to other countries. We have a small 
population of very advanced internet users. We have to convince a network of 
only about 30 critical, but opinion-leading journalists of our service. We have to 
persuade a small, tightly integrated network of private investors. Once we 
succeed at this, all doors are open. A well-oiled start-up engine is in operation 
here" (Interview, 18.10.99).
In some ways, it seems that Swedish entrepreneurs were able to benefit from many of the 
same factors that insured Silicon Valley's ascent and leadership in one technology wave
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after another. Only one crucial element was missing: In comparison to US internet start-ups, 
Swedish ventures, like their other European brethren, were undercapitalised. The fact that 
official venture capital funding was even lower in Sweden than in other European countries 
and that targeted government support schemes were lacking did not initially hinder the 
internationalisation of Swedish web development and electronic commerce start-ups, 
however. Informal private networks compensated to a degree for a lack of institutional 
venture capital. Swedish entrepreneurs had to develop a low-cost internationalisation 
strategy based on organic growth. Only later, when their extensive international networks 
required further funding, did they fail. Swedish web development and electronic commerce 
firms, therefore, also reacted to a “refracted” set of opportunities; in this case, however, 
these opportunities enabled early internationalisation through the path of organic growth. 
Web development and electronic commerce firms in other countries did not manage to 
internationalise as successfully as their Swedish counterparts. The exclusively domestic 
focus of many German, French and Dutch players, however, made them attractive 
acquisition candidates for US internationalisers.
The initial Swedish success in internationalisation relative to other countries in Europe 
showed how important sophisticated domestic demand structures are - even in the age of 
the global internet. The attractiveness of a home base cannot be discussed without analysing 
the role of government. The greatest contribution of government policy was in 
telecommunications liberalisation. The course of telecommunications liberalisation was 
supportive of internet development in Sweden because the national carrier was first exposed 
to competition, with privatisation being planned only from the year 2000. In other European 
countries, in the crucial period from 1996 to 1998, prices for internet access moved 
upwards as privatised telecommunications operators "rebalanced" their rates. Former 
monopolists used their dominance over the local "last mile" to extract maximum earnings 
from their internet users. Government ownership in the Swedish case to a certain extent 
prevented the dominant carrier from using is control of local phone lines to the detriment of 
the internet user. Although rate rebalancing also occurred, access price as well as pricing 
packages were more attractive in Sweden. Simply put, due to government ownership, 
Swedish policy makers were not placed into a situation of extreme conflicts of interests as
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their colleagues in other countries were: In Germany and other countries, the newly 
privatised entity was to be a "national champion," a star of the local stock market and a 
source of windfall income. In contrast, the internet user would have benefited from a tough 
stance towards the former monopolist- as occurred in the USA. In all countries as well as in 
Sweden, however, telecommunications policy was embarked upon independently of the 
development of the internet and its effects were inadvertent. Not inadvertent, however, was 
the emphasis on competition and the avoidance of pre-competition privatisation and 
excessive profit making.
Yet, towards the end of the period under discussion, significant changes in both institutional 
factors examined here were underway. Telecommunications liberalisation was leading to 
lower access prices and the venture capital bottleneck was disappearing. In Germany, 
development was more rapid than in many other countries because it was initially the only 
country in which the national regulator allowed the direct rental of a consumer local phone 
line from the Deutsche Telekom for a fixed monthly fee. Usage friendly internet fee 
structures were introduced by the incumbent and its competitors from 2000. The Neuer 
Markt contributed to a venture capital boom in Germany. An unprecedented boom in 
entrepreneurship occurred. But change occurred in other countries as well. In France, the 
Minister of Industry and Finance requested the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority 
(ART) to examine ways in which internet access rates could be lowered- with impressive 
results. In the Netherlands, widespread cable TV access was the basis for new unmetered 
internet services liberated from the local phone line.70 These developments, in addition to 
the massive rise of mobile phone use, engulfed many European countries and made the 
Swedish home market with its advanced demand structures appear a little less unique.
As a result, a host of new internet start-ups in the broadly defined portal, electronic 
commerce category appeared after 1998 all across Europe. A ‘Top 100’ table of European 
internet start-ups from August 2000 listed several start-ups from different European
70 Gordom Cramb reported on television cable in the Netherlands: "A 24 -  hour online service without per 
minute charges... is functioning in all main Dutch cities and will soon extend to all o f the country." He 
continued: "Evidence from other consumer electronics areas, like mobile phones, suggest that the Dutch do
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countries, with a significant number headquartered in Germany, but also several from 
France and Sweden (see Table 14 below). Although the relevant founding dates were not 
available, most firms except for Tiss.com and degriftour.fr were founded in 1999. In 
contrast to their predecessors, this ‘second generation’ of European internet start-ups were 
to a significant proportion venture capital financed. Furthermore, a surprising percentage of 
these firms were focused on consumers; Sweden was not the only European country any 
more with internationally ambitious consumer-oriented internet start-ups. Lastly, they were 
much more fervent and rapid intemationalisers than their predecessors.
Table 14. Company headquarter locations in Bathwick Group e-League of “Top 100” 
European internet start-ups in August 200071
Start-ups 
in “Top 
100”
Company names
Germany 14 Tiss.com, goindustry.com, dooyoo.de, ciao.com, 12snap.com, 
elabseurope.com, surplex.com, webmiles.com, 
efoodmanager.com, vitago.com, glomedix.com, censio.de, 
webvertising.de, beautynet.de
France 9 degriftour.fr, kelkoo.com, omniticket.com, finance-net.com, 
allocine.fr, proXchange.com, doubletrade.com, wineandco.com, 
femmeonline.fr
Sweden 5 epo.com, boxman.com, funplanet.com, citikey.com, 
wapshealth.com
Nether­
lands
0
In mid 2000, these ‘second generation’ ventures were all very young, private companies, 
however. Most of them were still vulnerable and dependent upon ongoing venture capital 
financing when the capital markets downturn came. Almost all disappeared in the course of 
the years 2000 and 2001. If one compares these to the ‘first generation,’ of at that time 
already publicly listed internet start-ups from Germany and Sweden, important differences
not rush in first- but that once a technology has proved its usefulness they embrace it wholeheartedly." 
"Switched on and netting business," Financial Times, Survey, The Netherlands, page II.
71 These were the results o f the second e-League table. It incorporated feedback from the first Bathwick Group 
e-League table published in the Sunday Times on 02.07.00 and was therefore more accurate than the first 
table. The table still showed strong tendency in favouring UK firms, in fact, in the second table, 62 companies 
from England were named. However, it was one o f the few comparative sources on intemet-start-ups across 
Europe. Published under http://www.bathwick.com/. accessed on 30.08.00. Bathwick Group is a consultant 
and research firm.
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were visible. The German firms on the Neuer Markt still very much came from a different 
environment. Their origins were in a Germany which was characterised by a lagging 
demand structure and by underdeveloped private and public capital markets. As a 
consequence, many of these were ‘mixed-play’ companies which were originally focused 
on the domestic market and corporate clients. Their internationalisation was much slower 
than that of their Swedish counterparts such as Icon Medialab, Cell Networks or Boxman. 
These companies were beneficiaries of advanced home demand conditions. However, the 
Swedish players, while rapid intemationalisers, were prevented from realising their 
ambitious strategies by a Swedish domestic capital market which was even less developed 
than the German capital market. The winners of the so-called ‘internet era’ at the end of the 
1990s seem to have been a very small number of successful ‘first generation’ American 
new ventures which managed to establish themselves internationally and secure sufficient 
funding to reach break-even before the capital markets downturn. In Europe, they occupied 
leading positions, sharing the market with the established European media and 
telecommunications companies.
While policy convergence in telecommunications did lead to better internet demand 
structures after 1998 and the initial success of the Neuer Markt altered the situation on the 
capital markets considerably, these improved home conditions only benefited the ‘second 
generation’ of new internet ventures. By then, however, the unique Schumpeterian window 
of global opportunity, characterised by rapid technological innovation and a massive wave 
of financing of new ventures, seems to have shut. Despite policy convergence and a 
considerable change of home country determinants, German and European information 
technology did not seem to have managed to ‘leapfrog’ to a position of global leadership 
side by side with the United States. It seems to be important, therefore, not only to compare 
distinct institutional environments statically at a given moment in time, but also to compare 
speeds of change in dynamically changing institutional landscapes. Timing apparently 
matters, too. A discussion of the issue of timing and institutional divergence insured by 
timing will conclude this thesis.
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Conclusion 
The Power of National Governments
From its founding in 1997, the German alternative technology stock exchange Neuer 
Markt developed spectacularly, symbolising a rebirth of entrepreneurship in Germany. 
Following the severe downturn in the Spring of 2000, however, a search for blame 
began. Investment banks, which had carried out the initial public offerings (IPOs), were 
faulted for a lack of research and unreasonably high initial enterprise valuations.1 
Several fund analysts, previously the stars of the Neuer Markt, were fired. Lastly, the 
Neuer Markt exchange itself was criticised. Insider dealings investigation and other 
reported criminal activities by the management of listed companies were cited as 
evidence for lax rules on the new exchange. Although this search for blame revealed 
some weaknesses of the IPO system in Germany and the inexperience of some 
participants within this system, one aspect of the downturn was not mentioned by public 
commentary, namely, the fundamental conditions for information technology (IT) 
entrepreneurship in Germany.
Public commentary did not present the full picture. Although the rules of the Neuer 
Markt were tightened in the aftermath of the downturn, they already were stricter and 
more transparent than those of other European exchanges, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.2 Most importantly, the downturn in the technology stock market was not 
limited to Germany alone. Although it was slightly more severe in Germany, the 
development was global and was led by the US technology exchange NASDAQ.
In the Introduction to this thesis, the question was raised to what extent the wave of 
entrepreneurship in the late 1990s in Germany was part of a global development and to 
what extent it was specific to Germany. In order to effectively be able to explore the 
impact of global shift vis-a-vis country-specific determinants, a novel framework called 
refraction was presented. Refraction ‘measures’ the extent to which domestic 
determinants impact upon the economic opportunities presented by global technological
1 “Aufstieg und Fall des Neuen Marktes: Die Rolle der Emissionsbanken. Auf dem Friedhof der 
Kuscheltiere,“ Financial Times Deutschland, 15.03.01, page 21.
2 “New rules aim to clarify Neuer Markt dealings,” Financial Times, 21.12.00, page 17.
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shifts. The method chosen was that of a single country study. An economy was selected 
in which an especially strong response to global change had apparently occurred. This 
country was Germany, and here, although it is still too recent to fully judge, 
entrepreneurial response seems to have ended as dramatically as it had begun. Perhaps 
the strength of the entrepreneurial revival itself was artificial, a fiction conjured by 
investors in the local capital market in need of a success story. To understand what 
happened, a detailed examination of actual developments seemed necessary.
Refraction revisited
Before embarking upon a study of actual developments, a framework for analysis was 
presented in the Introduction of the thesis called refraction. The refraction framework 
assumes the parallel existence of two opposing interpretations of technological change. 
Scholars examining technological change and economic history have closely linked 
innovation to social shifts in a specific local environment. Often, these changes are 
incremental and evolutionary in nature. Alternatively, network thinkers have understood 
recent changes wrought by the proliferation of global IT networks as worldwide, 
disruptive shifts emerging out of the techno-economic sphere with strong effects on 
society.
It is helpful to make a brief detour here and mention two writers who have had a great 
influence on recent theorising, Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter. Although Weber 
and the younger Schumpeter co-operated on some projects, and tried to answer some of 
the same questions, their focus differed. It is a fundamental issue, which will appear in 
different guises when summarising and drawing conclusions from this project. This 
difference has also been emphasised by several authors in an issue of the academic 
journal Industrial and Corporate Change dedicated to these two canonical thinkers 
(Hamilton, 1996; Galambos, 1996). Weber tried to unite economics, history and 
sociology. He saw change as multicausal, emanating from different parts of the greater, 
interwoven institutional setting. Thus, different institutions, including firms, changed 
jointly, moved by broad trends. Technology was not a specific, isolated issue of concern. 
Schumpeter acknowledged the greater institutional setting as well but narrowed in on 
economic actors more so than Weber did. He tended to focus on technological change
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and entrepreneurship. His understanding of change was ‘endogenous,’ or contained 
within the economic system (Rosenberg, 1994). Despite his pessimism about a world he 
viewed as becoming increasingly bureaucratised, Schumpeter believed the primary 
strength of the capitalist system lay in its encouragement of constant, entrepreneurial 
change.
One way to view the difference between Weber's and Schumpeter's work is in terms of 
scale. Whereas Weber discussed profound, deep changes in whole institutional 
landscapes, Schumpeter seemed to prefer writing about periodic changes limited to the 
economy and emanating from entrepreneurs. Yet, Schumpeter did not shy away from 
analysing broad changes such as bureaucratisation. The more important difference 
between the two seems to be the question who is in the driver's seat. Bureaucratisation 
for Schumpeter is caused in great part inadvertently by technological progress and the 
cumulative effect of multiple entrepreneurs' innovations. Shifts described by Weber are 
not technology-driven in the same way; a host of effects from different institutions and 
great historical currents are more important. The purpose of this investigation into the 
network economy was precisely this question: "Who is in the driver’s seat?"
Before arriving at possible answers to this question, we need to review the broad 
similarities common to much of what is called ‘institutionalist’ work. This work 
includes that of economic historians, including Nobel Prize laureate Douglass North 
(1990), and several prominent historians of economic change, such as Nathan 
Rosenberg (1982) or Joel Mokyr (1990). Evolutionary economics was also mentioned, 
Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter have defined this field (1982). Their primary 
concern has been to renew the economics discipline by basing it on change instead of 
equilibrium. The thesis also drew upon the writings on institutional change by Geoffrey 
M. Hodgson, who condenses thinking on institutions into a general-purpose theoretical 
framework for the social sciences (1994). The book on Italian economy and society by 
the political economist Robert D. Putnam has raised controversy by touting the benefits 
of what he calls social capital (1993). Putnam believes the economic prosperity of a 
region is linked to long-standing structures of trust. In this range of work, the spirit of 
Max Weber seems to be emphasised just slightly more than that of Joseph Schumpeter, 
with the exception of Nelson and Winter's contributions (see Stolper, 1994, 74 - 85).
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Three essential aspects of change can be found in the work of some of the recent writers 
mentioned here. They are, firstly, the incremental pace of institutional change, secondly, 
its so-called path dependency, and lastly, the continuity of local variety. Much of the 
Introduction was dedicated to explaining these three concepts. Actors are viewed as 
embedded in structures defined by different types of institutions. Change is a tedious 
process promoted by numerous agents with uncertain outcome. This, in turn, ensures 
that there exists a great variety of political economic ‘approaches’ world-wide, including 
within capitalist systems. This variety is not reduced by change. Change is not 
convergent, it is path-dependent and thus reinforces local variety. This institutionalist 
understanding can be contrasted to a very different, quite contemporary body of work, 
namely, thinking about the network economy at the end of the 1990s.
Network thinking is a sibling of ‘globalisation thinking,’ which has declared the 
disappearance of geographic boundaries and highlights convergence over divergence. 
Network thinkers also emphasise the potential of new players to challenge established 
enterprises, even the ability of new regions to ‘leapfrog’ economic development and 
assume a new role in the global economy. The international economy is a discontinuous, 
dynamic environment with reduced certainty. While so much of this modem 
mythmaking is easy to disprove, it would be unwise to completely ignore it. It has 
emerged from some of the most intelligent and best-informed observers of Silicon 
Valley. Here, we will briefly recap some of these practitioner’s arguments described in 
the introduction.
Kevin Kelly's approach is to summarise network thinking, thus the three basic trends he 
highlights in the beginning of his book New Rules for the New Economy are a good 
starting point (1998). According to Kelly, the three most important aspects of the so- 
called ‘new economy’ are that it is global, intangible and interlinked. These factors 
together are responsible for a decentralised force of upheaval which breaks up the ‘old 
economy.’ What is happening is that, for the first time, "we are connecting everything to 
everything" (page 12). This is why the internet is significantly different from the world­
wide corporate electronic networks which have existed for three decades. It is precisely 
because small firms and individuals are being integrated into the global network that 
real, lasting changes are occurring. The heroes of this networked vision are the people
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and also the small firms whose success is enabled by the global network. Accordingly, 
most old-style organisations, including governments, will not be able to cope with these 
changes and they will see their influence decline. In their place, the network will bring 
about new institutions, which are not dependent upon centralised, geographically 
founded means of control. New types of firms and new types of government will appear 
which operate according to principles of performance and voluntarism. In fact, the 
network behaves very much like a free market, with an ongoing selection process in 
operation. The economic sphere is privileged. Among the network thinkers, a belief in 
market selection has merged with 1960s anti-establishment thinking. In this context it is 
worthwhile to re-read Esther Dyson's explanation: "How I got the story and learned to 
love markets" in her book Release 2.1. Several of these writers recall Schumpeter, who 
in his early writings (1934) also emphasised technological change and privileged the 
economic sphere and the market over other social institutions.
Although the two different sets of ideas concerning technological change described 
above, institutionalist analysis and network thinking, really do seem to come from 
different worlds, both provide answers to our central question: "Who is in the driver's 
seat?" It is not that one set of thinkers point to one actor and the other to another; the 
very basis of their analysis is different- as is the difference between Weber's and 
Schumpeter's approaches to change. Whereas the historically guided institutionalist 
work described first has as its essential unit institutions in a geographically definable 
entity, sometimes a nation, sometimes an economic region, this is not the case with the 
network thinkers. In fact, the very purpose of institutionalist analysis is to ask why some 
regions do very well and others don't. Since they see firms as part of a larger political, 
social and economic institutional landscape, these authors look for combinations of 
factors encouraging or stifling growth. While the possibility for agent-driven change 
exists, much institutionalist writing emphasises institutional constraints. Furthermore, 
institutionalist work has difficulties explaining rapid and sustained global shifts. This is 
the strength of network thinking, which moves away from geographically defined 
entities. Network thinkers look for types of actors which will be successful in a 
networked, global environment, such as small, fast ventures, self-employed knowledge 
workers and new, nongovernmental globed movements and organisations. They 
juxtapose these to geographically based, old entities which will not be able to keep up
268
the fast pace, such as domestic governments. In most cases, network thinking does not 
reach the depth of Schumpeter’s analysis which explores the causes of change, questions 
them and arrives at an endogenous change model based on longer-term waves. Most 
network thinkers simply think of technological change as a deterministic and external. 
While the weaknesses of network thinking are recognised here, the aim of the thesis is 
to see what can be learned from juxtaposing institutionalist insight and network 
thinking.
Readers knowledgeable of the institutionally guided literature from Max Weber to 
Douglass North and David S. Landes can easily downplay the once fashionable topic of 
writing about the network economy and its lack of rigor. This is not the issue here.
These same writers acknowledge the importance of profound technological change 
occurring occasionally in history in combination with a strong social shift. Apparent 
contemporary changes in technology may signal a global social shift in progress and this 
possibility needs to be taken seriously by scholarship. Some sociologists, especially 
urban sociologists, critics of post modernity as well as of globalisation, have analysed 
current technological developments in depth to uncover possible parallel social currents. 
The sociologists discussed in this thesis included Manuel Castells (1996), Saskia Sassen 
(1996) and David Harvey (1990). These sociologists also understand that, despite a 
digital network and marketplace accessible all over the world, those firms which 
manage to innovate, create the most value and manage to grow faster are located only in 
a few, specific countries. Innovation does not seem to be equally pronounced 
everywhere.
To answer the guiding question pitting older, institutional structures against global 
technology, the thesis was divided into two parts. The first, comprising Chapters One 
and Two, focused on global change. It asked what could have caused the current 
perceptions of networked change by drawing upon writing from different academic 
fields such as sociology and economics as well as from network thinkers. The impact of 
international policy-making is considered and the development of international data 
networks cannot be explained without it. In effect, Part I tried to show what is real about 
the global virtual economy. The second part focused on domestic institutions and turned 
the question around: What is fake about the network economy? This study focused on
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one ‘old style’ entity, a single domestic economy, Germany, with its government and its 
firms, as well as a ‘new style’ player, the internet start-up. In doing so, it contrasted two 
supposedly very different paces of change: The rapid, global network disruption 
initiated by start-up companies, and the continuous, steady, multicausal evolution of 
domestic institutions.
Summary of Part I- Global Opportunity
No single, early event symbolised the entrepreneurial wave which would be unleashed 
by the internet more than the initial public offering of the internet software company 
Netscape on NASDAQ on the 9th of August 1995. The start-up was financed by 
aggressive venture capital partners. Its vision combined idealism and self-serving 
business sense: Transform the internet into an ubiquitous and global consumer network. 
These two concepts are crucial to understanding the nature of the internet opportunity.
Electronic networks have been put to use in corporate environments for a long time. 
Since the 1970s, multinational manufacturers as well as financial services used global 
electronic networks to co-ordinate their business processes. But installing and 
maintaining these networks was very expensive and, most importantly, the investment 
was borne exclusively by the participating parties. The internet turned the top-down cost 
structure on its head; numerous parties shared the costs of the decentralised network. 
Furthermore, the internet was a ‘stupid network,’ meaning that intelligence was located 
at the periphery and not in the centre. This was important because the decentralised 
technology of the internet provided a point of easy entry for a vast range of new 
enterprises which challenged established players. These structural and technological 
factors associated with the internet were crucial preconditions for ubiquity.
Ubiquity inspired and enabled a broad range of new, sophisticated services. By 
integrating the consumer into seamless business webs (Tapscott, et al, 2000), whole 
business processes from manufacturing to warehousing, distribution and finally 
consumption could be carried out digitally. ‘Company-only’ networks were opened up 
and extended. One of the first types of start-ups to target the opportunities described 
here were indeed software companies such as Netscape. But others thrived initially as
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well: Internet service providers (ISPs) were a threat to telcos; web development firms 
competed against consultants and portals challenged media conglomerates. Then there 
were the throngs of different electronic commerce service companies in diverse business 
areas from retail to financial services. From 1995 onwards, a first wave of start-ups in 
the USA strove to become ‘first movers’ in this vast array of different service segments. 
It is important to keep in mind that these entrepreneurial firms had an important stake in 
the sophistication of the internet marketplace; they helped ‘create’ the ubiquitous 
marketplace by ‘inventing’ and perfecting new types of services. Yet, US government 
was involved in the sophistication of the internet marketplace as well; 
telecommunications liberalisation allowed a low price regime for internet access to 
emerge. Internet technologies were developed in a subsidised research environment.
Next to ubiquity, intemationality was a crucial aspect of the internet opportunity. The 
fastest growing among the US internet start-ups also began to internationalise and set up 
a presence in different country markets, mostly in Europe. In Europe, they confronted 
indigenous start-ups as well as established firms. Most indigenous start-ups had not 
internationalised in a similar manner as their US brethren; they were domestic in 
orientation and some represented attractive acquisition candidates. The supply side 
represented by these internet ventures needs to be viewed jointly with the demand side, 
however. Due to the increasingly global nature of specific service businesses such as 
banking and consulting as well as multinational industrial enterprises, a small, elite 
segment of the world-wide population demanded personal access to an international 
data network. The emergence of this ‘international society’ needs to be seen in 
conjunction with the emergence of transnational enterprises and international 
government policy preparing the grounds for this emergence.
Not all shifts in the global economy associated with the internet were breathtaking and 
new, however. Parts of our understanding are plainly wrong. The global network 
economy itself is not new; in fact, corporate networks have been around since the 1970s. 
And governments have not lost as much control over the world network flows as was 
claimed in the late 1990s. Even global financial flows can be controlled. The problem 
seems to be instead that subtle policy instruments have not been sufficiently explored. 
Abruptly killing off financial flows is easier than fine-tuning them. What was real and
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novel, however, was certain aspects associated with the internet. Here, we are not 
referring to internet technologies or the academic network, which have been around 
since the late 1960s. The internet meant the end o f ‘company-only’ and ‘country-only’ 
networks. These unique aspects were also the reasons for the popularity of the internet 
among commentators and investors. The internet had the potential to massively 
influence how we live our lives.
Summary of Part II- National Political Economy
In the second part, the study departed from the so-called global network revolution to 
examine the development of the internet in a specific, domestic environment. The 
reason for this downshift in scale was the following: A detailed examination of internet 
firms in their home environment would reveal to what extent these firms are linked to 
domestic institutions. Strong linkages would suggest that location has not lost its crucial 
importance, that firms cannot simply set up shop elsewhere- at least not new ventures 
engaging in innovative market shifts. Differences among innovation activity would 
furthermore point to the perseverance of variety and challenges the view that the world 
is converging- at least in the important area of innovation activity. Lastly, it would show 
that firms cannot speedily ‘overtake’ the structures they are embedded in and that ‘old’ 
domestic structures themselves may be more sustainable than assumed by network 
thinkers.
In order to allow the inclusion of sufficient amounts of detail, the approach of a focused, 
one-country study of Germany was selected which was complemented by ancillary 
research from other countries. Why Germany? One reason is that Germany is not the 
USA. Much of our understanding of the network economy is derived from the 
experience of the USA. Specifically, Germany was attractive for this investigation was 
because it was host to a surprising shift in entrepreneurial activity in the late 1990s. 
Known throughout the 1990s as the ‘sick man of Europe,’ Germany was perceived as a 
country with strong, established technologies but with a lack of entrepreneurial 
dynamism which would secure it leadership in information technologies and 
telecommunications. After 1997, entrepreneurship seemed to have reappeared, judging
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by the temporary success of public listings of dozens of local internet ventures on the 
new German alternative stock exchange, the Neuer Markt.
To understand the seeming revival of entrepreneurship in Germany, the activities of 
three types of agents crucial to the development of internet ventures were examined in 
detail: National government, the former monopoly telecommunications carrier and the 
entrepreneurial companies themselves. In addition to identifying three types of agents, 
two arenas of interaction were selected as being especially important for the 
development of internet ventures in Germany. These two arenas were 
telecommunications policy and technology policy, especially the promotion of venture 
capital. From the example of the United States, we know that sophistication in the 
internet marketplace was closely linked to telecommunications policy. The aspect of the 
internet that most encouraged innovation was its ubiquity, by linking consumers directly 
to firms providing products and services via one network. And ubiquity, in turn, was 
encouraged by low local call fees, consumer-friendly pricing structures and low cost of 
leased lines- a result of the particular course of telecommunications liberalisation in the 
United States which combined tight government control over local access with strong 
competition in distance telephony and data trunk lines.
Throughout most of the 1990s, the German telecommunications landscape was static, 
despite valiant attempts at change. In the early 1990s, for example, policy-makers in 
Germany had a unique opportunity to inject a dose of competition into the mostly 
monopolistic landscape. This opportunity was created by the unification of Germany 
and the necessity to rapidly upgrade the antiquated phone system of the East German 
states. Innovative solutions, such as the bundling of telecommunications with other 
services such as cable TV or energy could have emerged in this environment. The 
business and social climate as well demanded new ideas addressing the 
telecommunications bottleneck in Eastern Germany; businesses small and large and also 
parts of the population were ready for innovative policy. Although the fixed-line 
monopoly of the incumbent operator was institutionally protected by the German Basic 
Law, the historic moment could have been used to grant the states of the former German 
Democratic Republic an exceptional status. While the moment was unprecedented and
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numerous reasons can be cited why change would have been possible, the status quo 
was preferred. The opportunity was not grasped.
After this lost chance, telecommunications liberalisation in Germany slowly moved 
along its consensus-driven path. The monopolist, renamed Deutsche Telekom, was 
privatised and publicly listed in 1996. As a political compromise to the employees and 
the Social Democrats, the company retained its ownership over several key assets, 
including its online service T-Online as well as its cable TV network. The main reason 
for keeping control of cable TV could not have been earnings. Since the network was 
reduced to carrying only TV programs and was not charged with transporting telecom 
services, it was a loss-maker. The main reason to retain cable TV was to delay the 
arrival of telecommunications competition. A further political compromise was the 
granting of a two-year ‘window’ from 1996 to 1998 in which the former monopolist 
could prepare for competition. The interests of the employees of the Deutsche Telekom 
matched those of the German Finance Ministry, which wanted to keep its privatisation 
income as high as possible. Strong competition was equated with a lower share price 
and less money in the coffers of the state. This is also why the new independent 
regulator, the RegTP, which began its work upon the arrival of competition in 1998, was 
arguably not very popular among some Social Democrats and also the Finance Ministry. 
The arrival of RegTP marked a new era, however, and finally resulted in profound 
institutional change, a decade after liberalisation was first seriously discussed in 
Germany and about 16 years after first steps towards liberalisation in the United States. 
The incremental, slow, multicausal shifts, which took place here, fit snugly into the 
framework of institutionalist analysis.
The point is that, given the institutional environment in Germany, it would have been 
improbable for liberalisation to have arrived sooner (unless the external shock had been 
greater). It is not surprising that the historic opportunity during the aftermath of 
unification was not taken. Yet, introducing fixed-line competition at that time would 
have put Germany on an equal footing with Sweden. Sweden allowed a first private 
fixed-line competitor in 1991 and established legislation allowing further competition in 
1993. Instead, the German opportunity of 1989 was transformed into a burden- the costs 
of modernising east Germany's telecommunication infrastructure was paid for by the
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German telephone user, especially also the private internet user. Until 1999, Germany 
had one of the highest internet access prices in the whole of the OECD. Lower prices 
would have meant higher penetration early on, and more sophisticated and ubiquitous 
demand structures. Germany had consistently low internet advertising expenditures, for 
example; this had had a negative impact on those internet start-ups that intended to 
derive part of their income from advertising. The effect of lower access prices was 
demonstrated convincingly by the growth of internet usage from 1999, when the first, 
significantly cheaper internet access packages were introduced country-wide.
The ‘tale of three countries,’ Germany, the US and Sweden, described above shows that 
the development of sophisticated internet services was closely linked to institutional 
change. In the United States, profound institutional changes took place 16 years before 
Germany. At first glance, it seems as if there is a strong random element here in this 
story. There was no way that German policy makers debating the future of the national 
telecommunications landscape in the early 1990s could have foreseen the importance of 
the internet. Certainly, there were a few farsighted individuals within German academic 
institutions, such as University of Karlsruhe's Werner Zorn, who fought for the use of 
internet standards on the German academic network. But these grassroots conflicts were 
contained to the mostly academic internet community. The immense commercial 
potential of the internet and especially its potential for entrepreneurs was only apparent 
from August 1995. After this date, however, it became increasingly apparent that the 
internet provided an innovative space for new ventures. The delays in opening up the 
telecommunications landscape from 1996 to 1999 after change and a new institutional 
structure was politically agreed upon cannot be attributed to a lack of knowledge. They 
were due to particularist policy-making, favouring groups which had profited immensely 
from the status quo in the monopoly era and did not want to give up their comfortable 
position.
But to emphasise inadvertent effects of policy-making would be a mistake. We should 
not lose sight of the broader historical context these changes occurred in. Although 
policy-makers could not have been aware of the importance of the internet before 1995, 
they were already from the 1980s onwards observing the shifts taking place in 
telecommunications such as the rise of data networking and the growing importance of
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global corporate networks. Although only the internet allowed these changes to come to 
full fruition, the internet itself can also be seen to be a result of these changes. One of 
the objectives of the first part of this paper was to show how the internet was both 
unique as well as part of a longer technological development consisting of decades of 
innovation activity. In other countries, such as the USA, UK and Sweden, the 
institutional framework already in the 1980s and early 1990s encouraged the arrival of 
alternative networks. In Germany, however, institutional structures in 
telecommunications resisted change much longer.
Comparing innovative activity
There is no such thing as a global internet start-up. Instead, there are American as well 
as German, Swedish and other start-up firms. The strategy and resources of internet 
ventures are different from one country to the next; this is one of the most important 
findings of the project and it is presented in Chapters Six and Seven.
In order to investigate geographic particularity in the so-called network age, this paper 
explored the influence of two vital determinants of start-up activity: Internet demand as 
well as the availability of venture capital (VC). In the United States, a highly 
sophisticated, ubiquitous demand structure as well as a venture capital boom can both 
be associated with the wave of entrepreneurial activity on the internet. On the one hand, 
demand sophistication in the United States allowed start-ups to specialise, focus their 
resources and competitively address one facet among a wide array of industries. New 
services were developed at an astounding rate. On the other hand, venture capital helped 
finance the extremely rapid international growth of the ventures, allowing them, among 
other things, to temporarily disregard cash flow constraints and to acquire competing 
and ancillary firms.
Both factors together helped bring about the ‘model’ internet start-up. It had the 
following three characteristics. First, the company was a ‘pure-play’ start-up focusing all 
of its resources on a very specific area and catering to sophisticated demand for internet 
services. Second, the firm could run negative cash flow over a number of years; private 
and public investors supported its vigorous growth strategy. Third, its growth was
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international and was in part achieved through acquisition. Obviously, there existed US 
internet start-ups which did not match the above ‘pure-play’ ‘model’ and were not VC- 
financed. They were, in fact, the majority of firms. But the commercialisation of the 
internet was strongly influenced by those firms which did correspond to this ‘model.’
The German internet start-up was a ‘mixed-play’ company. First, the German start-up 
was more of a general service firm, combining project-specific consulting, web 
development or systems integration services for clients with ‘pure’ offerings on the 
internet. Project-specific services therefore supported the ‘pure’ work; for this reason, 
the companies had a positive cash flow. Second, very few companies were venture 
capital-financed from 1996 to 1998. Those firms that enjoyed the advantages of venture 
capital financing in the internet arena were firms which were more traditional software 
companies, such as Blaxxun, Intershop or Brokat. The traditional means of industrial 
financing in Germany, bank credits, were not extended liberally to knowledge-intensive 
industries lacking securities, such as the internet entrepreneurs. ‘Bootstrapped’ growth 
mostly was organic. Acquisitions were few in number. Venture capital in Germany only 
really took off from 1998, when public market appetite for internet investments grew 
and the success of the Neuer Markt became evident. Third, international expansion was 
cautious; only after 1998 did it become more vigorous. German internet ventures were 
preoccupied with their domestic market.
Yet, despite these traits which can be found not only in Germany but also across other 
countries in Europe, national distinctions existed. Particularly interesting is a small 
subset of Swedish internet start-ups, which shared some of the above European 
characteristics, but which already in the period from 1996 to 1998 started to 
internationalise and grow rapidly. These Swedish start-ups, such as Icon Medialab or 
Boxman, initially compensated for the lack of a thriving, technology and early-stage 
oriented venture capital industry by drawing upon active, private ‘angel’ investors and 
by embracing a lower-cost organic growth strategy. Most importantly, they profited 
from advanced home demand, a result of early telecommunications liberalisation. This 
transformed Sweden into a hotbed for internet innovation. The start-ups rapidly 
developed advanced consumer-oriented services, which were then ‘exported’ to other 
countries. The small size of the Swedish economy was not a barrier to development.
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Yet, it was also not a lone facilitator, as often argued; the Netherlands also is a small 
economy, but its internet demand was less sophisticated. Internet start-ups in Holland 
were more domestic in orientation. However, after an initial phase of European 
expansion, the capital-constrained Swedish start-ups encountered strong obstacles in 
securing their position and creating sustainable companies.
The contrast between Germany and Sweden is instructive. Germany was fairly well- 
endowed with venture capital in a European comparison; Sweden has extremely 
advanced internet demand, matching that of the United States. Although both 
components, venture capital and demand structures, are crucial to explain the US story, 
home demand sophistication served Swedish start-ups well in the early days. It gave 
them a boost to internationalise early on and assume a position as rivals second only to 
US start-ups expanding across Europe. Especially web development firms, those types 
of internet start-ups which could generate profits to invest in growth, fared well in their 
internationalisation effort. While capital constraints eventually contributed to their 
demise, the development of Swedish companies proved the crucial importance of 
sophisticated, ubiquitous local demand structures. The sophistication of the venture 
itself reflects the sophistication of the home market.
In this study, we have carried out a broad sweep from telecommunications policy and 
institutional path dependency to demand structures and have arrived at innovation, firm 
structure and resource allocation. In trying to find out how essential national 
institutional structures are for global competition in the network age we arrived at the 
following conclusion: They are crucial. In fact, the detailed investigations of Germany 
in this study revealed that entrepreneurial firms did not induce change. They responded 
not to global opportunities, but instead to a domestically refracted version of these 
opportunities. Refraction was influenced by the country-specific institutional 
environment. During the course of 1999, institutional change had made itself felt in 
factors influencing internet entrepreneurship, including significantly lower access prices 
and a growing volume of venture capital. This came late. A second generation of 
German internet start-ups which profited from these improved home conditions 
appeared from 1999; they were bom into an environment already clustered with first 
generation internet start-ups, established players and U.S. entrants. They also had to face
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the consequences of stock market downturn in 2000 while they were still very young. As 
a consequence, they did not have favourable growth opportunities either, despite 
changes in fundamental conditions for entrepreneurship in Germany.
While the German case probably is not surprising to students of institutional change, the 
history of internet start-ups in Silicon Valley seems to indicate the opposite. Here, 
entrepreneurs, not Washington, are viewed as inducing change. But the geographic 
distance between Washington and Mountain View obscured the fact that US ‘pure play’ 
internet start-ups are focused on a national market for internet services created by 
national telecommunications policy. Up to and including 1999, even the most 
internationally oriented US internet start-ups, such as Yahoo!, generated only a fraction 
of their of their sales outside of the USA.
One of the main advantages of Silicon Valley is the existing cluster of venture capital 
firms. It is an industry which has thrived due to local cluster effects as well as national 
policies, such as a reduction in capital gains taxes. It is important to emphasise, 
however, that the services venture capitalists provide are not unique, neither 
geographically nor historically. The example of Sweden shows how Swedish private 
financiers have actively helped internet start-ups to grow and expand internationally.
The main advantages of venture capital financing can thus also be provided by 
experienced and active private investors. Venture capital in its current form was 
perfected in Silicon Valley, but famous VCs include the Rothschilds, Oppenheims, 
Bethmanns and other European private banking families which were active during the 
industrial revolution by financing railroad and steamboat investment. The point here is 
not to downplay the tremendous cluster advantage of Silicon Valley or to 
underemphasise the vital role of the financiers of innovation, but to show active 
investment know-how may be internationally mobile in contrast to local demand 
conditions, which are fixed. Yet, the demise of the Swedish start-ups also shows that 
long-term success also requires sustained investor support which most private families 
will not be able to provide. The longer term support which was available through the 
public US capital markets for a window of several years up to 2000 was missing in 
Sweden.
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The comparison of German and Swedish ventures showed that local demand conditions 
are just as important for innovation direction and success as financing. They have a 
direct impact on resource allocation in the start-up. The ‘pure-play’ internet firm was 
instrumental in pioneering new services in a way that a ‘mixed-play’ could not. It would 
not come as a surprise to specialists of technological change that ‘innovation’ includes 
changes in market and firm structures. In fact, Schumpeter argued that entrepreneurs 
create demand for their innovations. Without sophisticated demand in the USA, ‘pure- 
play’ start-ups could not have existed, and vice-versa. The point here is that, despite the 
growth of global networks, national government power remains massive, among other 
things, through its decisive influence on internet uptake through telecommunications 
policy.
To a certain extent, the rapid rise of entrepreneurship in Germany and its similarly quick 
demise was ‘constructed’ by the investors on the alternative stock market Neuer Markt. 
The German internet ventures were, due to weak local demand structures and the initial 
difficulties in raising capital, not able to assume positions of international leadership in 
their category. They were from the very beginning not companies which were focusing 
their resources on the high-growth requirements of the international stock markets. The 
demise of these companies was already contained in the ‘mixed-play’ code of the firms, 
as discussed at length in Chapters Six and Seven.
Future directions of research
In examining the interdependence of small, innovative firms and national institutions, 
this study focused on a relatively narrow area. It honed in on two ‘external’ factors, 
demand and financing. The experiences in Germany and the United States during the 
1990s pointed to the critical importance of these two country-specific determinants. 
Nevertheless, research could also have focused on more inclusive ‘external’ factors such 
as macroeconomic variables or specific determinants such as the educational system. 
These factors relate to an important issue which has not stood at the centre of this effort, 
know-how and human capital. Chapter Six only briefly touched upon this issue. Know­
how is deeply influenced by institutional factors. In studying know-how formation it is 
possible to draw even tighter linkages between national institutions and firm innovation.
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In a recent book, Nicholas Ziegler has highlighted some of the ways in which policy­
makers, the research and the business community interact as part of a know-how 
producing system (1999). The experiences in Germany during the late 1990s with 
entrepreneurship also indicate a lack of experience among decision-makers in capital 
markets and among entrepreneurs. More work can be carried out in this area.
One of the main challenges encountered when examining know-how formation and 
utilisation, however, is the separation of different structures working on national, 
regional and local levels. Economic historians have debated what the most relevant level 
may be for the study of economic activity. Indeed, studies of Silicon Valley such as the 
seminal work by AnnaLee Saxenian emphasise local institutional characteristics (1994). 
It is argued that Silicon Valley structures are particularly performance-focused and open. 
They seem superior for the formation of new ventures to those closed, community- 
focused structures which Putnam described in Europe (see the excellent article by 
Cohen and Fields, 1999).
Yet, know-how formation in the so-called network economy is a difficult object of study 
at this point in time because effects are subtle and difficult to interpret. Alone the 
question of the relevant level of study is challenging. Does one emphasise local, 
regional, national or supra-national institutions? The determinants chosen for this 
project, telecommunications policy and the availability of venture capital, are clearly 
national, keeping in mind important supra-national influences such as the European 
integration process or effects of international trade negotiations. Other determinants, 
especially know-how formation, are not so easy to delineate. Again, an investigation 
into know-how formation will involve not only ‘new’ knowledge fields such as web 
development resources and database programming skills, but also ‘old’ factors, such as 
international management experience and an understanding of capital markets and 
venture capital investment procedures. Furthermore, as Ziegler has shown in his study 
about know-how formation, modes of interaction among expert groups are crucial. It 
may be necessary for time to pass before embarking upon a potentially very rewarding 
examination of know-how formation in the network economy.
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The power of national governments
In the Introduction, the research question guiding the thesis was presented. After years 
of apparent lack of dynamism in the German economy, a wave of entrepreneurship 
associated with the internet seemed to have appeared in the final years of the 1990s. The 
question asked was what the underlying drivers of this apparent turnaround were.
In the first part of the thesis, practitioner network thinking as well as research from 
sociology and other academic disciplines was drawn on to explain how the internet 
assumed global proportions. Furthermore, it was shown how internet ubiquity and 
intemationality stimulated technological and business process innovation. Yet, 
technological innovation stimulated by the internet opportunity did not occur in an 
isolated, economic sphere. Parallel social developments were crucial, especially the 
emergence of an elite, so-called ‘international society’ working for multinational service 
and industrial enterprises. Next to the international research community, this group was 
among the first groups to demand internet access. Ironically, network thinking itself 
played a crucial role in the development of the internet by providing an idealised self­
interpretation which activated further demand. Government played a crucial role, both in 
the internationalisation of the internet as well as in encouraging domestic adoption. The 
role of government policy cannot be characterised as ‘hands o ff  even in the United 
States, where telecommunications liberalisation, the promotion of venture capital and 
subsidy of the national research data network were crucial determinants. These findings 
are not surprising for institutionalist scholars, who emphasise that important innovations 
involve joint changes in the economic, social and political spheres.
Yet, how important were international developments vis-a-vis national factors in 
causing the apparent turnaround? Indeed, in the second part of this thesis, which was 
dedicated to the German case study, it was shown that German entrepreneurs did 
respond to the internet opportunity at roughly the same time as in other countries, 
including the US and Sweden. While the internet did have this discontinuous, cross- 
border effect, the ‘first generation’ German internet start-up was unlike its US or 
Swedish counterparts. It was a ‘mixed-play’ company, which focused largely as a 
services firm on the IT needs of established, domestic corporations in the internet era.
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The first generation German internet start-up was not able to directly focus on the two 
innovative, unique aspects of the internet opportunity: Its ubiquity among small 
companies and consumers as well as its intemationality. Nevertheless, the 
entrepreneurial response in Germany was amplified through the successful and rapid 
launch of the Neuer Markt, the alternative technology stock exchange. Due to the Neuer 
Markt, Germany appeared the most entrepreneurial country in Europe during the 
internet ‘stock bubble,’ while the underlying reality of the entrepreneurial response was 
lacking vigour. With the downturn of the market, this became apparent. The 
entrepreneurial response in Germany therefore can be seen to exhibit continuities with 
the weak path of IT development in Germany.
A series of factors can be listed to explain why Germany missed this ‘leapfrogging’ 
opportunity. As discussed in Chapter Six, one important factor surely was know-how 
and the structure of expert networks which included entrepreneurs, the research 
community, venture capitalists and investment bankers. These experts attempted to 
emulate the Silicon Valley ‘model’ of innovation but were challenged by their own 
inexperience. They also had to face persevering traditional German innovation models 
in which the entrepreneur carries more personal risk as well as retains more control. Yet, 
this began to change in Germany in the final years of the 1990s, as expert networks 
evolved and lessons were learned. To an extent, these human capital issues existed but 
they were certainly not alone in accounting for the weakness in the entrepreneurial 
response in Germany in the late 1990s.
It was shown in the thesis that two policy arenas had a significant impact on internet 
entrepreneurship in Germany. These policy arenas affected the way that entrepreneurs 
could respond to the novel aspects of the internet opportunity. They refracted global 
opportunity and can be used to explain the fundamental weaknesses of first generation 
German internet start-up companies. The first was the restriction of internet demand in 
Germany among small firms and consumers and the second was the initial lack of 
venture capital. The first factor was a direct result of the course of fixed-line 
telecommunications liberalisation in Germany and the second factor can be linked to 
high taxation of private wealth, other tax issues as well as the initial lack of a liquid 
public capital market for young technology companies. In the United States, policy in
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both arenas differed considerably. Telecommunications liberalisation- a process which 
was largely disadvantageous to established, dominant telecommunications players- led 
to lower, subsidised internet access pricing. Tax adjustments stimulated the venture 
capital industry and the investing of private seed money.
After 1998, fixed-line liberalisation in Germany led to improved internet demand 
structures. In parallel, innovation in the capital markets made itself felt in Germany. Yet, 
shifts in these two specific determinants had only limited impact on first generation 
internet ventures. Their resources and strategies were to a large degree aligned with the 
older conditions. Therefore, despite the fact that convergence with US conditions had 
occurred, the timing of changes was crucial. As a result, when one looks at the 
development of the internet, Germany remained distinct from the United States. 
Established media and telecommunications companies had a better position in Germany 
vis-a-vis internet newcomers than their counterparts in the United States.
The thinking forwarded here thus far could lead one to think that rapidly adjusting one's 
home market to ‘American’ conditions is the key to creating global business advantage. 
American conditions have been regarded largely (and wrongly) as ‘hands o ff 
government. Yet, critics who want to bring government ‘back in’ identify the widely 
embraced trend to emulate presumably ‘hands o ff US conditions with a ‘race to the 
bottom.’ Both camps in the debate, those who seek to emulate US conditions and those 
who are warning of a possible ‘race to the bottom,’ are making two fundamental 
mistakes. First, both the emulators and the critics o f ‘hands o ff  government seem to be 
overlooking one crucial aspect of technological innovation. Innovation activity is indeed 
intimately linked to home demand structures, which, in the case of the internet were 
associated with fixed-line telecommunications liberalisation. It is difficult to predict, 
however, what aspects of home demand will turn out to be crucial in the future. 
Technology waves, especially major disruptions, are difficult to forecast, as we have 
seen. If one seeks to orient one's economy to current American conditions one implicitly 
assumes that technology is static. Second, both camps in the debate are wrong in seeing 
regulation and technological innovation as opposites. Less regulation is not always the 
solution for encouraging technological innovation; sometimes stricter regulation is- this 
has been demonstrated powerfully in the so-called deregulation of financial services and
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the growth of alternative, technology-focused capital markets, such as the Neuer Markt. 
In these instances, deregulation actually meant more regulation. A further crucial area 
where ‘hands on’ government has been beneficial for innovation activity is active 
competition policy; in this study the profound consequences of the break-up of AT&T 
as well as the commercialisation of the internet research network in the United States 
have been discussed. The simplification resulting out of a bipolar classification of policy 
into ‘hands o ff  and ‘hands on’ is not very useful.
The dilemma for policy makers is apparent. By examining innovation carried out by 
internet firms, it was shown that there were different types of cars on the so-called 
‘information highway.’ Ferraris were racing against Fiats. And national governments 
were to a great extent responsible for this. They refracted the opportunities presented by 
the global economy and recast them; small firms oriented themselves very much 
according to this refracted, domestic reality. Despite the opportunities presented by 
global networks, entrepreneurs could not ‘overtake’ national institutional conditions or 
ignore refraction. Government policy has led to vibrant innovation activity among new 
ventures in certain cases, but has had the opposite effect in others. Unfortunately for 
policy-makers, it is not clear how their powers are best put to use; how can one 
transform Fiats into Ferraris? The solution certainly is not simply to try to mirror 
perceived US conditions at a given point in time. Maybe Fiats will even prove to be on 
the road longer while the Ferraris overheat and roll onto the side. As Hayek pointed out, 
government does not have a sufficient basis of knowledge to be able to rationally 
intervene on behalf of a specific technology. The market mechanism alone distinguishes 
effectively between rival technologies.
After examining the ‘new’ network economy both globally and in Germany, some 
commonplace, classic liberal conclusions can be returned to. It is precisely because of 
its tremendous power and not despite of it that government should focus instead on the 
‘lesser’ tasks: On setting the rules of the road, reducing particularist policies and 
emphasising vibrant competition. This is a reiteration of key aspects of the classic 
liberal approach, emphasised by German Ordoliberal writers. ‘Lesser’ means here not 
less government intervention, but instead less ambitious policy objectives. Framework
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rules are preferred; ‘experimental’ process intervention is shunned (Sally, 1998, 108, 
109; see also Eucken, 1990).
But although Ordoliberalism had its home in Germany, the country was exposed to “the 
reality of daily mercantilism” (Starbatty, 1999,170, 171). Some German policy-makers 
were, in part, sincere in their confidence that their particularist sponsorship of a single, 
dominant firm, a ‘national champion,’ would foster innovation in their country. The 
underlying idea was that only a powerful, large entity can compete and innovate in a 
global environment. In fact, the impulse for telecommunications liberalisation in 
Germany seems to have sprung in part out of the desire of some policy-makers to ‘free’ 
the national champion to compete globally. Viewing telecommunications as an 
infrastructure good seems to have been regarded by these politicians as an ‘old 
fashioned’ perspective. National champion priorities were in alignment with 
institutional relationships. For example, despite the fact that the former monopolist is 
publicly quoted, German government was and still is a significant shareholder.
Active government technology policy has often been praised when discussing GSM, the 
European telecommunications standard. Indeed, the scale benefits of European GSM 
were apparent to large, pan-European operators and especially for the equipment 
manufacturers. Yet, the GSM standard was introduced in parallel with successful, early 
liberalisation and pro-competitive policy in the mobile telephony segment. By 
mentioning GSM as an example, we are being sympathetic to European technology 
policy. Large-scale standard setting in Europe has also failed by missing the needs of the 
market; this is not surprising, since market needs are notoriously difficult to forecast. 
When referring to GSM, one should also mention the example of ISO/ OSI, the 
networking standard advocated by European governments in place of internet standards. 
Policy support for this favourite standard of the large telecommunications monopolists 
delayed internet adoption in Europe. The effect of another telecommunications standard, 
UMTS, on the innovative activity of smaller ventures is as of yet not apparent.
It seems clear from this research that determined, early competition policy in the fixed- 
line telecommunications arena would have had a profound effect on the development of 
first generation internet ventures in Germany. Some liberal political economists regard
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active competition policy with suspicion due to the danger of abuse. Nevertheless, 
Ordoliberal writers, for example, explicitly included active competition policy as a 
necessary component of ‘framework’ policy. This is because Ordoliberals were just as 
concerned about the issue of power misuse by market players in the economy as they 
were concerned about power misuse by government (Sally, 1998,106-117). In fact, 
arguments for proactive competition intervention adopted to the so-called ‘network 
economy’ have become popular recently. Active competition policy was promoted by 
some US economists during the Microsoft trials. These economists argued that the lock- 
in effect occurring as a result of network externalities in the information economy gave 
established players an unfair advantage over newcomers, thus inhibiting innovation. To 
use another example, the German federal cartel authority has recently expressed concern 
that internet-based exchanges of bulk commodities such as cement can lead to illicit 
trust agreements between large buyers.
Given this very relevant current debate about the role of competition policy vis-a-vis 
global data networks, perhaps it is important to remind oneself here of the 
institutionalist premise that the market itself is an institution formed deliberately by 
actors in the economic, political and social spheres. What appears as proactive 
government intervention prone to abuse can also be interpreted as framework policy to 
insure a functioning market mechanism which can serve to select among rival 
technologies. The best example of a functioning market is the actively regulated stock 
market.4 It is interesting that even when studying a global wave of entrepreneurship, the 
aftertaste that seems to linger around longer feels a little more like Weber than 
Schumpeter.
3 “Kartellkonferenz in Berlin. Miiller: Freie Bahn fttrs Internet. EU-Kommissar Monti fordert weltweite 
Kooperation der Wettbewerbsbehorden" and „Thema des Tages. Wettbewerb durch Tempo," Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, 22.05.01, page 21.
4 In Emancipation, the Media and Modernity, a masterful book on media and technologies which also is a 
critique o f the so-called ‘new economy,’ the sociologist Nicholas Gamham includes a section on path 
dependency, lock-in and competition (2000, 75-78). In this section, Gamham describes how economists 
have shown that the Hayekian market mechanism for the selection o f technologies is suspended through 
the forces o f path dependency and lock-in. Gamham seems to suggest that in a network economy the 
market mechanism as a whole has limitations. If we view the market as a deliberately constructed 
institution, however, Gamham’s critique seems self-evident.
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Appendix A: Procedure and Results of the globalstartup Survey
As stated in Chapter Six, in early 1998, a representative list of internet start-ups in 
Germany was not available. Nor had the press identified internet companies beyond a 
small handful of high profile firms. For this reason, firms had to identify themselves 
by responding to a publicity campaign. The response rate was boosted by the 
participation of the monthly business publication manager magazin. They announced 
that they would to publish an article on a selection of start-up case studies in Fall 1998 
drawn from the pool of survey participants.1 The editors of manager magazin as well 
as “Spiegel Online,” the web publication of Der Spiegel, are thanked here for their 
indispensable and very kind co-operation.
An important factor which had to be taken into consideration was that entrepreneurs 
in the first months of their start-up phase have very limited spare time. In order to 
speed up the registration process, a web site was set up which allowed on-line 
registration (under http://www.globalstartup.com/ and http://www.smallfirm.org/).
The initial questionnaire was comprised of a brief set of basic questions. These were 
specifically devised to be filled out by entrepreneurs, questions on possibly 
confidential data such as sales figures were avoided. A selection of these internet 
start-ups were identified as potential high-growth companies. These entrepreneurs 
were asked to spend additional time on a second questionnaire. They were personally 
contacted by the author who assured them that he would respect their confidentiality 
concerns. The second questionnaire was designed to generate numerical data not 
contained in the first, such as sales figures. In addition, many of the founding 
managers of these selected companies were interviewed in person by the author to 
generate qualitative data for the project. Sample web site pages from the original 
survey can be found in the exhibit at the end of this section.
For the reasons just outlined, the design of the study had to address issues usually not 
present in other empirical surveys. The lack of a representative list of internet start­
ups was the most important issue. The results must, on the one hand, be viewed as 
tentative and useful mainly for the generation of leads and key concepts, for an initial 
taxonomy and to identify interview partners. On the other hand, the good timing of 
the survey at the beginning of increasing public interest in Germany for the internet 
start-up phenomenon resulted in a good awareness and a high number of responses. 
Contemporary experts, such as German venture capitalists, believed that the pool of 
responding firms was indeed representative. The numbers generated reflected their 
own observations at the time.
Procedure
1. Publicity campaign.
Publicity efforts began in mid January 1998. Firms could sign up on the 
globalstartup.com and smallfirm.org web sites until 15.03.98.
1 Helene Laube, Jochen Rieker, “Neue deutsche Welle” and “Shooting Stars,” Manager Magazin, 
October 1998, pages 208 -  231.
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Several internet start-ups as well as venture capital (VC) firms were contacted directly 
via email. VC investment managers were asked to identify the internet companies 
they had invested in.
Posts were placed in two internet newsletters. One was in the official mailing list of 
dmmv, the German multimedia association. The "dmmv E-Flash," was subscribed to 
by 360 member firms. The post appeared on 06.02.98. The other was a marketing 
mailing list, which was promoted by the multimedia marketing trade journal 
“Horizont.net.” The "Netmarketing-Digest" had 1,800 subscribers when the post 
appeared on 29.01.98.
An announcement of the study was made on “Spiegel Online” 
(http://www.spiegel.de/). The announcement ran from 15.02. until 15.03.98 under the 
business section of the home page. According to the "Informationsgemeinschaft zur 
Feststellung der Verbreitung von WerbetrSgem e.V." (IVW, http://www.ivw.de/) the 
site had 688,015 'visits' in January 1998 and was among the most frequently visited 
German-language content sites. This announcement on “Spiegel Online” can also be 
found in the exhibit at the end of this section.
An announcement was made on page 36 in the March 1998 print issue of manager 
magazin, which was released on 20.02. At the time, manager magazin had a 
readership exceeding 500.000 according to IVW.
2. Signing up.
The following restrictions were announced:
- The firm has to have its headquarters in Germany.
- The firm should not be older than two years or must have redefined the its
business strategy in the last two years.
The firm needs to have an international focus.
- Products or services of the firm should have a direct connection with the internet
or other online services.
The firms were free to interpret these criteria themselves and fill out a questionnaire 
of 28 questions.
3. First sample (n=123) o f  internet start-ups.
140 entries were collected. 11 entries were excluded from further analysis because the 
firms were in their sixth year of existence or older (founded before 1994). They could 
not be considered firms in a start-up or seed phase. Two entries were excluded 
because they were not firms. Both were projects at universities. One New York-based 
LLC and one Delaware corporation were removed. There were two double entries.
123 firms remained.
The ventures were then classified according to a taxonomy. 22 business areas and four 
groups (“Web developers,” “Software,” “Portals sites, electronic commerce start-ups 
and business-to-business exchanges” and “Others”) were defined. The classification
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was carried out on the basis of an evaluation of the returned survey as well as 
information found on the web sites of the firms.
4. Second sample (n=30) o f internationally active or potentially internationally active 
internet start-ups.
Of the firms that has signed up, 52 firms belonged to business groups that seemed 
especially promising for international expansion (“Software” and “Portal sites, 
electronic commerce start-ups and business-to-business exchanges”). These were 
further analysed according to the level of their international activity or potential 
international activity. This was again based on the survey answers as well as the firm's 
web sites. 28 start-ups were selected for an informal interview and a second 
questionnaire. 3 firms from other business groups that nonetheless were potentially 
high growth were added to this sample.
The founding managers of 18 firms were informally interviewed in person. Two 
founding managers were interviewed in their offices and the rest during the computer 
trade fair CeBIT '98 in Hannover. 13 were contacted over the phone. The founding 
managers of the selected firms were asked to fill out a second survey, which required 
more detailed and sensitive information than the first questionnaire. All agreed to fill 
out this second questionnaire on an anonymous basis, meaning that the results would 
only appear in aggregate form. The second survey was sent out by email in April and 
returned by 30 founding managers. One founding manager failed to return the second 
survey due to time constraints.
This procedure insured that two separate survey results could be analysed, one with a 
sample of 123 respondents and a second, more detailed survey, with a sample of 30 
respondents (the names of the 30 selected firms are listed at the end of this Appendix). 
In addition, 18 personal interviews with founding managers were carried out.
Firm taxonomy details
Before analysis, the firms were classified according to their primary business area. 
Business areas were grouped into potentially international, high growth segments 
(“Software” and “Portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups and business-to-business 
exchanges”) as well as generally project-oriented start-ups with a national or regional 
focus, the “Web developers.” Firms with a software and a portal focus are related in 
that, much of the time, internet software enables internet portal sites and electronic 
commerce companies to conduct their business.
The classification by business area was central to the study. Of course, overlaps were 
possible. Some firms were placed into one area, although they could conceivably 
belong to another area as well.
Note: In calculations where absolute numbers of international and domestic clients as 
well as turnover approximations were used, one electronic commerce start-up had to 
be excluded because the number of its consumers exceeded the totals of all other 
firms together. This caused strong distortions especially in comparisons between 
software and service start-ups.
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Here, the different start-up types are explained:
a) Web developers, n=57: These firms worked primarily on a project-by-project basis. 
They were systems consultants or new media agencies. Their revenue came from 
assisting other firms in realising their internet presence or an internet-supported 
business model. In the mid-90s, entrepreneurs involved in this process described 
themselves as 'evangelists' because they saw it as their task to convince their clients 
and also consumers of the benefits of internet activity (see Waesche, 1999a).
New media agencies: Companies that specialised in the design and development of 
internet sites and other digital media. They often had marketing know-how and co­
operated with systems consultants in realising projects for their clients.
Systems consultants: Companies that developed custom software configurations for 
clients and carried out systems integration. Usually this involved database technology.
Consultants, training: Companies that trained business users in use of the internet or 
consulted firms on all aspects of internet business.
TV/ internet studios: Firms that carried out video productions for use as streaming 
video over the internet.
3D: New media agencies that concentrated on 3D productions for the internet.
b) Software start-ups, n=23: Internet software firms with a high product 
standardisation potential.
Ecommerce software: Standardised or semi-standardised software that facilitated 
electronic commerce. ECommerce was defined as the sale of digital or non-digital 
products over the internet. ECommerce software often involved software for 
database-driven product catalogues and transaction components such as a virtual 
'shopping basket.' Firms partnered with financial software firms and financial service 
institutions. Clients were retailers.
Publishing systems: Standardised or semi-standardised software to control the process 
of publishing either solely on internets and intranets or also on other platforms such as 
CD-ROM or print catalogues. The ability to publish on other platforms was referred 
to as 'cross-media.' Publishing large internet sites or handling intranets with several 
sites was very complex task. This software tried to solve some of the problems 
associated with this task. Clients thus could be publishing houses or corporations with 
intranets.
Knowledge management: Software that attempted to solve the problem frequently 
referred to as 'information overload.' This type of software could be very simple or 
very complex, ranging from personal browser-based web-search tools to on-line 
information analysis systems for sales force databases. Information filters, 
autonomous agents and one-to-one customer profiling and addressing were all part of
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this category. A wide variety of different clients were possible including consumers 
and corporate systems in the service sector.
Financial software/ encryption'. Software that managed transactions over the internet 
and their security. Could be used to insure that data could not be used by third parties 
or to insure that a given document transferred over the internet was actually from a 
given party and authentic. Clients could be financial institutions or internet retailers.
EBusiness (Business processes): Internet software that supported business processes, 
either work-flow processes common to service corporations such as insurance 
companies and airlines or production or sale processes including warehouse 
management systems. Software often needed to integrate with SAP or legacy systems 
and thus had a strong middleware component. Clients could be all types of firms, 
service or manufacturing.
EBusiness (Communication): Internet software for firms that aimed to improve 
internal and external communications. Email, fax and internet conference system 
software all belonged to this genre.
c) Portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups and business-to-business exchanges
(forthwith: “Portal sites”), n=29: Internet start-ups with a high growth potential 
offering content, retail or exchange services to consumers or business clients.
Sale o f  products'. This group included both the so-called “e-tailers” which targeted 
consumers as well as procurement specialists, focusing on businesses. Competition by 
price, sometimes also by dynamic prices, was combined with branding and 
community approach.
Content: All types of content developed for publishing on the internet targeting 
consumers as well as businesses. Revenue could come from different sources: internet 
advertising through banners, sponsorship by a firm or subscription fees.
Hotel, travel’. The consulting group Datamonitor (http://www.datamonitor.com/) 
identified the travel industry as the internet industry with the highest proportion of 
total on-line sales (in a release of 28.04.98). In this survey, the travel area included 
not only the sale of travel services but also the development of online application 
services for hotels, such as booking systems hosted by the start-up.
Brokers: Internet-based services that provided bidding services or classified ads for 
their clients.
Extranets'. Extranets are networks linking two or more firms. The use of the term has 
since become unpopular and was replaced by business-to-business exchanges (B2B). 
Neither of the two terms is very precise and could refer to a wide array of different 
data network services connecting separate firms, including transfer of pricing 
information and or warehousing information for supply chain optimisation. It could 
also just refer to internal company news content being shared among different firms. 
Extranets were the successors to electronic data interchange (EDI). Relative to EDI, 
extranets were be cheaper to install and maintain, thus new combinations of
292
businesses could be linked. EDI would have in the past been much too expensive, for 
example, for electronically linking small retail outlets with a manufacturer.
Community, chats: Chat-based communities were usually consumer communities. 
Their purpose was entertainment. Revenue from hosting a chat community came from 
internet-advertising or, again, from sponsorship. The obstacles to building a 
successful revenue model were similar to those for content services.
Entertainment: As in the case with hotel and travel, firms in this business area catered 
to both business clients or to consumers. This category included firms specialised on 
providing application services for businesses which enabled game design. 
Alternatively, they provided internet entertainment experiences for consumers 
directly.
Marketing, ad services: This referred to centralised services for internet advertising. 
Service firms hosted advertising networks, which allowed what usually were small 
firms to participate in group advertising initiatives.
d) Others, n=14: Businesses that could not be placed into one of the above groups.
Provider, internet outsourcer: Firms that specialised in providing access to the 
internet or in hosting sites. This was a pioneering industry for the internet. By 1998, 
consolidation had already set in world-wide.
Hardware for internet access: Any equipment that was required for accessing the 
internet (such as modems).
Telecommunication services, networks: Telecommunication services such as software 
for locating the cheapest telecom provider. Telecommunications networking and 
telecommunications infrastructure.
Main survey results
1. The average German internet firm that participated in the survey was 1.8 
years old and employed 20 people.
The total number of employees of all firms together: 2,422. Mean total employment 
was 19.7.
Table 1. Breakdown of employees.
Mean % of total Median
Contract 11 54% 5
Free 6 31% 4
Abroad 3 15% 0
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36% of all firms were incorporated as Personengesellschaften, 59% as GmbH and 6% 
as AG.
2. Discounting international employment, the potential high-growth firms that 
were selected for the second, detailed questionnaire had more aggressive 
financial strategies than the general group.
Table 2. Key characteristics of the original sample and the 30 selected firms.
Original
sample
Selected
firms
Number of firms n=123 n=30
Average age 
(years)
1.8 1.7
Total employees/ 
firm
19.7 17.6
International 
employees/ firm
3.0 1.9
% int. employees 15% 11%
% int.
partnerships
16% 22%
% int. business 
clients
2% 13%
% int. consumers 0% 3%
% consumer firms 
of total
15% 7%
Likelihood of VC 
financing
11% 30%
Likelihood of tbg 
support
4% 13%
Likelihood of 
federal support
4% 7%
Likelihood of 
state support
8% 7%
Likelihood of 
bank loan
20% 20%
% are Personen- 
gesellschafien
36% 27%
3. The most popular form of financing an internet firm was by reinvesting 
profits. This was followed by investment by individuals (angels or founders), 
bank loans and venture capital.
At first glance, venture capital seemed a relatively significant form of financing 
for internet firms in Germany. It was the fourth popular financing option with 
11% of all firms being VC-financed. Instead of “VC-financed,” a more 
appropriate term to be used for this group of firms, however, would have been 
“private equity-financed.” In Germany, at the time, the range of services, which 
should have been available through an active venture capital investor, were not
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yet well understood. Entrepreneurs thought they were recipients of venture 
capital investments, when, in fact, they were not. The two terms “private equity” 
and “venture capital” were sometimes used interchangeably (instead of 
understanding venture capital as an early-stage, technology-oriented and active 
type of private equity investor).
Furthermore, the survey design contained a bias towards venture capital-backed 
firms. High profile venture capital investors had been contacted and their 
portfolio firms were asked to participate.
tbg-backed companies automatically required an individual or an active VC firm 
as a co-investor. Due to the selection process of the tbg, these companies better 
matched the criteria, which one would have associated with high-growth, VC- 
financed firms. For example, the proportion of firms, which generated profits 
available for reinvesting, was low. Furthermore, the proportion of “pure play” 
companies was higher and project-by-project work lower (see Tables 17,18). 
However, only 5% of all companies in the sample were tbg-financed and the 
majority of these were software start-ups.
Table 3. Forms of financing.
All firms Firms with 
VC
Firms with 
bank loans
Firms with 
tbg
support
Selected 
firms for 
second 
survey
Reinvesting profits 79% 43% 88% 33% 70%
Individuals 33% 14% 33% 33% 23%
Bank loan 20% 21% 100% 17% 20%
VC 11% 100% 13% 83% 30%
State ("Land") 
program
8% 21% 17% 17% 17%
Parent company 8% 0% 4% 0% 3%
tbg 5% 36% 4% 100% 13%
Other 5% 7% 8% 0% 3%
Federal program 4% 21% 8% 17% 7%
Table 4. Financial strategies of different business areas.
All firms Web
developers
Software Portal
Individuals 33% 33% 30% 31%
Reinvesting
profits
79% 86% 70% 79%
VC 11% 4% 17% 21%
Bank 20% 23% 22% 14%
tbg 5% 0% 17% 7%
Federal program 4% 2% 9% 0%
State program 8% 7% 4% 7%
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Parent company 8% 7% 4% 7%
Other 5% 7% 0% 3%
Most firms used more than one different type of financing.
4. The largest employers were internet service providers and software start-ups. 
Portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups start-ups and business-to-business 
exchanges were among the smallest employers.
Table 5. Business areas and employment.
Number of 
firms in sample
Number of 
employees
Employees/ 
firm (rounded)
New media 
agencies
33 555 17
Systems
consultants
15 267 18
Sale of products 6 57 10
Ecommerce
software
8 356 45
Publishing
systems
7 113 16
Content 6 40 7
Hotel, travel 3 15 5
Brokers 4 68 17
Consultants,
training
5 40 8
Provider,
outsourcer
9 458 51
Knowledge
management
2 40 20
Hardware for 
access
1 20 20
Telecom.
services,
networks
4 35 9
TV/ Internet 2 31 16
Extranets, EDI 4 52 13
3D 2 14 7
Community,
chat
2 38 19
Financial
software/
encryption
1 41 41
EBusiness
(Business
processes)
4 125 31
Entertainment,
games
3 33 11
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Marketing, ad 
service
1 18 18
EBusiness
(Communicatio
n)
1 6 6
123 2.422 20
Table 6. The largest average employers. Numbers are mean total employment/ firm.
Provider,
outsourcer
51
Ecommerce
software
45
Financial
services/
encryption
41
EBusiness
(Business
processes)
31
Table 7. The smallest average employers. Numbers are mean total employment/ firm.
Hotel, travel 5
EBusiness 6
(Communicatio
n)
3D 7
Content 7
5. The most popular business areas for German internet software start-ups were 
electronic commerce software, publishing systems and business processes. 
Internet portal start-ups focused on the sale of products (“e-tailers” and 
procurement specialists), content, information brokerage and extranets (“B2B”).
In the United States, firms emphasised roughly the same areas with the exception 
that knowledge management software was a much more frequent and electronic 
commerce software a less frequent business focus than in Germany.
Table 8. Frequencies of software and service start-ups by business area.
Frequency % of start-ups Frequency (US 
sample*)
% of start-ups 
(US sample*)
Software start-ups
Ecommerce
software
8 15% 5 7%
Publishing
systems
7 13% 11 16%
Knowledge
management
2 4% 18 26%
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Financial
software/
encryption
1 2% 0 0%
EBusiness
(Business
processes)
4 8% 16 23%
EBusiness
(Communicatio
n)
1 2% 4 6%
Portal sites and electronic commerce start-ups
Sale of products 6 12% 0 0%
Content 6 12% 7 10%
Hotel, travel 3 6% 1 1%
Brokers 4 8% 1 1%
Extranets, EDI 4 8% 1 1%
Community,
chat
2 4% 5 7%
Entertainment,
games
3 6% 0 0%
Marketing, ad 
service
1 2% 1 1%
Total 52 100% 70 100%
(* US data was obtained from Upside Media Inc.'s "Upside's 1998 Hot 100 Private 
Companies" which can be found on http://www.upside.com/. The report is dated 
30.03.98. Since the companies were categorised differently, the profile of each US 
firm was evaluated and the company placed into one of the business area groupings 
above. Firms from areas, which were not relevant to this survey, such as 
semiconductor equipment, were not included. Included were firms from the 
following: Ecommerce, Online Content, Net Infrastructure, Enterprise Software and 
Business Automation. The Upside survey was similar to globalstartup in that the 
companies nominated themselves. One difference in the table above is important, 
however: The Upside list included only selected firms, this particular globalstartup list 
included all software and service start-ups that participated. The Upside list therefore 
already reflected the selection process of the editors and industry experts.)
6. Business area alone did not seem to influence the level of international activity 
of a firm. Software start-ups were internationally active to a greater degree when 
measured by the numbers of employees abroad. Web developers and portal sites 
cultivated international partnerships to compensate for their lack of offices in 
countries outside of Germany.
Table 9. Business areas and proportion of international activity.
All firms 
(n=123)
Web
developers
(n=57)
Software
(n=23)
Portal
(n=29)
% int. employment 15% 7% 22% 16%
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% int. partnerships 16% 19% 19% 12%
% int. business 
clients
2% 13% 4% 23%
% int. consumers 0% 12% N/A 5%
7. Overall, growth expectations were good among those internet firms selected 
for the second survey. The firms expected to grow in sales by over 200% and in 
employees by over 60% in 1998. Software start-ups expected to generate DM 5.2 
million in sales, portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups and business-to- 
business exchanges around DM 1.2 million. The growth expectations of portal 
sites, however, lagged those of software firms considerably.
Table 10. Expected turnover and current employee growth in DM millions.
All
selected
firms*
Software Portal
1997 turnover 1.00 1.26 0.74
1998 expected 
turnover
3.00 5.17 1.24
Sales growth 200% 310% 68%
Current
employees
(rounded)
17 24 11
Growth in 
employees/ year
77% 103% 61%
(* Due to the fact that many firms were founded in 1997 or 1998, only 18 respondents 
gave turnover figures for 1997. For 1998 expected turnover, 28 firms responded.)
8. Estimated total start-up capital required by the selected internet firms to 
reach break-even ranged between DM 14,000 and DM 12,500,000. The average 
start-up capital required by a software firm was DM 2.8 million and for a portal 
site DM 1.3 million. These requirements seemed low compared to those of US 
internet firms and reflected the greater reliance in Germany on business models 
with early profit expectations.
Table 11. Start-up capital required by selected internet firms in DM.*
Mean 2.171.172
Median 1.000.000
Maximum 12.500.000
Minimum 14.000
Standard
deviation
(sample)
2.826.348
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(* n=29, one firm did not respond to this question.)
On average, the selected firms estimated months to break-even as 21 months. The 
median was quite close to this figure, 19. Minimum was 6 months, maximum 42 
months.
Table 12. Mean start-up capital required in DM millions and months to break-even by 
internet firm type.
Start-up
capital
Months to 
break-even
Software 2.8 24
Portal 1.3 19
9. Because portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups and business-to-business 
exchanges offered their services over the internet, their hardware and software 
as well as telecommunication and provider costs were substantial. 
Telecommunication and provider costs of internet software start-ups were much 
lower because they still sold software as a shrink-wrapped product and generally 
only conducted market research and software support over the internet.
Table 13. Mean distribution of costs.
All selected 
firms
Software Portal
Employees 52% 57% 47%
Hard- and 
software
15% 12% 19%
Telecommunica 
tion and 
provider
11% 7% 15%
Marketing, PR 
and advertising
17% 19% 15%
Other 5% 6% 3%
100% 100% 100%
10. tbg financed companies were internationally more active than the average 
selected software company but about equally active to portal sites. However, 
these figures have been influenced by the fact that high international sales were 
achieved by a small number of very active companies. Most start-ups in 
Germany were not internationally active.
Table 14. Geographic distribution of sales in %.
All selected 
firms
Software Portal tbg financed 
companies
Germany 79% 90% 66% 67%
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Rest of Europe 12% 5% 20% 24%
Rest of world 9% 5% 15% 9%
100% 100% 100% 100%
The median for all selected firms was 90% sales in Germany, 10% total foreign sales. 
11 of the selected firms, however, had a significant proportion of total foreign sales, 
between 30% and 90%.
Table 15. Number of firms with given percentage of foreign sales.
% foreign 
sales
Frequency %
90-100% 2 7%
80-89% 0 0%
70-79% 0 0%
60-69% 1 3%
50-59% 1 3%
40-49% 3 10%
30-39% 4 13%
20-29% 2 7%
10-19% 5 17%
0-9% 12 40%
30 100%
11. Software as well as portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups and business- 
to-business exchanges all concentrated mainly on the US market for future 
expansion. Aside from this US focus, however, portal firms were geographically 
more diversified and were interested also in the Asian market.
Table 16. Importance of different international markets. Percentage of firms in group 
that answered affirmatively.
Software Portal
"The USA is an important 
market."
85% 79%
"An office in the USA is 
necessary."
54% 50%
"Eastern Europe is an important 
market."
38% 50%
"Asia is an important market." 54% 71%
12. On average, a large proportion of sales by both software as well as portal 
sites was derived from project-by-project work. Software start-ups were 
especially dependent on project-by-project income. About one fourth of all 
selected firms were “hybrid” companies generating revenue through both
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significant project sales as well as significant product work. Only about 40% of 
the selected firms were “pure play” firms focused on generating sales mostly 
from products or scalable offerings.
Table 17. Break-up of revenue sources from project work or products by internet firm 
type.
Software Portal tbg financed
Proj ect-by-proj ect 62% 43% 30%
Product, scalable offerings 38% 57% 70%
Table 18. Proportion of start-ups generating most of their sales from project work or 
product sales.
All firms % of total tbg financed
Mostly project-by-project* 10 35% 0
Mostly product, scalable 
offerings (“pure play”)
12 41% 3
“Hybrids” 7 24% 1
29 100% 4
(* “Mostly project-by-project” was defined as project revenues of 75% or above, 
“Mostly product, scalable offerings” as product or scalable service sales of 75% or 
above. The two consumer start-ups were included in this latter category. One firm did 
not respond to this question.)
13. The thirty selected firms together had 134 job openings. Especially German 
software start-ups were working significantly under capacity.
Table 19. Firms are currently at % working capacity.
All selected 
firms
Software Portal
Mean 81% 78% 86%
14. Most German internet firms had two active managing directors who were 
also the founders of the firm. There still were a significant number of start-ups 
with a single founding manager.
Table 20. Number of active founding managers.
Number of 
active managers
Frequency in 
sample
% of total
1 10 33%
2 14 47%
3 5 17%
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4 1 3%
5 0 0%
30 100%
The average number of active founding managers was 1.90 over all firms, 2.00 for 
software start-ups and 1.86 for portal start-ups.
These results can be compared to those of the Stanford Project on Emerging 
Companies (SPEC). In 1996,160 start-ups of the Bay Area were examined. The most 
common number of founders also was two, but there were firms with three, four, five, 
six, seven, nine and twelve founders. The mean was therefore higher: 2.81 
(http://www-gsb.stanford.edu/research/programs/SPEC/).
15. Founding managers of internet portal sites and electronic commerce start­
ups generally had encountered commercial online networks earlier than their 
counterparts at software start-ups. One reason may have been the slightly higher 
average age of service founding managers.
Table 21. When did managing directors first encounter commercial value-added 
networks? Number of affirmative indications. Multiple answers possible.
All selected 
firms
Software Portal
1977-90
BTX
8 2 6
1991-94
On-line services
19 9 9
1995-
Internet
9 5 2
The mean age of all managing founders was 33 at the founding of their firm. The 
founding managers of software start-ups were on the average 31 at the founding of 
their firm, portal entrepreneurs were 34.
16. Most founding managers of the selected internet firms completed a university 
program. The number of founding managers who studied in a computer science 
related program was matched by those who elected a business related program.
Table 22. Types of university or vocational college courses completed by founding 
managers.
All firms Software Portal
Business courses 19 11 7
Computer courses 15 10 5
Other courses 12 2 7
Table 23. Other career experiences listed by managing founders.
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All firms Software Portal
Uncompleted 
university/ 
vocational college
4 4 0
Programming
experience
15 8 6
Started a company 
before
12 6 4
Employee at SME 15 7 7
Employee at MNE 14 5 9
Self-employment 19 8 10
17. Those founding managers who recommend a public funding program were 
matched almost exactly by those who advise against all programs. DtA, KfW and 
state (Land) programs were in equally high regard by those who recommended 
public funding.
Table 24. Number of entries from selected firms, which recommended public funding 
in Germany.
All selected 
firms
Can recommend 13
Cannot
recommend
12
No comment 5
Table 25. Recommended public funding programs.
All selected 
firms*
DtA tbg 5
DtA
Existenzgriinder
1
KfW 5
State# 5
(* Multiple selections of different programs possible.)
(# Named were: Land Baden-Wiirttemberg, MFG Medien- und Filmges. Baden 
Wurttemberg, Sachsische Entwicklungsges. fur Telematik mbH, 
Mittelstandsforderung Sachsen and Bayern Kapital.)
18. The German multimedia law (IuKDG) of 1997 did not seem very relevant to 
German internet firms at the time, but the deregulation of the 
telecommunications market did.
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Table 26. Number of affirmative responses to the question whether the given issue 
affects the firm today.
All selected firms
"Is the IuKDG relevant to your business today?" 53%
"Is the deregulation of telecommunications 
relevant to your business today?"
70%
"Are German provisions regarding data security 
relevant to your business today?"
60%
19. The managing founders of 77% of all selected firms believed the internet 
required international laws and controls, especially laws relating to digital 
signatures and encryption.
Table 27. Demand for international laws and controls regulating the internet. 
Percentage of all selected firms.*
All firms Software Portal
Value added tax 20% 15% 29%
Copyrights 57% 46% 64%
Trust centers for digital 
signatures and encryption
63% 62% 71%
Political or social 
undesirable content
0% 0% 0%
(* Multiple selections possible, this is why the percentages did not add up to 77%. 
77% was the proportion of all firms that believed international laws were necessary. 
The percentages should be read in the following way: 20% of all firms in the selected 
group indicated that value added tax regulation was necessary. NOT: 20% of the 77% 
who believed laws were necessary.)
20. The objective of most selected German internet firms was rapid growth and 
most of these firms believed this objective could only be achieved with venture 
capital and a later IPO. Portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups and business- 
to-business exchanges were, however, less inclined towards venture capital than 
software start-ups.
Table 28. Percentage of affirmative answers on questions regarding growth objective 
and financing.
All selected 
firms
Software Portal
Is rapid growth your objective? 87% 92% 86%
If so, do you believe rapid growth can only be 
achieved with venture capital and a possible later 
IPO?*
73% 83% 67%
Do you think your financing options have 
improved through the launch of the Neue Markt at
79% 85% 79%
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the German Stock Exchange and the better access
of venture capital in Germany?______________________________
(*Only firms that answered the previous question affirmatively.)
21. German internet start-ups were generally involved in strategic partnerships 
with other small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and those with business 
clients generated most of their income from SMEs as well.
Table 29. Break-up of revenue sources by client firm type (consumer firms did not 
answer this question).
All selected 
firms
Software Portal
Multinational enterprise (MNE) clients 29% 29% 24%
Small- and medium-sized (SME) clients 71% 71% 76%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Whereas the mean break-up between MNE and SME clients was 29%/71%, the 
median break-up was 20%/80%.
Of the 30 selected firm s, there were five with no MNE sales and one with no SME 
sales. 18 firms were relatively independent of MNE sales, with a proportion of MNE 
sales from 0% to 30%. Only three generated substantial sales proportions from MNEs, 
between 70%-100%. Seven firms generated significant sales to MNEs, between 31% 
to 69%.
Table 30. Percentage of affirmative answers on questions regarding partnerships.
All selected 
firms
Software Portal
Are you in a strategic partnership with a large 
firm/ MNE?
50% 69% 43%
Are you in a strategic partnership with SMEs? 83% 85% 79%
22. American software companies involved in the internet business were the most 
popular MNE partners of German internet start-ups, followed by Deutsche 
Telekom and Siemens Nixdorf.
Table 31. Existing strategic alliances with major corporations.
All selected 
firms
Deutsche Telekom 3
Siemens Nixdorf Informationssysteme 3
SAP 1
A German universal bank (Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank, 2
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Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank)
German public TV station (ARD, ZDF) 1
German private TV station (RTL, SAT1, PR07) 1
Java/ NC alliance (SUN, Netscape, Oracle) 4
Microsoft 5
Others 7
23. Distribution partnerships were the most frequent type of partnership for 
software start-ups. Portal sites, electronic commerce start-ups and business-to- 
business exchanges were not as active in partnering, some engaged in 
distribution, marketing and technology partnerships.
Table 32. Likelihood of selecting a given partnership
All firms Web
developers
All selected 
firms
Software Portals
Distribution 46% 42% 46% 61% 34%
Marketing 46% 49% 40% 43% 38%
Consulting 25% 32% 13% 17% 10%
Technology 54% 63% 42% 48% 38%
Outsourcing 13% 14% 8% 9% 7%
Financial 12% 9% 12% 22% 3%
Product
development
28% 30% 23% 26% 21%
Other 22% 26% 17% 13% 21%
24. Among the sample of 123 firms, the greatest likelihood for an internet firm's 
location was southern Bavaria (postal codes 80000-89999). The most important 
cluster for international activity was the greater Munich area (postal codes 
80000-83999 and 85000 to 85999). When firms with above average international 
activity were isolated, one fifth of these were located in the greater Munich area.
Table 33. Frequency of firms with given postal code.
Postal code Sample cities in area All selected 
firms
All firms (% 
of total)
Above
average
international
activity
index*
Above 
average int. 
activity 
index (%)
0-9999 Halle, Leipzig, Dresden 3 2% 1 4%
10000-19999 Berlin, Schwerin, Rostock 7 6% 1 4%
20000-29999 Hamburg, Bremen, Liibeck 17 14% 3 11%
30000-39999 Hannover, Kassel, Fulda 11 9% 4 14%
40000-49999 Diisseldorf, Essen, 
Osnabriick
14 11% 1 4%
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50000-59999 Mainz, Bonn, Koln 11 9% 3 11%
60000-69999 Frankfurt am Main, 
Wiesbaden, Heidelberg
18 15% 0 0%
70000-79999 Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, 
Konstanz
14 11% 5 18%
80000-89999# Munich, Ingolstadt, Ulm 21 17% 7 25%
90000-99999 Passau, Wurzburg, Erfurt 7 6% 3 11%
(* The mean o f a firm’s percentage international partnerships and clients/ consumers. 
If this mean was above 13% the firm was considered an internationally active firm.
13% was the mean of all firms where n=123.)
(#17 firms were located in the greater Munich area, carrying the postal coses 80000- 
83999 and 85000-85999. The area formed a triangle with the vertices at Garmisch- 
Patenkirchen, Rosenheim and Ingolstadt. 17 companies corresponded to 14% of the 
total. 6 scored above average on the international activity index. This meant that 21% 
of the firms with above avererage international activity were located in the greater 
Munich area.)
(The 14 venture capital-supported firms were found in 12 different cities. The only 
city that occured more than once was Munich. Four VC-supported firms were located 
in greater Munich area. Thus, about one fourth of all VC-supported firms were 
located in the Munich area.).
30 selected German internet start-ups
Table 34. Software start-ups
# Name Year Em
ploy
ees
City Product/ service description Partners/
clients
ECommerce systems
1. Shopmaker
GmbH
Deutschland
Electronic
Commerce
Solutions
http://www.sh
opmaker.de
97 23 Limburg Software for intemet-shops. Interfaced 
with SAP, Sage KAK, Oracle. SQL 
database system.
GEN (US 
Telecom.), 
GEFM 
(Deutsche 
Bank 
subsidiary 
),
Schopflin
(fashion
direct
retailer),
Sage
KAK,
SAP
2. USWeb
InnoMate
http://www.in
94 25 Diisseldor
f
Internet integrator with modular 
solutions for internet shopping and 
product databases.
Deutsche
Telekom,
Oracle,
IBM,
308
nomate.de
-
Compuser
ve
Publishing solutions
3. Hyperwave
http://www.hy
perwave.com
97 39 Munich Web-based knowledge management/ 
intranet development platform which 
combined web document and web 
content managment into an integrated 
and scalable system.
Motorola,
Siemens,
Lufthansa,
Deutsche
Bank
4. Systembureau
GmbH
http://www.sy
stemfabrik.de
96 14 Dusseldor
f
Publishing system for internet and 
intranets.
Bauboden
Bank
5. HFR Heiden 
Fuellenbach 
Realisationen
http://www.hf
r.de
94 12 Dusseldor
f
Project management and software 
solutions for cross-media-publishing 
and marketing needs. Combined 
internet, CD-Rom and print product 
catalogues. Close developmental 
partnership with Munich-based software 
company.
AIWA
Deutschla
nd GmbH,
3M/
Imation,
various
German
publishers
6. 2CK
http://www.2c
k.com
94 35 Munich Publishing system for use in intranets.
7. SAC
ProMedia
http://sac.pro
media.de
96 7 Regensbur
g
Cross-media publishing system. CD- 
ROMs in internet-standard which could 
be updated.
EBusiness software (Business processes)
8. Coin
Corporate
Interactive
AG
http://www.co
in.de
97 23 Hannover Internet-based system for workflow. 
Software solutions avaliable for 
publishers, insurance firms and other 
service corporations.
Hannoveri
sche
Lebensver
sicherung
9. Eway
http://www.e
way.de
96 5 Melle Web-based applications for the sales 
force. Web-based calendar.
10. ONEstone
http://www.on
estone.de
95 70 Paderbom Workflow systems integrated with the 
groupware platforms LotusNotes and 
MS-Exchange.
CSC
Ploenzke,
GIS
Langhage 
n, Dialog 
Switzerlan 
d
11. i-net software
http://www.in
etsoftware.de
96 13 Berlin Software for running a computer help 
desk over an intranet.
Microsoft,
GSW
Berlin
(Gemeinn
iitzige
309
Wohnungs
bauges.)
Financial software/ encryption
12. NetLife
http://www.ne
tlife.de
96 51 Hamburg On-line banking and ECommerce 
solutions (SET). Subsidiary in 
Singapore, sales offices in New York 
and Vienna.
Drei-
Banken-
EDV
Austria,
Postbank
AG, dvg
Hannover
(large
German IT
supplier)
EBusiness (Communication)
13. MSG Media 
Service
http://www.rn
edia-
service.group.
com
97 10 Oldenburg Developed a virtual web-based office 
for 'mobile professionals' called 
www.smartmessage.de. Another 
product was IntraSoft, an email 
workflow system for corporate feedback 
management. In addition, carried out 
project-based implementation services.
EWE
(local
electricity
provider),
Milagros
USA,
Hong
Kong
(Textiles
and
glasses),
mezzo.net,
Spain
Table 35. Portal sites and electronic commerce start-ups
Name Year Em
ploy
ees
City Product/ service description Partners/
clients
Sale of products (“e-tailers” and business-to-business procurement specialists)
1. Friedrich
Ingredients
http://gewuerz 
.de and 
http://www.in 
gredients.de
98 4 Konstanz Sale of food ingredients over the web. 
Managing founder had long export 
experience. Targeted Asia, South 
America and Eastern Europe.
Content
2. Localglobal
http://localglo
bal.de
97 17 Stuttgart Web-based content for SME exporters. 
Vitual trade fairs, calendar, articles. 
Editors based in Milano, Beijing and 
Poznan.
Deutsche 
Messe AG
3. PropackExpo
GmbH
http://www.pr
opackexpo.de
97 3 Karlsruhe A virtual trade fair including products, 
manufacturers, news and developments 
in the fields of processing and 
packaging technologies. Target group 
were the pharmaceutical, chemical, food 
and cosmetics industries.
Tellux
GmbH
4. OSM GmbH 97 4 Gleichen Compiled consumer information which Horizont,
310
http://www.on
linetest.de
could be sold to portal sites. Database 
technology centrally held information 
separate from the layout, which could 
be adjusted to the hosting site. Content 
on computer products and software was 
sold to 51 German language sites.
Chip, T-
Online,
Hoppenste
dt, Wer
liefert
Was?,
Weka
Verlag,
Bertelsma
nn
Hotel, travel
5. Serenata
http://www.se
renata.de
96 10 Munich Online reservation service for hotels 
that included software ’middleware' to 
link different front desk systems.
Hilton,
Hyatt,
Sheraton,
Steigenber
ger,
Intercontin 
ental and 
others.
6. Tiss
http://www.tis
s.com
95 3 Heilbronn Internet-based flight ticket service run 
through an international network of 
independent travel agencies.
Travelocit
y»
unnamed
German
media
corporatio
n
Extranet services/ E lH/B2I Exchanges
7. BPS
http://www.bp
s.de
97 12 Karlsruhe Ran a business-to-business (B2B) 
procurement platform for the fashion 
industry that linked producers with 
retailers in Germany and Europe.
Lee 
Cooper 
(UK jeans 
manufactu 
rer), 14 
German 
SMEs in 
the textile 
industry
8. Virtualheaven
http://underco
ver.virtualhea
ven.de:8080
97 9 Cologne Extranet for SME publishers. On the 
system, international licensing offers 
could be announced to members.
9. n:media
http://www.n
media.de
98 15 Dusseldor
f
B2B exchange linking manufacturers of 
PR articles and retailers using hybrid 
CD-ROM technologies. European focus 
with more than 50% foreign customers 
and a planned office in London.
Entertainment, games
10. NxN
http://www.nx
n.net
97 9 Munich Tools software to design computer 
games. The software allowed the design 
process to take place in a distributed 
environment by using the internet. The 
firm also hosted tool environments for 
game developers.
Unnamed 
major 
games and 
multimedi 
a
companies
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11. Entertaining
Interactive
Productions
(ESP)
http://www.ei
p.de
97 18 Altenholz Produced on-line and off-line 
entertainment applications. Launched a 
popular German lottery service on the 
internet (http7/www.jaxx.de/).
SAT.l TV
Community/ Chat
12. Medium.net
http://www.rn
edium.net
98 2 Leipzig Modular software for communities on 
the internet. Chat software was already 
being sold and a popular chat site was 
being hosted. Managing founders were 
16 and 17 years old.
UNICUM
(Intemet-
service for
students),
AIESEC,
Wirtschaft
smesse
Wien,
Radio
Bremen
13. 21TORR
http://2 ltorr.c 
om
94 36 Reutlinge
n
Ran a German-language internet 
community with more than 140.000 
participants. Users averaged 60 minutes 
per session. Banner advertising was 
avoided as a revenue stream, instead, 
companies could host events, 
promotions and chat channels. 
Managing founders called this approach 
"soft sponsoring." Expansion into 
Austria and Switzerland was planned. 
Partnership in France.
Levi's,
ZDF,
Havas,
Hewlett-
Packard
Brokers
14. Up2Day
Telekommuni
kation
http://www.ko
stenlos.de
96 14 Duisburg Hosted one of the most popular 
German-language classifieds service 
offers. Currently was developing a pay- 
for-view and search system for a major 
German publisher.
Unnamed
major
German
publisher
Table 36. Others
# Name Year Em
ploy
ees
City Product/ service description Partners/
clients
New media agencies
1. FORK
Unstable
Media
http://www.fo
rk.de
96 12 Hamburg New media agency with two American 
and one German managing founders. 
Planned expansion to New York.
Beiersdorf
, B&D
Verlag,
Kabel
New
Media
Consultants, training
2. InnoVatio 
Verlags AG/ 
Netz-
97 8 Leipzig Carried out on-line research for clients. 
Included regular reports as well as 
programmed alert mechanisms. Co-
Hoechst,
Mercedes-
Benz,
312
Informations-
Analyse
operations being formed with Ostavia, 
Berne, Dover and Vancouver.
Nestte
http://www.ne
tz-analysen.de
Hardware for access
3. Tixi.com
http://Tixi.co
m
96 20 Berlin Development of the Tixi-box, which 
was an autonomous modem-device that 
was able to receive emails from the 
provider and store them without the 
computer being on. Targets were SMEs 
that needed to answer email requests but 
did not want to invest in an expensive 
router infrastructure.
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v Einleitung
globalstartup ist der Name einer Studie, die in Zusammenarbeit mit der London School of Economics 
(LSE) und dem manager magazin durchgefuhrt wird. Ziel ist es, junge Untemehmen in Deutschland 
zu identifizieren, die Produkte und Dienstleistungen rund um das Internet entwickeln und deren 
Geschaftsmodell und Strategic nicht an nationalen Grenzen halt macht.
Wer sind diese Startups? Worauf spezialisieren sie sich? Wieviele Mitarbeiter beschaftigen sie? Wie 
sind sie organisiert? Welche Wachstumsperspektiven haben sie? Wie international ist ihr Geschaft? 
Wie finanzieren sie sich? Woher kommen die Griinder? Wohin wollen sie? Und welche Htirden 
miissen sie im Untemehmensalltag uberwinden?
Um diese und andere Fragen, vor allem in qualitativer Hinsicht, geht es in der Untersuchung, die fur 
das Fruhjahr 1998 geplant ist. Um die noch junge Branche moglichst exakt beschreiben zu konnen, 
sind Besuche bei den Untemehmen und Interviews mit den Grtindem und Geschaftsfuhrem 
vorgesehen.
r  Veroffentlichung im manager magazin
Nach AbschluB der Erhebung stehen die Untersuchungsergebnisse dem manager magazin zur 
Verfugung, das als Medienpartner einen Bericht tiber Fallbeispiele erfolgreicher Geschaftsmodelle 
veroffentlicht. Voraussichtlicher Erscheinungstermin ist Sommer 1998.
Auf Wunsch werden die Angaben selbstverstandlich auch anonym behandelt.
r Teilnahmebedingungen und Formblatt
Teilnehmen konnen alle Untemehmen, die...
• ihren Hauptsitz in Deutschland haben,
• in den vergangenen zwei Jahren gegriindet wurden (bzw. in den letzten zwei Jahren ihre 
Geschaftsaktivitaten neu ausgerichtet haben) oder unter 50 Mitarbeiter haben,
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• international ausgerichtet sind und global denken,
• Produkte oder Dienstleistungen mit direktem Bezug zum Internet oder anderen 
netzwerkbasierten Mehrwertdiensten anbieten (z.B. Interaetsoftware, Inhalte- und 
Informationsanbieter, Online-Handel).
Falls Ihr Untemehmen diese Bedingungen erfullt, nehmen Sie sich bitte ein paar Minuten Zeit, um 
dieses www-FormblaU auszufullen. Nur so konnen m r Sie in dieAuswahl der 100 deutschen Global 
Startups aufnehmen. Die Anmeldefrist endet am 15.03.1998.
r  Vorgehensweise
Nach Absenden des www-Fonribtaites sind Sie bei uns als Teilnehmer registiert. Ende Marz rufen wir 
Sie ggf. an, um einen kurzen Gesprachstermin zu vereinbaren. Es entstehen keine Verpfiichtungen; 
das Interview findet selbstverstandlich nur statt, falls Sie Zeit und Lust haben. Das Gesprach dient 
dazu, mehr iiber Ihr Untemehmen und Ihre Intemet-Strategie zu erfahren.
Die Ergebnisse der Gesprache werden in Zusammenarbeit mit dem zustandigen Redaktuer von 
manager magazin ausgewertet. Voraussichtlicher Erscheinungstermin vom mm-Report zum Thema 
ist Sommer 1998.
Bei Fragen konnen Sie sich an den Projektleiter der Studie wenden:
Niko Waesche 
Research Scholar 
International Political Economy 
International Relations
London School of Economics and Political Science 
t: +44 171460 1761 
f: +44 171 589 4382
info@global8tartop.com
r  Hintergrund
Die Studie ist Teil des globalstartup-Projektes an der London School of Economics. Dieses 
langjahrige Forschungsprojekt untersucht die wirtschaftlichen, techno logischen und politischen 
Rahmenbedingungen fur Untemehmensgriindungen in verschiedenen europaischen Landem. Kleine 
Untemehmen stehen im Zentrum des Vorhabens, weil sie heute durch das Internet schneller und 
leichter global prasent sein konnen als je zuvor.
Niko Waesche ist Research Scholar (Doktorand) an der London School of Economics im Fachgebiet 
International Political Economy/ International Relations. Vor dieser Tatigkeit arbeitete der 
Werbekaufmann an Internet, Intranet und Extranet Projekten bei Hoechst International Services 
GmbH (HiServ), Frankfurt am Main, sowie der Privatbank Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie., KoIn. Er berat 
auBerdem die Frankfurter Design-Agentur surface Weisbeck Glauninger Vitt GmbH.
r  Rechtliche Aspekte
• Bei der Studie handelt es sich um ein wissenschaftliches Forschungsprojekt im Rahmen einer 
Dissertation an der London School of Economics and Political Science (International Relations 
Department- International Political Economy).
• Aus der Teilnahme leiten sich keinerlei Anspriiche gegen den Leiter (Niko Waesche) oder den 
Medienpartner (manager magazin) ab.
• Die Studienergebnisse werden nach Auswertung exklusiv dem manager magazin zur Verfugung 
gestellt.
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v  Global Startup: Teilnahmeformular
Falls Ihr Untemehmen an der Studie teilnehmen soli, fullen Sie bitte dieses Formular aus und senden 
Sie es ab. Sie werden dann vom Projektleiter innerhalb von drei Arbeitstagen per Email kontaktiert. 
Vielen Dank fur Ihren Zeitaufwand!
Organisation! |
Rechtsformil
Adresseil
Stadt _______________ 1
: • VvwwvwvvvwvvvvvwvwvvvvvvvwvvwvvwwwwwvvvwvvwvvvvvvvvvwvvvvvvwvvvvvwvwvvwvwvwvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvC
Postleitzahlii
Website Hi h ttp : 
Ansprechpartneri 
Email!
VkWkVWVWWWWMW
□
Telefon
Ab sender dieses!! 
Formuiars!!; 
(Falls nichtib 
Ansprechpartner)!!
WmVkVVVVVAAVAMWAW
MIWWVVWVWtMMWMMMM9
I ! W.SV.V.VA-.V.Y.WA'W.WAV***
Griindungsjahrl 1998 \w\
! Anzahl feste Mitarbeiter!!
(Inland)!!E H
Anzahl freie Mitarbeiter;!
(Inland)!!
Anzahl Mitarbeiter im!!
Ausland!
Produkttypen/i! O  connectivity - Internet/ Mobiltelefon 
(Keine eineoder^ ^  connectivity - Internet/ sonstige
‘! IT elekommunikationmehrere!
Optionen moglich.)!! Q  connectivity - Internet/ TV
!| □  connectivity - Internet/ PDAs 
!! O  connectivity - Internet/ Datenbanken
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SPIEGEL ONLINE - Netscape
Global Start-Up
Wer sind die innovativsten und interessantesten 
Internet-Unternehmen in Deutschland?
U m  diese Frage geht es  in einem Forschungsprojekt der London 
School of Economics, das im Fruhjahr durchgefuhrt und von manai 
magazin und SPIEGEL ONLINE unterstutzt wird. Firmen, die 
Produkte oder Dienstleistungen rund urn das Internet anbieten und 
noch zu den Newcomern auf diesem wachstumsstarken Markt 
zahlen, konnen sich an der Studie beteiligen. Projektleiter Niko
http: //www. spiegel. de/werbung/homepage. html
SCHON MAI 
WAS VON
Appendix B: Interviews
Interviews with representatives of private enterprises
l& l Internet GmbH (Eigendorfer StraBe 57, 56410 Montabaur)
20.03.98, 11:00-12:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 6
With Anastasia Antoniadou, Dipl.-Betriebswirt (FH).
l& l Multimedia Service GmbH (Multimedia-Intemet-Park, Gebaude 71, 66482 
ZweibrUcken)
20.03.98, 12:00-12:30 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 6 
With Frank Ufer, Consultant.
2CK Gesellschaft fur DV-Dienstleistungen mbH (Kirchtruderinger StraBe 22, 
81829 Munchen)
21.03.98,13:00-14:00
CeBIT, Hannover, Tagungscentrum Messe (TCM)
With Christian Koch, Dipl.-Infom. (FH), Managing Director, and Christoph 
Koberle, Dipl.-Infom. (FH), Managing Director.
21Torr (ChristophstraBe 31, 72760 Reutlingen)
19.03.98, 16:00-17:00 
Halle 1, CeBIT, Hannover
With Martin Cserba, Managing Director, Marketing and Sales.
Atlas Venture
16.07.97, 09:00-10:30
Office of Atlas Venture, SteinstraBe 70, 81667 Munchen 
With Ingo Johannsen, Partner.
Blome + Partner Managementberatung fur Vertrieb + EDV (Wemer-von- 
Siemens-StraBe 19,49124 Georgsmarienhutte)
20.03.98, 14:00-15:00
Tagungscentrum Messe (TCM), CeBIT, Hannover 
With Frank F. Blome, Managing Director.
BPS Online-Bestellsysteme GmbH (GreschbachstraBe 3B, 76229 Karlsruhe)
23.03.98, 13:00-14:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 1
With Diana Schulirsch, Dipl.-Wi.-Ingenieur, Project Head, Member of 
Management.
Brokat Informationssysteme GmbH (IndustriestraBe 3, 70565 Stuttgart)
22.03.98, 17:00-18:00 
CeBIT, Halle 18, Hannover
With Dr. Boris Anderer, Managing Partner.
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Callisto Germany.net GmbH (Stresemannallee 30, 60586 Frankfurt am Main)
13.07.99, 11:00-12:00
Interview in company offices
With Stefan Kiihler, Presse- und Offentlichkeitsarbeit
COIN Corporate Interactive AG (Gottinger Chaussee 115, 30459 Hannover)
23.03.98, 12:00-13:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 1
With Arvin Arora, Executive Board and Hartmut Poppinga, Head of Marketing.
DeTeCSM (PfnorstraBe 1, 64293 Darmstadt)
09.07.99, 12:00-14:30 
Interview in company offices
With Dr. Hartmut Wittig, Dir. Corp. Strategy
ESD Information Technology Entwicklungs GmbH (RingstraBe 33, 04430 
Dolzig/ Leipzig)
12.04.98, 10:00-11:15
At London Office, 35A Smith Street, London SW3 4EP
With Rembert von Meysenbug, Head Multimedia Division (based in Leipzig),
and Nicolas J. Ziegler, Representative UK.
GFT Informationssysteme Gmbh & Co. KG (LeopoldstraBe 1, 78112 St. 
Georgen)
19.03.98, 13:00-14:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 3
Gesprach mit Ulrich Dietz, Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Managing Partner.
Hyperwave Information Management GmbH (Stefan-George-Ring 19, 81929 
Munchen)
21.03.98, 10:00-11:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 6
With Georg Thamer, Head of Sales and Marketing.
i-net Software GmbH (FriedrichstraBe 231, 10969 Berlin)
24.03.98,11:00-12:00
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 2
With Torsten Klose, Dipl.-Ing., Managing Director.
iNETiative Venture Capital Neue Medien GmbH & Co. KG
16.03.98, 12:00-13.30
Office of iNETiative, KaistraBe 14,40221 Dusseldorf
With Mirko Jovanovski, Investment Manager, iNETiative, Niklas Mahrdt,
iNETiative and Oliver Gardey, Smedvig Capital, London.
iNETiative Venture Capital Neue Medien GmbH & Co. KG
16.04.98, 17:15-19.30
Office of iNETiative, KaistraBe 14, 40221 Dusseldorf
With Mirko Jovanovski, Investment Manager, and Niklas Mahrdt.
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Intershop Communications
20.02.98, 18:30- 19:50
Office of Intershop Communications (UK) Ltd., Hygeia Building, 66 College 
Road, Harrow, Middlesex, HA1 1FD
With Wilfried Beeck, Managing Director Europe and Nicole Fischer, Director 
of Strategic Alliances, Europe (both based in Hamburg).
iXOS Software AG (Technopark Neukeferloh, Bretonischer Ring 12, 85630 
Grasbrun/ Munchen)
19.03.98,11:00-12:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 2
With Eberhard Farber, Dipl.-Kfm., Speaker of the Executive Board.
Lars Heiden Jorg Ftillenbach Realisationen (HFR)
04.03.98, 18:00-19:30
Office of HFR, Gerresheimer StraBe 22-24,40211 Dusseldorf 
With Lars Heiden and Jorg Ftillenbach, Founding Managers.
living systems AG (Roggenbachstrasse 1, 78050 VS-Villingen)
18.04.99, 20:00-20:30
Interview in Queen's Arms pub, Queen's Gate Mews, London SW7 
With Kurt Kammerer, Vorstand Consulting
local global, Magazin ftir AuBenwirtschaft (RotebtihlstraBe 154, 70197 
Stuttgart)
19.03.98, 14:00-15:00
TCM (Tagungszentrum Messe), CeBIT, Hannover 
With Hans Gang, Publisher.
Lucent Technologies Business Communications Systems & Microelectronics 
GmbH (Bramfelder StraBe 121, 22305 Hamburg)
Lucent Technologies Network Systems GmbH (In der Raste 26, 53129 Bonn)
24.03.98, 14:00-15:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 16
With Michael Grtin, Manager Business Management, Business 
Communications Systems (based in Hamburg) and Harald Kettenbach, Public 
Relations Manager, Corporate Communications (based in Bonn).
Medium.net (DinterstraBe 13, 04157 Leipzig)
22.03.98, 13:00-14:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 22
With Xuan Baldauf und David Uhlmann, Founders.
Microsoft GmbH (EdisonstraBe 1, 85716 UnterschleiBheim)
24.03.98, 10:00-11:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 2
With Thomas Baumgartner, Press Liason Intemet& Tools.
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MobilCom Aktiengesellschaft (Postfach 520,24753 Rendsburg -  Budelsdorf)
13.09.99, 09:00-09:20 
Telephone interview
With Stefan Arlt, Press Speaker
Nacamar Data Communications GmbH (Robert-Bosch-StraBe 32, 63303 
Dreieich)
12.07.99, 10:00-11:00 
Interview in company offices
With Michael Wirsik, Marketing Manager
Netlife Internet Consulting und Software GmbH (Elbberg 1,22767 Hamburg)
23.03.98, 14:30-15:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 18
With Claus Muller, Managing Partner.
Netlife Internet Consulting und Software GmbH (Elbberg 1, 22767 Hamburg)
23.03.98, 14:00-14:30 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 18
With Andreas Schlichtmann, Head of Marketing.
NETCOLOGNE Gesellschaft fur Telekommunikation mbH (Maarwegcenter, 
Maarweg 163, 50825 Koln Braunsfeld)
30.04.99, 09:00-09:30
Telephone interview London -  Cologne 
With Werner Hanf, Managing Director
NetPartners Venture Capital, Milano
14.04.98, 17:45-18:15 
Telephone London/ Milano
With Michelle Appendino, Managing Partner.
ONEstone Information Technologies GmbH (RiemekestraBe 160, 33106 
Paderbom)
24.03.98,12:00-13:00
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 2
With Oliver Heinz, Managing Director.
Online Marketing und Vertriebs GmbH (Im Ddrmke 8, 37130 Gleichen/ Klein 
Lengden)
20.03.98, 15:00-16:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 6
With Hartmut Stopler, Managing Director.
ShopMaker GmbH Landesvertretung Deutschland (Justus-Staudt-Strafte 2, D 
65555 Limburg)
19.03.98, 09:30-10:30 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 6
With Dr. rer. oec. Luigi Carlo De Micco, Founding Manager.
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Tixi.Com GmbH (Karmeliter Weg 114, 13465 Berlin Frohnau)
23.03.98, 9:15-10:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 6
With Simon Verdenhalven, Sales & Marketing.
TPS Labs AG (BalanstraBe 49, 81541 Munchen)
27.02.98, 09:00- 10:30
Regents Park Marriot, 128 King Henry’s Road, NW3 3 ST
With Michael Wenglein, Sales & Marketing Analyst and Marc Philipp
Gosswein, Sales & Marketing Analyst (both based in Munich).
TVM Techno Venture Management GmbH & Co. KG
16.07.97, 15:00-16:00
Office of TVM Techno Venture Management, Tolzer StraBe 12A, 82031 
Griinwald
With Peter Kaleschke, Managing Partner.
US Web InnoMate
16.06.98, 10:00-12:00
Office of US Web InnoMate, HallbergstraBe 28, 40239 Dusseldorf 
With Oliver Hock, Managing Director, Birgit Merz, Marketing, and Jochen 
Rieker, Redakteur, Manager Magazin.
USWeb InnoMate (HallbergstraBe 28, 40239 Dusseldorf)
24.03.98, 13:00-14:00 
CeBIT, Hannover, Halle 18
With Kai Petersen, Dipl.-Informatiker, Managing Director.
Verteilte Systeme, Universitat Stuttgart, Institut fur Parallele und Verteilte 
Hochleistungsrechner (IPVR) (BreitwiesenstraBe 20-22, 750565 Stuttgart)
20.03.98, 13:00-14:00 
CeBIT Hannover, Halle 22 
With Dipl.-Inform. Hartmut Benz.
Webplanet Corporation (Ostring 7e, 85630 Grasbrun)
23.03.98, 18:00-19:00
CeBIT, Hannover, Tagungscentrum Messe (TCM)
With Dieter E. Hesse, CEO & President.
Interviews with parliamentarians, their staff, government officials and 
representatives of private/ public institutions
Georg M. Brohl, Ministerialrat, Medienrecht 
Dr. Alexander Tettenborn, Oberregierungsrat, Medienrecht 
Anton-Josef Cremer, Referent, Medienrecht
10.05.99, 15:00-15:50
Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Technologie, Haus VI, Villemombler 
StraBe 76, 53123 Bonn
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Dr. Manuel Kiper, former MdB (Biindnis 90/ Die Griinen)
31.05.99,9:30-9:45
Via telephone London -  Oldenburg
Dr. Marianne Kulicke, Deputy Head, Department Innovation Services and 
Regional Development, Gerhard Samulat, Public Relations (with) Jochen 
Rieker, Editor, Manager Magazin
Fraunhofer-Institut fur Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung (ISI) (Institute 
Systems and Innovation Research)
24.06.98,10:30-12:00
Fraunhofer-Institut fur Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung (ISI), 
Breslauer StraBe 48, 76139 Karlsruhe
Kilian Lenard, Speaker
European Net Economy Forum (ENEF), Kurfurstendamm 132a, 10711 Berlin
15.08.99,9:00-9:15
Via telephone Munich - Berlin
Dr. Hans-Peter Lorenzen, Ministerialrat, Unterabteilungsleiter 6A 
Kathrin Meyer, Referat 6A 5
11.05.99, 10:30-11:30 Uhr
Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Technologie, Haus VI, Villemombler 
StraBe 76, 53123 Bonn
Harald Lux, Consultant and freelance journalist
Nettraffic.de ISP Watch, Heinen & Lux GbR (Sandkaule 5-7, 53111 Bonn)
10.07.99,11:30-14:30
Summer lunch in a restaurant on the Rhine
Dr. Martin Mayer (Siegertsbrunn) MdB (CSU)
23.04.99,13:00-13:30 
Via telephone London - Bonn
Dr. Michael Meister, MdB (CDU)
22.03.99, 15:00-16:00 
Bundeshaus, 53113 Bonn
Siegmar Mosdorf, Parlamentarischer Staatssekretar, MdB (SPD)
Andreas Schaal, Personlicher Referent des Parlamentarischen Staatssekretars 
Kathrin Meyer, Referat 6A 5 
10.05.99,13:00-13:45
Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft und Technologie, Villemombler StraBe 76, 
53123 Bonn
Lutz Reulecke, Medienpolitischer Mitarbeiter, (FDP)
25.03.99, 17:15-18:15 
Bundeshaus, 53113 Bonn
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Jorg Tauss, MdB (SPD)
25.03.99, 16:15-17:00 
Bundeshaus, 53113 Bonn
VATM, Verband der Anbieter von Telekommunikations- und 
Mehrwertdiensten e.V. (Oberlander Ufer 180-182, 50968 Koln) 
15:00-16:00, 14.07.99 
Interview in offices of the association
With Jurgen Grutzner, Stellvertretender Geschaftsfuhrer, and Eva-Maria 
Schreiter, Referentin fUr Presse- und Offentlichkeitsarbeit
International interview partners
Ola Ahlvarsson, CEO
Result Ventures Knowledge (Peter Myndes Backe 12, 118 46 Stockholm, 
Sweden)
18.10.99, 12:00- 12:45 
Telephone interview
Nils Gunnar Billinger, Head
Post and Telecommunications Authority (P.O. 5398,10249 Stockholm, 
Sweden)
21.12.99, 11:00-11:30 
Telephone interview
Klaas de Boer, Former Investment Director
Vannenberg Group in Putten, The Netherlands (now independent start-up 
consultant living in London, W8)
14.10.99, 11:15-11:45 
Telephone interview
Benoist Grossmann, Partner
Viventures Partners SA, (Tour Sequia 1, Place Carpeaux, 92915 Paris La 
Defense, France)
08.10.99,18:00-18:30 
Telephone interview
Roel de Hoop, Founder
Hot-Orange.com, (Stephensonstraat 19,1097, Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
26.10.99
Email interview
Johan Jorgensen, COO
Municel (c/o Result Venture Knowledge, Peter Myndes Backe 12, 118 46 
Stockholm, Sweden)
11.10.99,11:00-11:30 
Telephone interview
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Par-Jorgen Parson, CEO
Cell Ventures AB (Hightechbuilding 111,101 52 Stockholm, Sweden)
02.12.99, 15:45-16:15 
Telephone interview
Tony Salter, CEO
Boxman AB (Innovation Centre, 68 Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RX, 
UK)
03.12.99, 11:00-11:15 
Telephone interview
Marc Simoncini, PDG
Opsion Innovacion/ iFrance (Boulogne Billancourt 92100, France)
06.11.99 
Email interview
Kjell Spangberg
Swedish private investor living in San Francisco
17.11.99, 17:00- 17:30 
Telephone interview
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Appendix C: Selected financial figures for international telecommunications operators
Table 1. Selected financial figures for international telecommunications companies in the year 1998*
Net revenue 
US$ million
Net income 
(loss) US$ 
million
Net income 
as percentage 
of net 
revenue
Shareholder 
equity US$ 
million
Return on 
equity (on 
the basis of 
net income)
Year-end 
share price 
US$
Number of 
shares issued 
(million)
Basic 
earnings 
(loss) per 
share
Market 
capitalisation 
US$ million
European Te ecommunications Operators
Deutsche
Telekom
(DT)
39,126 2,493 6.3% 27,853 9.0% 31 2,743 0.91 85,582
France
Telecom
(FTE)
27,359 2,553 9.3% 18,860 13.5% 70 1,025 2.49 71,750
Mannesmann 21,142 699 3.3% 7,060 9.9% 109 390 1.79 42,666
Royal KPN 
N.V.
8,926 763 8.5% 6,565 11,6% 47 473 1.61 22,373
Telia Group 6,381 559 8.8% 3,438 16.3%
US Telecommunications Operators
AT&T (T) 53,223 6,398 12% 25,522 25.0% 76 1,784 3.59 135,227
Sprint
Corporation+
17,134 #853 5.0% 12,448 6.9% 95 431 1.98 40,945
US Telecommunications/ Cable Entrants
MCI
WorldCom
(WCOM)
17,678 #-2,571 45,003 72 1,274 -2.02 91,728
* Based on Annual Reports. Share prices were not always contained in the Annual Reports. In these cases, year-end share prices were estimated. Exchange rates used 
were 1.76 DM per US$ (Deutsche Telekom), 1.11 US$ per 1 Euro (Mannesmann, Royal KPN and France Telecom) and 8.03 SEK (Swedish Krona) per 1 US$ 
(Telia).
+ Sprint Corporation acquired 100% ownership o f the wireless operator PCS and split its stock into Sprint FON and Sprint PCS. These figures represent the combined 
group.
Qwest
Communicati 
ons (QWST)
2,243 -844 4,238
'
25 278 -3.02 6,975
IXC
Comminicati 
ons (IIXC)
668 #-221 35 36 -6.15 1,260
Level 3 
Communicati 
ons (LVLT)
392 §-128 2,165 42 302 -0.43 12,684
@Home
Network
(ATHM)
48 -144.18 494 40 114.24 -1.26 4,560
# NOTE: These figures are recalculated to be applicable to common shareholders. 
§ NOTE: This income figure is based on operating income.
Table 2. Market capitalisation o f selected firms as o f 25.08.991
Ticker Share 
price in 
US$
Number 
of shares 
(million)
Market 
capitalisa 
tion US$ 
million
DT 43 2,994 128,742
FTE 78 1,025 79,950
T 48 3,196 153,408
WCOM 80 1,861 148,880
FON 45 868 39,060
QWST 29 746 21,634
IIXC 36 37 1,332
LVLT 63 340 21,420
ATHM 42 368 15,456
In addition: Mannesmann had a capitalisation of US$ 63,836 million and Royal KPN of US$ 22,933 million. As with the original table, a uniform 
exchange rate of 1.11 US$ = 1 Euro was used.
1 For ticker symbols, please refer to Table 1 in this Appendix.
Table 3. Market capitalisation as multiples of net revenues 1998 and market capitalisation growth of selected telecommunications and cable 
companies.2
Market cap 
multiple 1998
Growth of 
market cap 
12.98 to 08.99
European Operators
Deutsche Telekom 2.19 +50%
France T616com 2.63 +11%
Mannesmann 2.02 +50%
Royal KPN 2.51 +3%
U.S. Telecommunications Operators
AT&T 2.54 +13%
Sprint 2.39 -5% #
U.S. Telecom and Cable Entrants
MCI WorldCom 5.19 +62%
Qwest 3.11 +210%
IXC 1.89 +6%
Level 3 32.36 +69%
(2}Home 95.00 +239%
# Due to a stock split into Sprint FON and Sprint PCS.
2 Please refer to Table 1 o f this Appendix for details on the figures. Market capitalisation multiples are market capitalisation in US$ at year-end 1998 divided by net 
income for 1998 in US$. Growth in market capitalisation is relative to values as o f 25.08.99.
Appendix D: Internet advertising expenditures and the number of internet 
users by country1
1996 1997 1998 1999 (Estimate)
USA Spend USD 267 M (LAB/ 
Coopers & 
Lybrand);
USD 236 M 
(Cowles/ Simba)
USD 907 M (LAB/ 
Coopers & 
Lybrand);
USD 597 M 
(Cowles/ Simba)
USD 1,920 M 
(IAB/ PWC)
USD 3,000 M 
(IAB/ PWC, based 
on 1st Quarter)
Users 40 M
(FIND/SVP)2
62 M (Intelligest) 79 M
(CommerceNet/
Nielsen)
109 M (Nielsen// 
NetRatings)
Germany Spend DM 6 M (G+J 
EMS)
DM 24 M (G+J 
EMS)
DM 50 M (G+J 
EMS);
USD 27 M 
(Prognos, ZAW)
DM 1 SOM (G+J, 
EMS); USD 82 M 
(Prognos)
Users 2.8 M (Computer 
Industry Almanac)
5.5 M (EDC) 6.9 M (G+J EMS) 9.9 M (G+J EMS, 
4th Wave)
France Spend USD 6.7 M 
(Havas);
FF 30 M (IAB/ 
PWC)
USD 13.5 M 
(Havas);
FF 80 M (France 
Pub);
FF 113 M (LAB/ 
PWC)
Between FF 160 
M and FF 240 M3
Users4 0.8 M (Computer 
Industry Almanac)
1.3 M (Computer 
Industry Almanac)
2.5 M
(Mediangles)
6.2 M
(Mediangels)
Nether­
lands
Spend USD 1 M (Jupiter) Dfl 6 M (Media 
Plaza)
Dfl 18 M (Media 
Plaza)
Dfl 30 M (Media 
Plaza)
Users 0.7 M (Computer 
Industry Almanac)
1.0 M (Computer 
Industry Almanac)
1.4 M (Computer 
Industry Almanac)
2.3 M (Pro Active)
Sweden Spend - SEK 61 M (IRM) SEK 207 (IRM) SEK 408 M (IRM)
Users 1.1 M (Computer 
Industry Almanac)
1.8 M (Computer 
Industry Almanac)
2.4 M (Sifo 
Interactive Media)
3.2 M (Sifo 
Interactive Media)
1 Advertising expenditure estimates were obtained from the following sources on the internet: Internet 
Advertising Bureau (http://www.iab.net/), Cowles/ Simba Information (http://www.simbanet.com/). 
Nielsen// NetRatings (http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/). G+J Electronic Media Service 
(http://www.ems.gui.de/). Media Plaza (http://www.mediaplaza.nl/). IRM Institutet fbr Reklam & 
Mediestatistik (http://www.irm-media.se/). Internet user numbers have been compiled from different 
sources by Nua Ltd. Online Relationship Management, "How many online?" Dublin and can be 
accessed on http://www.nua.net/. To complement these figures, Computer Industry Almanac estimates 
were used, these Eire quoted in Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 1999, 248 - 250. The following web sites 
were also consulted: Nielsen// NetRatings (http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/). Sifo interactive Media 
(http://www.sifointeractive.com/), For French statistics, see also http://www.joumaldunet.com/.
2 Early internet user figures are generally very inaccurate in all countries, because they were often not 
based on representative surveys, but on internet host counts (it is impossible to accurately say how 
many internet users access a given host computer). The added difficulty faced here is that often only 
one figure in each country is available for a whole year, and the month these numbers were estimated 
are not uniform. Given the rapid growth o f the internet, it can make a great difference whether 
indicators from the beginning or the end o f the year are taken. The early US data actually was released 
early in the next year instead o f  the year indicated. To obtain the figures used in this table, several 
different sources were consulted and the numbers that matched most closely with the different 
estimates were used.
3 Unofficial estimate o f Thierry Noisette, journalist and Internet Analyst. Email sent to author on 
30.09.99. See: http://www.strategie-intemet.com/. http://www.joumaldunet.com/.
4 Does not include Minitel users.
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